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The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I traces the history of Council 
housing from the nineteenth century to the present day, showing the influences in 
building and management that have produced poor, run-down publicly owned housing 
estates. Octavia Hill, the ardent reformer, developed a system of intensive, 
localised management, coupling slow renovation of the worst slum housing with 
social support for the most disadvantaged households. Local authorities failed to 
copy her approach while wanting to combat slums. They built for secure, working 
-" families and built large, dense blocks of flats, often displacing the very poor. 
General housing subsidies were introduced in a big building spurt after World War I, 
and in 1930 these subsidies--were targetted at slum clearance, relief o4 overcrowding 
and the construction of flats in inner cities. Local authorities were expanding 
rapidly and private landlords declined. After World War 11 the mass housing era 
began and about four million homes were built by Councils over 30 years. Half 
were industrially built or in the form of-flats, both unpopular styles. Most were 
in cities on large estates. Management problems developed apace, with poor staff 
training and little political will to provide meticulous landlord services. 
Lettings policies concentrated the poorest families on the least popular estates. 
, Homelessness increased in spite of evidence of a crude housing surplus. The 
gap between the Council sector and the owner-occupied sector grew in socio-economic 
terms. 
Part 11 examines the detailed evidence of the Government and local authorities 
illustrating the emergence of difficult to let estates as a major housing problen. 
Councils were already seriously concerned in the late 1960's. Difficult-to-let 
estates were first recognised officially in 1974 by the Government. The over- 
whelming evidence provoked the Government into a major new housing initiative in 
1979, the Priority Estates Project. 
Part III present the conditions on 20 unpopular estates around the country, and 
the efforts of the local authorities concerned to tackle the problems through 
local estate-based initiatives. 
Overall; the conclusion is that major advances can be made through an integrated 
localised approach, although the future role of elected political bodies as major . landlords of predominantly poor communities must be questioned. Autonomous . local management organisations, better training and more socially mixed estate 
communities are found to be ways forward- . 
NOTE ON THE AREA OF THE U. K. COVERED IN THE STUDY 
The information in the study from DoE sources covers England, as does the Priority 
Estates Project survey. Some examples from Wales and Scotland are explicitly 
mentioned. 
The other major source, the Housing Policy Green Paper, covers England and Wales. - The studies by David Donnison, Clare Ungerson and Patrick Dunleavy, which provide 
further general statistics', cover Britain as a whole. 
2 
CONTENTS 
PAGE 
LIST OF TABLES AND DIAGRAMS 3 
INTRODUCTION 6 
CHAPTER I Nineteenth century origins of the landlord 
CHAPTER II 
CHAPTER III 
CHAPTER IV 
CHAPTER V 
CHAPTER VI 
CHAPTER VII 
CHAPTER VIII 
CHAPTER IX 
CHAPTER X 
CHAPTER XI 
CHAPTER XII 
' CHAPTER XIII 
CHAPTER XIV 
CHAPTER XV 
CHAPTER XVI 
APPENDIX 
tradition 1U 
The interwar years 49 
Post-war housing - the mass council boom 86 
The emergence'of housing departments 133 
Post-war allocation policies 180 
The threads of deprivation in the council 
sector 228 
Analysing difficult-to-let estates - the 
Government's figures 253 
The worst estates -a survey ZVb 
The management of unpopular estates - empty 
property and lettings problems 343 
Problems of repairs, rents, cleansing and 
caretaking 372 
Local offices on unpopular estates 407 
Improvements to the estate and its 
environment with the help of residents 424 
The hard core of management 451 
The local authority investment in local 484 management 
Changing the social dynamics 499 
Conclusion -. the way forward 512 
Illustrations of the estates in the study 537 
EF) ºb1 1a4ýcc? y 
3 
LIST OF TABLES AND DIAGRAMS 0 
1. 'Distribution of housing stock by tenure 
2. Public sector new building as a percentage of total 
3. Ownership of housing 1938 and 1960 
4. Percentage of Local Authority dwellings built as flats 
5. Proportional cost of building flats compared with houses 
6. Types of Local Authority dwellings 
7. Proportions of-new construction by value in contract 
value ranges 
8. Table and diagram showing Decline in city population and 
increase in national population 
9. Council house building and slum clearance 
10. Percentages of houses and flats 
11. Mismatch between size of dwellings and size of households 
in Local Authority stock 
12. Densities 
13 Percentage of households over 1.5 persons per room 
14. Shared dwellings 
15. Sharing households 
16. Percentage of vacant dwellings 
17. Concealed households 
18. No. of households without bath 
19. Housing Conditions 
20. Dwellings and households 
21. Diagram showing peak of Council activity in public sector 
building, flat-building and high-rise building 
22. Ownership of housing 
23. The stock of dwellings by tenure 
24 Table showing the number of Local Authorities out of 57 
where the Housing Manager performed each function 
25. City of Bristol Housing Department 
26. District Council 
27. Metropolitan District Council 
28. Trend in attitudes to renting and owner-occupying shown 
through four-opinion surveys 
29. Changes in tenure by socio-economic group 
30. Income gap between Council tenants and owner occupiers 
31. - -Household Income 
32. Numbers of. people receiving supplementary benefit and as 
a percentage of all people in that tenure 
4 
33. Density 
34. Date of construction of difficult-to-let dwellings in 
England and Wales in 1974 
35. No. of difficult-to-let dwellings in metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan districts by building type 
36. Table showing distribution of difficult-to-let dwellings 
by date of construction and style of construction 
37. Total of difficult-to-let dwellings at different 
densities 
38. -Difficult-to-let dwellings by building types and 
bedroom size 
39. Reasons held by housing managers to be very important 
in unpopularity 
40. Table showing the breakdown by period for reasons of 
unpopularity 
41. Table showing main reasons for an estate's unpopularity 
by period of construction 
42. Difficult-to-let dwellings in England 
143. Table showing changes in the proportion of difficult-to- 
let dwellings by region between 1978 and 1983-- 
44. Distribution of council stock and difficult-to-let stock 
by area 
45. Table showing the percentage of council-owned property, 
of flats and maisonettes and of difficult-to-let, in the 
cities with the highest concentrations of all three 
46. Table showing the 5 local authorities owning over 30,000 
council dwellings, having over 50% of their stock in 
flats and maisonettes, featuring among the-. --most deprived 
18 local authorities and rehousing over 1,000 homeless 
families a year 
47. Concentration of social problems on unpopular estates 
48. Contrasting levels of deprivation and dissatisfaction in 
Cleveland County and in the Ragworth Estate 
49. Characteristics which led to the establishment of estate- 
based management 
50. Table showing design problems on 20 estates, leading to 
their unpopularity and decline 
51. Number of projects on different-sized estates 
52. Average type and size of estates in study 
53. Lettings problems prior to the establishment of estate- 
based management 
54. Void properties on 20 estates 
55. Diagram showing backlog of repairs on Peel Lane 
(Back o' the Moss) compared with the rest of the Heywood 
area 
5 
56. Methods of rent payment 
57. Table showing rent collection method and arrears 
58. Table showing pattern of arrears 
59. The pattern of very high arrears 
60. The pattern of low arrears 
61. Usual rent payment method 
62. Percentage of tenants in arrears for each major payment 
method 
63. Key characteristics of high and low arrears authorities 
64. Number of local authorities operating estate-based management 
offices from 1978 
65. Opening hours of estate offices 
66. Areas of management responsibility under the control of the 
projects 
67. Local responsibility for light management functions 
68. Improvements in the projects leading to increased popularity 
of estates 
69. Diagram showing the number of problems and improvements on 
different style . estates 
70. Ratio of caretakers to properties 
71. Caretaking 
72. Tenant Involvement 
73. Capital improvements 
74. Lettings 
75. Change in the number of empty properties under local and 
central lettings in all projects 
76. Numbers of empty properties and change in the rate of 
voids since the local office opened 
77. Improvements in repairs 
78. Table showing pi"oductivl. ty of local team 
79. Average rent a'rre'ars -. 1982. 
80. Impact of estate-based'management on rent arrears. 
81. Rent arrears under local management 
82. Staff input increases with local management 
83. Seniority of-project leaders 
84. Sources of funding for local management projects 
85. Table showing management costs 
86. Management and maintenance costs for local authorities and for local projects 
87. Simplified model estate budget 
88. Beat policing 
6 
INTRODUCTION 
"Public. squalor" might be a more apt title for the story of 
unpopular, run-down council estates. Ubiquitous, 
sensational press coverage of the phenomenon has generated 
a climate of panic, yet very little is known or documented 
about the 300,000 council dwellings officially classified 
as difficult to let or the estimated one million dwellings 
on council estates housing some three million persons who 
would like to leave and on which housing staff are 
reluctant to work. 
Council tenants move more often than owner-occupiers, 
primarily in an attempt to escape unpopular estates and 
upgrade their housing status. Most council tenants say 
that they would like to become owner-occupiers but less 
than a third want to buy their existing council dwelling, 
even with very favourable discounts. 
': Councils often choose to demolish unpopular, unlettable 
council homes rather than admit defeat of their past hopes 
by selling them to developers or to homesteaders, who 
would often bid for them. 
Counci I. repai rs workers have esti mated that two-thi rds of 
their work time goes on travel and paper-pushing and only 
7 
one thi rd on actually doing repai rs. Ombudsmen say most 
housing complaints are connected with repai rs. 
Tower blocks have often been blamed for council housing's 
bad name. Yet far from being the main culprit, they are 
under-represented in every count of unpopular estates. 
They are also easier to improve and to let than "slab 
blocks", "deck access" and "walk-up flats". 
Tenants are often assumed to be the cause' of an estate's 
decline or decay. There is logic in expecting the people 
who live there to keep it clean and care for it. Yet few 
tenants believe they have the power or the right to exercise 
full control over their home and immediate envi ronment. 
legally, it is clearly the landlord's responsibility to 
maintain the fabric of all dwellings and also all communal 
areas of which the council is the sole owner. This legal 
duty would apply to all the estates in this study, a duty 
that has rarely been executed. 
The book examines these problems and illustrates them from 
the development of slum housing areas within the landlord 
tradition, and particularly the public landlord tradition. 
It also examines current efforts at reversing those 
conditions. 
It has been shown that the key to improvements and 
sometimes dramatic reversal Lies in a few embarrassingly 
simple and well-known techniques. 
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The landlord must have a local estate base, with full-time, 
committed, local staff, open to tenants every day. The 
local staff must have direct responsibility and be able to 
get the key jobs done, such as letting an empty property or 
getting a repair seen to. The tenants must be involved in 
deci si on-uraki ng. Manual workers, such as caretakers and 
repai rs workers, must be part of the local team. Money 
must be spent carefully, sparingly and incrementally, so 
that it is not wasted and confidence can be won back in the 
landlord. The process of dumping reluctant but desperate 
tenants on the estates of lowest demand must be reversed 
through a local recruitment drive to attract friends and 
relatives into the community. Should this smack of 
favouritism, a close look at the hierarchy of estates and 
the pecking order of applicants wi LL disabuse any innocent 
observer of the f ai rness of exi sting systems of allocating 
public housing. 
There is no sign that public-rented housing will go away. 
The Thatcher government, in spite of the popular image that 
it wants to get rid of council housing, has publicly 
asserted that for the foreseeable future, at least four 
million dwellings will remain in public ownership. About 
70% of the occupants of these homes will be eligible for 
Housing Benefit to subsidise the rent and rates they cannot 
afford. Nearly half of the dwellings will be in the form 
of flats or maisonettes. A million will be industrially 
bui Lt, often structurally defective, expensive to maintain 
and heat, hard to insulate and unpopular with families. 
v 
9" 
Such is a, large part of the council stock of the future, 
poorly designed and built, and occupied predominantly by 
low-income households, on large and uninviting estates that 
are hard to manage. 
The Development of Unpopular Council Housing Estates and 
Attempted Remedi e's is an examination of how we reached. thi s 
critical ebb in our long struggle to overcome slum housing 
conditions. Fortunately, the conclusions bear little 
relation to the bulk of the gri sly story. For only in the 
Last few years of renewed crisis, has a new strand of 
thinking emerged in the housing world. Many housing 
problems respond more swiftly and more positively to 
sensitive, localised housing management than they do to the 
blunt instrument of the bulldozer or the attempt to create 
yet another Mecca. 
"The land over which the bulldozers may be poised 
is not the'Garden of Eden; and ther5 are , already more than two persons living there. " 
.: 
A custodi al app roach to the publicly-owned bui lt 
environment, ugly as much of it is, will augur well for our 
cities of tomorrow. 
Reference 
1Speech by Archbishop Worlock of Liverpool at the Institute of 
Housing Annual Conference in Harrogate 1984. 
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CHAPTER I- NINETEENTH CENTURY ORIGINS OF THE LANDLORD TRADITION 
"Transplant them tomorrow to healthy and commodious 
houses and they would pollute and destroy them. " 
- Octavia Hill 
The Industrial Revolution in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries caused a huge movement of people from countryside 
to town. Large new cities sprang up around the new 
factories and humble shoddy dwellings were packed into the 
urban landscape in a way that had never happened before. 
People had to live near work, for there was no transport; 
factory and mining hours were long - 16 hours a day was 
quite common. "Back-to-backs" and "two-up-two-down" became 
the classic housing style of the masses. 
The social and health problems caused by 19th century urban 
conditions were overwhelming. With no sanitation, no piped 
water, a damp climate, and families with an average of five 
children, epidemics of cholera, smallpox, typhoid and 
tuberculosis were common and the death rate rose in the 
crowded streets of industrial cities. Although overcrowding 
'and dense urban development were not new, and although the 
industrial landscape affected only a small part of the 
country initially, it set a pattern of utilitarian squalor 
that by the end of the 19th century embraced the majority of 
the popuLation. 
1 
Its marks have endured till now and in the 
major centres of population have only been displaced by a 
more modern and possibly as squalid uti li tari ani sm. 
11 
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Throughout the 19th century, private landlords provided the 
vast majority of housing for rich and poor alike. By 
1914, only 800,000 dwellings were owner-occupied while over 
seven million were rented from private landlords. Councils, 
which had started building to replace insanitary dwellings 
in the 1880s, owned a mere 20,000 dwellings in 1914.2 In 
the city areas where land was scarce and jobs plentiful, 
housing had long been expensive, crowded, and in bad 
condition for the mass of the poor. The housing needs of 
the bursting city populations were often in conflict with 
those of the factory owners and increasingly as the 19th 
century advanced, with those of the railway companies, road 
builders, model dwelling companies, housing trusts, and 
even school boards, which from 1871 were requi red to provide 
schools in districts where none had yet been built. These 
activities swallowed up city land and extenuated the 
problems of providing better housing for poor people. Even 
the initial attempts of local authorities to provide decent 
housing invariably displaced the poorest and most vulnerable 
households, making their problems worse. Most landlords 
did not want to cater for the very poor, who were seen at 
worst as feckless, disorderly or diseased, and at best as 
unprofitable. 
Nineteenth century working conditions were probably as bad 
as living conditions. Lord Shaftesbury and others fought 
for Factory Acts to control such abuses as child labour, 
while, starting in 1864, Octavia Hill and a growing band of 
12 
Lady helpers led a valiant housing reform movement that 
stressed the importance of running poor housing properly in 
order to make up for the inadequacy of the buildings. 
"Building never was our main duty. It always was 
the right government of houses which I felt the 
greatest need. "3 
Octavia Hill argued forcibly that improvements like tapped 
water should be added and overcrowding reduced, rather than 
attempt to replace the slum houses with better dwellings at 
a cost that would put them out of reach of the poorest and 
most needy people, creating even more stress in the 
remaining slums. 
THE ROYAL COMMISSION INTO THE HOUSING CONDITIONS OF THE 
WORKING CLASSES 1 884-1 885 
The clearest insight into conditions of overcrowding, ill 
health and exploitation in the homes of the very poor is 
given by the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working 
Classes, which published its findings in 1885, examining in 
detail why severe overcrowding continued up to the 1880's 
in spite of the substantial increase in the total number of 
dwellings, the general rise in living standards, and the 
improved sanitary and other health conditions. The great 
reformers, Lord Shaftesbury and Octavi a Hill, both gave 
evidence to the Commission. Lord Shaftesbury asserted to 
the Commission that - 
"The evils of overcrowding ..... were still a public 
scandal and were becoming in certajn localities 
more serious than they ever were, " 
13 
Demolition, whether for sanitary reasons by local authorities 
or for developments such as railways, new dwellings and 
schools, was seen as the major cause of worsening conditions 
for the poorest - 
"Demolitions have taken place for all these purposes 
and although the health and appearance of London 
have vastly improved in consequence of some of 
them, and though others have been a great boon to 
the better class of the poor, yet they have been 
accompanied with the severest hardship to the very 
poor, increasing overcrowding and the difficulty of 
obtaining accommodation, and sending up rents 
accordingly. "5 
The demolition of unfit housing and the construction of 
model dwellings were also found to be a growing cause of 
displacement - 
"The houses so removed are generally in a hopelessly 
bad condition..... Nevertheless a good deal of 
hardship is caused by this class of displacement. 
The overcrowded state of Spitalfields is attributed 
in great measure to such clearances, and the rise 
in rent which has doubled..... is largely owing to 
demolitions..... When the new model dwellings are 
completed the very poor displaced do not generally 
find accommodation in them, and therefore the 
overcrowding continues notwithstanding the new 
erections. " 
The continued influx of immigrants from the country, Ireland, 
Scotland and Europe added to the overcrowding. These 
workers, according to the Royal Commission, 
7 
often enjoyed 
better health and were therefore more popular with employers. 
But their arrival intensified the problems of overcrowding 
in the poorest, most transient di st ri cts. 
The Commission concluded that - 
14 
the pulling down of buildings inhabited by the very 
poor, whether undertaken for philanthropic, 
sanitary or commercial purposes, does cause 
overcrowding into the neighbouring slums with the 8 further consequence of keeping up the high rents. " 
The Commission examined evidence of wage levels in relation 
to rents and found that dockers and coste rmonge rs earned 
between eight shillings and ten shillings a week, depending 
on employment and markets. Artisans earned about 25 
shillings and the average for all Labourers in "Clerkenwell 
was about 16 shillings. 
The average rent for one room across several London 
districts was 3s. 1 04d. ; for two rooms 6s. in the 
provinces, the ave rage was 2s. 6d. Thus the ave rage rent 
for one room in London would be a quarter of the average 
wage. 
9 But for the poorest families, rent would amount to 
nearly half thei r wages. 
People without work or drifting in and out of the multitude 
of casual jobs would be constantly on the move, evicted from 
room to room. 
I- 
The Royal Commission looked at conditions of overcrowding 
and rent levels among the poor, and found that - 
"It was common practice in London for each family 
to have only a single room for the rent of which 
nearly half of them paid between 25% and 50% of 
their wages..... A contributory cause was the 
existence of the disreputable middle man. "1 0 
15 
The middle man was in effect the housing manager, fixing 
and collecting rents, letting rooms and evicting tenants, 
doing repairs to a minimal standard or not at all. Hi s 
basic job appeared to be packing in as many people as 
possible to maxi mi se rents. The same rents were often 
charged by middle men to the very poor for part of a room 
as were charged by Octavia Hill and other more 
conscientious landlords for a simple flat. 
It is worth quoting one or two examples of actual 
conditions: 
St. Pancras - "an underground back kitchen 12 feet 
by 9 feet and 8 feet high inhabited 
by seven persons. " 
Bermondsey - the washhouse at the back, 10 feet 
by 5, a father and mother, two 
children and two older sons. " 
Newcastle- - "140 families in 34 houses, which 
upon-Tyne each consist of four rooms and two 
cellars..... 50 houses with 230 
families..... 62 houses with 310 
fami lies. "11 
Usually in each house there was only one water supply and 
one closet for all the families. 
was shared by several houses. 
In some cases the . closet 
In Cterkenwett a case was 
found of 16 houses using one closet. 
"A Large number have no washhouses, no backyards, 
and some no back venti l ati on, " llA 
having been built on what were the backs of older houses. 
16 
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The conditions of the houses let under these conditions were 
often a cause of scandal. The street doors were not 
secured, so stairways and entrances were commonly 
"crowded by persons who, presumably having no other 
place of shelter, come there to sleep. "l 4 
Although the Commission cites vestries and district boards 
as being responsible for hi ring scavengers to remove "di rt, 
ashes, rubbish and filth", it is clear that this duty was 
rarely performed adequately. 
"There is much room for improvement in the matter 
of ashpits and dustbins ..... Vegetable substance..... is frequently thrown into open dustholes..... lying 
for weeks decomposinglgnd poisoning the atmosphere 
of the close courts. 
The question of repairs was most complex. According to the 
Commission the owner was responsible but he would usually 
lease the house to a middle- man with responsibility for 
repairs in exchange for profit in rent collection. This was 
considered a major cause of the break-up of single family 
houses into one-room tenements. A case was cited to the 
Commission of the landlord, Lord Northampton, renting a 
house to a middle-man for £20 a year, who in turn rented it 
out room by room for a total of £100 a year. The middle- 
man expected to make between 50% and 150% profit on the rent 
he paid over to the landlord. 14 Repai rs were mini mal and 
gross overcrowding was the crude method of expanding the 
rent income. Lord Northampton claimed that he did not like 
to enforce repai rs in case it led to even higher rents. 
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Absurdly, because of the low wages and high rents, rent 
arrears were often a serious problem. Octavi a Hill gave 
evidence to the Commission of large rent debts accumulated 
in properties she acquired. This was inevitable, given 
the wage and rent levels quoted, and led to constant moves 
by poor "fami lies. The Commission claimed that - 
"it is likely that more than one half the population15 
of certain poor districts are constantly shifting. 
The impact on family life of these conditions was 
devastating. Lord Shaftesbury described the human waste 
in moving terms - 
"An intelligent active young man..... comes up to 
London; he must have lodgings near his work; he 
is obliged to take, he and his wife, the first 
house that he can find, perhaps even in an alley..... 
his health is broken down; he himself succumbs, 
and he either dies or becomes perfectly useless. 
The wife falls into despair; in vain she tries to 
keep her house clean; her children increase upon 
her and at last they become reckless..... Their 
hearts are broken and they have not the means of 
doing it. They do not know how soon they shall 
go; thi are merely wanderers on the face of the 
earth. " 
Many other witnesses to the Commission described this 
'impoverished class in less sympathetic terms, attributing 
their atrocious conditions to their own fecklessness and 
addiction to 'drink. The Commissioners did not resolve the 
cause and effect - 
"To return however to the question whether drink and 
evil habits are the cause or consequence of the 
condition in which the poor live, the answer is 
18 
probably, the unsatisfactory one that drink and 
poverty act and react upon one another..... the 
poor who live under the conditions described have 
the greatest difficulty in leading deceyý Lives 
and of maintaining decent habitations. 
The Royal Commission sought evidence -f rom Octavi a Hi ll about 
work among the "rejects" of society, asking if her role was - 
"to reform the tenants that nobody else will touch. " 
Her answer underlined the close interdependence of cause and 
effect: 
"The tenants and the houses. " 
18 
Her overriding commitment to helping only the very poorest 
was a hallmark of her reforming zeal. Lending a special 
quality to her intimate and personal involvement in the 
details of housing management. She, like all reformers, 
was convinced that there was a way out. 
"The principle on which tie whole work rests is that 
the inhabitants and their surroundings must be i lýgaroved 
together. It has never yet fai led to succeed. 
OCTAVIA HILL, THE HOUSING MANAGEMENT ADVOCATE 
Octavia Hill, the Victorian housing reformer who gave such 
vivid evidence to the Royal Commission, based on her hard-won 
experience of housing conditions among'the poor, had begun 
to acquire responsibility for slum property 20 years before 
the Commi ssi on sat. She prevai led upon rich benefactors 
either to invest their own money in poor, tenanted 
property and allow her to restore it by sound management, or 
19 
she was actually given houses which she managed with 
alacrity and efficiency. The condition of the properties 
she acquired was often appalling - 
N out of 192 panes, only 8 were unbroken. "19 
The levels of soci at di so rde r in the overcrowded lodgings 
were equally distressing - 
"Such was the court in 1869; 20truly wild, lawless 
and desolate little kingdom. " 
She summed up, in "Homes of the London Poor", 
21 both the 
conditions she set out to combat and the simple management 
techniques she used to such good effect. When she began 
her housing work, she found that - 
"In Marylebone, where I began work, nearly every' 
family rented but one room..... There were no 
cooking ranges in the rooms; water was hardly 
ever carried up higher than the parlours.... 
Wages were very de ci de dl y lower, hours of work 
were longer.... From these and many other causes 
a London court in 1864 was a far more degraded 
and desolate place than it can be now..... Moreover 
in the rough courts they were little meddled with 
and could pursue in ignorance their insanitary 
habits. " 
The very first court that she took over with money from John 
Ruskin was a decayed slum - 
"The place swarmed with vermin; the papers black 
with di rt, hung in long strips from the walls; 
the drains were stopped, the water supply out of 
order. "22 
Octavia Hill blamed negligent private landlords for the 
extortions of the system of management among the poor in 
20 
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the most vividly scathing terms. She came across a 
private landlord who was an undertaker by profession and 
who told her of the large number of bad debts which he 
compensated for by the ready trade from his tenants in 
funerals - 
"It's not the rents I Look to but the deaths I 
get out of the houses. " 
She found middle-men, acting on behalf of the landlords, 
often a cause of serious mismanagement. In an area of 
ill-repute in Notti ngdal e she took over, she found - 
"Our first duty was to remove the middle-men and 
to enter into direct relations with the tenants..... 
The di rty furniture was removed, and the people 
were encou raged to provide their own. Int hi s 
way, the rent being lower for unfurnished rooms, 
families could take two rooms for the same rent 
as one, thus mitigating the crowding. The 
closets, washhouses and yards were supervised; 
the drunken and rowdy inmates were in a measure 
both influenced and restrained and the quiet poor 
were protected, encouraged and gradually raised 
to better conditions..... No large expenditure in 
building has been incurred. "23 
Octavia Hill detailed the role of the middle- man landlord 
in exploiting and corrupting the vulnerable poor. She 
seemed to believe that there was an evil connivance between 
the chaotic lives of those who fell out from society and 
those prepared to make a living out of the desperation that 
was its consequence - 
"The influence of the majority of the lower class 
people who sublet to the poor is almost wholly 
injurious. That tenants should be given up to 
the dominion of those whose word is given and 
broken almost as a matter of course, whose habits 
21 
and standards are very low, whose passions are 
violent..... is very sad. It seems to me that a 
greater power is in the hands of landlords and 
landladies than of schoolteachers, power of life 
and death..... There are dreadful instances in 
which sin is really tolerated and shared, where 
the lodger who will drink most with his landlord 
is most favoured and many a debt overlooked, to 
compensate for which the price of rooms is 
raised; and thus the steady and sober pay more 
rent to make up for losses caused by the 
unprincipled. -24 
She found the management of such houses often almost non- 
existent - 
"The dustbins were utterly unapproachable, and 
cabbage leaves, stale fish and every sort of dirt 
were lying in the passages and on the stairs; in 
some the back kitchen had been used as a dustbin 
but had not been emptied for years..... in some the 
kitchen stairs were many inches thick with dirt 
which was so hardened that a shovel had to be used 
to get it off»25 In some there was hardly any water 
to be had.... 
However, there was nothing inevitable in this mismanagement 
and exploitation. 
Octavi a Hill was committed 
relationship work with the 
"Steady improvement of 
without selection of 
reconstruction of the 
to making the landlord-tenant 
existing tenants. 
the people and the houses 
the former or sudden 
. 26 Latter was our first duty. 
To do this, she became a thoughtful business manager, making 
the housing system for the poor advance the economic and 
social interests of all parties - 
"The distinctive feature of our work has been that 
of devoting our full strength to management, "27 
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which she defined as "just governing rather than helping". 
In that sense she was far from being a philanthropist or a 
lady-bountiful. She was convinced that all must pay thei r 
way - 
"Prompt payment of rent strikes a blow at the"28 
credit system that is the curse of the poor. 
She felt that unless housing for the poor was made 
economically viable, landlords would never fulfil their 
duties properly nor would tenants ever get a reasonable deal. 
She emphati cal ly cl ai med that - 
"I have never allowed a second week's rent to 
become due. "29 
In this sense her rule seemed harsh - 
"The main tone of action must be severe. "30 
But she believed that unless tenants assumed responsibility 
for their part of the bargain, they would abuse the 
property and fail to establish their independence and self- 
respect. Therefore "those who would not pay..... were 
ejected". For - 
"where a man persistently refuses to exert himself, 
external- help is worse than useless. "31 
Yet her helping hand was extended wherever there was a spark 
of response and her decades of work convinced her that 
almost all were helpable. She devised a battery of 
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supports for the many tenants who regularly hit hard times. 
She organised savings clubs; she reduced overcrowding by 
giving fami lies more rooms for vi rtually the same rent as 
they previously paid for only one room; she only gave 
extra rooms, however, as they became avai l able by 
persuading tenants to move to new houses that she was 
acquiring at a steady rate. She explained the lengths to 
which she would go to persuade tenants to take an extra room 
when it became available, or to move to another house to 
obtain a better home for their family. Many people were as 
resistant then as now to moving. She did not believe in 
coercion. 
She reserved maintenance work for resi dents who lost thei r 
jobs, believing that - 
"It is far better to give work than money or 
goods. -32 
One dictum was - 
"Perfect strictness in our business relations; 
"33 perfect respectfulness in our personal relations. 
'she rejected strongly the notion of patronage - 
"refuse resolutely to give any help but such as 
rouses self-help. "34 
She was adamant that physical improvements should only come 
after a basic businesslike order had been established - 
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"repairs promptly and efficiently attended to, 
references taken up, cleaning sedulously supervised, 
overcrowding put an end to, the blessing of ready 
money payments enforced, accounts strictly kept, and 
above all35tenants so sorted as to be helpful to one 
another. " 
Octavia Hill claimed not to reject any needy tenants unless 
their behaviour to fellow-tenants was outrageous or unless 
they actually refused to pay their rent. But she did move 
a noisy tenant away from a quiet one, and tried to protect 
frail or ill tenants from any kind of disturbance. Her aim 
in "sorting tenants" was to help curb the impact of 
disturbing tenants on neighbours and to protect those 
seeking a peaceful life from disturbance. 
She applied herself diligently to every trivial detail of 
management and maintenance, believing that 
"it is on such infinitesimally small actions that 
the success of the whole work rests. "36 
While decay and neglect bred their own disarray, she felt 
that 
"people are ashamed to abuse a place they find 
cared for. "37 
Above all it was her constant personal intervention and 
application in all aspects of management that restored order 
and habitability to previously ungovernable Loss-making 
slums. 
"They will add di rt to di rt..... but the more they 
find done for (the property] the more they will 
respect it till 
, at 
last order and cleanliness 
prevail. "38 
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She herself, and increasingly her band of trained helpers, 
were a constant presence in the houses they ran, enforcing 
their own standards on people previously trapped in 
enslaving, communal squalor - 
"The surest way to have any place keptt clean is to 
go through it constantly yourself. 3 
She was able to make ends meet on modest rents but to 
respectable standards by organi sing improvements 
incrementally on the basis of trade-offs with the tenants - 
"reconstructing the estate can be successfully 
accomplished only if they [the landlord] can 
ensure the goodwi ll and co-operation of the 
present tenants. -40 
Better amenities were introduced slowly and only to the 
extent that they could be paid for out of rents collected, 
and to the extent that existing improvements were respected. 
She invited tenants to choose their favoured improvements 
themselves, thus ensuring a high investment in protecting 
them. She always aimed to retain the existing community and 
rehouse tenants back into the area where rebuilding or 
extensive renovation were taking place, although she always 
tried to avoid uprooting anyone in the first place. She 
held tenants' meetings regularly in her own home and later 
added common- rooms to the courts she managed in order to 
encourage tenants' associations. She believed firmly in 
resi dent supervisors, resi dent repai rsmen and so on; she 
used to employ girls from the tenants' families in cleaning 
the houses and yards and in supervising play areas; and she 
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ardently advocated that open space be attached to all 
dwellings, no matter how small. She or her assistants 
personally visited all her tenants at least weekly, 
collecting rents, organi sing repairs, sorting out disputes, 
enforcing standards and finally establishing personal 
friendship. She felt that these five elements of management 
were totally interrelated and had to be carried out by one 
manager only, through personal door-to-door contact. She 
saw no short-cuts to this approach and no specialisation. 
The manager managed everything. It was the door-to-door 
contact and the total responsibility of one manager for 
everything affecting the landlord/tenant relationship that 
were her unique management tools. 
Oct avia Hill took a very strong stand against flat-building, 
which was now being advanced as the new answer to the slums. 
Her two main arguments against flats were - 
"the small scope they give to individual freedom", 
and the fact that - 
"people become brutal in large numbers. " 
41 
She objected to the segregation of rich and poor caused by 
Large blocks, believing that small clusters of poor families 
and rich families together worked better. She disliked the 
public nature of flats, the many communal areas inviting 
disorder and abuse, and the complications of controlling 
family and social life in an anonymous block that generated 
So little intimacy. She did not accept that improved 
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amenities and better layout compensated for the loss of 
outdoor space by each dwelling which she believed was an 
essential ingredient of healthy family life. in her 
evidence to the Royal Commission on the Housing of the 
Working Classes, she was asked whether her experience 
bore' out the common working class objection to "very 
large blocks". She replied, 
"They feel the objection to them on the ground 
of the monotony and ugliness of them and that 
feeling seems to grow. "42 
She also claimed that tenants much preferred the old 
terraced houses - 
"The people always greatly preferred cottages, 
or houses accommodating a small number of 
families. " 
She made the further criticism that the high cost of 
constructing blocks of modern flats determined access 
only for the more affluent working classes, thereby 
extending overcrowding, high. rents and poverty in the 
remaining slums. For example, she found that rents in 
Drury Lane rose by 6d. to is. 'a week in consequence of 
/- the Peabody development there. Octavia Hill's criticism 
of slum demolition and reconstruction because it worsened 
the conditions of the poorest was echoed by other 
witnesses to the Royal Commission. 43 
Most of all she believed that blocks of flats could only 
work with authoritarian rule because of their density and 
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communal arrangement. She preferred smaller-scale, more 
personal management in lower buildings. 
44 She believed 
in exercising tight management control, not through 
policing and the threat of eviction, but through a 
familiar and trusting relationship, with clear 
responsibilities on both sides. 
Octavia Hill did not only oppose flat-building on design 
grounds. She also opposed the principle of municipal 
housing, believing that elected representatives should not 
control something as basic as the supply of homes to their 
electors. She abhorred the large-scale approach so 
readily adopted by public bodies. However, she 
increasingly recognised that the scale of the problem was 
beyond her scope and indeed praised the efforts made by 
Glasgow City Council to tackle their slums, 50 dwellings 
by 50 dwellings, 45 attempting to rehouse people within 
their own communities. 
By the end of her life in 1912, private landlords under 
her system were finding it increasingly hard to make ends 
meet. She felt herself overwhelmed by the scale of the 
housing problems of the very poor, and appal led by the 
spectacle of unlet, publicly-owned tenements, too expensive 
for the most needy. She bequeathed her system of 
management but failed to make any significant impact at a 
critical stage on the public bodies that were to become 
the major providers of housing for the poor. The most 
likely explanation is that she genuinely did not expect 
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councils to expand their housing activities very far. 
this, she could not have been more wrong. 
Three other elements to Octavia Hill's work should be 
mentioned. She advocated strong action against anti- 
social behaviour - 
"It is a most merciful thing to protect the poor 
from the pain of living next door to drunken, 
disorderly people, "46 
and she had no scruples about evicting tenants whose 
In 
behaviour made life miserable for other residents. Noise, 
alcohol and violence were the abuses that she cited and 
that she regarded as "immoral", though by inference 
unstable relationships and prostitution were a major cause 
of disputes, brawls, general disturbance and scandal. 
"Those who47... Lead clearly immoral Lives were 
ejected. 
She implied from her yearly letters to fellow workers that 
respectability and Victorian morality were important 
insofar as they affected the communal life of a house or 
affected relations between tenants. She only ever cited 
continuous disturbance to neighbours or an absolute 
refusal to pay rent without just cause as reasons for 
eviction. 
Octavia Hill talked passionately of one solitary old lady 
who begged to be moved so that she could die in peace 
without being able to hear her drunken, disorderly 
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neighbour. But she did not evict without first giving 
the offending tenant the choice of a more socially 
acceptable way of Life, since disorder was often bred of 
Lax standards of management. She found that reform was 
very often possible, and cites no case where she actually 
gave up. 
The second special element of Octavia Hill's approach was 
her love of nature and her desire to beautify the envi ron- 
ment of. crowded city courts, on however small a scale - 
"The sweet luxuriance of spring flowers is more 
enjoyed in that court than would readily be 
believed. "48 
As a crusading founder of the National Trust and a 
fighter for London's few open spaces, she felt that the 
poor would find life so much more bearable if they had 
access to sunlight and to growing green things. 
Therefore she sought always to provide access to open air 
in spite of working under the most despe rate conditions. 
She and her fellow workers arranged many trips to the 
countryside with tenants and their children. On one 
occasion she was known to come back with bunches of wild 
flowers for all her tenants. She also acqui red country 
property to which children of the tenants and sometimes 
whole families could go to recover from illness and to 
enjoy fresh air and nature. 
The thi rd element not so far mentioned was training. 
Throughout her career she recruited like-minded women who 
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could act as visitors/rent-collectors/managers for the 
ever expanding stock of property she controlled. * She 
believed strongly that women rather than men should 
provide the personal, home-based service of housing 
management she had evolved because the woman was so much 
more in command of the home and family and the man was so 
often absent. She also believed women to be more 
sympathetic in distress and more knowledgeable in questions 
of budgeting, diet, hygiene, child development and so on. 
She was clearly not too happy about the growing problem of 
male estate superintendents. i n the blocks of flats then 
being built, as, they played the tough role of 
authoritarian guards and could not establish the friendly 
personal trust that she so relied on. This was yet 
another argument against the blocks. 
She did not establish formal training other than in 
book-keeping, about which she was almost fanatically 
rigorous, and she relied heavily on the individual 
By the time she died about 50 trained women managers 
worked with her di rectly or with landlords who adopted her 
method of management. This means that she must have 
controlled or directly influenced the management of about 
15,000 properties. In her evidence to the Royal Commission 
she was asked how much property she owned or managed and she 
responded that because she constantly disaggregated her 
operations and encouraged each new development to be 
autonomous, she had no idea at all of the numbers of 
properti es' or tenants involved. Eight years before the 
Commission sat, she had valued her own property at the 
equivalent of about 1,000 one-room tenements. 
"I know I balanced off the accounts of E70,000 and 
that was then decentralised; I have never touched 
it again. All I have now has grown up since. " 
When asked how much, she replied - 
"I am not sure. " 
It is thZ6efore hard to deduce how big a landlady she was herself. 
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initiative and responsibility of her workers. She 
devolved all responsibility for personal""door-to-door 
management to each worker,. who was given responsibility 
for about 300 properties. She wrote to them often; held 
meetings with them and reprimanded them for shortfalls in 
rent or any other lapse in standards. Octavia Hi ll 
wanted housing management recognised in the way that 
nursing and teaching were coming to be recognised. 
"If there existed a body of ladies trained to more 
thorough work, qualified to supervise more 
minutely, likely to enter into such details as 
bear on the comfort of home life, they might be 
entrusted by owners with their houses. We all 
can remember how the training of nurses and of 
teachers has raised the standard of work 
required in both professions. The same change 
might be hoped for in the character of the 
management of dwellings let to the poor. "50 
When the Royal Commission asked her about training for 
housing management, she explained - 
"I think people with tact can do it..... capable, 
sensible, ordinary people. What we want is a 
combination of interest in the people with a 
certain amount of business training. " 
She felt she could train a capable person in six weeks. 
CONCLUSION 
Octavi a Hi L L, for all her great love of nature and open 
spaces, accepted the built environment with all its horrors 
and sought to change it through running it properly rather 
than trusting to a new round of building enterprise to 
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replace the old. 
AL ready far ahead of her time in thinking, she saw 
redevelopment as a terrible scourge on the poorest 
families, appalling as she found the existing conditions - 
The high cost of building, the rise of rates, the 
sometimes absurd requi rements of local bodies, 
make it impossible to reaccommodate families at 
the same rents as in the old houses. This makes 
it to my mind a very great duty on the part of 
owners and local authorities to preserve so far as 
possible all old houses occupied by the poor, 
always supposing the drains and roofs are sound, 
and the rooms dry and light. The fashion of 
clearing away, which makes a grand show, has in my 
estimation, gone quite far enough..... so pause 
before you destroy an old house which is, or can 
be made heal thy. "5l 
Octavi a Hi !L showed how, with meticulous management, and 
a businesslike but personal and trusting relationship with 
the tenants, she could transform the living conditions of 
the very poorest and break even financially or even show a 
slight profit on the money invested. Octavia Hill must 
be one of the few housing reformers who neither. built 
houses nor argued for the replacement of slums with new 
and better homes, but relied entirely on how she ran or 
'. managed the existing houses. 
However, her bold experiment compares well with the brave 
but almost futile struggle of her successors to have an 
impact on the major 20th century problems of slum 
clearance, mass public housing, and the emergence of vast 
bureaucratic systems. These are questions for the 
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following chapters. 
Her whole ethos hinged on what she believed to be the 
constant gentle, understanding, unifying touch of women 
workers, and her reforming methods were kept alive by the 
women that she trained and their successors. 
THE PHILANTHROPIC TRUSTS 
The Peabody Trust was founded in 1862, two years before 
Octavia Hill acqui red her first property. The Guinness, 
Sutton and Samuel Lewis Trusts were founded Later in the 
Victorian era. Several rich Victorians, appal led. by the 
urban squalor that increasing wealth had spawned, 
bequeathed fortunes for the purposes of building model 
dwellings to house the deserving poor. In dense 
city conditions, the Trustees wrestled with tnei r bequest, 
packing as many homes as possible onto the scarce land. 
These early trusts built thousands of model dwellings, 
usually in large blocks of tenement flats, to house the 
poor, but not the very poorest. They were more than ready 
to exercise disciplined and tightly controlled management 
over their expensive and much vaunted experiment. 
Octavia Hill's methods of intensive, unified, on-the-ground 
IRI: -- 
management were widely adopted by the philanthropic trusts, 
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although she criticised Peabody for displacing the very 
poorest and disapprovea of their dense, large-scale 
developments. It was spelled out in the Sutton Dwellings 
Trust* deeds that they would house the "respectable poor" 
with "proof of good character", and this certainly made 
thei ý social tasks easier. They developed a system of 
resident estate management, with a resident superintendent 
in charge of each estate, controlling lettings, rents, 
repai rs, communal cleaning, laundries and bath-houses, and 
ruling the blocks, often with a rod of iron. One 
or resi dent worker, caretaker, porter, repai rsman, manager' 
superintendent was employed for every 50 dwellings. The 
tradition has survived to this day. The Trusts throughout 
their 120 years history have been the envy of many local 
authorities, although they have often also been accused of 
paternalism, selective lettings, and harsh management. 
While it is said that they could not have succeeded with 
the "i rrespectable" or disaffected, their intensive, 
coherent, local and resident management system has made 
physically unattractive blocks vi able for tow-income 
families for generations, which contrasts sharply with the 
early experience of local authorities. 
I- 
It is a source of some puzzlement that the close, high, 
utilitarian blocks of the early Trusts have always been in 
hi h demand and 9 popular wi th resi dents in spi to or the ir 
oppressive style. The Trusts, and the occupants would 
readily admit that these poky Victorian tenements were 
*Later to become the Sutton Housing Trust. 
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physi cal ly far from the ideal homes tney were built to 
provi de. Tne key factor which made them work over their 
hundred years of history was the meticulous, it rather 
authoritarian style of management. The Trusts bequeathed 
a legacy of local resident management and maintenance, 
Leading to close and interdependent relations between 
tenant and landlord that have inspired new thinking much 
later in the story of "Public Landlords'. 
The philanthropic Trusts up to the First World War had 
built more than three times the number of dwellings built 
by local authorities. They had the assets of private 
capital bequeathed for charity and the intense commitment 
to helping the poor of leading philanthropists. But the 
Trusts paid no heed to Octavi a Hill's appeal to renovate 
the old terraced awetlings rather than build anew. The 
very poorest were often di splacea by the redevelopment 
that followed their eviction. In any case they could 
not afford the new rents, exactly as Miss Hill had 
predicted. 52 
A pattern of urban redevelopment was set by the 
philanthropic Trusts which actually intensified the 
problems OT the very poorest in the late 19th century. 
In the 1880's local authorities were to be given powers to 
follow the path of model dwellings construction. In 
fact, local authorities had just begun to build their 
first blocks of model dwellings when the Royal Commission 
was called to examine the terrible housing conditions and 
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to propose solutions. One solution it did not endorse 
was the development of large tenement blocks of flats, 
whether by Trusts or councils, both because they 
r 
di splacea the poorest families, making their housing 
conditions worse and their rents higher, and because they 
were intrinsically unpopular and hard to manage. The 
early history of the London County Council proved them 
right. 
THE BEGINNING OF LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING 
The fi rst Acts that gave local authorities the power to 
remove unhealthy dwellings and replace them with sound 
working class homes came between 1868 and 1879 and were 
called the Torrens and the Cross Acts. After the Royal 
Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes had 
pondered the stirring evidence of people like Lord 
Shattesbury, Octavia Hill, Bishops and other concerned 
people, local authorities, in addition to replacing 
demolished slums under the Artisan's and Labourer's 
Dwellings Act of 1875, were given even greater powers to 
build new working class houses. This propelled local 
authorities into a pathfinding role which they have only 
recently seen curtai led a hundred years later. 
With the power to demolish bad housing and replace it 
with good, local authorities stepped into the housing 
market. They believed that public landlords could 
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provide bette r conditions, standards and services than 
private landlords, although tney did not attempt to solve 
i 
the problems of the poorest. 
Renting, especially in cities, was simultaneously becoming 
Less profitable for private landlords as standards and 
costs rose and as the stock of housing aged and land became 
scarce. 
Average rents before the Fi rst World War were higher as a 
proportion of average income than they were in 1975 for 
council accommodation. Overall rents dropped from an 
estimated 122'% of income in 1912 to 7.27. in 1975.53 
According "to the 1 977 Housing Policy Green Paper: 
54 
"average local 
were lower in 
typical rents 
high relative 
post-war year 
authority rents in the tate 1930's 
relation to average earnings than 
before 1914. But they wereýstiLL 
to income in comparison with the 
s. " 
The following graph il Lust rates the rents paid as a 
proportion of income since the beginning of the century. 
There are no figures for council rents till 1936, so the 
only earlier comparisons are with private sector rents. 
* 
*BY 
calculating the difference between the rate of public 
i nvestmen, t %i n housing and the rate of public subsidies to 
housing between 1924 and 1975, it is possible to deduce, 
that the rate of subsidy has increased more than twitce as 
fast as the- rate of investment. Tnerefore ipublic sector 
rents in the early years of tithe century were bound to be 
much closer to the market rate than they are now and the 
rent levels for the private sector can be taken as a 
measure of the p ropdrti on of income spent on rents. 
These calculations are based on investment and subsidy 
figures in the Housing Policy Green Paper. 
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The graph illustrates the problems that families with below 
average incomes would have had in meeting rent payments. 
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From the start council housing was aimed at employed 
working families. The Housing Policy Green Paper of 1977 
estimated that the average rent and rates for a new working 
I- 
1 
early council tenancies. 
class dwelling in 1906 would have been 25% of average 
earnings. 
55 It follows therefore that anyone earning 
below average wages or in unstable employment would not be 
able to afford a new council dwelling for which rents and 
rates were not subsidised at this stage. Nor were there 
rebates. Only steady wage-earners were selected for-the 
". Bui ldi ng" costs were so high that only the better 
paid arti sans and persons of si mi tar economic 
status could afford to pay the rents which the 
local authorities were obliged to charge, and' the 
local authorities for their part had perforce to 
secure a class of tenant which would be an *asse-t 56 
and not a liability from a rent-payi'ng standpoint. " 
40 t 
Local authorities considered their new housing projects 
as models tor others to follow, rather than a mass 
solution. 
However, from its earliest days council housing was beset 
with two flaws. Fi rst, it was not geared to the market 
place, cushioned as it was by financing from the rates 
and by special powers under the various Acts. So the 
demand for council housing and the rents it could command 
were not carefully measured. Some flats were difficult 
to Let from the very earliest days of council history. 
According to Octavia Hill's biographer, Moberley Bell, 
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London County Council flats were being advertised for 
letting at the turn of the century with 2-4 weeks rent 
free as an inducement - 
"The difficulty was not to find tenements, but 
to find tenants. " 
/- 
Octavi a Hill herself was alarmed by the obvious drop in 
demand for rented housing - 
ALL over London the same change has taken place, 
and the local papers are ringing with accounts of 
the thousands of tenements unlet..... there has 
been a depression in trade and an alarming 
extravagance on the part of local authorities 
which has increased the difficulty of the 
financial problem. "58 
"So-me -o-f- the 'le-ss" popuL-ar-, L-. C. C. estates nad numbe r"s--of-" .. -, - 
empty dwellings until the Fi rst World War created a 
shortage acute enough to generate demand for the unpopular 
blocks - 
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"In some of the less favourably situated block 
dwellings, there was for many years a high 
proportion of empties, and it was not until the 
pressure on housing due to the war was felt that 
some block dwellings were fully let. "59 
London County Council opted tor the "modern" idea of 
building flats rather than houses, consi de ring amenities 
more important than design, and wanting to house as many 
families as possible on the scarce land. There was 
fierce argument in the Royal Commission over the 
advantages and drawbacks of flat-building. Octavia 
trill reasoned forcibly tnat blocks of flats were not a 
response to housing demand but an imposed solution that 
would never be popular - 
"..... the day has quite gone by tor the erection 
of block buildings. They were never satisfactory, 
and nothing but the great pressure on the people 
ever made them resort to them. Now that the 
facilities of transit enable so many to get to the 
suburbs, ana thus the great pressure on the central 
houses is removed, blocks would not let well, at 
least so I believe. ' 
Her arguments did not prevail and flats became the norm 
for council building in inner city areas, providing many 
more amenities than before and greater internal space to 
each family, but depriving it of privacy and outdoor 
space, however restricted - 
"Even a third-rate house with a backyard - of its 
own is better than the modern flats which the 
London County Council is now building because 
when the tenant can command his own front door 
and staircase, he can preserve the unity of his 
family. "60 
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There was a radical change in the housing scene over the 
final ZO years of the last century, with a rapid 
expansion of public intervention in the bui Lt envi ronment, 
with major redevelopment in cities tor roads, railways, 
schools and other public buildings, the spread of flat- 
building, the suburban explosion, and the gradual impact 
of health and labour laws. 
Local autnorities were only just finding their feet on the 
housing front, and some rushed into the breach without any 
careful evaluation of who needed help or how that help 
could best be provided. The result in the big cities 
where early council initiatives were most common, such as 
Birmingham, Glasgow and London, was the provision of 
relatively expensive, high-standard accommodation for the 
working classes, where shortages of very cheap 
accommodation were still acute but where access to good 
housing was not possible for the poorest and where the 
supply of land was strictly limited. 
I- 
Under the new powers given to local authorities, change 
came on a relatively small scale at fi rst. By the Fi rst 
World War, only 10% of the population owned their own 
homes and only 20,000 local authority awes li ngs had been 
built - one half of them were in London. The vast 
majority were still in the hands of private landlords and 
conditions for the masses of people were very poor. 
43 
4 
OWNERSHIP OF HOUSING 1914 (in millions) 
Tenure Nos. of dwellings % of dwellings 
Owner-occupier .8 10% 
Local authorities . 002 (20,000 total) 
. 02% 
Private and 
miscellaneous rented 
7.1 907 
Total 7.9 100% 
Source: Housing Policy Green Paper 1977 
THE BIRTH OF HOUSING DEPARTMENTS 
Local authorities had been pushed by the squalor and 
health problems of the slums into rearguard demolition 
and attempts at public landlordism for which there was no 
precedent or procedure. 
Management was not regarded as a major issue because of 
the class of tenants housed, although there are early 
references to social abuses creeping into the public 
tenement blocks, due to the dense design, lack of privacy 
and lack of careful management supervision. 
No study of housing offers any account of the birth and 
early growth of LocaL authority housing departments, but a 
revealing insight into the rapid development of municipal 
housing management, which took a very different path from 
I that propounded by Octavi a Hill or the early Housing 
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Trusts, is gleaned from the Minutes of the London County 
CounciL proceedings from its birth in 1889. 
The London County Council set up the Housing of the 
Working Classes Committee in 1889, the year in which the 
Council was formed. By 1893, it had been linked with 
the new Public Health Committee, and while rents were 
collected under the direction of the Controller of 
Finance at Headquarters, resident mate superintendents 
for the large new estates were appointed by the Valuers' 
Department, who were responsible for day-to-day management. 
The estates housed securely employed working families and 
61 the L. C. C. was reputed to be highly selective. 
Tenants took great pride in being selected for counci l 
accommodation and the Council regarded its dwellings as 
standard-setters for the large private rented sector that 
still housed most of the working people in the country. 
Applicants were chosen for their reliability of character, 
their standard of cleanliness and their ability to pay the 
council rent on the dot. 
I- 
Irene Barclay, 62 in her history of the St. Pancras Housing 
Association, describes somewhat bitterly the way the London 
County Council selected respectable tenants for their 
dwellings early in the century, leaving the poorest and 
most needy households to fend for themselves, even where 
the Council was demolishing their homes - 
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"My serious criticism of the L. C. C. pre-war (1914) 
housing was that only a proportion of the 
population displaced from slums was rehoused - 
the families where the wage earner was in regular 
employment: postmen, policemen, foremen in 
established firms, a few white-collar workers; 
the rest went where they could to escalate slum 
conditions by overcrowding the neighbourhood. " 
Even so, densities on early council estates were 
extremely high, often over 300 persons per acre. 
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There was an average of five persons per dwelling on the 
large Boundary Street estate built in 1907, which is 
still standing north of Stepney, its dense blocks largely 
filled now with Bengali families. The estate has over 
700 flats. 
The L. C. C. had a system of resi dent caretake rs, repai rsmen 
and porters. Door-to-door rent collection was carried 
out from County Hall. But sometimes on the bigger estates 
an office was opened where rent could be paid by tenants 
and repai rs orde red. From the very beginning, estate- 
based staff were answerable to superiors at County Hall, 
often in different departments. There is early mention 
of the Finance, Controller's and Building Departments 
all having separate roles on a particular estate. 
The L. C. C. came part of the way to provi ding a coherent 
'management structure on some estates, with resi dent 
managers (cal led superintendents) and caretakers, but aL l 
important decisions, lettings and rent control were sti ll 
passed up to separate departments in a remote County Hall. 
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By the turn of the century, the L. C. C. had one housing 
employee for every 60 duel Li ngs, including manual 
repairsmen, a total of 131. Because of the scale of the 
operation, in 1912 a Housing Manager was appointed under a 
Housing Committee, with nearly 300 employees administering 
10,06U dwellings. As far as we know, this was the first 
housing department in the country. The Housing Manager 
was responsible for three sections, each responsible for 
separate aspects of housing management: 
- repai rs, with its 'own maintenance staff. 
- Lettings, rent collection and empty property. 
- investigations and enqui ri es, general housing 
matters, Lodging houses. 
I- 
By the First World War, the ratio of staff was down to one 
employee for 30 dwellings, but many of these employees were 
based at County Hall. Management was co-ordi. nated at 
headquarters and most flatted estates did not have a 
resident superintendent because they were not thought to 
be big enough. Even Boundary Street with 700 dwellings 
was not considered large enough to justify a resident 
superintendent. Segmented, non-resident and functionally 
divided housing management had qui Vckty grown up and taken 
root, white the dense, ftatted estates of the L. C. C. posed 
problems from the very -outset. " 
With 10,000 dwellings by the outbreak of WorLd War i, the 
L. C. C. was probably the biggest and most developed 
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a 
municipal landlord in the country. 
problems were present: 
All the now fami Li ar 
-a large, remote landlord. 
- dense, large estates of several hundred 
dwellings. 
-a number of council departments directly 
involved in housing, leading to the creation 
of a sectionally divided housing department. 
-a high ratio of staff to properties but a 
poor showing on the ground. 
- unlet flats. 
- incipient problems of soci at abuse and 
vandalism. 
Generally, in local authorities before the 1914-18 War, 
housing management was either farmed out to estate agents, 
64 
private companies or trusts, 
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or was handled piecemeal by 
a series of departments within the local authority, such as 
Surveyors, Valuers, Treasurers, Public Healtn, Engineers. 
66 
Local authorities were undertaking a task they had never 
set out to accomplish. Building decent homes and clearing 
slums had been an objective. Running them as good 
landlords had not. 
None of the housing management ski L is built up lb-y' 'the' 
Trusts or among the Victorian women housing managers was 
referred to in the records of the development of the 
.^ Housing Department of London County Council, although 
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i ndi rectly the resi dent superintendent and caretaking 
systems were a clear attempt to draw on that experience. 
Yet by 1914, the L. C. C. was saddled with a system that 
was to cause more and more serious problems as time went 
on. Other cities were following the same muddled road. 
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CHAPTER II - THE INTERWAR YEARS 
"It is a gross error to equate problem families 
with the housing poor" B. Cullingworth 1979 
The First World War created a housing crisis. Very little 
construction took place during the war. Strict rent 
control meant that private landlords could not make a 
profit, nor maintain their property in reasonable repair. 
The absence of large numbers of able- bodied men at war 
only served to make building and repairs problems worse. 
Even the benign landlords of the philanthropic housing 
movement, of which Octavia Hill had been such an important 
member, found it increasingly difficult to make ends meet. 
Conditions for the poorest families were very bad. 
THE BEGINNING OF SUBSIDIES FOR BUILDING 
Soon after the war in 1919, Parliament passed the Addison 
Act which subsidised house building for the first time. 
By 1924, the volume of public and private house-building, 
the level of subsidy and the general fall in prices led to 
cheaper building and cheaper rents, and councils began to 
build to müdest standards to help low-income families. 
--The -result was a building boom with Local authorities 
building over half the new houses in the following five 
years. Councils became firmly established as major 
landlords. But even with subsidies, rents were still not - 
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within the means of the lowest-paid workers 
..... local authorities could still pick and 
choose. "l 
Although blocks of flats continued to be built in big 
city areas in dense, poky tenements, most of the early 
post=war council housing was actually built outside the 
cities because land was already densely used and problems 
of displacement were very great. Many were built on 
green field sites on the edge of the cities, often to 
generous standards for the day. "Garden city" ideas had 
taken root whereby worker f ami lies were to be given space 
and individual homes in planned surroundings away from 
the city squalor. Cottage estates were favoured against 
city flats, wherever this was possible. But the location 
of some of the early council cottage estates away from the 
main areas of employment on the edges of big cities made 
them unpopular over the years and they became difficult to 
let. However, on the whole, the council housing of the 
inter-war years, especially the "cottage estates", stood 
the test of time and was built to higher standards of space 
and craftsmanship than the council homes built immediately 
after the Second World War up till the Parker Morris report 
of the early sixties. In the twenties, there were no cash 
incentives to clear slums or to help the most needy and on 
the whole, the emphasis was on the easy option of providing 
large numbers of homes for general needs. 
Most L. C. C. building was on cottage estates, but in 1924 it 
began to build some "lower standard" dwellings so that it 
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could help poorer families. It afterwards found this 
policy a major cause of "sink estates" as low rents 
attracted poverty, which in turn lowered the reputation 
of an estate and its popularity. The council also at 
later stages had to carry out extensive remedial works 
such as building back extensions to move baths out of 
kitchens. 
The L. C. C. was often a step ahead and its shift in 
emphasis in the mid-twenties towards helping more needy 
families was soon to be adopted by the Government. 
The L. CLC. stock quadrupled between 1929 and 1939 to 
1 00,000 dwellings. 
SUBSIDIES FOR SLUM CLEARANCE AND FOR FLATS 
Because of land scarcity, the costs of redevelopment, and 
the social problems inherent in clearing slums, these were 
largely left to fester until 1930 when the bias was 
shifted towards slum clearance and flat-building, prompted 
by special government subsidies. 
As the years passed and standards rose from 1919 onwards, 
more and more of the old terraced houses were designated 
as only fit for clearance. In response to the pressures 
of deteriorating slum conditions and the poverty caused 
by the great depression of 1929/30, Parliament passed the 
Greenwood Act in 1930, for the fi rst time giving di rect 
subsidies to councils for the demolition of slums. The 
Government gave councils £2.5s. per person per year for 
52 
each person they rehoused from a condemned slum. This 
gave councils a double incentive to demolish slums and S 
to rehouse people from bad conditions. The role of Local 
authorities as a Landlord began to change. In addition 
to the existing subsidy for building costs, a special 
subsidy for expensive sites was introduced which was given 
only for buildings over three storeys high on sites above 
a certain price. Councils interpreted the additional 
subsidy for flats as a di rect encouragement to build 
upwards. It was in fact the Logical policy to adopt 
following the decision to clear slums in city centres on 
a large scale while attempting to put back the homes 
being torn down, to a higher standard. 
The rationale for this subsidy was that flats, although 
more expensive to build, were necessary if housing 
/- 
conditions in crowded cities were to improve. Flats were 
seen as the only way of fitting more people in, while 
bui"l di ng modern homes and giving overcrowded f ami Li es more 
space. The problems of communal supervision and housing 
management were underestimated or ignored and the virtues 
of terraced housing were unrecognised. No attempt was 
made to continue the familiar street patterns of the 
cities. Nor was the idea of renovation and installation 
of amenities accepted as a way of tackling the widespread 
slum conditions, in spite of Octavia Hill's experience 
half a century earlier. 
Demolition had well and truly caught hold as the fi rst 
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prong of attack on bad housing conditions, and flats 
seemed the obvious answer to the continuing inner city 
problem of overcrowding. By 1937, nearly 200,000 homes 
had been demolished and a further 200,000 were in 
demolition programmes. London, Birmingham, Manchester 
and Liverpool had the biggest problems but other urban 
areas were caught up in the same process. The critical 
effect of the ambitious slum clearance programme was 
that tenants had no choice - 
"Families are being removed, whether willing 
or not. -2 
The L. C. C., under the influence of the subsidies for 
flat-building, reduced its commitment to peripheral 
estates of houses and gardens and reverted to Large- 
scale flat-building i nside London. By the late thi rties, 
it was building far more flats than houses, in spite of 
evidence that some of their inner estates were al ready, 
hard to let. In the Late thirties, the L. C. C. built 
nearly four flats for every house. 
This new combination of subsidies, aimed at demolishing 
slums and encouraging local authorities to rehouse 
ex-slum-dwellers and overcrowded families in new council 
accommodation within the cities actually changed the 
emphasis of council housing policy from being a source of 
pride to both occupants and landlord alike, to being a 
provision for the poor and the needy which almost 
immediately became a source of shame to the landlord 
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and tenants. No one wanted the slum image attached to 
expensive new housing yet the occupants brought the 
reputation of the old areas with them. Some of today's 
most unpopular estates date from the thirties when they 
were first built to house slum populations. The slum 
image carried straight over and has never disappeared. 
The Government's 1939 report described the process - 
"A number will adapt themselves quickly to their 
new surroundings; some will not react to the 
change in their condition quite so readily and 
will need initial guidance. Others without 
continuous supervision will produce a slum 
atmosphere wherever they are sent; and a few, 
a very few, will be beyond reclamation 
altogether. " 
There were several other important legislative changes in 
the 1930's that had a direct impact on the future of 
council housing. In 1935, the overcrowding Act 
increased subsidies to flats on expensive sites and did 
away with subsidies for any housing that was not 
specifically designed to relieve overcrowding and slum 
conditions. Each person rehoused by the council to 
relieve overcrowding received a special subsi dy. This 
tied the public provision of housing very tightly to the 
most needy, low-income households, and marked the onset 
of Welfare Housing, recognising that it was too expensive 
to provide di rect Government subsidies for anything 
other than housing for the most badly housed people. 
The previous general subsidies were held to have caused 
sharp increases in house and building pri ces in the 
twenties. 3 These new subsidies were carefully 
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targeted at the worst housing conditions. 
A further Housing Act in 1938 clarified the type of 
household to be housed - either displaced by demolition 
of unfit areas or rehoused to abate overcrowding - and 
it, set the minimum subsidy for flat-building at double 
the level for other dwellings, and payable for 40 years. 
It also laid down that local rates had to match the 
Government subsidy with an equal amount. These 
provisions established the tradition of pubLi c housing 
for the needy for tong into the future. 
TENURE CHANGE 
Overall, the housing stock expanded in the inter-war 
years by 44% while the proportion of council dwellings 
rose from 0.2% at the onset of World War I to nearly 10% 
by 193 8. 
1. DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSING STOCK BY TENURE (millions) 
Owner- Local authorities 
Private 
Year 
occupied and new towns 
landlord Total 
and others 
1914 
.8 . 002 7.1 7.9 
1938 3.7 1.1 6.6 11.4 
Source: Housing Policy Green Paper 1977 
The figures show a major expansion in the stock across 
the board, but with owner-occupation expanding faster 
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than any other tenure. Council housing was fairly 
close behind. Private landlords sti LL dominated the 
total stock but their share had dropped from 90% to 58%. 
From 1 938 onwards, private renting was to enter an 
inexorable decline and owner-occupation was to become 
the central strand of housing provision, which council 
housing, because of the very large subsidies it required, 
was only rarely to match. Nonetheless, councils were 
moving rapidly towards becoming major landlords. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALLOCATION POLICIES 
Specific central government intervention in the question 
of allocations did not arise unti L 1936, when it first 
spelled out local authority responsibility for those in 
poor housing nearly half a century after the first council 
dwellings were constructed. 
The 1936 Housing Act instructed local authorities to take 
account of need in allocating council housing, if 
couched in somewhat ambiguous terms: 
"Local- authorities are obliged to give reasonable 
preference to persons who are occupying 
insanitary or overcrowded houses, have large 
families, or are living under unsatisfactory 
housing conditions. " 
The phrase "reasonable preference" hardly made the local 
authorities' obligations crystal clear. But because of 
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the generous subsidies paid to councils by central 
government for each tenant rehoused from a slum or from 
overcrowded conditions, councils switched thei r 
rehousing policies to favour needy households, away 
from applicants who could convince housing officers of 
their worthiness. 
Almost exclusively slum-clearance families were rehoused 
in the thirties. The shift in allocations. from stable, 
affluent workers to poor, insecure slum dwellers was 
almost total. Such was the level of poverty that local 
authorities had on occasions to burn the tenants' 
belongings, as well as demolish their homes, because of 
infestations of vermin, lice and so on, when they were 
rehoused: 
4 
We noticed dire poverty..... They may begin [in 
a council house] with less than they had in 
their original homes because some of their 
effects have been destroyed to kill the ver. min. " 
According to John Macey5 in his seminal work on housing 
management, in the period before the Second World War, 
up to 70% of rehoused tenants had infested belongings. 
EARLY SLUM' CLEARANCE CREATED FIRST PROBLEM ESTATES 
r . 
c., .. rº ate.... ., ca..... a.. . .. _,. x ,. 
Tenants were moved en bloc from crowded old neighbourhoods 
with very few amenities to new estates built to high 
standards for the day. The old slum neighbourhoods would 
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be demolished but the former residents carried the slum 
stigma with them and the new estates would sometimes 
acqui re notoriety from the outset. Ina recent survey 
of 20 local authority initiatives on unpopular estates, 
6 
five of the seven pre-war estates were found to have 
been 'unpopular from when they were first occupied by 
virtue of the population that moved into them when they 
were first let. Surprisingly, most of these estates 
were cottage estates of houses and gardens.. The 
current problems of the Walsall pre-war estate of 
Goscote were described in the following terms by the 
estate manager: 
It was fi rst occupied in 1938 as an inner city 
slum clearance area. New tenants brought 
their trade of tat-collection with them. The 
evidence is still visible by the more than 300 
skips of old tat so far collected in Goscote. " 
In some cases the emergence of unpopular estates was a 
Long process of attrition whereby over the years an 
accumulation of problems and pressures pushed the estate 
into a downward spiral. In others, notorious streets 
from the old Victorian inner cities became notorious 
enclaves of council housing. Dispersal would have been 
seen as spreading bad apples around. local authorities 
had readily taken on board the new housing 
. responsibilities towards needy families, without 
considering the best ways of eradicating some of the 
social problems they aimed to resolve. It is possible 
that many authorities believed a physical solution to 
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housing was sufficient, or were simply unaware that 
housing management was vital to the creation of a viable 
public-rented sector. With displaced, forcibly 
uprooted, and often totally dispossessed families from 
crowded slum streets, the need tor social support on a 
new estate was paramount, but often totally lacking. 
The rot set in from the very outset. 
1939 "DISPERSING BAD TENANTS" 
Ina situation of severe housing stress, no one 
questioned the justice of allocating new publicly-owned 
and heavily subsidised housing to the most deprived. 
Nor did many question the assumptions behind the 
demolition of old slum areas nor the wisdom of 
transplanting communities en bloc to brand new estates. 
However, in 1939 the Government's Housing Advisory Sub- 
Committee on Housing Management became concerned over the 
allocation of housing to more disadvantaged tenants and 
recommended the advisability of dispersing "bad tenants" 
among good, even if it meant breaking up old social 
networks. They were not convinced that semi-penal 
measures, such as the Dutch adopted towards difficult 
tenants, involving segregation and strict supervision and 
rehabilitation, were either "desirable or necessary in 
8 this country % They fett that putting vulnerable 
households together would exacerbate the problems and 
make estates unmanageable: 
60 
We favour the principle of separating 
unsatisfactory families from one another, 
so far as this is possible, and 
interspersing them among families of a 
good type. "9 
The Committee recognised the danger of ghettoisation and 
the need to allocate sensitively to avoid concentrations 
of disturbed families, but their recommendation seems to 
have fallen on deaf ears. Dispersal did not take place. 
As a result of the dramatic changes in housing policy 
and housing subsidy, and the major shifts under way in 
the pattern of tenure, over the inter-war period, a 
totally new set of problems faced local authority 
landlords by 1939. 
The developments in housing management over the inter- 
war period illustrates just how unprepared most local 
authorities were for the task in hand. 
THE WOMEN HOUSING MANAGERS AFTER OCTAVIA HILL 
'- Following on Octavia Hill's death in 1912, the women 
managers, who had been trained by her and had worked 
with her, 'formed the Association of Women Housing 
t r.... ýi... ý 
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Workers* in 1916 with 50 members in order to advance the 
work of unified, intensive local housing management to a 
high standard. Early members, such as Irene Barclay, 
qualified as chartered surveyors, a most unusual 
departure for women - 
"A good deal of foolish fuss was made of us as 
the fi rst women surveyors. "1 0 
Later the Association organised special training for its 
prospective members, asking the Royal Institute for 
Chartered Surveyors to set examinations tor admission to 
their association. Trainees were very carefully selected 
and it was considered quite a challenge to be allowed to 
embark on the professional career of housing management. 
The women involved had a very strong sense of 
responsibility towards their work and were rigorous in 
the selection of sui table trainees. In addition, members 
did a three-year apprenticeship in door-to-door housing . 
The Association changed names a number of times before it 
finally merged with its rival, the Institute of Housing 
in 1965: 
1916 "Association of Women Housing Workers" 
Renamed "Association of Women House Property Managers" a 
few years later. 
1928 "Conference of Women Muni ci pal Managers" formed. 
1928 "Octavia Hill Club" founded by Miss Jeffrey, one 
of her followers. 
1932 The three bodies united as: "Society of Women 
`Housing Estate Officers". 
1948 Admitted men and changed its name to: "Society 
of' Housing Managers". 
1965 Merged with the institute of Housing. 
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management. Members gained the R. I. C. S. qualification 
on passing the series of professional examinations. 
The hallmarks of the Society were a high standard of 
professional competence, and the total control under one 
manager of all aspects of landlord responsibility, from 
the organisation and supervision of repairs, to the 
enforcement of tenancy conditions, lettings and rents, 
as well as all aspects of welfare. The society hotly 
defended Octavia Hill's insistence that Society managers 
should be female. There were numerous serious debates 
on the question of male members in the housing worldll 
and the women only gave way on this point in 1948. Some 
women housing managers today still think it was a mistake! 
The women managers, however, strongly rejected, and 
resented, the exclusively do-gooding, welfare role 
traditionally . considered appropriate to females. They 
were determined that the business areas, rent collection, 
maintenance and repair should be their responsibility 
too. 
Although local authorities began to acqui re property in 
the last 20 years of the 19th century, in all but a few 
very exceptional cases, they did not attempt to establish 
a system of localised an unified. estate management ti ll 
nearly 50 years later when they controlled some million 
properties and their management problems were manifold. 
The Society of Women Housing Managers throughout the early 
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decades of this century worked almost exclusively in the 
private sector, with the philanthropic trusts, the Church 
Commissioners, and the Crown Estate Commissioners. 
Nonetheless, some of their work left its mark. During 
the Fi rst World War, women managers, in the absence of 
men, ran big housing estates for the Ministry of Munitions. 
Unfortunately, they resigned in favour of the male 
managers at the end of the war. They aLso. buiLt up and 
ran large estates for the Crown Estate Commissioners, 
under the control of the notable follower of Octavia 
Hill, Miss Jeffery. That management system has survived 
to this day and helped produce leading women members of 
the Institute of Housing, an organisation which first 
appeared in 1932. 
The most important departures were in the twenties when 
nine local authorities appointed women housing managers, 
almost entirely to run difficult or unpopular estates. 
Cheste rti el d, under the inspiration of their town clerk, 
Mr. Parker Morris (of Parker Morris standards fame), went 
to the Crown Estate Commissioners and, inspired by their 
intensive system of management, selected a woman housing 
manager, Miss Upcott, for their most difficult estate. 
Miss Upcott later organised the Conference of Women 
Muni ci pal Manage rs in 1928 to represent what was seen as 
a growing area of work. The Ministry of Health had 
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clearly stated as early as 1920 that - 
"The success of working class property depends 
very largely on its management..... Proper 
management will requi re a person specially 
skilled and trained for the work. The manager 
must be given ample authority ..... Little is done 
except by the Association of Women House 
, 
Property Managers, who have rendered such 
admirable service in redeeming unfit property. 
There will have to be more facilities for 
training if needs are to be met. "12 
However, these early gains were not consolidated. 
Li ve rpooL Corporation appointed a woman manager in 1936, 
only to rescind the appointment because she would have 
been in charge of men, an unacceptable departure. 
Only 46 women were employed by local authorities by the 
mid-thi rties, with about 130 qualified members altogether. 
The hallmark of the Society continued to be that - 
The women managers work in administrative control 
of the estate and at the same time in direct 
touch with the tenants..... including rent 
collection, court work, maintenance of properties 
including ordering and checking the work and accounts 
of direct labour staff, applications and tenancies, 
rehousing, social and educational work, committee 
work and relations with other departments. "13 
- light years away from the early fragmented housing 
management style of the L. C. C. 
More was the pity that while local authorities entered a 
period of massive expansion with widespread adoption of a 
social role in housing, the women managers were shunted 
into a siding called "welfare". 
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The Society itself had an increasingly chequered history, 
fighting a rearguard action against the admission of men 
as members throughout the inter-war period when they had 
only 130-150 members. Some members began to accept 
with some gratitude a welfare role on the large new slum- 
clearance estates of the thirties, hoping that it would 
lead to a new departure in Local authority housing 
management, but flying in the face of their dearly 
cherished management traditions. They were rarely 
given overall, co-ordinated responsibility for management; 
rather they were recruited to help impoverished new 
council tenants cope with the problems of a brand new, 
high-quality dwelling in a totally alien community. 
When the women housing managers adopted the role of 
housing welfare workers for councils, they believed that 
welfare had finally fused with housing management and 
that they would play a critical role in solving the new 
soci al problems of council housing: 
"By virtue of slum clearance and overcrowding, it 
[a local authority] has no option but to take 
all families whatever their income and character 
and trust that they will become satisfactory 
tenants. For this reason constant supervision 
and skill is always required..... The permanent 
social service which housing has now become can 
be far more economically and efficiently 14 administered by one [housing] department. " 
It seemed that the Octavi a Hill tradition had survived 
Long enough to come into its own again. But while the 
Society was hopeful that its ideas would take root in 
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local authority housing management, by the late thirties 
only 75 of its members were actually employed on counci l 
estates and between them they were covering 35,000 
properties, just under 500 properties each, and less 
than 5% of the total counciL stock. 
By the Second World War, only a small minority of 
councils had a housing department at aLL, 
15 
or any 
concept of housing management as conceived by the 
Society. A much more typical pattern was the Birmingham 
model propounded at the National Housing Conference in 
1938: 
"The collection of rents is divorced from the 
welfare work and a section of women home visitors 
is wholly employed in investigating and assisting 
cases of the unenlightened type. "lb 
The division of rents and repairs from allocations and 
welfare was fiercely if ineffectually opposed by the 
Society of Women Housing Estate Officers, in spite of their 
growing involvement in the welfare side of public housing. 
But the women were on the defensive and their views were 
largely discarded. 
/ 
Mary Besley, employed as Housing Manager by Lincoln 
Counci 1, addressed the National Housing Conference in 1938 
on the problems of local authority management. She felt 
that the responsibility vested in the Public Health, 
Surveyors and Treasurers Departments for the management 
of local authority housing had led to the management 
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itself, as opposed to building, repairs and rent, 
appearing "i nsi gni fi cant and tiresome". She criticised 
this fragmented approach - 
'They are employing several different officials 
to do separate parts of the work when they might 
employ people trained in the same work as a 
whole..... Continuity of contact is invariably 
sacrificed if several different people conduct 
business with the tenant. It is obviously 
easier too for even the most amenable tenant to 
co-operate with one well-known official rather 
than with several. -17 
She argued forcibly that the method of unitary management 
of the Society of Women Housing Managers was the only 
answer - 
"Records are available to show they are a 
financial success. "18 
The viability of intensive management was based on - 
"the absolute maximum number of houses for a 
collector of 330 if there is a large proportion 
of slum clearance among them, and 400 if there 
is no slum clearance. "19 
The Government-sponsored Central Housing Advi cory Committee 
in 1939 strongly endorsed the employment of women and the 
Society's approach - 
"The essenti at p rovi si on that the person 
responsible for ministering to the social 
needs 'of the tenants shat L be given some 
business reason to gain pe ri odi cal entry into 
the house. " 
.... we see no satisfactory alternative to 
the appointment of a qualified woman officer 
competent to undertake all management duties, if social service is to be carried but and 
economy secured. " 
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However, notwithstanding Mary Besley's confident 
affi rmati ons and the recommendations of the Government's 
appointed advisers, the Society and its tested methods 
continued to lose ground. 
In spite of the "manifold problems of large-scale 
2 
ownership", 
0 
and the questionable influence of the 
women housing managers on public housing management, the 
Society continued to propound its belief that - 
"a good landlord can create good tenants, . 
21 
and that Octavia Hill's approach was still valid - 
The soundness of Octavia Hill's approach is 
again demonstrated: respect for the individual, 
co-operation between the landlord and the 
tenants, the equal importance of human needs 
and technical efficiency. "22 
I- 
But their statements came as belated reactions to a 
problem with which they had little real contact, and 
reflected a lack of realism about the scale of operations 
involved in public housing and their own failure to play 
any cri ti cal role in its earlier development. 
By 1938, there were 1.1 million publicly owned homes, 
which would have required well over 3,000 trained managers 
in order to apply the methods of the Women`s Association. 
Their numbers were Less than 200, and their influence was 
insignificant in relation to the problem they were 
attempting to address. Their voice went almost unheard 
and was certainly unheeded. 
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THE BIRTH OF THE INSTITUTE OF HOUSING 
Meanwhile, the normal council structure continued to 
comprise a variety of specialised technical departments 
handling different parts of housing management, with 
repairs, rents, lettings and welfare handled 
respectively by Engineers or Surveyors, Treasurers or 
Town Clerks, Valuers, and Public Health, Sanitation or 
Housing Officers. 
The Municipal Yearbook of 1935 shows that only 13% of 
the 450 local authorities in Britain had appointed a 
housing manager - 
"In many districts, town clerks, treasurers, 
medical officers of health, engineers and 
surveyors are either separately or in 
combination, in control of the management of 
municipal houses..... and excellent though each 
official may be in his own sphere, skilled 
management is not only outside his province 
but housing management as such must always be 
to him a secondary consideration..... Little 
has been done by way of social service..... 
Management is incorporated in the ordinary 
machinery of local government, different 
officers being responsible for such part of 
the work as falls within their specialised 
duties. »23 
Construction was often the dominant interest of the 
"professionals" and there was a well-rooted belief that 
-men making a career of public administration could more 
competently handle the technical problems of rents, 
repairs, and lettings than well-intentioned women housing 
visitors, whose main role was seen as improving the lot 
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of the poor. 
In 1932, a body cal led the Institute of Housing was 
formed with a mate-dominated membership drawn almost 
exclusively from local authority employees, and 
propounding a very different approach to housing 
management than the existing women managers' organisation, 
separating a social and welfare role completely from the 
more techni cal and professional questions of repai rs and 
rents. The rival local authority-based organisation 
was born of different imperatives and propounded an 
opposite housing management tradition - 
"their cdntentions are largely conflicting" 
affirmed the Ministerial Central Housing Advisory 
Committee in 1939.24 
The Institute of Housing dominated the local authority 
housing world with "ex-town clerks trying to cope: 
25 
It had its own examinations, set to a lower standard than 
the Society, arguing that there was neither time nor 
money to replicate Octavi a Hill's approach nor the 
/- Society's training - 
"The cost would not be 
26 justified by results. " 
T. he, Insti tute held. fi rmly., to the belief that. housi. ng 
welfare should not be confused with the business and 
technical administration of housing which they regarded 
as "men's work". 
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The Society in turn refused to recogni se the I nsti tute, 
which in its early days provided no training, and would 
not allow joint membership, after some initial attempts 
at co-operation. But by 1938, the Institute of Housing 
had a membership of 261, including 78 members who were 
chief housing officers within their local authorities. 
This fact helps to explain why the Institute defended 
hotly the existing technical orientation of public, 
housing management, and opposed the integrated, intensive 
and local approach advocated by the women. The majority 
of the Institute's members under such a reorganisation 
would have virtually lost their hold on a large part of 
their bailiwick and municipal housi ng, whi ch had become an 
extensive and capital intensive activity, would have been 
handed over to the benign control of women welfare 
workers - 
The Institute of Housing are of the opinion that 
social service should be kept entirely apart 
from the other functions of housing, e. g. rent 
collecting and repairs, on the grounds that only 
a few tenants require supervision and that the 
majority can therefore be left entirely alone, 
thus avoiding unnecessary expenditure on 
management. -? 7 
They rejected out of hand the Society of Women Housing 
Managers' advocacy of one manager for 300 properties on 
grounds of, ' cost, overlooking the fact that under the 
, sectional/technical system they. advocated,, local 
authorities usually employed (and still do) about one 
worker to every 40-65 dwellings. 28 
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THE CENTRAL HOUSING ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S FIRST REPORT 
ý_ 
A landmark in the history of municipal _ 
housing 
, was,,. _made " 
in 1939 by the fi rst report of the Cent rat Housing 
Advisory Committee, appointed by the Government to 
consider the problems of municipal council estates. It 
took evidence from both the Institute of Housing and the 
Society of Women Housing Managers, as well as many local 
authorities. It also visited estates throughout the 
country. 
The report brought into the open the central conflict 
between the two professional housing bodies, and on the 
whole f avou red the Society's approach over that of the 
institute. However, it failed to make clear-cut 
recommendations on many key issues - 
We are unable to recommend for general adoption 
in its entirety any of the systems which have 
been described to us. " 
It therefore failed to galvanise either support or 
opposition at a critical time in the evolution of housing 
management, when the overriding concern was how to cope 
with impoverished families and how to establish viable 
communities on the new estates. 
Nonetheless, many vital issues were raised by the report, 
which fitted with the changing needs of public housing 
and the growing concern bo. th for the welfare of tenants 
and the creation of a cohe rent housing service. 
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The report posed a series of critical management 
questions, revealing the members' own sense of fear and 
anxiety over the "slum problem" now transposed to 
municipal estates - 
"How shall the undesirables be dealt with? " 
"What steps can be taken to prevent the bed bug? " 
"How can he be supplied with the bare necessities 
of comfort? " 
Who shall teach him to cultivate his garden? - 
29 
The Committee estimated that 80% of tenants were "of a 
good standard" and only about 5% required "continuous 
supervision". But slums were not as easy to eradicate 
as had been imagined - 
"Others without continuous supervision will 
reproduce a slum atmosphere wherever they are 
sent and a few, a very few will be beyond 
reclamation. " 
The report recommended strongly the dispersal of this 
minority of probLem-prone tenants in the hope that good 
neighbours would upgrade them. They felt that this 
approach stood some chance on a , spacious cottage estate 
with a resident manager. 
But in the dense, flatted blocks the opposite happened - 
"The impact of one antagonistic person on another, 
the quarrels of children, the behaviour of a 
noisy tenant, may be magnified out of proportion 
to the importance of the actual event and cause 
a general feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction. 
Local authorities recognise the value of 
e xe rci sing a somewhat closer supervisory control 
over families Living in flats than over tenants on cottage estates. "0 
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In the event, local authorities only parti ally adopted 
a supervisory role, and problems built up rapidly. At 
_,. _ ._., --no stage was-it suggested-that--the """antagoni 
sti c" . tenants 
should not be rehoused in flats. This would have been 
the only possible solution, unless widespread and 
intensive policing was to be the management stance. 
However, flats were recognised as a permanent management 
problem because of their density, the proximity of 
neighbours and their unguarded common areas. - 
The report made a number of other usefuL points. It 
defended the door-to-door system of rent collection for 
all families, providing a vital point of contact. it 
stressed the need for good public transport to the outer 
estates and for social centres on all estates to rebuild 
a cohesive life for residents, especially since so many 
new residents from old slums were used to the vitality 
of city centres. 
The report also stressed that the landlord should retain 
responsibility for all functions including minor repairs 
and re de co rations, otherwise poorer, more vulnerable 
families would always be falling behind in their standards. 
An interesting but largely overlooked piece of advice was 
that the manager of a large estate should hold a university 
degree, which in pre-war times was an exceptional demand. 
Two universities, London and Cambridge, at that stage 
offered degrees in estate management. 
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On the question of women housing managers, the Committee 
was unequivocal in its approval, endorsing the personal 
approach and, the, combination of business wi. t_h-. soc. i al . ý.... _ . --. -. "ý.. 
matters - 
"The essential provision that the person 
responsible for ministering to the social needs 
of the tenants should be given some business 
reason for gaining periodical entry. " 
The Committee disagreed with the Institute's. view that 
social service should be kept separate from housing 
management - 
"The housewife is usually willing to talk more 
freely to another woman and to entrust her with 
a fuller degree of confidence. It is easier 
for a woman than for a man to be admitted to a 
house..... These are in our view strong 
arguments for employing women..... we see no 
satisfactory alternative to the appointment of 
a qualified woman officer competent to 
undertake all management duties if social 
service is to be carried out and economy 
secured. "31 
But the report failed to endorse unequivocally the 
central tenet of the Society of Women Housing Managers 
that one manager should handle - 
"rent collection, ordering and supervision of 
repairs and costing, selection and allocation 
of tenants, keeping records and accounts, 
Court work in connection with notices to quit, 
and social service. " 
It described the normal system of local authority 
management - 
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"In the main, management is incorporated in the 
ordinary machinery of Local government, 
different officers being responsible for such 
parts of the work as falls within their 
speci ali sed. -duties. -. - --The surveyor Looks-after 
the fabric of the houses, the treasurer sees to 
rent collecting and finance whilst the clerk 
exercises general supervisory functions, "32 
and lamented somewhat timidly the fact that only 17% of 
local authorities had appointed housing managers at all. 
The report did maintain, however, that no one system was 
best and that it had visited very well-run, popular 
estates under various systems of management. 
One of the impressions to come over from the 1939 report 
was that people were uprooted and rehoused in strange 
conditions that they did not readily take to and that 
they had to be helped to cope with. There was the 
blanket recommendation that all tenants should be assumed 
to be verminous and lice-infested - 
The cleansing process should be applied to all 
tenants as a routine. " 
Then there was the admonition that - 
"Houses must be guarded against misuse and the 
interests of neighbours must be protected..... 
Fi rm handling introducing an element of 
compulsion, is occasionally necessary, for a 
family must not be allowed to break the 
conditions of tenancy. " 
There was the added worry over flats - 
"where life is devoid of the spacious freedom 
of the cottage estate. " 
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At no point was the construction of new municipal 
housing for poor families questioned, yet the C. H. A. C. 
report conveyed a strong sense of its inappropriateness, 
exposing the raw nerves of both the uprooted 
communities and the politicians and bureaucrats who had 
charge of the construction and management. No one 
thought or dared to question the rightness of building 
brand new estates to replace old slums. No one ever 
wondered whether social problems were i ntens"i ti ed rather 
than ai Levi ated by the vast transfer of populations that 
went on in the thi rti es. Yet the C. H. A. C. report 
implied that all was not well with municipal housing. 
THE LOCAL AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT PROBLEM 
Developments in the L. C. C. between the wars illustrate 
the lack of a clear sense of direction in local authority 
housing management. After the war, with its great burst 
of housing activity, the L. C. C. in 1919 appointed a 
Director of Housing on the very high salary of E2,000 p. a. 
Housing development became a major part of the job and the 
Housing Manager of pre-war times became the Housing Estates 
Manager under the Di rector. In the 19208s the L. C. C. was 
building peripheral estates on a large scale, having 
reduced its inner city flat-building to a very small share. 
Ot course the early post-war houses were subsidised and 
r 
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bui't to a high standard and were therefore very 
attractive. ALL of these much more privileged 
developments had resident- superintendents, a system that 
seeºned to work well, but for some inexplicable reason 
focussed an integrated management se rvi ce where it was 
Least needed. * 
At that time 10% of the Council's stock was Let to L. C. C. 
emp'oyees, and several of the new outer post-war estates 
in such places as Bromley and Roehampton were considered 
very desirable residences for administrative staff. 
John Macey, later to become Controller of Housing at the 
G. L. C. with nearly a quarter of a million properties 
under his wing, was a favoured L. C. C. tenant under this 
scheme. The rest of the stock was let at this stage on 
a strict system of date orders - no f Llvou rs, no 
judgement, other than ability to pay. 
The resident superl ntendents were each responsible tor 
2,000 dweL Li ngs. The L. C. C. by its management system 
tied itself to the logic of large esttites, arguing that 
ý, Y 
one resident superintendent should mar, age, 2,000 dwellings. 
*As an interesting sidelight on management problems, in 
1921, the L. C. C. Housing Committee decided to prohibit 
the keeping of cockerels on its estates, though hens were 
allowed, and it also decided in 1923 to purchase four 
bikes for staff to use on the largest estates. (At that 
stage a bike cost about six times the average weekly wage, 
whereas today it costs half the weekly wagel). These 
two items, recorded in Council proceedings, give some 
notion both of the involvement of politicians in detailed 
management decisions and the lack of devolution to a local scale. 
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Within London, the estates were usually of several 
hundred dwellings and often did not warrant their own 
Yyý+M 
superintendent according to the L. C. C' s own standards. 
Here the rot set in, although there was always resident 
caretaking staff. Caretakers, however, were considered 
lowly employees and the records show that they were 
employed on roughly the same level as lavatory 
attendants. They had little responsibility except for 
small repairs and cleaning. Women were occasionally 
employed as caretakers too. There was no one actually 
in charge of most of the dense inner city blocks on the 
estate itself. 
By 1925, the L. C. C. had 20,000 dweL Li ngs and it decided 
to allocate a quarter of new lettings to "meet cases of 
hardship". It also reduced the quota of all lettings 
allocated to staff to 5% and at that stage some of the 
better-paid L. C. C. officers were asked to Leave the outer 
estates by the Council to make room for more needy 
tenants. 
By the late twenties, a number of factors coincided 
which led to a radical redirection of housing policy, 
first within the L. C. C. and later at a national level. 
First was the decision in 1925 to give some priority to 
needy families. Second, came a series of decisions 
between 1926 and 1928 Leading to a renewed emphasis on 
80 
flat-building within the central areas, abandoning the 
early post-war policy of building cottage estates on the 
outskirts of London. Thirdly, came the Lowering of 
building standards and conditions of tenancy to aLLow 
cheaper rents and to encourage poorer families to move 
in. " Otherwise flat-building in inner areas would have 
failed to achieve the desired objective of attracting poor 
families, thereby improving slum conditions. A prime 
motivation in all this was the growing pressure in 
remaining slum areas, as the poorest families were 
constantly displaced by redevelopment and pushed into 
receding and rapidly deteriorating old areas. 
The central management problem for the L. C. C. was that 
for most of the inner city blocks there was no coherent 
management system to cover rents, repai rs, lettings and 
welfare problems. As a result, management problems grew 
While the populations rehoused became more needy. 
In 1930, the L. C. C. recorded that - 
"The present system of management is an 
intelligent one which secures cleanly living 
on the part of the great majority of tenants 
..... Notwithstanding this there are 
undoubtedly some tenants who appear to be 
unable to appreciate to the full the 
accommodation afforded. " 
No sooner had the Council begun to rehouse genuinely needy 
tenants than the Lack of coherent management became aLL 
too apparent. While the Council blamed inadequate 
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tenants for failing to make proper use of their new 
accommodation, it did also make a radical shift in its 
`ýr 
management organisation. The L. C. C. made the bold 
ý, Rý_ 
decision in 1930, ten years after the Ministry of Health 
had first recommended it, to employ women housing 
managers with responsibility for door-to-door rent 
collection, repai rs, cleaning, tenancy matters and court 
action - 
"Although it has not hitherto been the practice 
to employ women for the purpose..... a woman is 
specially fitted to be the helper and adviser 
of tenants. " 
This decision was ahead of most other Local authorities, 
which continued to defend the prevailing system of- 
assorted departments handling fragments of the housing 
se rvi ce. However, the L. C. C. only sustained the 
intensive system for a few years and on a few estates. 
CONCLUSION 
Tne 1939 Government report lent offi ci al recognition for 
the first time to the problem of municipal estates, 
previously held as a solution per se; it recognised 
that large, uprooted communities containing only a small 
minority of impoverished or uncoping households posed 
special problems; it recognised after 40 years of 
intense building and nine years of special subsidies, the 
limitations of flats to house families and the special 
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demands they made on management; it brought into the 
open the critical division between Octavia Hill's method 
of. management and__cu. rrent -local authority practi ce, - 
propounded and defended by its practitioners in the 
Institute of Housing; above all, it recognised the vast 
social problems unleashed by highlighting the contrast 
between expensive new estates and overcrowded inner city 
slums from which the poor families came. 
The reaction among local authorities was to recognise 
the problems outlined, to move in jerky steps towards the 
creation of housing departments, but to reject 
unequivocally the central recommendation that one person, 
based on the estate for which he or she was responsible, 
should deal with any single tenant on all matters 
affecting his tenancy, including repairs. No local 
authority that we know of adopted across the board the 
decentralised integrated management system of the Society 
of Women Housing Managers. 
The L. C. C., wni ch had tentatively branched out into the 
Octavia Hill app roach in 1930 with the appointment of one 
woman manager and two female assistants, reacted 
defensively and narrowly. It is worth quoting in full 
from the report the Council produced in response to the 
Government - 
"The question of adopting the Octavia Hill system 
....: has been considered on more than one occasion 
and many of those who advocated the system 
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apparently took the view that the Council's 
system merely consisted of rent collection 
..... The Council's system, however, extends far beyond this and recognises the desirability 
.. _ _of 
making contact with fami lies f rom. slum. . 
clearance areas as early as possible and the 
need for after-care measu res..... The chief 
difference between the Councit's system and the 
Octavia Hill system are 
1) the Council mainly employs trained men of 
practi cal experience, while in the Latter 
system trained women managers are responsible 
for the management. 
2) the pivot of the Octavia Hill system is the 
combination of all functions of management and 
the door to . door collection of rents in one 
person, whereas in the Council's system all 
questions of principle or matters of a difficult 
technical nature are dealt with at the central 
office, and the bulk of the rents is collected 
at local offices. 
The Octavia Hill system is undoubtedly very 
successful when applied to working class dwellings 
previously subject to bad management and neglect, 
but it is doubtful whether it possesses any 
advantage over the Council's system. 
"We cannot subscribe to the view that it is essential 
in every case for one officer to maintain contact 
with a tenant for all purposes. 
"We do not accept the theory that women are, by reason 
of their sex, more sui table than men for this [housing 
management] work. 
We see no adequate reason, therefore, in the interests 
either of the Council or its tenants, to suggest a 
radical change in the existing system. " , 
In defence of its own centrally organised system, the L. C. C. 
argued that door-to-door collection was more expensive than 
office collection; that soci at welfare combined with rent 
collection would slow down the rent collectors and involve 
a large increase in staff; and that in any case tenants 
were often vi sited by superintendents or surveyors from 
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the centre. 
___.. u 
The 
. -L.. 
C. 
_C. __. 
ha. d a very_ intensive staff ratio, _higher 
than 
_. _. -. 
even the resident, estate-based housing trusts, and 
could certainly have organised integrated local management 
if it wanted. However, it would have had to break up 
its now vast central empire, employing over 22 thousand 
workers. The L. C. C. did not admit that estate management 
at estate level was necessary. It reinforced the strong 
trend towards sectional, centrally operated housing 
departments, of which it had been the pioneer. 
The existing housing management structure offered little 
or no social support and had few devices for coping with 
the management problems of the very poor. Slum rehousing 
had begun before this question was addressed, and when it 
was finally raised in the late thirties, the Institute of 
Housing, with its powerful local authority following, took 
an entrenched and defensive position, rejecting out of 
hand the management approach that was tai for-made to solve 
these very problems -a local manager combining soci at, 
financial and organisational skills, working intensively 
and intimately in a small patch, so that all families no 
matter how poor or disarrayed could be reached and helped. 
The women advocates of this longstanding management 
tradition f ai led to make thei r mark and faded rapi dly 
from the scene thereafter. * Municipal housing management 
has yet to recover from these failures of the inter-war 
pe ri od. 
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CHAPTER III - POSE-WAR HOUSING - THE MASS COUNCIL BOOM 
"We don't constrain ourselves witn plans at 
the beginning when ignorance is highest" 
-"In Search of Excellence" 
SECOND WORLD WAR - MAJOR SHORTAGE 
The Second World War brought all building to a vi rtual 
halt and created another major housing shortage, this 
time principally through bomb damage. Three-quarters of 
a million homes were either demolished by bombing or 
seriously damaged - out of 11'-x- million. Rent controls 
continued on vi rtually all private rented dwellings, 
accelerating the decay of the old stock of city housing. 
Strict rent controls remäined till the late fifties, 
thereby depriving L andLo rds of funds tor repairs. 
Yet 66.7% of homes at the end of the war dated from before 
the Fi rst World War and were in constant need of 
renovati ono Many private landlords gave up the rented 
market in the decades of tight rent control following the 
Second World War. 
Because of scarcity and lack of repairs, the war gave a 
huge spurt to council housing programmes. The general 
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neglect of old city property fed into the massive slum 
clearance programmes of the late fifties and sixties. 
The crude - _posytwar, 
shortage forced Government to act 
and the war itself generated an ethos of state 
intervention that made it easy for the post-war Labour 
Government to take on the housing problem as a major 
plank of its soci aL strategy. 
LABOUR'S HOUSING FOR ALL 
In 1945, the Labour Government was determined to make 
council housing a general service like health and education, 
available to anyone rather than a means-tested welfare 
provision for the poorest, as it had become in the thirties. 
The Government saw its role as in spi ring and subsi di sing 
housing development with local authorities as the principal 
builders and landlords. The Green Belt was introduced 
as a major innovation in city planning, which very much 
encouraged dense council building within the cities, 
while attempting to protect more general envi ronmental 
conditions. 
New Towns were launched as a pathfinder to better social 
conditions, especially housing conditions, spearheaded 
by the State. The belief in Town Planning was never 
stronger. New towns enjoyed the unique feature of being 
built by public authorities both for renting and 
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owner-occupation, but they largely excluded the very 
poorest and most disadvantaged families by tying access 
to accommodation . 
to jobs within new town. industries. 
Nonetheless, new towns made a special contribution to 
the public sector housing stock by taking in a broader 
spectrum of social groups than had previously been heard 
of or than was usually contemplated in the cities. 
The poorest groups and the racial minorities. on the whole 
remained locked within the cities in private-rented 
dwellings. The Labour Government was conscious of the 
problems of acqui ring and building on expensive city sites 
and introduced a special additional subsidy in 1949 to 
encourage a mixture of houses and flats on such sites to 
diversify new city building away from flats alone. 
Improvement grants for older property were also introduced. 
Unfortunately, these imaginative new subsidies had little 
take-up at that point. 
Unlike health and education, housing could not readily be 
provided universally by the State. There was such 
I- 
scarcity that demand was too great to be met by public 
effort only; in any case, the private sector still owned 
nearly 90% of homes after the war and there were strong 
political differences over the desirability of mass council 
housi ng. 
Nonetheless, in the six years after the war, the bulk of 
housing was built by councils - about 80% of the total. 
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By 1951, Labour had built over three-quarters of a milli on 
council homes, nearly as many in six years as were built 
in the whole inter-war period, many of them flats in 
blocks over four storeys. But shortages continued with 
a further million homes still needed urgently. Mainly 
because of this sense of urgency, public house-building 
retained its dominant position as the major provider of 
new housing till the sixties. 
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There was no slum clearance in this period since the 
housing shortage was so acute, and councils either built 
on bombed sites or went outside, the cities. The urban 
Land shortage reinforced the trend towards flat-building 
which seemed the only answer to city problems. In the 
cities with the biggest housing problems, very few houses 
were built in spite of the 1949 additional subsidy for 
mixed developments of flats and houses. 
THE CONSERVATIVES' MASSIVE BUILDING PROGRAMME 
The Conservative Government elected in 1951 expanded the 
housing drive even further, and within a short period of 
about two years, shifted the emphasis to owner-occupation 
as an ideal. Council housing was no longer for all, but 
for those who couldn't or wouldn't buy. Under the 
Conservative Minister of Housing, Harold MacMillan, a 
300,000 homes a year target was pledged and met for most 
of the next 11 years. This was nearly double Labour's 
average rate. 3- million new houses were built, over 
half by local authorities in spite of the Conservative 
preference for private housing. By 1960, the stock of 
council dwellings had more than tripled from pre-war 
levels, although by the end of the fifties private 
building was beginning to overtake the rate of council 
building. 
The following table illustrates the much faster rate of 
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expansion in the council sector than in any other. 
While private renting shrank and owner-occupation al most 
- 
doubled, council 
-renting 
more than tripled. 
3. OWNERSHIP OF HOUSING 1938 and 1960 (in millions) 
Tenure 1938 1960 
% of total 
in 1960 
Owner-occupier 3.7 6.4 45.7% 
New towns and local authorities 1.1 3.6 21.0% 
Private rented and miscellaneous 6.6 4.6 32.8% 
Total 11.4 14.6 100.0% 
Source: Housing Policy Green Paper 1977 
LOWER STANDARDS AND HIGHER SUBSI DIES FOR FLATS 
In order to speed the production of homes, the 
Conservatives in 1951 drastically reduced space standards. 
' 
Densities were increased to enable more homes on scarce 
and expensive land. 
2 Housing, especially public housing, 
became meaner. Extra subsidies became available for 
expensive land, mostly in inner city areas. These 
subsidies became an albatross. Designed to overcome the 
barriers to council building where it was believed to be 
most needed, it actually encouraged councils to build in 
locations, in a style, at a density and on a scale that 
later proved highly unpopular and undesi rabLe. In a 
sense it was killing the goose that Laid the golden egg. 
Because councils were encouraged through subsidy to buy 
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expensive Land, it seemed more economical to build at 
higher densities, thereby rationalising the extra cost 
of, the. l and. 
3 Al_so,,, i. ts_eemed the. only way to, provi de __ 
adequate internal space for the growing population. 
However, since high-density fL ats were more expensive 
to build than houses, this circular logic led to more 
subsidies which in turn encouraged more flats. 
Ironically, within another 10 years the demand for 
family-sized dwellings within the public sector was to 
fall drastically and the space standards provided by 
flat-building were often too generous. 
4 
THE SWING TO FLATTED ESTATES 
The style of council housing under the impact of such a 
massive and fai rly continuous upsurge in building was 
changing and becoming gigantesque. 
At the beginning of Conservative rule in 1951, over 85% 
of council building was still in the form of houses, 
although the rate of council flat-building was already 
much higher than in the private sector. Government 
subsidies for flat-building inevitably led to an 
inexorable rise in the proportion of council dwellings in 
that form as the following diagram illustrates. 
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Source: "Politics of Mass Housing". P. Dunleavy 
Flats were on the ascendancy throughout the fifties, and 
by the mid-sixties comprised over half of the council 
dwellings being built. 
Among owner-occupiers the proportion of flats and 
maisonettes remained at a fairly steady low figure of 7%. 
The vast expansion in the proportion of flats, traditionally 
ý' and continuingly unpopular in this country, was accounted 
for by ever-increasing subsidies for flats, with larger 
subsidies'for more floors addeda 
The cost of building high-rise flats was 50% greater 
than building houses. Yet the subsidy tor a high-rise 
flat in the years 1956-61 was three times higher than for 
a house. This gave councils an incentive to build high. 
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By 1965, it was reduced to double. When once the extra 
subsidy for high-rise was abolished in 1968, councils 
stopped building in that style. It was never economic 
to build that way, which makes the mass production in the- 
hated style all the more absurd. 
5. PROPORTIONAL COST OF BUILDING FLATS COMPARED WITH HOUSES. 
1964, AND SUBSIDY LEVELS (1956-1965) 
Cost Subsidy Subsi dy Style (base 1 00) (actual 1965 1956-61) 
House 100 £22.1 £64 
4-storey flats 114 £32 £89 
10-storey flats 145 £57 £109 
15-storey flats 150 £66 £107 
Source: P. Dunleavy, "Politics of Mass Housing" 
As an illustration of how subsidies favoured high building. 
the Housing Subsidies Act of 1967 Laid down the following 
sliding scales 
Per dwelling 
(a) Dwellings in 4-storey blocks........... £8 a year 
(b) Dwellings in 5-storey blocks........... £14 a year 
(c) Dwellings in blocks of over 5 storeys.. £26 a year 
There were strong regional vari ati ons in the proportion of 
flats, relating directly to land costs and therefore 
eligibility for extra subsidy. In 1967,91% of the homes 
built by the G. L. C. were in flats, 65% of which were in 
high-rise blocks. By 1971, two-thi rds of the counci L 
stock in the London area was in the form of flats compared 
with 10%'for rural areas. 
6 In the inner areas of 
Bi rmi ngham, Liverpool and Manchester, proportions were 
approaching these. Flats became a hallmark of council 
housing in our large centres of population. 
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The following diagram illustrates the change in style of 
construction and the strong swing to fl at-bui L di ng from 
the early fifties onwards. 
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SIZE OF ESTATES 
. It., i. s... ve. ry di f. f. i cult _. to-know -the. -numbers-"of="dweLLi ngs 
being built per estate in the council sector compared 
with the private sector during the period, as no record 
can be traced of this information. The most 
/- 
records' show that post-war estates tended to be larger 
than pre-war, and the Priority Estates Project reports8 
informative examinations of housing policy, history and 
development appear to have overlooked this important 
element. However, the mass building of council estates 
on a large scale by one landlord was bound to lead to 
attempts at land consolidation in the hope that 
economies of scale would come into play. Large 
contractors who played a major part in council building 
programmes, because of their scale and because the 
single landlord favoured single, large contracts, also 
encouraged estate building on large sites. The L. C. C. 
7 
show that more modern estates of the sixties and 
seventies were bigger than the thirties to fifties 
estates. The most di rect evidence we have is collected 
by Patrick Dunleavy in his lengthy study of flat-building 
and the high-rise movement. He showed the contrast 
between the size of private and public house-building 
contracts. The gap indicated what experience would 
bear out, that council estates have been built with many 
more dwellings per estate than the private estates that 
appear so" popular. 
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7. PROPORTIONS OF NEW CONSTRUCTION BY VALUE IN CONTRACT VALUE 
RANGES. 1969 
Contracts valued at: 
- -1111.1-1- -- ---- 
Public sector 
housing 
Private sector 
-housin 
Under E100,000 15% 80% 
£100,001 - 25 0,000 12% 12% 
£250,001 - 500,000 19% 5% 
E500,001 - 1,000,900 20% 2% 
£1,000,001 - 2,000,000 14'%. 2% 
Over E2,000,000 19% 0% 
Source: P. Dunleavy 
(See later chapter for more detail on size). 
The table illustrates the heavy bias in the private sector 
towards small contracts, producing 20 houses or less in a 
single contract, compared with one-third of public sector 
contracts covering at least 200 dwellings. 
Thus under the aggressive housing policies, first of the 
euphoric post-war Labour Government and then of the 
housing-conscious Conservative Administration of 1951-1964, the 
Large, inhuman style of modern flatted council estates 
became accepted. 
REDEVELOPMENT 
Councils and governments, wni le encouraging industry, 
offices and homes to move out of cities, had still not 
recognised the now relentless decline of city areas and 
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continued to build at a rate and density set by outdated 
population predictions. 
8° DEI: i.. INE IN CITY POPULATION AND INCREASE IN NATIONAL POPULATION 
POPULATION TRENDS IN 9 MAJOR URBAN AREAS* IN THE U. K. 
1931-1981, COMPARED TO NATIONAL POPULATION TRENDS IN 
THE U. K. (with cumulative population increase/decrease 
shown as 7. ) 
1931 1951 1961 1971 1981 
Population of 
9 major urban 8.9m. 7.9m. 7.6m. 7.5m. 6.5m. 
areas in U. K. (-11%) (-15%) (-16%) (-277. ) 
Total population 46. Om. 50.3m. 52.8m. 55.6m. 56.3m. 
of U. K. (+9%) (+15%) (+21'%) (+22%) 
Inner London, Birmingham, Kingston-upon-Hull, Leeds, 
Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Nottingham, 
Sheffield. 
Mil 
6 
Population of 
9 major urban 
areas in U. K. 
5 
02 
4 
Total population 
of U. K. 
"3 
I- 
2 
Source: Census Data 
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Outer boroughs and county councils restricted counci l 
building, partly to preserve the Green Belt and partly 
ýýý 
to preserve Land for more prosperous 
, 
or, xmor_e, ýdesi, rabl, e,,. ý,..., ýy,. r,. ý, .... 
private developments, also partly to retain a 
Conservative vote in the suburban and rural electorate. 
Council tenants were often considered Labour voting 
fodder. The consensus was also that they brought inner 
city soci al problems with them to new council estates. 
Therefore council efforts were further concentrated in 
Labour-controlled city authorities where land was scarce 
and expensive, and slums were worst. To some extent 
also, the Conservatives in the fifties and Labour in the 
sixties felt obliged to continue the expensive land and 
high flat subsidies as the only way of producing the 
volume of dwellings believed to be needed and of helping 
the needy inner cities to tackle their worst slums 
through major redevelopment programmes. 
SLUM CLEARANCE 
Because of the pressure during the fifties for Large-scale, 
fast production of council housing and because the 
authorities witting to undertake big public housing 
programmes were on the whole the dense, Labour-controlled 
city authorities, shortage of building land became the 
absolute 'barrier to progress. The only way to get land 
on sufficient scale in the cities was to demolish existing 
housing. 
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Thus in the fifties demolition became again a main plank 
of the council housing programme, after a 20-year 
The policy of large-scale demolition was sustained 
through subsidies to the mid-seventies although the 
public mood swung against it progressively from the 
late sixties. 
9. COUNCIL HOUSE BUILDING AND SLUM CLEARANCE 
1945 - 1975 
200,000 
180,000 
160,000 
140,000 
120,000 
100,000 
80,000 
60,000 
40,000 
20,000 
/I 
Source: Ministry of Housing and Local government 
and Department of the Environment Housing 
and Construction Statistics. rtr3ttYi1r_ .1_. : .., v 
'New° büi Ld -"Housing Policy" " 1977: "` '' ' 
The level of demolition was not hard to justify from the 
councils' or Government' s point of view. Five million 
X11 
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102 
S 
homes lacked basic amenities. At the end of the war, 
42% of households had no access to a bath at all. In 
---. -1951 69% of all households--either --shared -a'-horneor 
lacked basic amenities. Objectively, insanitary, 
overcrowded conditions seemed to justify demolition. 
However, a perceptive elderly tenant from the Byker 
district of central Newcastle, which was for years a 
blighted slum clearance area, observed that baths, sinks 
and hot water could have been installed in many of the 
popular but old and unplumbed terraces: 
"It's wicked - these-houses have been under 
demolition order for 20 odd years, and you know - 
they could've been saved, they could've just 
given us a bath and hot water. "9 
FLAWS IN SLUM CLEARANCE 
The slum clearance policy set in train a series of new 
housing problems that were i LL- con si dered at the time. 
The demolition programmes themselves were often based on 
misconceptions about housing need, housing policies and 
the social consequences of massive intervention. 
First, it is cheaper and easier to instal amenities in 
existing buildings than to displace whole communities, 
demolish and start again. 
case in the '19th century. 
Octavia Hill had made this 
The- L. C. C. - did not agree. 
They argued in 1880 that only by building new could they 
provide adequate modern homes with proper amenities. 
Peter Wilmott and Michael Young, Like Octavia Hill, 
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argued the case for saving East End Victorian terraced 
houses in 1957: 
he .. ve rwhe l mi ng mä jo ri ty [of' East Enders] want 
a house, rather than a flat, inside, rather 
than outside the East End. Should the aim not 
be to provide as many new and reconditioned 
houses as possible while avoiding di spe rsal? "1 0 
Not until the 19700s did subsidies substantially favour 
rehabilitation over slum clearance and even then the 
fi nanci al incentives were often too marginal for 
structurally sound but badly run-down houses. Although 
basic amenity installation grants had first become 
available before the war and were greatly increased in 
the sixties, these were not adequate to cover major 
repairs, such as damp-proofing, roof replacement, 
replastering, modern heating. Therefore, slum clearance 
continued to be the favoured economic option after it had 
outlived its usefulness. At the same time, the building 
industry was geared almost enti rely to new building on 
"clean" sites and had been for nearly 200 years. The 
messy and unpredictable work of rehabilitation was more 
suited to a small repairs firm than to a large-scale 
building contractor. Most were very slow to adapt to 
the opportunities provided by rehabilitation. 
.I--J. 
X. ---I. AI. -ýI.. 4. I.. 0ý 
"UNFIT" 
Second, a Large proportion of the houses declared unfit 
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during the slum clearance decades were not actually 
proved to be unfit. It was never required that 
councils should prove houses were slums. Until public 
opposition to demolition emerged in the seventies, it 
was sufficient simply to declare properties unfit. In 
fact the G. L. C. in a house condition survey in 1967 found 
that 69% of the properties it was demolishing in the late 
sixties had been assessed as structurally sound. London 
alone lost 54,000 structurally sound properties in the 
period of 1967-71. The last major redevelopment area to 
be demolished in Islington was the Westbourne Road area 
of Holloway. There at least 60% of the houses were 
found to be structurally sound when surveyed. In the 
end the four-storey terraces were demolished on social 
grounds based on the Medical Officer of Health's report 
on overcrowding, crime and prostitution. The area was 
demolished in the early seventies amid a fever of 
enthusiasm for renovation and opposition to demolition 
in adjacent areas. 
11 
Local authorities defined slums in a very arbitrary way. 
Welwyn Garden City in assessing its housing stock 
claimed to have the same proportion of slums as the 
mining towns of the Rhondda. Liverpool, Salford and 
Bolton, with similar Coronation Street-style back-to- 
backs, claimed respectively that 43%, 34% and 10% of 
their Victorian terraces were "slums". Far too little 
control was exercised over slum clearance, and no 
acceptable standard for subsidising or alternatively 
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preventing demolition was enforced. Councils' 
compulsory purchase powers were greatly increased 
-. ---. between-1.951-1-97.1-, - -making it ever easier for--- Large. -areas '-- ý---° 
to be swept away under the bu Ll doze r. Councils were 
i 
allowed to add areas of "fit" housing to clearance areas 
in order to produce large and neat packets of land. 
Some demolition areas, especially in London, were 
declared primarily because there were large gardens and 
councils could therefore gain land. The massive scale 
of slum clearance inevitably fed the "mass housing" ideas 
of modern architects and planners. Birminghams first 
post-war clearance area covered no less than 50,000 
properties, in one grand sweep through the central city, 
to be followed a few years later by a further 50,000 
properties. No wonder it proceeded to build the 
largest concentration of tower-block flats of any city 
in Western Europe - over 400 blocks above six storeys. 
The whole approach to poor city communities was 
insensitive, inflexible and devastating in its impact, 
like its chief implement, the bulldozer. 
I- 
TIME LAG IN CLEARANCE 
Another element almost totally i gnored by redevelopment 
advocates was the housing havoc created by the long 
time-Lag, usually of 10 years or more, between deciding 
to demolish and completing a new housing scheme. One 
area of Newham took over 30 years to redevetop. 
12 Some 
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areas of Islington were blighted by redevelopment plans 
for 15 years or more. Over the slum clearance bonanza 
-- -- - period, -. areas were zLow. ly-empt. ied and demoLi_shed. _., _ 
piecemeal causing a loss of housing space and thereby 
generating even more housing need in the short-term and 
running up vast costs in terms of idle land, lost rents 
and rates and social disturbance. It has been 
caL cul ated that it wi LL take the London Borough of 
Camden 100 years to make up for the Loss of. dwelling 
spaces through redevelopment. This is in spite of 
frequently very high densities within the rebuilt estate. 
The. effect on the "slum" population was to disperse many 
of the people in advance of the demolition programme. 
This meant that by the time many city housing schemes 
came to fruition, the population designated to occupy 
them was no Longer there, heralding Large estates for 
which planned demand had partially evaporated. 
The huge waiting lists for council homes were often 
artificially created at the height of the demolition 
era, But slum clearance in most city areas actually 
caused a substantial Loss of population with up to half 
the previous population being "dishoused" out of the 
area in the process, as the long waiting Lists forced 
desperate but able families to look elsewhere for a 
home, often choosing to buy in the suburbs or move to a 
new town. Even in the central Byker district of 
Newcastle, where there was an absolute commitment to 
rehouse the tight-knit old community back into the new 
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Byker, only one-fifth of the residents actually survived 
the long phases of redevelopment to move into the new 
, _. _.. ___ .. 
BY_ke, r,,. estate. . 
The o. the. r _four, -_f. 
i. fths... we, r. e_.. di. spersed.. by--...,.. _ 
the bulldozer. 13 The depopulation figures for the 
cities in part illustrate the impact of slum clearance. 
Over the 50 years from 1931 to 1981, the population 
14 
in our cities shrank from 9-,, mi LLion to 62 million. 
About 2 million of those who left were directly uprooted 
by slum clearance. 
Thus the clearance plans generated big demand, leading 
to pressure for high density rebuilding schemes, while 
at the same time displacing large numbers of the 
residents for whom rebuilding was taking place. 
IMPETUS TO DECLINE 
The irony of modern housing policy lies in the 
accelerated decline of most inner city areas, actually 
fuelled by the redevelopment process. The very areas 
with the worst slums and greatest overcrowding were 
already suffering severe unemployment, industrial decay, 
and suburban flight by all who could escape. The 
post-war new towns policy was built on tnis desire to 
move out to greener pastures. Demolition on a large 
scale forced a flood of both population and small-scale 
industry-that has not been attracted back. The stow 
1 
slide became a heLter-skeLter under the impact of massive 
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redevelopment schemes. 
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DISPERSING SLUMS 
The most significant element in slum clearance was the 
dispersal of settled urban neighbourhoods that it 
caused. Without romanticising old slum streets, there 
can be little doubt that the people involved in the 
displacement suffered an acute sense of loss. 35% of 
women in Newcastle high-rise flats claimed to prefer 
their old, terraced slums. Today in Liverpool, tenants 
are voting with their feet. 1 0,000 households prefer 
to share accommodation in terraced housing rather than 
to live in self-contained council flats. In their 
seminal book, "Family and Kinship in East London", 
Wi l mott and Young were told by the overwhelming majority 
of East Enders they interviewed that they wanted to stay 
put in terraced houses in the oLd streets. Not for 
nothing has the nostalgia of Coronation Street survived 
for 10 years on ITV as the most popular television 
programme among viewers. In Manchester, Liverpool, 
Salford, Oldham, Blackburn, the Victorian terraced house 
is the prize council offer, not the modern flat. The 
irony is that in the inner area of Salford, it is 
actually quite hard to locate the few surviving streets, 
so dominant are the ugly modern blocks that replaced them. 
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Planners were often quite clear about the aim and 
effect of slum clearance - 
The task is surely to break up such groupings 
[slum dwellers], even though the people seem 
to be satisfied with their miserable 
environment and seem to enjoy an extrovert 
social Life within their own locality. " 
This statement was made in 1963 by the Chief Planner at 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. 
Attempting to rid ourselves of the soci at stigma of 
slums was almost universally assumed to be a constructive 
attack on housing need until the consequences of the 
alternative became clear in the late sixties and 
seventies: 
"One result is that a considerable movement 
of people takes place over long distances 
with devastating effect on the social groups 
built up over the years. " 
Unfortunately while the redevelopment phase was in full 
spate, this was often seen as a good thing. The 
consequences in terms of social mal ai se were often 
minimised, under a form of derision of low-income 
households' ability to adapt or be grateful, "the coals 
in the bath" syndrome. 
1" 
In sum, a very cavalier attitude to the cost of slum 
clearance, in both social and financial terms, and to 
the newly-fashionable styles of post-war housing, 
determined the ease with which over 12 million homes were 
demolished between 1945 and 1980. The replacement of 
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old slums with unpopular new estates was made inevitable 
by two other major elements: the design and scale of 
- --- --new. -counci-L --housi-ng;... -.. and the reL ati. ve., negLect.. of.. _. housi-ng. -r..., --.. - 
management in the face of poli ti cal enthusiasm for 
numbers of dwellings. 
THE NEW ESTATES 
Subsidies favoured flats over the 40 years from 1930 to 
1970, multi-storey flats being more favoured than Low- 
rise for a period of about 15 years up till 1967. The 
impact on the council stock, particularly in cities, was 
substantial and a high proportion (about two-thirds) of 
unpopular estates are large and flatted and located in 
city areas (see later chapter). At least half of these 
are estimated to be industrially built. The style of 
private housing was the opposite, built in small pockets, 
ove rwhe L mi ngly in houses built of traditional materials. 
10. PERCENTAGES OF HOUSES AND FLATS 1981 
Houses Flats* Total 
Owner-occupied 93% 7% 100% 
Local authority or 66% 33% 100% new towns 
Source - General Household Survey 
*Flats includes maisonettes built as dwellings on two 
floors but in a block comprising 3 or more storeys. 
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The fashion for including maisonettes on the new dense 
estates, an attempt at building high and dense blocks 
-- -whi le' provi di ng'-a -dweL-l-ing more- Like --a -house -than a- ý" 
flat, and therefore hopefully more suitable for families, 
usually with two internal storeys or floors, crept in in 
the fifties. The style became more and more dominant 
in the late sixties as tower blocks fell from favour 
until management problems, generated by lack of privacy 
and supervision, noise disturbance, Large numbers of 
children above ground and a general dislike of the often 
complex and unorthodox design, made it possibly the most 
unpopular. type of council dwelling of all. Nonetheless, 
substantial numbers were built and by 1981,16 33% of the 
total council stock comprised flats and maisonettes, with 
possibly nearly half a million in the form of 
maisonettes. 
BIG SEEMED BETTER 
Why did the Government invest so much extra money in an 
unpopular form of housing? The shortage of land and the 
ambition to provide more internal space made flat-building 
seem logical from the outset in the 1880's. The large 
scale of building required by governments because of the 
post-war housing crisis and the demand generated by slum 
clearance favoured dense, high building. 
It was also easier in administrative and financial terms 
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to deal in large contracts, and big builders were 
prepared to eat out of the hands of willing local 
--- f--- ---authori ties. The greatest single factor, however , was-- -}- 
the di rect involvement of the architectural profession 
in government and in big building forms. Post-war 
architectural fashion was firmly wedded to large-scale, 
dense, high-rise housing. Architects were often hi red 
direct by big construction firms to handle large council 
building contracts. According to P. Dunleavy, almost 
every leading British post-war architect was identified 
with the design and production of high-rise mass 
housing. By the 1960's deals between local authorities, 
major architects and large construction firms were 
commonplace. Only 32% of local authority dwellings 
were contracted through open tendering in 1964.17 (See 
P. Dunleavy for detailed documentation of this process). 
The whole local and central government system came to 
favour large-scale, mass-produced housing as foreseen by 
the idle visionary of modern architecture, Le Corbusier: 
We must create the mass production spi rit. The 
spirit of constructing mass production houses. 
The spirit of living in mass production houses. " 
(From "Towards a New Architecture", by Le Corbusier) 
There was an almost fanciful desire to create' extraordinary 
environments and to experiment with unheard-of building 
forms. Equally there was an obsession with ugliness 
over which the public exercised no control. Bare, 
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unadorned facades of grey concrete or sheet glass were 
the sophisticated design rage. Even guttering and 
WY , 
window sills became obsolete for a time. 
18 Vain 
M .. 
attempts in recent years by the Royal Institute of 
B ri ti sh Architects to refute such cri ti ci sm coming from 
quarters as varied as tenants' federations and 
associations and the Royal family, have sounded 
remarkably hollow. 
/- 
FASHION FOR HIGH-RISE 
Behind the Government's post-war housing targets lay the 
new architectural mode - that of determining social 
contact through the physical structure of new housing, 
"the village in the sky". The arrogance of these 
architectural assumptions was obvious to the general 
populace and only public authorities had the capital and 
the power to experiment on a damagingly large scale. 
In Britain the private sector built on a miniscule scale 
in the style of Le Corbusier and his ilk. Not so 
public bodies - the desire for large-scale and high- 
density fed off the ambitions of young architects to 
replace slums with a new Mecca. Tom Wolfe in his 
scathing denunciation of modern architecture sums up the 
social disaster of mass high-rise council housing: 
"On each floor there were covered walkways, in keeping with Corbusi. er'9 idea of 'streets in 
the ai r'. Since there was no other place in 
the project [estate] in which to sin in public, 
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whatever might ordinarily have taken place in 
bars, brothels, social clubs, pool halls, 
amusement arcades, general stores, corncribs, 
rutabaga patches, hayricks, barn stalls, now 
took place in the. streets in the ai r. _ .___ Corbusier's boulevards made Hogarth's Gin Lane 
look like the oceanside street of dreams. 
Respectable folk pulled out, even if it meant 
living in cracks in the sidewalks. " 
(Extract from "Bauhaus, to Our House", Tom Wolfe) 
Planners and sociologists backed the architectural 
fashion almost unequivocally, although Peter Townsend, 
Peter Wi l mott and a few others presented serious concern 
for the consequences of the expensive craze. People on 
the ground, housing managers, caretakers and tenants, 
were not asked on the whole, and did not find a voice 
against the new style of housing till very late in the 
day. The failure of high-rise and high-density, mass 
council housing was only recognised officially after the 
fashion had passed and after the costs had become 
prohibitive. But the failure also showed up in the low 
demand for the big new estates, many of which were 
difficult to let as early as the late sixties. 
19 
Ordinary people did not Like the style or the social 
consequences. One estate of tower blocks in Knowsley, 
Merseyside, was blown up as redundant in 1983, without 
it ever having been fully occupied in its 10-year life. 
Another estate in Glasgow was taken down when it was only 
built up to the second floor, because there was no demand 
for the type of dwellings it would offer. (See later 
chapters for more detail. ) 
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LAND SCARCITY IN CITIES 
-... __.... The_, oth. e r _e_l. e, me, nt, : whi. ch 
f avou red hi gh- ri 
large estates has- been frequently referred to - land 
scarcity, and subsidies favouring the acquisition of 
expensive land. This policy aimed to help hard-pressed 
cities but in fact saddled them with too much housing in 
depopulating areas at an unacceptable density on land 
that was so valuable that high-rise/high-de. nsity building 
seemed inevitable, as a justification for the initial 
outlay. 
Le Corbusier seized on the crowded nature of cities and 
/- 
argued for a nuclear view of city development with high 
densities in the centre, thinning out to leafy spacious 
suburbs on the outskirts. His view of spacious suburbs 
might be viable, but the nuclear city is not, packed as 
it is with low-income, ex-slum families forced to live 
at densities sometimes even higher than the previous 
crowded slum houses. Although there are large unused 
areas around flatted estates reducing overall densities, 
the blocks themselves often have absurdly high densities, 
creating a caged atmosphere which the surrounding 
dereliction, often planned as "leafy communal space", 
intensifies. Half the displaced slum dwellers of the 
post-war years have been rehoused back into flatted 
blocks in inner cities. About 80% of high-rise building 
is concentrated in inner. areas - replicating previous 
slum conditions, but rationally planned on the grounds of 
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land shortage and a modern and sanitary answer to 
space-starved cities. As we have learnt to our cost, 
the -rationalism of-., -the the, rni-st -architectural 
movement created a kind of human folly with 100-foot- 
high buildings held together with only one in 20 of. 
the requisite bolts, and unable to take a gas supply 
for fear of explosion. 
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INDUSTRIALISED SYSTEM BUILDING 
Another element in the post-war style of flat-building 
was the favour which industrialised building found among 
public authorities. It was actively encouraged by 
Governments, both Conservative and Labour, since it was 
expected that industrialised building would be cheaper, 
quicker and larger in scale: 
"The Minister proposes to launch a concentrated 
drive to increase and improve the use of 
industrialised methods in housebui l di ng for 
the public sector..... 
The advantages for housing authorities..... 
On numbers: this is the only way to build 
the number of houses we need. 
On speed of erection: most industrialised 
techniques show worthwhile savings. 
On price: for flats, industrialised techniques 
are al''ready'slightl'y cheaper ..... bu*t-"effici'ent 
organisation of supply and demand can bring 
down promotion costs. 
On desi gn: the use of carefully prepared 
standard designs will release scarce 
professional time to concentrate on raising 
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the quality of layouts. 
On construction quality: industrialised 
methods facilitate quality control. " 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government 1965 (17) 
2Oa 
None of the claims proved true. It failed to become a 
cheaper option for a number of reasons - the materials 
were more expensive, and their bulk made them awkward 
and expensive to transport; the extra elaborate 
machinery needed to construct industrialised housing 
added to the costs; meanwhile labour costs were only 
marginally reduced. 
Industri ali sed bui lding was only rarely faster than more 
traditional methods-, in spite of such claims being 
continually made for it. One reason was that the other 
elements in the time scale, such as clearing the site, 
planning and design work, were as long and so the actual 
building time was only one small element. Another 
problem was the unfamiliarity of the techniques and the 
lack of skill of the largely casual labour force. 
Another problem was the intense supervision requi red 
because of the complexities of engineering. - In 
practice, this supe rvi si on was often i nadequ ate. 
Although it may have been the only building method 
capable of producing the volume of dwellings planned, 
with hindsight, supply was to outstrip demand in many 
areas and much demand was artificially generated through 
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demolition to make room for the new buildings, so 
volume of production was an invalid justification too. 
Industrialised building has left a legacy of technical 
problems, some of which are unresoLvabLe. About 3,000 
Bison flats will probably have to be demolished less 
than 20 years after they were built. Several other 
standard industrial systems are now being questioned 
21 
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for their safety and the total bill for remedies is likely 
to be in the realm of many millions. Often panel- 
constructed flats have no insulation at all, with the 
concrete panels positively conducting cold air into the 
dwellings, causing extensive condensation and damp. 
Roof weights were reduced to a bare minimum, with 
inadequate allowances for the impact of wind. Flat 
roofs and open decks and corridors have leaked on many 
industrially built estates. The list is endless and 
sometimes frightening. 
UNPOPULAR, UNGOVERNABLE STYLE 
There are so many structural elements in the design of 
council housing over the last 35 years that have led to 
its increasing unpopularity that it is impossible to 
list them all. Unguarded common areas are known to 
cause insecurity and vandal damage, yet almost all council 
flats have such areas. Common entrances and balconies 
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shared by six or more households are subject to heavy 
vandal i sm and lack of privacy. A very high proportion 
-ý" of, council flats»are-in this category.. --.. "Unused . space... 
is always abused", according to the insightful Octavia 
Hill. Almost all council estates, except the old 
tenement-style blocks built around small courtyards, have 
unused, open space. Bridges linking blocks, unguarded 
lifts, long open decks and balconies, noise-prone 
maisonettes, underground garages, all require constant 
supervision and maintenance. This factor was never 
built into the original plans or castings. 
RESTRICTED DEMAND 
The biggest problem of post-war council housing in Britain 
has been its vast scale. No other Western industrialised 
country has produced public housing on a comparable' 
scale. 
22 Councils acted as though they were building for 
infinite demand. Yet the very rapid expansion of 
owner-occupation since the war constantly eroded demand. 
Councils restricted demand too by building almost 
exclusively for families until recently. As early as 
1968, nearly half the households in the country had one or 
two persons only, while 88% of the council stock was built, 
for families, a majority of dwellings having three 
bedrooms. 
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11. MISMATCH BETWEEN SIZE OF DWELLING AND 
SIZE OF HOUSEHOLDS IN LOCAL AUTHORITY STOCK 
I nr 2 narsnns More than 2 neoole 
Proportion of 
~ 
12% 88%,. 
.~ý.. 
units 
Proportion of 46% 54% households 
Source - Cuttingworth 1968 
In addition, the very areas where council housebuilding 
was concentrated were the depopulating, unpopular inner 
areas of declining housing demand. Demand was further 
reduced by building the wrong product. So while the 
vast majority wanted houses, councils were hell-bent on 
producing flats. The opposite was true of the private 
sector, which built almost exclusively houses for owner- 
occupation, thus fuelling the trend towards home 
ownership by providing what most people wanted. Many 
young households in the post-war years have migrated 
from inner city areas and have become owner-occupiers, 
seeking the more salubrious suburban environment and a 
house with a garden. The desire to owner-occupy has 
now seized the vast majority of our population according 
to Building Society surveys (see Chapter VI). 
NATIONAL SURPLUS 
By 1971, there was a crude surplus of dwellings over 
households of 200,000. * of course there were many 
*Households were carefully counted in the Housing Policy 
Green Paper and sharing and concealed households were 
estimated according to recognised formulae. 
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empty dwellings in the private sector, including second 
homes, as well as a certain level of empty property 
caused through household moves and improvement work. 
Nonetheless, the new crude surplus represente'i a real 
fall in demand, which inevitably manifested itself in 
Low demand for badly built, unpopular council estates. 
The following table showing falling densities bears out 
this fact. 
12.1 DENSITIES - PERSONS PER ROOM 
1911 1921 1931 1951 1961 1966 1981 * 
1.1 . 91 . 83 . 74 . 66 . 57 . 
55 
Source: Housing Policy Green Paper 
The proportion of households living at above 1.5 persons 
per room has also dropped steadily, showing that the 
benefits of the greater stock of housing has been 
distributed throughout the population. 
13. PERCENTAGE HOUSEHOLDS OVER 1.5 PERSONS 
1931 1951 1961 1971 1981 
% households over 
1.5 persons per 11.5% 5.1% 1.8% 1.4% 0.6% 
room 
The smalVer number of households living at high density 
is bound to be reflected in falling demand for rehousing 
through councils. 
Similarly there has been a reduction in the numbers of 
*1981 fi gu res are taken from the Census. 
122 
shared dwellings: 
14. NO. OF SHARED DWELLINGS 
Year Shared Dwellings 
1971 300,000 
1976 250,000 
1981 160,000 
And this has been coupled with a drop in the total number 
of sharing households: 
15. NO. OF SHARING HOUSEHOLDS 
1951 1,872,000 
1961 886,000 
1971 637,000 
According to the 1981 Census, nearly 686,000 households 
did not have self-contained accommodation. Although 
the figures are clearly somewhat uncertain, the underlying 
trend has been towards lower demand for council housing 
in most areas. 
Predictably, the proportion of vacant dwellings in the 
total stock has expanded: 
16. % PERCENTAGE OF VACANT DWELLINGS 
Year % of vacant dwellings 
1971 3.2% 
1976 3.8% 
1981 
(predicted) 
4.9% 
Source - Housing Policy Green Paper 1977. 
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A further crude measure of falling housing demand is the 
fall in the number of concealed households: 
17. CONCEALED HOUSEHOLDS 
1951 935,000 
1961 602,000 
1971 426,000 
1981 * 266,50'0 
Source: Housing Policy Green Paper 1977 
The number of people without the use of a fixed bath has 
fallen dramatically too: 
18: NO. OF HOUSEHuLDS WITHOUT BATH 
Year No. of households without bath 
1951 4.8 million households 
1961 3.2 million households 
1971 1.4 million households 
1981* 500,000 households 
Source: Housing Policy Green Paper 1977 
With the great expansion of rehabilitation programmes and 
improvement grants in the seventies, this figure has 
dropped dramati cal Ly again, and Less than half a 'mi L Li on 
households are now without a bath. The smaller the 
number of-households lacking basic amenities, the lower 
the demand for council rehousing. 
The percentage of households unsatisfactorily housed on 
any count, sharing, overcrowding, or Lack. of basic 
*1981 figures are taken from the Census. 
r 
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amenities, declined. sharply over the same period from 
69% in 1951 to 24% in 1971. Of course slum clearance 
and massive housebuiLding programmes played a major 
par; in the reduction of housing need. The 
influenti aL Parker Morris report of 1961, which 
recommended mini mal space. standards and amenities for.,, 
all council housebuilding and improvement to older 
dwellings, also had a major impact in bringing about 
higher housing standards,, although the aim of building 
to. higher standards -and converting old property into 
fully self-contained dwellings often conflicted both 
with financial "cost-yardstick" restrictions and with a 
rational internal. Layout of dwellings. 
The combined effect has been to reduce", housing 'need^' 
and therefore housing demand. " Of course the figures 
given here are all national totals and in no way reflect 
the varying conditions of different parts of the country. 
London has for Long experienced more acute housing need 
than other areas and in 1971, a full 27% of households 
were sti l l- Living at densities above 1.5 persons per 
room. 
.: 
On the whole, the richer areas of the Midlands and 
South-East England have better equipped housing and 
Lower rates of unemployment, but higher levels of sharing 
and overcrowding. The seriously declining areas of the 
North, where densities are lower as populations move 
away, but unemployment rates are high, have the greater 
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poverty and more poorly equipped housing: 
19. HOUSING CONDITIONS 
Area Overcrowding Sharing Poorly 
equipped 
Unemployed 
North 1.8% 1% 7.7% 12.7% 
North-West 1.5% 1.4% 6.8% 7.2% 
Merseyside 2.8% 2.1% 10% 16.7% 
W. Midlands 3.5% 1.5% 3.5% 2% 
South-East 4.4% 11.77. 3.77. 1% 
Inner. London 12.9% 32.4% 12.6% 1.7% 
Sou rce: Census Indicators of Urban Deprivation, Working 
note, No. 6, Department of the Environment, 1975. 
This table illustrates clearly not only sharp regional 
differences, but also the clear relationship between 
economic decline and fall in demand for housing. Note 
the consistent link between high unemployment and low 
sharing and overcrowding rates. 
In overall numbers, dwellings exceeded households from 
1961 onwards, and the gap widened steadily up till 1978, 
by which time there were about half a million more 
dwellings than households. 
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20. DWELLINGS AND HOUSEHOLDS 1951-78 
Millions 
22 
20 
18 
16 
14 
1 8 
Source - "Housing Policy" by David Donnison 
I- 
Council waiting lists have halved and in some cases 
quartered in size. The average wait for a council home 
for a family is down to weeks in many parts of 
Merseyside and the North-West. Even in London most 
families in housing need have some hope of a council 
home, although waiting time is now rising again and 
current cutbacks could, if continued, generate a new 
intensification of housing shortage. 
The problem has shifted to the kind of home that will be 
offered. Increasingly it is the unpopular flats on 
high-density estates or the pre-war, cottage-style homes 
on run-down impoverished estates on the outskirts of 
towns that will be offered to incoming council 
I 
applicants. Most frequent vacancies tend to arise on 
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these estates. And the applicants will be much more 
reluctant now than a generation ago to accept the offer 
of council accommodation if they don't like it. 
The result is a new kind of mismatch between 
households and dwellings, with increasing numbers of 
council homes being categorised as unpopular or difficult 
to let. 
HOUSING MANAGEMENT 
It housing management had enjoyed the status it deserves, 
as the critical function in the housing service, then 
government, architects, and local authorities would have 
quickly learnt that they were making an appalling' 
mistake in pursuing the goals of mass housing, high- 
density flat-building, communal design and industrial 
technology. Then the production on a mass scale of 
homes that would become difficult to manage, if not 
difficult to let, would have been stopped in its 
expensive tracks, and replaced much earlier by smal le r- 
scale housing renewal, coupling new building with 
widespread renovation of the old stock, thereby 
preventing the devastation of our cities that has led 
to such soci at di stress. 
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AFTER THE MASS HOUSING BOOM 
The peak years for the production. of council dwellings, 
for the building of flats and for the production of 
high-rise blocks, were the mid-sixties. 
21. DIAGRAM SHOWING PEAK OF COUNCIL ACTIVITY IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
BUILDING. FLAT-BUILDING AND HIGH-RISE BUILDING 
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Sources - Peter Levin and Patrick Dunleavy 
However, slum clearance and large-scale building 
continued for many years after it was no longer 
4 
consi de red the app rop ri ate solution to our housing 
problem. The G. L. C's Elthorne Estate was still being 
built in ; the late seventies, nearly 20 years after it was 
first conceived. The Byker Estate in Newcastle still 
had vacant cleared land to be built on in 1982 and had 
AL the appearances of a building site 10 years after 
the slum-clearance residents were moved from the old 
/"-. j , .- 
-\ 
*SLu m demolition only peaked in the seventies. 
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Byker into the new homes. Both these estates replaced 
areas that many residents did not want to leave. Both 
new estates were built on a vast, modern scale that 
many found threatening after the old streets they were 
used to. Both developments "dishoused" a majority of 
people from settled communities. 
The kickback from the multitude of similar schemes, 
the scarred landscapes and long time-lags, produced a 
fever of new council activity in renovating the fast 
deteriorating old stock through Housing Action Areas, a 
new neighbourhood-based concept in slum-renewal, 
introduced in the new Housing Act of 1974. Many 
thousands of terraced properties were acquired by 
councils. In Islington alone, over 5,000 street 
properties were bought up and renovated in the seventies. 
Some slum clearance areas were converted to rehabilitation 
areas and several public enquiries into demolition plans 
had a stormy passage in the seventies, the latter ones 
sometimes overturning council demolition plans and 
preserving old housing areas. Nonetheless, over one and 
a half million new council dwellings were added to the 
total stock in the seventies, many of which, as we shall 
see later, were classed as difficult to let almost as 
soon as they were fi rst occupied. 
Council housebui lding had managed to produce well over 40% 
of the total new stock right up to the late seventies, 
partly because deceleration was harder than would have 
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been supposed. But by 1978 the production of council 
housing began to drop steeply, falling far behind the 
private sector, a position from whi cn it has never 
recove red. 
22. OWNERSHIP OF HOUSING (in millions) 
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The figures in the di agram show a dramatic change in the 
distribution of dwellings and tenures since the war. 
The stock overall has increased by a little more than 
one and a half times. Private landlords have halved 
in number; council dwellings have multiplied five times, 
the fastest increase of any sector; but owner- 
occupation now dominates the national housing scene, 
having expanded threefold since before the war. 
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23. THE STOCK OF DWELLINGS BY TENURE in 1971 
TENURE NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS 
Owner-occupied 8,228,000 
Rented from local authority or new town 4,628,000 
Rented from private landlord 2,796,000 
Rented with job or business 750,000 
ALL tenures 16,402,000 
Source Housing Policy Green Paper 1977 
The pattern of council housing over the last five years 
has changed dramatically. Traditional materials have 
come strongly back into favour. very few flats are 
being built and those that are tend to be low-rise, two- 
or three-storey, often sheltered dwellings for the 
elderly and handicapped. Sites tend to be small infill 
areas, and the concept of an estate is weakening, and 
being avoided where possible, in favour of common or 
garden streets. It is unlikely that council housing 
will ever,. again enjoy the prestige, the subsidies and 
the planning acceptance that led to its heady mistakes 
of the post-war era. However, the legacy is massive 
with approximately five million council dwellings in 
England and Wales alone. While owner-occupation is now 
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the majority tenure, private landlords, in spite of all 
coaxing, continue to disappear and housing trusts and 
associations represent only a fractional cont ri buti on 
to the rented sector. Council landlords represent a 
very substantial part of the national scene, housing 
about 15 million people and controlling vast stocks in 
alt our major cities. 
of rented accommodation. 
They p rovi de the major source 
Our next chapter looks at 
the housing superstructures tnat emerged in Town ' Hall s 
to cope with the relatively new empires. 
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CHAPTER IV - THE EMERGENCE OF HOUSING DEPARTMENTS 
"A municipal tenant is a privileged person, 
living in accommodation it would be impossible 
to rent at the same figure elsewhere and which 
is in addition managed and maintained according 
to the most advanced ideals prevailing. " 
Article in Housing, October 1942, by 
S. R. Butcher, Fellow of the Institute of Housing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Councils became public landlords without commitment, plan 
or forethought. They intended only to provide housing 
. and put almost no effort 
into how they would run it. The 
Government report of 1939, encouraging local authorities 
to put someone in charge of the stock is proof of how far 
they were from actually doing so. By the time war broke 
out, over four-fifths of all councils had no housing 
manager, or person in charge of running the council stock. 
A typical council landlord looked like this: 
Councillors 
(with a 
lettings 
committee to 
, Valuers (acquisition, 
-demolition) 
control all anitary Inspectors 
rehousing and (slum clearance, 
all eviction Town lerk overcrowding, health, 
decisions, case t with some welfare 
by case) I örientation) 
Treasurer Engineers 
(rents) (repairs and 
building) 
Surveyors 
(supervision of 
building, supervision 
of maintenance) 
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Less than one fifth of local authorities had an employee 
with any specific housing management responsibilities. 
An enlightened housing management structure in local 
authorities with slum clearance problems and large new 
estates looked something like this: 
/I 
Treasurer 
Councillors 
(with lettings committee 
and eviction committee to 
vet all lettings and 
authorise all eviction) 
Housing Manager or 
Housing Welfare 
Officer"(responsible 
wn Clerk for lettings and for 
welfare support in 
tenancy matters. 
NValuers 
Engineers Surveyors Sanitary Inspectors 
No local authority that we have discovered had a fully 
integrated, single housing management structure to-cover 
all dealings with tenants*. ' Nor could individual, 
representatives of the landlord ever feel in control of 
any other part of the landlord service in their dealings 
with the tenants. 
Housing management, as conceived by Octavia Hill and the 
Society of Women Housing Managers, was, according to 
available records, never practised within local 
authorities. At best a few threads of welfare-work 
were woven into a complex town hall structure in the 
face of major problems with families from slums, or a 
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particular estate was singled out for special local 
treatment because of its social and management problems. 
Very few local authorities, at least within the cities, 
would claim to have been on top of their landlord 
responsibilities at the time when council housing changed 
from being a minority to a mass provision, with direct 
Government responsibility for funding of demolition and 
rebuilding. 
THE WAR AND AFTER 
At the outbreak of the Second World War, a few housing 
departments existed, like the L. C. C. But the war led to 
severe cutbacks in the estate-based services like repairs 
and caretaking. 
Under the impact of staff shortages, the L. C. C. itself 
handed over much of its rent collection to private agents, 
and amalgamated the management of several large estates 
under one non-resident superintendent. 
This probably hastened the end of the resident management 
service to the large estates and increased the already 
remote scale of operation. 
Meanwhile many London boroughs were establishing housing 
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departments and by 1946, one quarter had done so. Their 
primary task was letting vacant dwellings, coupled with 
welfare support to tenants in difficulties. The other 
two major areas, rents and repairs, were invariably 
handled by other departments of the*Town Hall, even where 
a housing department was established. At that stage, 
Town Halls were responsible for compact geographical areas, 
something of a genuine parish, and each council, on average, 
owned 1,400 houses. Therefore the fragmented, 
compartmentalised and bureaucratic structure, inadequate 
as it was for good landlord-tenant relations, could still 
be held together by paper work. It was, however, to 
prove a very bad foundation for the problems to come with 
the housing spurt of the post-war era. 
The Institute of Housing's journal in 1942 produced a 
thoughtful analysis of the way forward in the light of 
the growing scale of council housing and the problems of 
often. confused, uprooted slum-dwellers in the face of an 
unidentifiable landlord. It argued that maintenance 
should be firmly in the control of the housing manager; 
that mixed housing should be built in small groups of 
ý dwellings; that selection and training of g goodstaff was, 
vital; and that - 
"The ordinary tenant..... likes to have a quick 
and easy contact with some person in authority, 
capable of giving a quick and clear-cut decision, 
and is moreover not at ease if contact can only 
be made after a journey to a somewhat grandiose 
building. For this reason some enlightened 
authorities have decentralised management into 
137 
S 
local groups in charge of officers with delegated 
powers to deal with all matters of a difficult or 
technical nature to whom the tenants have easy 
and local access. "1 
This demand for a localised service was instigated 
primarily by the needs on the one hand of disorientated, 
new occupants of council housing, and on the other of 
housing managers facing a complex battery of problems on 
large estates. However, it was very much the exception 
to the rule. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S 1945 REPORT 
In 1945, the Central Housing Advisory Committee produced 
for the Government a second report on the management of 
municipal estates, giving the clearest insight available 
into the problems of local authority landlords. 
2 
Many municipal organisations contributed advice to the 1945 
Committee. The L. C. C. and most urban authorities with 
more than 1,000 dwellings, supported by the Institute of 
Housing, advocated the appointment of a Housing Manager to 
each local authority. The rural districts, with far less 
stress, f;. 1t less need to organise management into a single 
department. The Municipal Treasurers and Accountants 
inevitably thought that rent collection should be kept 
separate from other aspects of management firmly under 
I their own wing and that "business or work" time should not 
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be uneconomically used on integrating welfare with 
management. The Sanitary Inspectors' Association argued 
that their members were well placed to become effective 
housing managers. And Municipal Engineers argued with 
regret that rent collection had taken precedence over 
other aspects of housing management, such as maintenance. 
To the reader 40 years on, the evidence of the municipal 
experts gave ample testimony to the piecemeal and even 
chaotic approach to estate management through the 
conflicting roles of different "professional" departments 
and specialisms. Most local authorities claimed in their 
evidence that housing management problems could be solved 
by more comprehensive and more rigidly enforced procedures 
in each department. Why local authorities thought that 
foolproof systems could be established to cover the 
multitude of eventualities, building styles, climate and 
family circumstances, is hard to*imagine. Because 
operations were increasingly tied up at the centre in an 
attempt to solidify and clarify procedures, the ground-level 
jobs of caretakers, rent collectors, 'welfare visitors, and 
repairsmen, became more and more remote from decision-making 
. and therefore more ineffective. The gap was not just 
between landlord and tenant, but between estate-based 
menial workers with little responsibility or supervision, 
and the operational and "professional" base firmly lodged 
in the Town Hall. The 1945 report concluded that - 
"the varying needs of many thousands of individuals 
cannot be reduced to. a mathematical formula. " 
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The Government's advisers could on balance see the need 
for radical developments in housing management, but they 
failed to give shape to this general sense of things 
going down the wrong path. 
The report concluded that tenants were to blame for many 
problems because of a "deterioration in tenants' care. " 
This was associated with the war and the encouragement of 
animals in backyards for food, coupled with the removal 
of metal fencing for munitions. Anxiety wäs expressed 
that pigs and fowl should be banned as soon as food 
supplies increased. They did not dream that the 
disappearance of animals would do nothing to reinstate a' 
sense of control, purpose or order among individual 
householders, in the face of absentee landlords. 
Over the early post-war period, the L. C. C. underwent a 
series of management changes. It finally responded to 
the C. H. A. C. recommendations to make housing management 
more personal, by spreading door-to-door rent collection 
in the place of resident superintendents. This method 
reduced arrears and improved contact with tenants, but it 
became very mechanical with each collector covering about 
800 dwellings a week: It also led to the closure of 
several estate offices. Over the same period, some 
housing functions were handed over totally to other 
departments in response to the demands of the scale of 
operation. A separate Works Division was established; 
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so was an Acquisition Division, Rating and Statistical 
Division, Administration and Establishment Division. 
Housing architectural work was handed back to the central 
Architects' Department. In addition, Valuers, Engineers, 
the Chief Officer of Supplies, the Comptroller of the 
Council and the Medical Officer of Health were variously 
involved in parts of the housing service. The Housing 
Department itself had reduced its functions to allocations, 
welfare, caretaking, arrears pursuit, and repairs ordering. 
Eleven different departments at County Hall were thus 
directly responsible for fragments of estate management. 
VANDALISM IN 1948 
Social problems continued to mount on the poorer estates. 
The war could be blamed as a major cause. At a big 
housing conference in Scotland in 19148; vandalism was 
highlighted as a major problem, echoing the C. H. A. C. reports' 
anxiety over lack of "tenants' care". 
"There is still an evident lack of social 
conscience on the part of the general community 
towards communal property. Trees and shrubs, 
flowerbeds and playing field apparatus are 
still being destroyed to an alarming extent. " 
In addition, gardens were reported neglected and packs of 
dogs roamed uncontrolled, in spite of food shortages, 
rationing and the drive to vegetable growing. Fences were 
not reinstated after they had been collected for war 
purposes or in some cases were replaced with easily broken, 
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damaged or burnt wooden fences. Little did we realise 
that in the 1980's many of those vital garden fences, 
establishing dominion and control, would still be missing, 
and back wastelands would still be the preserve of packs 
of stray dogs. 
THE INSTITUTE OF HOUSING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING 
MANAGEMENT 
The demand for housing personnel in local authorities was 
accelerating and systems were constantly modified to keep 
pace with the demands of expanding rehousing programmes. 
There was a severe labour shortage and major difficulties 
in recruiting qualified staff into local government. 
Many recruits were untrained and had a minimal educational 
background. Job structures were consequently routinised 
and narrowed, and areas of discretion as far as possible 
eliminated. The L. C. C. was forced to reduce its entrance 
requirements from the equivalent of two 'A' levels to two 
'0' levels over this period, a far cry from the pre-war 
recommendation that only graduates should be recruited for 
the job of estate manager. 
Throughout this period, the most serious misconception of 
both Government and local authorities was the belief that 
slum demolition and rehousing was solving most social 
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problems, thereby removing-many social needs in one "simple" 
operation,, 
The Institute of Housing was continuing to recruit members 
and to engage in the ongoing housing debate. Although 
full membership of the Institute was still in the region 
of 262, associate members and student members boosted the 
total by 1949 to 1,612. 
The Society of Women Housing Estate Managers, with 250 
" members, was finding it hard to recruit suitable 
candidates for its rigorous training. They played an 
accommodating role in local authorities, trying to make 
the system bend to the requirements of housing management. 
On this, almost everywhere, they fought a losing battle. 
The Institute of Housing had much lower recruitment and 
training standards than the Sbciety of Women Housing 
Managers. The Institute still held that welfare and the 
"women's side" of housing management should not be 
confused with the main council job of keeping the 
technical side operating smoothly. The Institute also 
ý" argued that in more affluent post-war conditions, intensive 
management was no longer normally necessary. The Society 
continued to argue that high-density, communal housing 
presented special management problems and that "group 
management", where each manager was responsible initially 
for all aspects of the landlord/tenant contact, was märe 
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effective than the prevailing "sectional management" 
where functions, such as rents, lettings, repairs, were 
separately run within the Town Hall and often not 
controlled by a housing manager at all. 
4 
But there was little sense of urgency and a serious 
under-estimation of the developing social and management 
problems of council housing with no major reorganisation 
of public housing proposed. 
THE GOVERNMENT REPORTS ON FLATS 1952 
A special sub-committee of C. H. A. C. in 1952 considered 
the problems of flat-living, because special management 
needs were generated by this peculiarly communal form of 
housing. While making many clear recommendations in 
favour of resident caretaking, supervision of common 
facilities, such as laundries, liaison with tenants' 
representatives, and rehousing families with children in 
houses rather than flats, the report did not challenge 
the basic assumption that flat-building was necessary. 
Nor did it propose a radical reorganisation of management 
to encourage local, estate-based offices to develop, as- 
already operated so effectively in the flatted estates of 
Peabody, Guinness, Samuel Lewis or Sutton Trusts. It 
argued consistently that local authorities should avoid 
"an ongoing maintenance commitment" and yet'flats by 
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C. H. A. C's own definition required long-term, continual 
management and maintenance. At the time of the 
Government's report, councils were building about 100,000 
flats a year. Yet the members of the Committee barely 
addressed the major problem of long-term, coherent 
management and maintenance of an increasingly difficult 
stock, while recommending that pets, such as rabbits and 
pigeons, should be encouraged and creepers planted up the 
bare walls in order to help tenants keep in touch with 
nature. There was a strong sense that the Government 
and its advisers were running behind a scale of problem 
they barely perceived. 
5 
The whole issue of flat-building, and the subsidies to 
encourage it, was not raised by the membership of the 
Committee; nor was the question of funding the additional 
management costs of flatted estates. According to the 
L. C. C., it cost more than twice as much to manage and 
maintain flats than cottages. 
* Many ideas, such as 
"consultation with responsible representatives of the 
tenants through their own organisation" or proper rubbish 
disposal, were caring but ill-thought-out. Others were 
simply idealistic, such as collective tenants' gardens 
UNIT COST OF SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT6 
All dwellings Cottages Flats 
1950-51 £4,911 £3,1409 £7,919 
1951-52 5,422 3,706 8,853 
1952-53 5,710 3,939 9,271 
1953-54 6,300 3,985 10,839 
145 
a 
making use of the surplus open space, or unrealistic, 
such as the introduction of cleaning rotas. There was 
nothing wrong with these ideas in themselves if they 
could be organised and supported by a local management 
structure. The committee did not come to grips with 
either the scale and cost of the problem or the 
impossibility of applying local tenant-oriented solutions 
without intensive local management. Resident caretaking 
was the only vital link, but caretakers had no management 
authority and no control over the main services such as 
lettings, repairs or refuse disposal. The failure of 
local authorities to raise the basic problems with the 
Committee is ample proof of their ignorance of the problems 
they were generating. -By implication, none of these 
issues were being addressed'by local authorities. The 
report reveals a singular blindness to'the Government's 
headlong propulsion into large-seäle flat-building without 
a concept of the public landlord's role or structure. 
THE GOVERNMENT REPORTS ON "UNSATISFACTORY TENANTS" 1955 
The post-war boom, relative affluence and full employment, 
did not do away with the problem of "unsatisfactory 
tenants'f and in 1955 the C. H. A. C. was publishing again on 
this 'taxing subject, in a report entitled "Unsatisfactory 
Tenants". 
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The scale of the problem was estimated to be very small - 
only 0.1% of tenants being considered "problem families" 
and 5% requiring fairly constant supervision. The 
advice was sound - tackle arrears early and firmly; do 
not cluster anti-social families together; give 
practical help rather than "mere advice and verbal 
encouragement". The vital realisation was that "mere 
provision of a house is usually not enough". However, 
this admonition was never taken sufficiently seriously 
and many social workers still believe that physical 
housing conditions are the main cause of a family problem. 
In fact, it is possible to argue that the uprooting and 
rehousing of disturbed families within poor communities 
through slum clearance, coupled with the greatly 
increased material commitments of a new council house and 
the total change in housing environment in some cases, 
pushed a precarious family over the brink. 
7 The fact 
that the landlord structure was remote, unclearly 
organised and uninvolved in the wider social dimensions 
of rehousing, catapulted social disarray affecting a 
small number of "problem" families into centre stage. 
The C. H. A. C. report on the problems of disruptive tenants, 
like the previous Government interventions, failed to take 
seriously enough the scale of the emerging'problems, or 
recommend a substantial change in direction. In 1984, 
the common cry of the city. council landlords was that 
"Council housing would be alright if it wasn't for the bad 
tenants". Their impact is magnified out of all proportion 
147 
4 
by the failure to inject strong social support within 
the housing service. 
HOUSING MANAGEMENT SHIFTS GEAR AGAIN DOWNWARDS 
By the mid-fifties, waiting lists were growing 
everywhere, in the wake of the post-war marriage and baby 
boom, slum clearance programmes were starting up, and the 
proportion of flats to houses being built was"rising. 
Average densities were lower than pre-war levels and more 
communal spaces were provided, requiring additional care 
and cleaning. But the blocks themselves were as dense. 
or denser, as high flats became more fashionable'. In 
1955, the L. C. C. alone received half a million enquiries 
about the waiting list and the expected wait for a dwelling 
was seven years. In the following year, the waiting list 
was frozen. Under this pressure, beleaguered housing 
officials scrambled to make the system fit new and 
expanding demands. Allocations became the critical area 
of housing management. Ingenuity was taxed, corners were 
cut, and applied management at estate level was rarely the 
primary concern or even a topic of debate. *The only 
direct contact between landlord and tenant had for many 
years been the rent collector. Yet because of the 
rapidly expanding stock, the rent collector was 
increasingly seen as a person of limited ability and 
application, hired to cover as many doors-as possible, as 
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fast as possible, and his function was constantly being 
narrowed. 
8 
Partly because of this and partly because 
management problems within the central bureaucracy were 
growing, further attempts were made at streamlining by 
reducing rent collection to fortnightly rounds. 
9 The 
limited contact was becoming widespread and with it, came 
higher arrears and general neglect of detailed "chasing", 
whether of arrears, or cleaning, or repairs. Without it, 
also came a further disparagement of the rent collector's 
role and of the vital connection between landlord and 
tenant. 
Simultaneously, because of the political importance of 
rehousing on the vast scale that was now under way, 
housing departments as such were becoming more fashionable. 
Single-point "management" was openly advocated, but the 
entire debate focussed on the creation of a unified housing 
department within the Town Hall, as opposed to fragmented, 
multi-department management, as previously practised. 
However, the emerging housing department rarely incorporated 
repairs and often did not take over rent collection. 
Therefore, there was a large gap between a "single-point" 
housing department, with functions divided and delivered 
separately, and the "single-point", estate-based manager 
responsible for a small gröup of dwellings and the 
wellbeing of their occupants. Because of this gap, 
enlightened housing managers10 argued that decentralisation 
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to districts, which was just beginning, was only workable 
in an integrated housing department capable of delegating 
total housing responsibility to a district. A 
decentralised office, within which decisions constantly 
gravitated back to the centre, would not resolve the 
basic management problems. Unfortunately, most efforts 
at coherence were concentrated in the overgrown centre. 
THE 1959 REPORT ON HOUSING DEPARTMENTS 
In 1959, the C. H. A. C. attempted to address these central 
problems. C. H. A. C. conducted a unique enquiry into the 
organisation of housing departments in 57 local 
authorities and found that less than half, only 27, had a 
separate housing department, responsible for most elements 
of housing management. The other 30 authorities varied 
from 11 with no. housing manager at all to 19 with a 
housing manager usually responsible for a limited part of 
housing management, such as lettings and welfare, based in 
another department. 11 Just under a third of the 
authorities gave housing managers responsibility for 
repairs. Only just over a half collected the rent. 
More than half the local authorities listed the Treasurer, 
Surveyor, or Chief Public Health Inspector as in charge of 
housing. The following table indicates the way housing 
functions were divided. 
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24. TABLE SHOWING THE NO. OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OUT OF 57 WHERE THE 
HOUSING MANAGER PERFORMED EACH FUNCTION 
Applica- Alloca- Rent Ordering Executing Supervision Housing 
tions-- tions -- Collection Repairs Re airs of Estates Welfare 
45 43 30 36 18 45 42 
The inquiry found that almost all rent collectors also took 
repairs orders, thereby underlining the point that the 
personal contact between tenant and rent-man brought its 
own positive management benefits, however limited the rent 
collectors' role was now considered. This was in spite of 
the fact that rent collectors were often controlled by 
another department such as the Borough Treasurer's. 
As a result of the survey, C. H. A. C. at last argued strongly 
and clearly for detailed, unitary, localised management, 
including door-to-door rent collection, local management 
control of repairs, close co-operation between landlords 
and tenants, and the need for training, as well as 
recommending input from tenants and managers into design. 
However, the new report stressed the virtual autonomy of 
local authorities and offered no coherent strategy for 
'' dealing with the new scale of public housing provision. 
"Local authorities have complete freedom to 
manage their estates as they think best. " 
This point was reaffirmed by the veteran housing management 
expert, John Macey, in 1984.12 It is a very odd quirk of 
housing management history that it is the only public service 
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over which central government exercises virtually no 
control. 
Maybe because of the weak central government role in public 
housing management, no consideration was given to recruitment 
of staff, training programmes, budgeting, repairs, 
apprenticeships or any of the other critical issues facing 
local authorities. The approach of the 1959 Housing 
Advisory Committee contrasted sharply with the Government's 
approach to training, recruitment, inspection, budgeting 
and management within the health, education and social 
services. The Ministry, throughout this period, employed 
only one civil servant to advise nationally on housing 
management, yet the stock by the late fifties represented 
nearly four million dwellings and an investment of 
approximately £12,000,000,000. 
The 1959 report, while raising these key issues, misfired 
in several directions. For example, it endorsed the 
spreading practice of fortnightly rather than weekly rent 
collection, while arguing that payment of rent was the 
primary link between landlord and tenant; it did not 
challenge flat-building nor address the serious problem of 
supervision on large flatted estates; it made a big play 
of management costs, arguing that tenants should take over 
internal redecoration,, which was bound, to increase 
difficulties in re-letting and have greater impact on 
poorer tenants. It did not question the general philosophy 
of large-scale mass housing, based on drastic redevelopment 
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There was a vital point in the 1959 report that was 
seriously debated for the first time, the general 
appearance or environment of estates. The report found 
instances where - 
"the general level of maintenance of open spaces 
and verges falls considerably below the quality 
of the houses and the efforts of the tenants 
themselves. " 
C. H. A. C. recognised that this lamentable decay lay not at 
the tenants' door, but at the landlord's, underlining the 
drastic splits within local authority management - 
"The local authority should have an agreed 
policy" 
with arrangements for - 
"co-ordinating the work of general maintenance 
and the supervision of the estate as a whole. " 
It was clear that such common-sense liaison and on-the-ground 
organisation did not normally take place. 
The Committee, with singular lack of wisdom on the 
/- multiplying social problems, found a hidden advantage in 
the proliferation of flats, as - 
"it becomes easier to offer to tenants who either 
cannot or will not cultivate a garden, -, transfers to more suitable accommodation. " (i. e. flats) 
The painful fact that flatted estates were far harder for 
the local' authority to maintain by virtue of the communal 
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space that they, the landlord, and not tenants, were 
directly responsible for, was ignored. The reality that 
tenants with an untidy garden were likely to cause more 
nuisance if their untidiness spilled over to communal 
balconies, staircases and'courtyards, was also overlooked. 
The Government openly endorsed pushing less ambitious, 
less coping families into flats on the grounds that they'd cope 
better without the added burden of a garden. This view was 
only a short step from the widespread view of local authority 
politicians that "bad" tenants should be rehoused on "bad" 
estates, thereby fuelling another whole strand to the 
development of unpopular estates. 
The Government was equally shortsighted in its attack on 
the other glaring environmental problem, car-parking. 
Because so many pre-war and flatted estates had little or. -no 
parking facilities, grass verges and front gardens were 
often converted to that use. The report therefore 
recommended universal car-parking provision - 
"It is better to make over-provision than 
under-provision, " 
advice which planner 
adopted, leading to 
flatted estates and 
unused multi-storey 
virtually abandoned 
ball-gazing was too 
rs, architects and developers roundly 
the gross over-provision of garages on 
the current spate of demolition of 
car parks and plans to concrete in many 
underground garages. The crystal 
complex to hit the target. ' 
Advice on welfare was equally misdirected, separating out 
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housing functions from social support. Local authorities - 
"should not give the impression that they are 
running a 'secondary welfare service' for council 
tenants. " 
In any case - 
"the need for specialised welfare work as part of 
the landlord's function has decreased. " 
The report concluded with a proposed pact between landlord 
and tenant - 
"There must be a real understanding of human needs 
by the landlord and a willingness on the tenant's 
side to take his share as a responsible tenant 
and neighbour. " 
The underlying ingredient to this pact was in almost every 
case still missing -a local management organisation through 
which access between landlord and tenant was possible, and 
without which, no trade-off of responsibilities could be 
established. 
The report advocated local management where possible or 
suitable, particularly in large authorities - 
"that such offices, and in particular the 
presence of a resident officers, are welcomed by 
tenants was made clear in evidence we received 
from tenants' organisations. " 
However, the changed social conditions of the post-war era 
were assumed to dictate a generally reduced need for housing 
management. The C. H. A. C. was therefore speaking with 
forked tongue, making it easy for the prevailing 
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wisdom to continue. 
The report was generally complacent and unchallenging, 
assuming that all was reasonably well in municipal housing - 
"These changes have..... resulted in the community 
now accepting increased responsibilities. In 
addition there have been great advances in design, 
both of individual dwellings and estates due to 
increased interest in and study of all aspects of 
housing; there have also been modifications and 
improvements resulting from technological advances, 
in the construction, fitting out and servicing of 
dwellings. "13 
New housing developments were believed to be moving the 
populace as a whole inexorably towards a "final housing 
solution". 
CULLINGWORTH ON HOUSING DEPARTMENTS 
Barry Cullingworth, following on the 1959 report of the 
Central Housing Advisory Committee, gave a brief history of 
the growth of housing departments, bearing out the story we 
have so far told. 
Cullingworth's analysis revealed that housing departments 
employed one staff for less than every 50 properties, 
including all repairs and maintenance workers and all other 
manual staff employed on estates. This was a higher ratio 
than the philanthropic Housing Trusts and should have allowed 
a local authority to manage all its stock intensively along 
the unitary lines developed by Oetavia Hill. However, a 
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further detailing of the jobs covered in Bristol's technical 
services department illustrated the structural problems of 
local authority staffing. 
"The Technical Section is not formally subdivided 
as is the Administrative Section, but its 
responsibilities are equally as-extensive and 
varied. The staff includes 19 Technical 
Assistants, 7 Bonus Surveyors, 14 Housing 
Inspectors, 3 Administrative Assistants, 25 
Clerical Assistants, 8 Maintenance Superintendents, 
10 Foremen, 9 Depot Assistants, 9 Storekeepers and 
623 Building Trade 0peratives. i1 
Bristol Housing Department was responsible for no less than 
66 estates, each with an average of 560 dwellings. The 
case for decentralisation and estate-based management 
couldn't have been stronger, and yet it was not even 
considered by Cullingworth or Bristol. 
The outline structure of Bristol Housing Department in the 
sixties, a relatively clear and integrated service compared 
with the other examples given by Cullingworth, Leeds and 
the G. L. C., illustrated a large, modern, sectional housing 
department, comprehensively organised, a model for the 
great leap forward of the seventies, when most housing 
departments burst their seams. 
- 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE L. C. C. 
By the early sixties, the L. C. C. was operating on a massive 
scale, owning 110,000 dwellings, processing and completing 
21,000 allocations in 1964 alone, and employing one estate 
officer (i. e. manager) tb every 310 dwellings. The 
overall staff ratio in the housing department, including 
repairs workers, was by now well under one to 30 dwellings. 
In 1964, the L. C. C. was reorganised into the Greater 
London Council with a strategic housing role, expanding its 
activities even further and serving to intensify the 
difference between outer and inner estates, as well as 
enhancing the complexity of the internal organisation. 
The L. C. C. was double the size of Bristol and several 
times more complicated. 
At the same time, the London boroughs were reorganised into 
much larger and more dispersed areas, against serious 
staff resistance, creating housing management problems on a 
scale not previously experienced. 
In 1967, there was a special investigation into hooliganism,. 
within the G. L. C., which was on the increase, especially on 
' large, flatted estates which dominated the G. L. C. stock. 
There was no recognition of the fact that the constant 
population'upheavals of the previous 20 years, and the 
virtual withdrawal by housing management into-the centre, 
The G. L. C. had 360 flatted estates and 44+ cottage estates. 
The latter were all located on the periphery of London. 
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were in any way related to the accumulating social problem. 
The report expressed a sense*of defeatism - sanctions were 
felt to be limited. The police could not help in 
prevention because at that stage the police only patrolled 
so-called public areas, thereby excluding most council 
estates, which were considered private housing areas. 
Public housing authorities, including the G. L. C., widely 
acquiesced in this policing anomaly, causing up to the 
late seventies a major breakdown in contact between the 
police and the large urban communities that were being 
transposed into ever bigger and more alien estates. Many 
of the problems of ultimate social breakdown on the worst 
estates in the seventies and eighties must have hearkened 
back to the failure of the police to police estates. 
The next year, following a report on the cost of management, 
staff numbers at the G. L. C. were severely restricted, rent 
collection was reduced to a monthly cycle and giro payments 
were introduced even though they were found "not wholly 
satisfactory". The G. L. C. housing management was under 
constant attack from politicians and community activists, 
leading to a proposal to - 
"bring forward schemes in which tenants are ' 
directly associated with the management of their 
own estates. " 
By this time. John Macey, had come from Birmingham, the second 
largest housing authority in the country, to the G. L. C. He 
had argued in the Institute of Housing's journal, "Housing", 
in 1961 that repairs must be fully integrated into the 
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management service and quoted evidence from the 
philanthropic trusts of the Victorian era 
"Experience very soon showed that tenants readily 
responded and improved their own attitude to 
rent-paying and to the care of the landlord's 
asset if the latter himself showed a proper 
interest in the care of the property and dealt 
with the tenants' reasonable complaints or 
requests for repair. " 
This was, of course, a profound statement about the 
landlord's role but a far cry from current practice where 
management and maintenance were usually running behind the 
problem and never catching up. Public landlords either 
did not accept or failed to deliver on the notion of 
meticulous management. 
However, in 1965, in the first edition of his landmark 
book on housing management, Macey argued that while the 
intensive and unitary system of management was clearly the 
most effective, it was no longer necessary, except in 
special circumstances, in terms of the declining social 
problems - 
"In pre-war days when there were far more problem 
families..... it was a popular system..... such an 
intensive system of supervision, which is 
necessarily expensive, would now be justified 
only very exceptionally. "15 
I- 
He acknowledged that with resident staff, including repairs 
"the relationship between landlord and tenant is 
much better than under any other system-, "16 
and that 
"The comprehensive door-to-door system of 
collection and management is probably the best 
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combination for economy and efficiency for17 
authorities with large numbers of houses. " 
Macey believed that with 2,500 dwellings or less, a local 
authority could run an economically viable, unitary 
service on the ground, including repairs. What he did not 
address fully either in the Institute of Housing, his book 
or his tenure at County Hall, was how to disaggregate the 
housing service in practice. * His sense of fairness and 
desire to co-ordinate housing activities at the top would 
not allow him to relinquish central control*'of a broad- 
fronted housing service. Therefore, his powerful advocacy 
of local management entities, including repairs, was not 
developed into a practical system, and the new G. L. C. 
continued to withdraw and centralise its services, finally 
even removing resident caretakers and local repairsmen in 
the early seventies. 
Macey rejected his own preferred method as too labour- 
intensive and socially outdated. In all the detailed 
management procedures he evolved himself as a Director of 
Housing of the largest authority in the country (the L. C. C. ) 
and advocated in his book, he assumed that housing 
departments would be strongly organised at the centre and 
would operate central or district systems based on a division of 
responsibility between functions. Nowhere did Macey set 
out procedures for a local estate management system covering 
all functions. While weak Government reports appeared to 
fall on deaf ears, John Macey's Housing Management blueprint 
missed a critical moment in the history of housing and his 
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tenure at the G. L. C. intensified the trend towards a highly 
functional and central "professionalism". 
By the time John Macey retired from the G. L. C. in 1971, 
there were 10,000 employees in the housing department, and 
hot on the tail of the establishment of the London-wide 
authdrity, the dismemberment of its housing department with 
the transfer of estates to the London boroughs was set in 
train, only to burden the already large London borough 
landlords with often vast acquisitions of difficult-to-manage, 
G. L. C. flatted estates. 
yet again. 
I- 
MANAGEMENT CUTS 
The problem was being transposed 
Meanwhile other pressures were at work within the arena of 
public housing management, mainly the desire to minimise the 
cost and staff commitment of a rapidly exploding service. 
The influential Metropolitan Boroughs' Committee produced 
in 1963 a series of recommendations on how to cut the costs. 
of management in line with the local authorities' general 
feeling that housing management could work perfectly well 
for the majority of "normal" tenants remote from tenants 
themselves and with a minimum of contact. It advised on 
how housing departments should save money on basic services. 
John Macey continued to be active in housing management 
long after retiring from the G. L. C. and he has been an 
ardent activist in the Housing Trusts, defendin and 
extending their intense involvement on the estates in local, 
tenant-oriented management. He retired as Chairman of the Samuel Lewis Trust in Spring 1985. 
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Some of the recommendations were as follows: 
- Rents should be collected fortnightly or less frequently. 
- Door-to-door collection should be linked with other work 
or discontinued. 
- Visits should not be made for less than three weeks' 
arrears. 
- Certain work should be made the responsibility of the 
tenants. 
- Responsibility for the elderly should be placed on 
caretakers, rather than managers. 
- Daily supervision of caretakers should be discontinued. 
-, Some cleaning should be carried out by tenants and the 
use of mechanical equipment should be 'extended. 
- Visiting cleaning gangs should replace residents. 
- Motorised transport should be provided for patrols 
(of. Panda policing). 
- Typing pools and mechanised dictation should replace 
personal clerical support. 
Each of these recommendations represented a retrograde step 
into the centre and a withdrawal where it hurt most., The 
Metropolitan Boroughs' Committee was very much swimming with 
the tide,; but these measures, often appearing perfectly 
logical as a paper exercise, led to'the widespread 
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disappearance of the vital personal contact and supervision 
that made rented housing viable. Maybe the crucial error 
was to imagine that the landlord could withdraw as long as 
tenants were coping-and well housed, on the grounds that 
they would act like owner-occupiers and actually take charge 
of their property. It was possibly forgotten that the 
legal relationship between landlcrd and tenant would not be 
so readily abdicated on the tenants' side, without the 
actual security of ownership. Local authorities did broadly 
follow the recommended cuts in service. 
Management problems continued to grow and in 1968, the 
Scottish Housing Advisory Committee noted that local 
authorities - 
"have generally failed to accord to management the 
importance and priority it requires if a satisfactory 
service is to be provided. " 
It was found that, in Scotland, housing managers were only 
responsible for about half the key functions of management. 
Local management was not even mentioned. 
A NEW TURN FOR THE INSTITUTE OF HOUSING 
I- 
The Institute of'Housing had undergone fairly radical changes 
in the 20 years since the war, partly under the impact of the 
merger in 1965 with its rival, the Society of Housing 
Managers. The Society, in the post-war conditions of mass 
public housing, first decided to admit male members in 1948, 
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then lowered its recruitment and admission standards to cope 
with the demand for housing personnel and the shortage of 
applicants. Finally, it amalgamated its examinations with 
the Institute's in 1962 at a lower level than the Royal 
Institute of Chartered Surveyors, through which it had 
previously passed its members. In 1965, the two 
organisations merged completely, under the new title of 
Institute of Housing, all reference to management 
disappearing and symbolising a new sense of the profession. 
Management, in the women's sense, had never been acceptable 
to the men, and this was enshrined in the new organisation's 
examinations, with their emphasis on building, planning, the 
law, housing finance, local and central government history 
and structures, and a reduced role for the applied duties of 
rent collection, repairs, and the integration of social 
support into business management. 
However, the Institute's membership was more alive than ever 
to the debate on housing management organisation, probably 
influenced in part by the active women members who were now 
more centrally engaged as a result of the merger. 
In 1968 in the Institute's yearbook, a radical new line was 
taken: 
"All aspects of housing management should be in the 
hands of one person ..... 
[who] should be responsible for the collection of rents..... This link [with 
tenants] is becoming more difficult to maintain in those areas where rents are no longer collected door 
to door. " 
The loss of the door-to-door rent service highlighted the 
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vital role it had played as the only tenuous link between 
landlord and tenant. 
The most critical point made by the Institute was that - 
"This contact with the tenants has a very 
considerable influence on the'standard of an 
. 
estate, " 
not because it was a means of upgrading tenants, although 
some pressure could be brought to bear on individual, 
disarrayed households, but because it was thq. vital channel 
for delivery of prompt and effective landlord services. 
It was the sign of a responsible landlord, determined to 
take care of his property and look to the welfare of his 
tenants. For a good estate was always primarily a function 
of a good landlord, the tenants feeling collectively unable 
to enforce. good communal standards in the face of landlord 
neglect. A final point made by the Institute was that - 
"The housing manager should order all repairs and 
approve completed work. " 
For the Institute this statement in their yearbook of 1968 
was a standard-bearer to which members are still trying to 
put flesh and blood. It actually totally shifted the 
,- emphasis from professional departments at the Town Hall to 
housing managers on an estate, and from separate technical 
departments to integrated repairs services. It also 
shifted from bad tenants causing decay in otherwise "good" 
areas to the landlord directly carrying the can for whether 
an estate was good or bad. However, no realistic method 
of applying the obvious solutions was any longer to hand. 
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REORGANISATION, 1974 
Local government history was about to take another sharp 
twist which was to have a devastating impact on the already 
weak and complex structures of housing management. In 1974, 
the Government reorganised all local authorities into new, 
amalgamated and much larger units. The number of local 
authorities was chopped from about 2,000 to 400 in England 
and Wales, in the name of streamlining and simplification. 
Many mergers did not make sense'geographically, and local 
government in many places is still grappling with the 
organisational nonsense that was created in 1974, with 
Town Hall functions now'often split between different 
historic administrative centres. Worst of all, housing 
departments often tripled in size overnight, in a few cases 
rationalising a small and scattered ptock, but in most 
urban areas, removing the landlord a large step further 
away from the tenants. Council housing stock jumped from 
an average of 1,400 after the war to 14,000 in 1975 in each 
local authority. The city authorities were often double 
this size or more. 
Many housing departments ended up with subsidiary. Town 
Halls, often located several miles from each other with 
different functions based in each. Therefore, there was 
no. lon er g just the historic confusion and the rapid 
expansion of a difficult-to-manage stock, housing almost 
exclusively low-income households from demolition areas, 
but the unwieldy structures and scale of amalgamation with 
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the consequent intensification of all previous problems. 
These shifts and waves of change gave some sense of urgency 
to the housing situation. As the public stock expanded 
and as the complexity of building styles increased and 
populations on the less popular estates became more 
universally poor, so did councils move towards a unified 
housing service. Unfortunately the "right" system was no 
longer applicable because of the scale of public housing 
and the complexity of local authority administration. 
The Comprehensive Housing Service, as the new thrust of the 
public landlords came to be known, was a sure case of 
closing the stable door after the horse had bolted. 
THE COMPREHENSIVE HOUSING SERVICE 
I- 
The Housing Services Advisory Group -a government-sponsored 
committee, which took the place of C. H. A. C., set up to make 
recommendations about the organisation of the housing 
service - in 1978 produced its housing blueprint for the 
Government and local authorities, called "Organising A 
Comprehensive Housing Service". This was welcomed by 
progressive housing managers within local authorities as a 
major step in giving some coherence to fragmented housing 
management. The scale of operation, however, made 
coherence very difficult in practice. What was commonly 
called the Comprehensive Housing Service comprised a central 
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housing directorate covering housing policy, development, 
housing management, private sector matters and advisory 
issues. It was responsible for an average of 14,000 
properties, rising to 38,000 in the metropolitan 
authorities. 
The Comprehensive Housing Service often served to reinforce 
centralised and functional organisation at the expense of 
what few remnants existed of local management. 
The Housing Services Advisory Group recommended a structure 
for the Comprehensive Housing Service which belied the 
unified approach altogether by putting each area of housing 
management under a different section leader, while putting 
a single "Director" in charge of the overall service. The 
following diagram illustrates the typical unification and 
division of responsibilities. 
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REPAIRS AND OTHER PARTS OF HOUSING MANAGEMENT 
The execution of repairs was not normally included within a 
comprehensive housing department and was almost always 
handled by a separate directorate or division for whose 
services the housing department became the so-called 
client. There was no leverage in the market sense because 
the repairs organisation enjoyed a monopoly within the 
I- 
local authority. 
Nor was there leverage in a hierarchical sense internally, 
since repairs were usually run by a department as powerful 
as or more powerful than housing. More importantly, 
technical services, including repairs, commanded the lion's 
share of housing budgets. Therefore, housing directors 
Often seemed like featherless birds. 
As a result of the failure of the "client role", there has 
been a growing trend to put repairs under the housing 
directorate, but this has often been a nominal arrangement 
with few teeth in terms of sanctions or incentives. Even 
the new legislation of 1982, forcing Direct Labour 
Organisations to go out to tender for 60% of their work, 
seems merely to have generated a new set of evasions and 
more centralised corner-cutting than ever. Repairs have 
increasingly been ordered by telephone or at district and 
central offices, as contact at estate level has shrunk even 
further. Lettings too almost invariably continued to be 
run centrally on a tight rationing system in spite of 
I /I 
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evident changes in demand and the decline of slum clearance. 
Arrears continued to be followed up locally, but rent 
accounts went on being handled centrally, often in finance 
departments. So estate managers have usually been left 
with almost no role at all in the most sensitive and locally 
responsive management areas of all. 
A modern housing department put a typical London housing 
director in charge of 20/40,000 properties, with some 
500-1,000 jobs involved and at least £1400,000,000 of public 
investment in the stock itself. Many ladders of 
responsibility were involved in holding such an operation 
together and at the bottom of it, there was a collection of 
poor, badly-designed or located estates, which the Director 
could not readily deal with and in many cases, had not even 
had time to visit. Therefore to regard the Director of 
Housing as the person who could ensure-the unified delivery 
of all services to a particular tenant on a particular estate 
through a single operation, called "The Comprehensive Housing 
Service", was to whistle in the wind. 
The Housing Service Advisory Group was so concerned to 
advance the unification of housing functions in a single 
department that it paid no regard at all, not even a passing 
reference, to the urgent need to address the size and scale 
of the public. housing stock, and the economic and management 
viability of an operational unit of the size it was proposing. 
It ignored the question of estate-based management altogether. 
It even stated quite categorically that repairs could not be 
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considered a "core service" of housing management, 'while 
every previous Government report had stated it to be one of 
the pivotal services. 
CONCLUSION 
The notion of a Comprehensive Housing Service, which seemed 
like a major advance in the late seventies has bedevilled 
progress in tackling estate management by upgrading the 
Town Hall status of housing departments at the expense of 
the basic jobs on the ground. 
Housing is historically in an anomalous position in local 
government. The Secretary of State and the Department of 
the Environment (previously Ministry of Housing) have 
virtually - 
"no jurisdiction in regard to the mana ement of 
the local authority's housing stock"19 
except for very limited responsibility under the Acts of 
1957 and 1980. There are no enforceable standards and 
the Government plays a purely advisory role in the running 
ýý of the housing stock. Yet the stock is worth nationally a 
nominal £50 thousand million. 
Nor are local authorities directed by statute to set up a 
housing committee with the specific task of running the 
housing stock owned by the local authority'. There is no 
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requirement to appoint a housing manager. So not only is 
the Government not responsible, it has apparently not laid 
down a framework for local-government to carry out its 
duties as a landlord either. In fact, not until the 
Housing Act 1980 did local authority tenants enjoy such 
basic rights as security of tenure and some local 
authorities only set up housing departments at all in the 
last two or three years. 
* This compares sharply with the 
law concerning almost all other aspects of local government, 
and with private sector housing, which is infringed with 
numerous Rent Acts and public health laws. 
It is unclear why the Institute'of Housing in its early 
years failed to advocate the establishment of a unified 
housing department within the Town Halls. At a stage when 
local authorities were relatively small landlords before 
the war, it would have made sense and would have given some 
direction to developments. Only after management problems 
assumed overwhelming proportions and the preoccupation with 
building declined, did serious attention focus on management. 
By then, it was too late to resolve the problem within the 
central framework. 
Housing management of the public stock began to meet major 
difficulties when large numbers of the poorest families 
began to be rehoused in the 1930's. The lack of a local 
system, the lack of a proper budget or standards for 
management and maintenance, the weak political structures 
both in central and local government for the control of the 
Tower Hamlets established its housing department and appointed 
its first Director in 1982. In the Rhondda Borough Council, 
the Borough Treasurer is still responsible for housing management. 
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publicly-owned housing stock, all meant that the new 
demands generated by rehousing from slums could not be 
adequately met. With a weak management and maintenance 
organisation, the other problems of poverty and social 
uprooting, unfavourable design and large-scale estate 
development, all fed each other at the least popular end 
of the housing scale, just as they had done in the old, 
privately-rented housing market. 
Octavia Hill's Victorian predictions are no longer as 
outmoded as they seemed - 
"These [new estates] will rapidly become as 
forlorn and rowdy as their old haunts, unless 
something of thoughtful rule be established in 
them. And the huge blocks of flats will 
equally need the presence of trustworthy 
leaders and human government. " 
More recently, through the Department of the Environment's 
Inner Area Study in Lambeth, Jean Cox19 observed - 
"In general the quality of the environment seems 
to depend more on the way the estate is 
maintained and cared for than on the standard 
of design. " 
I- 
The most recent observation came from the Audit Commission's 
Report on local authority rent arrears, asserting that 
arrears were largely accounted for, not by the incidence of' 
deprivation but by the style of management. ' 
"The importance of management performance..... 
far outweighs. ' the impact of external factors 
..... Good management can affect the local situation, 
even in the most difficult circumstances. More 
successful authorities..... often have arrears 50% or 
more below the levels of authorities facing similar 
socio-economic conditions. 20 
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The current crisis among large, remote local authority 
landlords has grown from this chequered history. The 
results are: 
- vastly expanding rent arrears in line with the 
withdrawal of the door-to-door service. 
21 
- centralised and expensive repairs services that are 
often slow and unresponsive to tenants and very 
inefficient in terms of productivity, completion 
times, prevention, etc. 
- housing managers, usually untrained, with an 
assortment of parts of jobs and no overall control. 
23 
- distant, if not hostile relations between tenants 
and the landlord and a common desire among tenants to 
keep moving (more than among owner-occupiers). 
24 
Only in the philanthropic housing trusts and associations, 
has intensive, local and unitary housing management been 
retained. In cost and staffing terms, Trusts, such as 
Peabody, Sutton, Samuel Lewis and Guinness, invest about 
the same as city local authorities.. Housing Associations 
and Trusts are allowed by the Government to spend. 
approximately £8 per week per unit on management and 
maintenance (1984). For this they receive a direct 
subsidy. Local authorities are expected to pay for 
housing management and maintenance out of rents and rates. 
By law they must set up a Housing Revenue Account and they 
spend between £5.011 and £12.92 per unit per week. 
5 The 
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average is about £5.77. The difference between housing 
associations and local authorities is that local 
authorities do not receive a direct management and 
maintenance subsidy. It is always at their own 
discretion how much they actually spend on ground-level 
services, whereas smaller landlord bodies, whose only 
function is to be a benign landlord, tend to spend almost 
all on direct on-the-ground services. 
In terms of staff ratios, both local authorities and 
housing associations employ about one worker to between 
40-50 dwellings, including manual workers. 
26 But local 
authorities tend to tie up staff in central functions and 
very top-heavy repairs organisations. It is true that 
local authorities have direct responsibility for 
homelessness and carry out wide housing functions not 
. assumed by housing associations. The public 
housing 
estates are on such a large scale as to defy many 
straightforward management solutions. - Therefore the 
comparison is limited. However, in terms of direct 
management and maintenance responsibilities, their roles 
as landlords are very similar, but are executed in a very 
different way, due largely to the historic development of 
housing management in the two strands - housing 
associations being strongly influenced by the Octavia Hill 
tradition and more recently by local voluntary initiative 
and input from tenants, local authorities being more 
influenced by male-dominated professionals in surveying, 
accounting, architecture and so on, and directly 
1796 
controlled by politicians. With low-income populations 
and very dense buildings to manage, the results could not 
be more strikingly. different. 
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CHAPTER V- POST-WAR ALLOCATIONS POLICIES 
POST-WAR ALLOCATION POLICIES: LABOUR HOUSING FOR ALL; 
CONSERVATIVE HOUSING OF LAST RESORT 
"In reality a large part of the council stock 
displays that type of neglect which suggests 
lack of pride rather than lack of money. " 
Reade, "Policy and Politics", January 1982 
Having traced the development of housing management from 
its early hey-day. in the second half of the nineteenth 
century to its heavy-handed, overweight bureaucracy in the 
second half of the twentieth, we came to see the emergence 
of unpopular council estates as inevitable. However, the 
way public housing has been allocated must still be 
scrutinised, as it has had an overriding influence on the 
final shape of the problem. The decision as to who 
deserved what was always the most difficult and sensitive 
area. 
Octavia Hill was openly committed to helping only the very 
poorest and to rescuing social rejects. She was also 
totally committed to preserving existing tenancies in the 
houses she acquired. Therefore selection did not arise. 
By contrast, early public housing tenants were carefully 
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screened for their ability to pay, their regular income 
and for their respectability. In 1930, the sharp change 
towards slum clearance and helping the needy, pushed public 
housing into a conflicting role - how to stop slums from 
recreating themselves in the new public housing estates to 
which slum-dwellers moved en masse. With little sense of 
history, few declared policies, and little awareness of the 
long-term consequences, local authorities tried to cope 
with social problems through a policy of social segregation, 
rather than intense management support. 
By the 1950's, the institutionalised sifting of applicants 
was firmly entrenched and most local authorities were 
judging applicants twice over - were they eligible for a 
council home? What kind of council home did they deserve 
or best suited their style of life? A whole battery of 
assessments, points, home visits, gradings, quality offers, 
rights of refusal, picking and choosing, grew up, that not 
only eventually snarled up the lettings process into a 
laborious and lethargic maze, but also categorised tenants 
in a way that no self-respecting welfare or private system 
should, solidifying far more intensely than the old slums 
ever had, sub-class divisions, creating communities at the 
bottom of everyone's aspirations, which inspired only a 
desire to escape. 
The following analysis is based on long involvement in the 
lettings processes of Islington and the GLC, and on the 
fragmented and partial accounts available officially. Few 
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local authorities have been open, even about such basic 
matters as how they operated their points system. So the 
account is derived from first-hand experience rather than 
second-hand sources. However, the Priority Estates Project 
and the Department of the Environment Difficult-to-Let 
Investigation involved contact with about 100 local 
authorities. The pattern of sifting, grading,: and 
segregating applicants was almost universal. 
1 
In earlier chapters, we have outlined changes and 
developments in who should be entitled to a council home. 
The actual policies governing selection for particular 
dwellings do not appear to have been documented. Right up 
to the Second World War, access to any kind of council 
housing was considered a huge step up the ladder, and 
although stigmatised estates were emerging, the incipient 
lettings problems were not recognised till well into the 
sixties. We take up the account at the end of the war in 
1945, when lettings policies and procedures became more 
central to housing management as public housing came to be 
regarded as a broad-based provision, rather than simply a 
slum clearance mechanism. 
Between 1938 and 1960,650,000 dwellings had been 
demolished2 (including 200,000 in the war) and 2,300,000 
new council dwellings had been built. The surplus of new. 
dwellings over demolished dwellings was used to move people 
out from slum areas to peripheral cottage estates, thereby 
reducing city populations. It was a desperate attempt to 
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bring households into balance with dwellings. It 
generated a whole new emphasis in housing management, 
namely mass rehousing, and a set of policies for deciding 
who deserved what. 
The post-war Labour Government of 1945 was committed to 
council housing for all, as a universal service, and the 
1949 Housing Act removed the obligation on local authorities 
to house only the "workin g class" . This should have shifted 
allocation policies back towards mixed rehousing. However, 
six years later, when councils were still trying to cope 
with the housing crisis created by the war, a Conservative 
Government adopted a very different policy: owner- 
occupation was favoured and council housing was reduced to 
a provision primarily for those who could not afford to buy. 
Need became paramount again as it seemed the only fair 
criterion for allocating a scarce welfare resource 
designated to help those who could not help themselves. 
The 1957 Housing Act stressed that: 
"Local authorities must give reasonable preference 
to persons occupying insanitary or overcrowded 
houses, have large families, or are living under 
unsatisfactory conditions. " 
Because of the massive slum clearance programme that was by 
then gathering steam, in practice councils had very little 
choice in who they rehoused. Between 1960 and 1975, 
1,100,000'further homes were demolished and 1,600,000 new 
dwellings were built by councils. Many of the demolished 
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dwellings contained more than one household. It is 
therefore easy to see that most new dwellings in that 
period were required to redress the balance of demolition. 
Some new dwellings, however, were used to rehouse 
existing council tenants wanting rehousing from older 
council property in order to make room for "poorer and 
less deserving" families in inferior dwellings. This was 
generally considered a realistic way of allocating very 
different qualities of property to families with often very 
different standards of behaviour and housekeeping. 
However, many of the new estates were built to high density 
in the form of unpopular flats, and residents of old, 
decayed areas often proved reluctant to move. A pecking 
order of rehousing was developed, with the more skilled 
getting a better. deal from the'council, which still had 
complete autonomy to allocate more popular dwellings within 
the stock to whom it chose. Lettings priorities had 
become a central housing issue as the scale of building 
continued at a high level. 
NEED AND MERIT IN THE ALLOCATION OF COUNCIL HOUSING 
ýý Councils accepted responsibility for the needy while 
attempting to maximise the use and value of a very varied 
and complex stock. Applicants were assessed usually 
through a points system that gave priority for overcrowding, 
lack of amenities and sharing a dwelling. But points were 
also given, often disproportionately, for length of 
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residence, which often positively militated against need. 
Large numbers of tenants were not eligible for points at 
all, either because they had not lived within the local 
authority area for five years, or because they occupied 
furnished rooms and were therefore categorised as transient, 
regardless of how long they had lived there. For decades, 
both these restrictions disqualified all immigrants and all 
new city dwellers from rehousing. Points only began after 
you were deemed eligible by the particular local authority. 
These restrictions also usually applied to slum-clearance 
and demolition areas; thereby ensuring that the most 
vulnerable families often could not be helped but were 
shunted on from one redevelopment area to the next, as the 
supply of rented housing in more salubrious areas declined 
in the face of rapidly expanding owner-occupation. 
Once accepted as eligible, tenants were graded according to 
suitability or merit, usually by a home visitor who assessed 
tenants' housekeeping standards, quality of child-care, 
rent-paying ability and general competence. Ironically, 
the home visit to assess need in a very personal way was 
the tool whereby poorer, more needy households were often 
designated unsuitable for better housing, resulting in the 
social grading of tenants and the development of strong 
social segregation according to the popularity of estates, 
and the merit of the applicants. The most vulnerable 
households were often thereby rehoused into the least 
suitable property. 
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The Oldham Community Development Project3 did a comparative 
study of allocations in several northern cities dating back 
to 1950 which demonstrated that grading of tenants and social 
segregation in rehousing were widely accepted practices. 
There were in fact objective reasons why the sifting and 
ranking went on in spite of a commitment to rehousing 
according to need. Each applicant faced a conflict between 
timing and quality in the offer he was prepared to accept. 
4 
Time pressure induced the most desperate families to take 
what they could, quickly, according to availability. 
Quality aims led waiting list applicants and more determined, 
less vulnerable households to wait for good offers. 
In the case of rehousing from council clearance areas and 
rehabilitation programmes, timing and quality pressures 
combined to give that group first claim. Studies conducted 
in the G. L. C. 5 and in Birmingham6 both found that "good" 
rehousing cases from demolition areas had the pick of the 
property on the shortest time-scale. Usually rehousing 
cases were allocated the best property quickly unless they 
were a "poor quality tenant" or a "low-grade" applicant. 
councils' need to empty condemned property. ensured favoured 
treatment for residents of demolition areas. Vulnerable, 
needy households were offered the worst, quickly. Their 
The 
access was determined by their need, but their need enabled 
councils to put them in the worst property. Those that 
could wait, but were eligible for rehousing, could pick and 
choose and ended up in property they liked, often after a 
considerable wait. Furnished tenants were normally simply 
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evicted in advance of the council taking over. 
John Lambert7 described vividly the complex structure of 
rules to regulate need through merit, allowing for pressure, 
favours and special pleading, underlining "the personalised 
and individualistic nature of the wait in the queue". As 
many as five different departments would be involved in the 
lettings process in Birmingham, the biggest housing 
department in the country, and different demand groups 
would "bid" for dwellings, the homeless, the-poor and the 
non-white faring invariably worse than others. 
Thus need and merit acted as the shaky and conflicting 
criteria of fairness in the allocation of council housing 
even though need became widely accepted as the main criterion 
of access and merit the principle criterion of allocation. 
MERIT AND GRADING OF TENANTS 
The merit system, which developed alongside need, worked 
largely through the grading of applicants. At*various 
times, Islington, Lambeth, and other councils tried to 
dispense with grading and gave the most disadvantaged 
families equal access to good council accommodation, 
abandoning any form of grading altogether. These policies 
were usually applied temporarily. Due to pressures from 
ward councillors, housing managers on good estates and 
sometimes residents, these attempts were quietly shunted 
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aside as objections to the breaches in the social hierarchy 
poured in. 
The standard approach was to grade tenants according to 
their suitability for different types of accommodation. 
In many authorities this involved a simple approval, on'the 
basis of a home visit, for an ordinary letting. Then other 
elements in the scramble for good offers would come into 
play, such as family size, or ability to wait. It was 
taken for granted by housing experts and practitioners that 
home visits were essential and that the majority of tenants 
would be classed as suitable for good accommodation. 
The G. L. C. lettings survey in 1976 described the grading 
process as it had grown up over the years of priority 
lettings, dating from about a century before. 
"The first stage of the lettings process involves 
the applicant being visited by a welfare 
assistant, who assesses the prospective tenant's 
suitability for different types of property by 
looking at their rent record and judging their 
domestic standards. " 
9 
I- 
This was inevitably a subjective process. Income and 
economic security played a large part in a family's reliability, 
standards of housekeeping and general ability to cope. 
Race also played a part in grading according to the G. L. C. 
survey. 'Black tenants were on average less often assessed 
at the highest grade than white. This was partly due to 
much greater overcrowding and poverty among immigrants and 
larger numbers of children. It was also a result of 
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cultural differences and possibly prejudice. Even so, 
75% of non-white applicants compared with 87% of white 
were assessed at the highest grade, thereby guaranteeing a 
matching problem between a majority of suitable tenants 
and a majority of unpopular estates. 
The G. L. C's complex system of matching tenants and property 
illustrates the highly bureaucratic and judgemental nature 
of grading by merit, as well as the severe lettings 
problems posed by a largely unpopular stock: 
Whereas most applicants were assessed at the most favoured 
grade, most dwellings were assessed as below the most 
favoured grade. Therefore the grading of tenants and 
property was only the first step in an attempt to match 
the two. 
Each property and applicant was given a "lettability 
range" of 1 to 19, which determined the quality of 
property offered. 
The G. L. C. developed a measurement of popularity for the 
full range of its dwelling-types, taking account. of age and type, 
that may indicate the popularity of the council stock 
nationally. The main categories in order of popularity 
were: 
rt) Post-19614 house. 
2) 1955-64 house. 
3) 1945-54 house. 
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4) Inter-war house, post-19614 flat, pre-1919 
modernised house. 
5) Pre-1919 house, 1955-64 flat. 
°- 6)--, - 1945-54 flat° and inter-war modernised flat. 
7) Inter-war unmodernised flat and pre-1919 
modernised flat. 
11 8) Pre-1919 unmodernised flat. 
9 
This ranking order of popularity is based only on physical 
type and does not allow for social or management factors 
that can distort the scale. 
I- 
Flats are now widely recognised as less popular than houses. 
Unfortunately since 1964, more flats have been built in the 
council sector nationally than houses. 
10 Tenants' 
dissatisfaction was intensified because most applicants 
lived in houses prior to becoming council tenants, thereby 
linking dissatisfaction with the new flat with loss of the 
old home. 
John Lambert, in his study of Birmingham's housing department 
in 1978,11 found that council employees, responsible for 
letting the large number of flats available, had to exert 
considerable pressure on applicants not to hold out for the 
rare but popular offer of a house. 
"There was understandable pressure on housing 
visitors to find prospective tenants for the 
many flats which the Council possessed. "12 
Similarly, 
.a 
survey conducted in 1975 of slum clearance 
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residents in Hu1113 came up with the staggering figure 
that only 2% of the applicants said they would accept 
offers of accommodation in flats or maisonettes. Over 96% 
would hold out for a house. However, in practice many- 
applicants would end up in flats through a process of 
pressure from lettings officers, by virtue of the number 
of flats available for letting during the slum clearance 
period. 
Flats have been demolished in Liverpool, Knowsley, 
Merseyside, Birkenhead, Glasgow, Tyneside and London 
because of the difficulty of persuading tenants to live in 
them. In very few cases were the flats demolished because 
they were structurally unsound. Two-thirds of the 
unpopular estates in the recent Department of the 
Environment study of estate-based management14 comprised 
flats, even though they form only one third of the total 
council stock. 
The council sector, which was not regulated by what people 
wanted but by what Governments and local authorities 
decided, built far more flats than were wanted and in some 
cases, more than were needed. 
Obviously, if over 80% of applicants were given the highest 
grading initially and only about 10% of the stock was in 
the most popular category, then the lettability range was 
determined by more subjective and discriminatory factors. 
The G. L. C. repor uncovered clearly that the most 
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economically and socially disadvantaged were concentrated 
on the old flatted estates, the least popular lettings 
offer, based on the home visit which determined the type 
of, offer made. , 
The numbers of households from disadvantaged groups in the 
G. L. C. sample allocated to older flats were as follows: 
Head of household Allocated an older flat 
Homeless i43% 
Non-white 45% 
Unemployed 12.5% 
Unskilled 21% 
Under 30 142% 
The proportion of all other applicants allocated to older 
flats was 15%. 
With such a complex set of allocation procedures, it was 
hoped to reduce areas of discretion to a minimum. Yet 
the report admitted that - 
"owing to the flexibility of the system, it was 
quite possible for identical applicants to be 
given different lettability ranges. " 
The object of grading and matching was to ensure that 
unpopular property was let and the value of good property 
was maximised. Yet in spite of grading and matching, 
0 
"desirable properties let quickly: whereas 
unattractive, old flats can be unlet for 
months. "16 
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So in the area of highest housing demand in the country, 
some property became virtually unlettable and the complex 
system of grading failed to solve the problem of 
allocations. Tenants low down the grading scale resisted 
the allocations system even where they had little hope of 
finding their way to a better offer. The G. L. C's 
experience seemed to indicate that the very complexity of 
grading, lettability ranges, and matching, so downgraded 
the poorer estates and refined and slowed down the system 
as to make it unworkable. Any tenant who could resist, 
did so.. 
Liverpool, Birmingham and Glasgow, as well as other local 
authorities, operated similar grading systems to the 
G. L. C., both for property and for tenants. In Birmingham, 
condemned property was used systematically until the late 
seventies, when the-last redevelopment areas were 
demolished, for adversely graded families. The lettings 
files of these families were labelled "recommended for 
older property only". 
17 In Glasgow, very large areas of 
city council housing have become unlettable and thousands 
of unpopular council dwellings, some relatively new, 
proposed for demolition. Adverse grading enhanced the 
unpopularity of certain estates. Similar tales could be 
told in Manchester and Liverpool. In Newcastle and 
Islington; the worst blocks of flats were earmarked for 
"unsuitable" tenants. Eventually these-blocks were fit 
only for demolition too. 
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GRADING INEFFICIENCY 
The object of grading was to classify estates on a scale 
- --from most to least popular and to do likewise with tenants. 
Grading did not work as a means of ensuring proper use of 
the council stock. On the contrary, it so stigmatised 
estates at the bottom end of the grading process that 
their decay was hastened. 
"Unnecessarily rapid decay of the housing stock 
is proportional to the degree of social- 
segregation ..... Decay is attributable to 
the 
perceived social undesirability of the buildings 
in question. 1118 
The policy of grading and then allocating, not according to 
need, but according to perceived social disadvantage, 
including homelessness, colour, unskilled work or no work, 
created low demand, empty dwellings, and consequent social 
disarray on the least popular estates. 
HOUSING MANAGERS GRAPPLE WITH ALLOCATION PROBLEMS 
John Macey and Charles V. Baker19 in 1965 wrote an 
ýý authoritative book on council house management, rightly 
convinced that this Cinderella of local authority empires 
deserved more considered attention. They grappled 
thoughtfully with the problem of how to allocate the 
council stock to applicants, recognising that some estates 
were much more in demand than others and that tenants, 
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given the choice, would always opt for the most popular 
estates, thereby creating a lettings bottleneck. They 
therefore weighed up who "deserved" good housing and how 
less popular homes should be best used. The approach 
advocated by Macey and Baker was based on widely accepted 
current local authority practice and long experience. 
Their formula has been regarded as a blueprint by housing 
professionals for 20 years and their careful analysis of 
the most difficult issues in housing management was like 
a litmus paper for all the areas of conflict and confusion. 
They epitomised the most serious and considered balancing 
act of the city housing departments. 
MARKET RENTS TO DETERMINE WHO GETS WHAT 
Macey and Baker did not enjoy sitting in judgement over 
tenants struggling to improve their housing situation. 
But they were intensely conscious of the conflicting 
claims of different households and wanted to establish a 
method that would eliminate accusations of favour and 
privilege. They concluded that rent levels should dictate 
broadly which tenants chose the better or worse housing. 
This idea has commonly been rejected on the grounds that 
it would intensify socio-economic segregation. It also 
failed to address the problem that many council tenants 
could not pay anything approaching a realistic rent, made 
worse by-the recent phenomenon of very high levels of 
unemployment with over 70% of council tenants nationally 
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being eligible for Housing Benefit. 
20 
Their market-oriented approach to rents was not widely 
adopted. Rents have been fixed by a combination of 
non-market calculations, leading to sometimes absurd 
anomalies. For example, in the city of Liverpool, rents 
for flats in some highly stigmatised blocks were higher 
than in the adjacent houses with gardens that could be 
let many times over. The actual construction and debt 
repayment costs, as well as perceived standards of amenity 
for modern flats as opposed to old houses, were so much 
higher that this influenced rent levels. Although the 
very low cost of pre-war cottage estates has been used to 
offset the cost of modern flats through a system of rent- 
pooling, tenants still usually pay more for the less 
popular modern estates. Therefore, council rent 
structures have not related to the popularity of or 
demand for particular dwellings. Instead of low rents 
attracting poor tenants to lower quality housing, 
relatively high rents for unpopular flats compared with 
relatively low rents for much more popular cottage 
property have driven away many potential applicants, 
making unpopular housing even more difficult to let. 
The exception has been low priority applicants on 
supplementary benefit who have not had to take account of 
rent levels anyway. The socio-economic segregation 
that Macey and Baker's "market" approach would have 
encouraged has happened in places through the reverse 
process, with undifferentiated council rents tending to 
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drive away from the least popular estates wage-earning 
tenants and encouraging a concentration of welfare 
recipients for whom rent levels are not a deterrent. 
Unified Housing Benefit introduced in 1982 has finally 
succeeded in making rent levels irrelevant to the 
allocation of housing, although unless Housing Benefit is 
used to enable poor tenants to gain access to more popular 
dwellings, it is not clear that it will help lettings on 
stigmatised estates. Meanwhile rent levels have not been 
used as an objective, if economically discriminating 
method of determining access to better or worse council 
housing. Macey and Baker did not in any case believe 
that ability to pay alone should determine allocations. 
FAIRNESS IN ALLOCATIONS 
Macey and Baker argued that good, reliable tenants should 
be offered the best property and "unreliable" tenants the 
worst on grounds of justice and prudent management. 
"..... Apart from the avoidance of trouble to the 
management, it will usually accord more nearly 
with the popular idea of fairness that good 
behaviour should receive some reward. " 
Although this dictum might ring true, the G. L. C. 
21 found 
that over 90% of applicants had no history of rent arrears 
and 80% were deemed suitable for the best property. Even 
if Macey and Baker's notion of just allocation were 
accepted and applied, council applicants, the vast majority 
of whom were "good and respectable", would be competing for 
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the small proportion of council property that was most 
desirable, at least in the major cities where unpopular 
flats formed so much of the council stock. Therefore 
the reward of the best offer became highly subjective and 
personalised, with lettings officers selecting from the 
80-90% of "respectable" tenants, who should actually get 
the 20-30% of "good" offers. 
Macey went on to recommend that homeless families should 
be allocated according to their circumstances. If 
homelessness was seemingly the families' own fault, such as 
wilful rent arrears leading to eviction, they should be 
offered inferior property. 
"In cases, e. g. those where eviction is the 
result of wilfully running up arrears-without 
reason, it would be folly to provide the family 
with a better home than the one they have lost. 
"There needs to be a carefully considered and 
firm policy for allocations to the homeless. 
While it is very undesirable to use the long- 
known deterrent of splitting up families, it 
may be necessary to acquire some older, less 
popular housing, for those whose claims on the 
resources of the authority are weakest..... housing 
can only be given to one group at the expense of 
other, often more deserving families. " 
Macey and Baker recognised at the bottom of the housing 
I. ladder a group of households whose seeming fecklessness 
and incompetence made them suitable only for low grade 
council property. In this way social stratification 
became institutionalised in council housing departments. 
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HOME VISITS TO ASSESS APPLICANTS 
As mentioned earlier, applicants were visited in their 
home to assess their needs and to try and gauge the type 
of property they were most suited for. The original 
idea of home visits, strongly advocated in the thirties 
to help slum-clearance families make the rehousing 
transition with the personal support of a lettings/welfare 
officer, became distorted into the crucial chance to assess 
the suitability of a family for various types of rehousing. 
The decision to place people on the worst estates was not 
taken lightly. Macey and Baker attached a lot of 
importance to home visiting in assessing the suitability of 
an applicant for particular types of property: 
"The applicant's suitability from this standpoint 
is usually judged by a visit to his present 
accommodation ..... Trained housing 
assistants can 
distinguish between untidiness, and'dirt due to 
adverse conditions, and that which-is due to poor 
standards of home care. There is rarely any 
real excuse for lack of personal cleanliness. 
The current rent book will indicate the applicant's 
attitude in the matter of meeting his financial 
obligations, due consideration being given to the 
validity or otherwise of any explanations put 
forward as the reason for any arrears shown..... 
"..... It is desirable, but 
for assistants engaged on 
lettings work to have had 
of seeing people in their 
to judge both their good 
not always possible, 
the 'office' side of 
a good deal of experience 
own homes, and learning 
and their bad qualities..... 
"It will be appreciated that the personal suitability 
of the applicant and his wife are a guide in the 
type of dwelling to be offered. " 
Home visits were standard practice in the G. L. C., 
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Birmingham and many other local authorities. 
could not think of a better way of "assessing" 
applicants. 
Councils 
USE OF OLD AND POOR QUALITY PROPERTY - TRANSFERS 
To back up these allocation methods, Macey and Baker 
outlined two very important uses of the diverse housing 
stock. Both had disastrous social consequences. First, 
they proposed that old property should be kept available 
for the very poor on the grounds that they could not 
afford better. Secondly, they advocated maintaining as 
many pre-war council properties as possible available for 
"low priority" applicants by rehousing existing tenants 
and higher priority applicants to better dwellings. The 
use of transfers as a social ladder had the great advantage 
of giving dissatisfied and aspiring council tenants a 
leg-up into the bottom of the council sector. However, 
it failed to allow for the fact that the very process of 
sifting and shifting was constantly undermining the 
stability of estates which had only existed for a generation 
by advertising the fact that the "better" families moved 
off. It generated a disproportionate desire to leave old' 
for new, and inspired a sense of failure and captivity in 
those who did not succeed in gaining a transfer. 
The bitterness generated by the failure was in turn often 
meted out on new incoming tenants who were blamed for 
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"dragging the estate down". Indeed they often were 
poorer and more disadvantaged than the successful 
"leavers". In that sense a liberal transfer system within 
the council sector bedevilled the chances of older and less 
popular estates maintaining their own sense of identity and 
backbone. The result was an ugly decaying spiral. 
It is ironical that transfers generated such mobility among 
council tenants that they moved more often than owner- 
occupiers. This was particularly true of tenants on 
unpopular estates. 
22 
In sum, Macey and Baker endorsed the prevailing wisdom that 
good housing should go to respectable and deserving tenants 
and that the least desirable', poorest housing should go to 
corresponding households. As long as someone had to sit 
in judgement over who got what, it was hard to come up with 
a fairer notion. 
The book "Housing Management" validated judgement over poor 
people's access to "welfare housing". Long before it was 
ever recognised as such, council housing had become a 
gateway. For some it was a way up, for others, a further 
step down. It mainly depended on how your fate was sealed 
by the all-important lettings officer. 
CULLINGWORTHcS REPORT ON ALLOCATIONS AND MANAGEMENT 
While problems were accumulating within the council sector 
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as a result of discriminatory allocation procedures and 
grading of tenants, government and enlightened housing 
experts were still focusing their energy on the issue of 
access to public housing as such. 
In 1969, the Cullingworth Report of the Housing 
Management Sub-Committee23 made a number of important 
recommendations on the management and allocation of council 
housing. 
ACCESS FOR THE MOST DISADVANTAGED 
Cullingworth argued very strongly for the most vulnerable 
and sometimes problematic families to be given absolute 
priority for a council dwelling, but with the important 
proviso of built-in social services support. He later 
countered the accusation that he had been advocating the 
ghettoisation of council housing. The size of the council 
sector was such that much more responsibility could be taken 
for the most needy without the whole public sector becoming 
stigmatised. 
I- 
Cullingworth did not, however, allow for the fact that many 
councils would create social ghettos by organising 
allocations in such a way that the least able tenants he was 
trying to persuade councils to help would end up on the 
least popular estates. Social ghettos were created within 
the council sector by virtue of the poor gaining access 
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according to the prescription of the Cullingworth report, 
but on the whole only to less popular estates. 
Nor did he consider satisfactorily the implications of 
rehousing families whose behaviour-was such that they could 
not cope with community life on high-density estates. 
Most council dwellings were on communally-designed estates 
which stripped a family of privacy and drew attention to 
and accentuated the nuisance caused by certain types of 
behaviour. Cullingworth overlooked the nature of many 
public housing estates in his advocacy of access for 
families who could not cope with normal life. 
DISPERSAL OF RACIAL MINORITIES 
Unlike the 1939 Housing Management report24, Cullingworth 
did not recommend the dispersal of disadvantaged families 
across the range of stock. But he did recommend with 
great force the dispersal of Commonwealth immigrants to 
avoid racial ghettos. His recommendations on this were 
no more adhered to than the 1939 recommendations for 
dispersal of "problem" tenants. Colour became enmeshed 
with other elements of discretion and discrimination in the 
allocation of council housing and Cullingworth's report will 
stand out as a farsighted failure to influence'practice. 
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DATE-ORDER ACCESS 
Cullingworth attacked the accepted 'system of grading 
tenants according to their suitability for better or worse 
property. He argued that it was unnecessary for the 
allocation process. Instead, he advocated date order for 
access. But by 1969 much of the council stock was already 
highly unpopular and difficult to run. Unless tenants 
lost all rights to choose where they lived, date-order 
lettings would enable applicants under least stress to 
hold out for the best property, since they could wait the 
longest. However, his stand against merit or a points 
system was more radical than was obvious at the time. And 
no one has since come up with a fairer allocation system. 
OPEN WAITING LISTS 
His other important and contentious recommendation was that 
waiting lists should be open to all-comers and that 
residential qualifications should not be a bar to a council 
tenancy any more than they were a bar to owner-occupation. 
This should be coupled with a publicly declared system of 
i- 
allocation. 
It is possible that had these reccmmendations been widely. 
followed, council housing would have become an open door to 
the whole community, as were other-social provisions such as 
schools. Social polarisation through allocation might then 
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have been less severe because open allocation on a straight 
date-order and the critical exposure to public examination 
would have shown up the problem much earlier. 
By raising the vital areas affecting access to council 
housing, the Cullingworth report was representing the 
Government's concern on the one hand with councils 
excluding needy groups and households, and on the other 
creating social or racial ghettos. But the report did not 
tackle satisfactorily the issue that was already at the 
forefront of housing managers' agendas - how to avoid 
unpopular estates being matched with impoverished 
populations, once access' itself had been assured. 
BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH 
Cullingworth did point to the approach that was long 
overdue if council estates were to be saved from the same 
fate as the slums they were built to replace: 
"Local authority houses and flats represent a 
considerable part of the nation's wealth and 
it is the responsibility of local authorities 
to treat their management as an important 
business enterprise. " 
If local. authorities had followed this sensible if obvious 
recommendation, the allocation process would not have been 
left to feed the decline and decay it was generating at 
the time of Cullingworth's report. Cullingworth moved 
the debate a long way forward from the conventional wisdom 
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of Macey and Baker. His recommendations were not backed 
by housing legislation, and council housing is still 
largely bedevilled with assessment-- and judgements of 
fairness, following the same historic system that the 
Cullingworth Committee aimed to dismantle in 1969. 
HOMELESSNESS AND EMPTY COUNCIL DWELLINGS 
In spite of increasing vacancies and the emergence of 
difficult-to-let estates, access to council housing was 
not made easier in time to avert the growing problem of 
homelessness. 
Cullingworth, in his essays on housing policy in 1979,25 
pointed out that: 
"It is possible to have a general surplus of 
housing accompanied by acute need which market 
forces and public policies do not meet. " 
Thus there can be high vacancy rates in dwellings and high 
numbers of homeless. The explanation is clear: 
"The homeless do not have easy access to 
available accommodation ..... its very existence 
ý- by definition points to a particular housing 
shortage. " 
It has not paid private landlords in cash terms to let to 
potentially homeless families and it has not been an 
obligation on local authorities to give vulnerable 
-households sufficient priority to prevent the problem of 
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homelessness arising. Yet generally there are more than 
enough empty council dwellings to match the numbers of 
families received into local authority accommodation as 
homeless, especially within the city areas where most 
homelessness occurs. (The Audit Commission has shown 
that in London in 1983, there were 5,500 homeless families 
being accommodated in temporary accommodation, at a cost 
of £18 million, while there were 30,000 unlet council 
homes within the same local authority areas. )26 
"Homeless" families are rarely homeless as such however. 
They are either under threat of homelessness or they are 
in temporary accommodation arranged by the council. 
Therefore in some senses "homelessness" is a misnomer, 
applied to the most desperate families forced to throw 
themselves on the mercies of the council sector for want 
of any sound alternative. 
The concept of homelessness covers two housing allocation 
problems. First, there is the problem of access by the 
young and the vulnerable. Because of restricted access, 
these groups are disproportionately squeezed into the 
homeless category, which is their only avenue to a council 
home. Since the 1977 Act, homelessness has provided 
obligatory access to temporary accommodation at least. 
Second, there is the problem of moving homeless families 
from temporary to permanent council accommodation, the 
issue being what housing they should be entitled to. On 
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the whole, homeless families are allocated as a policy to 
the least desirable accommodation. Even where this is 
not the case, the pressure to rehouse a homeless family 
into permanent accommodation leads the council to offer 
them the most readily available and therefore least 
desirable stock for which there is little competition from 
other groups. As long as the homeless are rehoused on an 
emergency basis, they will continue to be treated 
differently from less pressured households, and they will 
be expected to accept whatever is offered. 
The twin problems of access and quality'of offer could be 
dealt with by simplifying and opening up the allocation= 
process. Boroughs like Lambeth, Islington and Tower 
Hamlets, have been in the anomalous position of having 
large numbers of so-called homeless families in temporary 
accommodation, while having several thousand empty council 
dwellings in each-borough. The councils' main line of 
defence has been that homeless families would not accept 
offers of inferior accommodation, preferring to hold out 
in bed and breakfast hostels for a better offer. The 
tight lettings process and the constant grading has 
generated this bottleneck. 
I- 
STIGMA OF HOMELESSNESS 
The most obvious problem is that the existence of homeless 
families alongside empty dwellings somehow implies 
$ 
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inadequacy on the part of the homeless. Why couldn't 
they get a home like everyone else? Councils, through 
eviction of troublesome tenants and tenants with large 
rent arrears, actually cause some homelessness and 
exacerbate the identification of homelessness with 
problem families. Conditions in temporary accommodation, 
to which homeless families are usually admitted, are 
often quite appalling. In 1980 Islington was rehousing 
families in an old seamen's hostel in Stepney, which had 
been closed down, while it had 4,000 empty council 
dwellings within the borough. Conditions in the hostel 
made family privacy and stability extremely difficult. 
The same applies to the very expensive solution of bed 
and breakfast accommodation, commonly used by many London 
boroughs. The cost causes intense bitterness among 
properly housed rate-payers. Families in this plight 
are accelerated down a social spiral, validating 
discriminatory lettings as they go. 
There is abundant evidence that homeless families are 
disproportionately concentrated on the least popular 
estates. In Lambeth, 40% of lettings are to homeless 
families but only 20; 0 of new dwellings go to the homeless. 
In the G. L. C., homeless families were three times as 
likely to be offered old flats as ordinary applicants. 
On the least popular estates in Brent, up to 80% of 
offers are made to homeless families. In a hated tower 
block in Haringey, almost all lettings in one-bedroom 
flats at one stage were to one-parent, black, homeless families. 
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The five Home Office Community Development Projects 
revealed very big concentrations of homeless families on 
the least popular estates. 
27 Unless more popular 
accommodation was actually reserved for the homeless, 
this would be inevitable, because of the pressure they 
were under to take anything. 
The concentration of homeless families in particular 
estates could itself cause social problems. A new 
brick-built, low-rise, high-density estate-in Brixton 
became a socially disturbed ghetto within two years of 
first being occupied because most of the one-bedroom flats 
were let to one-parent, often teenage, "homeless" 
families in a concerted drive to reduce the numbers in bed 
and breakfast accommodation. What could have been a 
pleasant and well-run estate became a social nightmare, as 
single young-girls, desperately in need of support and direct 
financial help as well as a home, were thrust together as 
strangers in a futuristic, lavish, but unstructured 
environment with no adults to help or hinder. 
Homelessness became a funnel down which the most needy 
were pushed in order to gain access to council housing 
without "spoiling good estates". 
The G. L. C's exhaustive and thoroughly self-critical 
survey28 of their allocation process conducted in 1976 
demonstrated clearly that the problem of discriminatory 
lettings to homeless families was at least in London well 
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established before the Labour Government in 1977 
introduced legislation to force councils to give 
2A 
priority to homeless families. They concluded that: 
"The most significant social variables 
associated with variations in the quality of 
accommodation are homelessness and eclour. " 
Within the G. L. C's four main priority groups for 
rehousing (decant, homeless, special groups, general 
needs), homeless families consistently fared worst, 
although they enjoyed high priority for access. About 
45% of them were allocated to pre-war flats (the least 
popular housing type) compared with 8% of rehoused (decanted) 
households. The G. L. C. also found that homeless families 
were offered old flats 2.8 times more frequently than they 
were offered a more popular home. 
The G. L. C. 29 was able to show that homeless families were 
younger, more often with a female head, more often 
nora-white, and twice as likely to be unemployed as the 
rest of the population. 
HOMELESS PERSONS ACT 1977 
The 1977 
; 
Housing Act broke new ground in lettings 
policies. It imposed on local authority housing 
departments the duty to rehouse homeless families and 
families threatened with homelessness, homeless pregnant 
women, and other "vulnerable" persons threatened with 
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homelessness. 
Many local authorities argue that the 1977 Act opened the 
floodgates to "problem" families and made certain that 
more needy households would be increasingly concentrated 
on the least popular estates, where the largest number of 
empty properties were found. In fact, local authorities 
were already supposed to give priority to such applicants. 
However, the rapid shrinkage of the private rented sector, 
and the expansion in the overall number of'households, -' 
made an increase in threatened homelessness inevitable. 
By the same token, the vast and rapid expansion of public 
housing made councils the obvious providers of shelter for those 
without a secure roof. 
The first mistake most councils made was to adhere to 
unnecessary allocation restrictions long after the acute 
shortage had disappeared; the second was ' implicitly 
to regard homeless families as inferior to other 
tenants, and therefore unworthy -of good housing. The 
ghettoisation of homeless families, given their obvious 
vulnerability by virtue of their need, rebounded against 
the councils and the homeless. 
I 
Certain estates and housing areas became so stigmatised and 
socially explosive because of the high concentrations of 
homeless families that demolition sometimes came to be 
regarded as the only solution. One estate in Islington, 
W 
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The population increased by one-tenth in the 30 years after the war, but households by one-quarter, 30 
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Blythe Mansions, used primarily for homeless families as 
a deliberate policy, was demolished in 1978 because the 
stigma attaching to the estate became so intense. The 
estate was structurally sound. The stigma derived from 
homelessness and the associated poverty, numbers of 
children, reduced supervision through the incidence of 
one-parent families, and the concentration of racial 
minorities among homeless families. 
31 Because vacancies 
were becoming hard to fill on the worst estates, the 
homeless category grew to take up the slack. 
The Homeless Persons Act of 1977 should have been a 
pathfinder in opening up socially-owned housing to those 
who really needed it. Because of the tight allocation 
system and its inevitable sifting, the Act was turned into 
a management albatross forcing councils to expand greatly 
their provision for vulnerable groups while doing nothing 
to ensure the equitable distribution of poor tenants among 
good and bad council homes. The business of sitting in 
judgement over who got what became even more entrenched. 
The Act was not the cause of the problem. It heightened it 
because councils were still not prepared to follow a policy 
of dispersal or to abandon their more general approach of 
sifting allocations in favour of a less judgemental and 
more straightforward system. 
For families who had been homeless, vulnerability, 
deprivation and poor housing conditions continued to be 
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linked within the council sector and the 1977 Act did 
nothing to ensure equal access to good accommodation in 
the light of the now statutory obligation on local 
authorities to rehouse them. Therefore segregation, if 
anything, became more intense since 1977 and homeless 
families have been increasingly blamed for the continuing 
decline in conditions on many of the poorest estates. 
In no local authority we have visited have homeless 
families enjoyed automatic access to the best estates. 
In most, they are rigidly designated as eligible only for 
the worst. 
SEGREGATION IN THE COUNCIL SECTOR 
Other forms of social segregation continued to operate 
along with homelessness. These included the treatment 
of racial minorities and the role councils have played in 
rehousing so-called "problem families" (families whose 
anti-social behaviour makes them difficult or impossible 
to live next door to). 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
Racial discrimination is more insidious in its long-term 
effects than other forms of discrimination in council 
housing, because it marks people by virtue of their skin 
colour only. No effort. on the part of the person can 
. ýy 
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change the fact of colour. 
The G. L. C. 32 analysed in great detail the relation 
between colour and allocation. Their findings coincided 
with other less comprehensive studies of discrimination. 
33 
All other factors causing low-grade allocations, such as 
homelessness, low income, poor previous housing conditions, 
female head of household and family size, were allowed 
for and the writers still concluded: 
"Differential allocation cannot be completely 
explained by the measurable aspects of the 
lettings process. " 
Racial discrimination was the only element that explained 
the constant over-representation of racial minorities in 
the least popular dwellings. 
The findings of the G. L. C. were clear and disturbing. 
Non-white applicants compared unfavourably with white on 
all aspects of housing type. 
Non-white White 
In flats rather than houses 92% 73% 
In pre-1915 property 145% 25% 
Above 10th floor 6% 3% 
Inner London (rather than Outer) 91% 63% 
On cottage estate 14% 25% 
The unskilled and the unemployed fared worse than other 
socio-economic groups, but within them non-white applicants 
ý- 
216 
were much the worst. 
White Black 
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average quality* of housing . 5.3 6.4 
% in older flats 28% 57% 
Unemployed 
average quality of housing 5.8 6.2 
% in older flats 48% 56% 
All applicants 
average quality of housing 4.6 5.8 
*Quality is measured on a scale of 1 to 8. 
The G. L. C. found that as many as 48% of all new lettings 
in older flatted estates were to households with a non-white 
head, causing incipient racial ghettos to emerge on some 
estates. 
Not surprisingly, non-whites were much more dissatisfied 
with their housing than whites as a much smaller proportion 
were rehoused in the area of their choice or the type of 
property they wanted. A particularly striking finding was 
that 814% of non-white households had no friends or 
relatives in the area they were rehoused in, compared with 
64% for whites. Councils have often countered allegations 
of racial discrimination with the argument that "they like 
to live together". This view was not borne out by the ,.. 
G. L. C. survey. The G. L. C. survey did conclude, however, 
that "non-white households were more resigned to 
u" 
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dissatisfaction. " 
The London Borough of Islington34 conducted a lettings 
-survey to . assess-_the"-, quality_... of. rehousing.. for,.,. white 
non-white residents. They found very similar patterns to 
the G. L. C. The Runnymede Trust35 in 1975 came up with 
similar findings. The recent C. R. E. report on Hackney36 
showed unexplainable concentrations of minorities on the 
worst estates. 
The survey of estate-based management offices conducted in 
19823? by the Department of the Environment showed that in 
all areas in the survey with an ethnic minority population 
of 10% or more, the most unpopular estates in those areas 
had a disproportionate concentration of households from 
ethnic minorities. 
A series of factors in many allocation systems offer 
opportunities for racial discriminatio 
38 
n: 
- residential qualifications for the waiting list. 
- poor communication between the Town Hall and 
members of racial minorities. 
ý- - assessment of housekeeping standards. 
- shortage of larger dwellings which are more in 
dempLnd among racial minorities. 
- greater housing need among minorities creating 
much more pressure to be rehoused in areas of 
less choice. 
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Cüllingworth, in 1969, foresaw the possibility of racial 
concentrations developing within the council sector. 
The G. L. C. survey bore out his fears. Prior to council 
»^rnco-wwvrwwu. ro .. t. -j "-tirrw ..,. r... _ 'i . a+ . +v_. ""_e. r 
a. -+... w. nr+i_f 
rehousingnon=white applicants°"to the G". L Cý""were""spread 
fairly evenly through eight inner London boroughs. 
After rehousing by the G. L. C., they were largely 
concentrated within the four boroughs with the greatest 
proportion of pre-war council flats. ' In Lambeth, the 
non-white population rose from 12% to 19% as a result of 
G. L. C. lettings. 39 
Racial concentrations on the worst estates have enhanced 
their problems by advertising their unpopularity, by 
heightening white prejudice and by increasing lettings 
problems, thereby ensuring ever greater concentrations'of 
less favoured applicants. 
OPENING UP THE SYSTEM OF ALLOCATION 
The Department of the Environment in 1977, during the 
Housing Policy Review, 0 published a consultation paper on 
allocation and access to council housing, advocating a 
much looser approach to allocation. The abolition of 
residential qualifications and publication of allocation 
methods were recommended anew as a way of opening up the 
system. There was a refreshing recognition of the need 
to widen the social make-up of the public sector as it 
'G 
;ý 
.ý 
.f 
increasingly became the only alternative to owner-occupation, 
219 
and in the face of reduced demand from slum clearance and 
redevelopment areas. It is true that Cullingworth some 
years previously had asked councils to provide housing 
-ý"-- ----, for--local--professionals. as . well as less affluent, --more.. z- . -, "", -r. - ý--ý 
needy households. But whereas Cullingworth, with the same 
basic recommendations, had stressed need, the Government 
was now stressing broad social mix. There was growing awareness 
of the need for communities to have a cross-section of 
interests, ages and classes. Councils like the G. L. C. 
began to introduce open-access, first-come,. first-served 
policies, though these only ever applied to difficult-to-let 
estates. 
The Scottish Housing Advisory Committee in 1980 went even 
further in attempting to broaden the public view of 
allocations: 
"Insensitive allocations and transfers contribute 
to the creation of difficult-to-let estates and 
have an important role in improving conditions 
too. "L1 
The Committee recommended that date-order allocations 
should be adopted as the method of distributing the most 
popular dwellings, thereby abolishing grading and merit as 
the determinants for the best property. It did not address 
the problems of urgent cases still being concentrated where 
demand was slacker. It maybe simply recognised the 
inevitability of this. 
However, the Committee envisaged compensatory allocation 
measures-on difficult-to=let estates. It proposed that 
i 
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unpopular dwellings should be taken outside the normal 
lettings system and special lettings devices should be 
adopted. This included reducing the number of socially 
ý"- - -- ---. disadvantaged people-on, these- estates,,. reducing. high_________ 
child densities, finding tenants for vacancies who did 
not add problems. A reversal of the standard lettings 
and transfers procedures would be involved, and an 
aggressive approach to recruitment of more socially able 
households was implied. Unfortunately, good ideas voiced 
in advisory reports simply marked progress. in thinking 
among those not hewing at the coal face. Lettings 
procedures barely changed. 
HOUSING ACT 1980 AND THE RIGHT TO BUY 
The 1980 Act was intended to tackle the thorny problem of 
allocation procedures by legislation, but fell short of 
the conventional wisdom by failing to abolish residential 
qualifications for council housing. It did, however, 
make it legally binding on councils to publish their 
allocation systems. The Government hoped that a general 
leaven of ownership on large estates would combat some of 
the social problems resulting from the sifting of 
-allocations. So far, however, it appears that the right 
to buy is achieving the exact opposite. The more 
attractive and popular council houses, primarily in 
suburban and rural authorities and on smaller estates, are 
selling well. But many tenants, on the unpopular estates 
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with such large concentrations of poverty and unemployment, 
could not afford to buy, even on the very favourable terms 
of the Act. The large flatted estates in the 
rY., . M. -ýR: Mf ýJ,. ""e. . -. 
1V"^Y+w Mý".. +hW. r ý. Kr blý iY ýýr YYýwr. 'N! "Wýý. vY'týr '. u4" .a . rr. .. nw . ýMVVý. - 
!` "i Y": .. v r j: +. . "b`Jb W"'ý4 predomiantlyýLabour-run big cities were not only 
unpopular, but were also made inaccessible for owner- 
occupation to low-income occupants by virtue of service 
charges, high rates charges and social breakdown. 
Therefore the social polarisation, that was caused by;. the 
councils' own allocation systems has been exacerbated by 
the right to buy. 
TRANSFERS HAVE SEIZED UP THE SYSTEM' 
Transfers have worked very much in the same way as the 
right to buy. In fact they have enhanced the right among 
more ambitious and better housed council tenants. The 
scale of transfers in the last fifteen years has accentuated 
the contrast between old and new estates, flats and houses, 
reputable and disreputable estates, by constantly generating 
the aim to move on. It has also undermined among residents 
the commitment to improve conditions. It has left a 
constant vacuum at the bottom of the scale since families 
only ever want to transfer upwards. 
In the late sixties, while the supply of new council 
accommodation was still very plentiful, a decline in the 
number of new redevelopment or demolition areas set in. 
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Because of the drop in rehousing cases from demolition 
areas, new property became available for other categories 
of applicants and there was an acceleration in the 
ýýý^ ýtransfer, "-, of -exist ing-council,, tenants---into -new council ý ýýT a°ý 
property, accentuating all the problems at the less 
popular end of the stock. Already by the end of the 
sixties, nearly half of all lettings were to transfer 
cases. 
A close investigation of local authority po. licy and 
practice in the seventies showed that: 
"The decision common to all authorities studied 
to give priority to transfer applicants, in the 
allocation of houses has tremendous effect. 
This decision apparently influences the type of 
waiting list applicant who will be housed by 
determining the type of property available for 
letting to new tenants. "43 
Inevitably, the less popular property made available to 
first-time applicants through transfers attracted less 
ambitious, more needy applicants. Councils had broad 
discretion and a minimum of legal obligations over transfers. 
Because transfers counted for so many moves in the council 
sector and tended to be moves to better property, the sifting 
process was intensified. The fact that according to census 
information, council tenants moved more often than owner- 
occupiers but moved closer to their previous address, 
suggested that they were simply climbing the housing ladder 
through transfers, rather than moving for employment 
44 
reasons. This was simply a reflection of the 
dissatisfaction of many tenants with their existing 
accommodation. 
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By the same token, if a large part of the property let to 
first-time tenants is of poor quality, then council 
occupancy is constantly getting off to a bad start. It 
""'andA wý "ý ýbecöinesý'här"d""t6 generäte ä"ýs'ens& of `pri'de`pdi purpose 
the general objective of a council tenant becomes to get 
out or move up. The degree of social grading in the 
council sector thus becomes more and more intense with 
transfers both a cause and a result. 
There are now serious practical limitations on transfers 
that are working in favour of a more integrated and 
businesslike approach to poorer estates. A large-scale 
- transfer system is only 'possible if there is. a constant 
supply of vacant and pöpular property. Because very 
little new council housing is-now being built, transfers are 
declining and are made available only to the most eligible 
and "deserving" tenants. This has intensified the pecking 
order at the top end but the population stability it is 
generating on the less popular estates could enable other 
improvements to get under way. 
In addition, the right to buy, introduced in 1980, has 
I- 
reduced the supply of better property needed for a flexible 
transfer system, as the half million dwellings sold so far 
are concentrated largely on more popular estates and involve 
very few flats, only one out of a hundred. The result is a 
drop" in' trans'fe'rs, ä decline in the average . quality of the* 
council stock and a sense of bitterness among those who 
feel forced to stay within it with less opportunities for 
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transferring up the ladder. This dissatisfaction is 
generating pressure to improve the more run-down estates. 
---------Meanwhile ; -the --private°-owner-occupied"., secto, r- cont-inues-to-- -°-- 
expand, at the expense of the public sector, as a result 
of which some slack continues to occur in the council 
sector. 
The tenants most likely to move out of council accommodation 
and buy in the private sector, rather than-buy their 
existing council dwelling, are those living in undesirable 
council property that they do not wish to buy. Therefore 
as a result of spreading owner-occupation, vacancies will 
be even further concentrated in the least popular estates 
rather than in the more popular dwellings suitable for 
ambitious transfer applicants. If the unwanted dwellings 
are to be let, some improvements are required. 
In sum, transfers can no longer be used as a central plank 
of allocation policy and as a safety valve for unpopular 
estates. This change might work to the advantage of the 
entire council sector. 
CONCLUSION 
Need seemed . ai 
sensible criterion of access to council 
housing in the face of housing shortages and slum 
conditions, and yet it has been much harder to translate 
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into fair allocation practice than it should be. 
The City University Housing Research tea©45 suggested 
-- °'° "" "ttfat °the"very° size-end -complexity of, housing -department 
systems led to a many-faceted, interlocking hierarchy of 
decisions where events and individuals were totally lost 
in computers and paper work. It has proved hard to open 
up, as Cullingworth and others have proposed, a system 
that was so big. 
Allocation systems are still largely the invisible arm of 
housing management and local political structures. 
Having examined the inequities of present allocation 
systems and their serious consequences for the poorest 
members of our society and the worst estates, it becomes 
tempting to embrace Octavia Hill's impassioned plea 100 
years ago, not to allow local political masters to control 
the allocation of homes for their electors. The room for 
trade-offs and pressure is too great. The poor under auch 
a 3yatem would be always vulnerable and the more dynamic 
members of the electorate able to manoeuvre political power 
to their own housing advantage. 
In the areas of the country where there 13 now a aurplua of 
council housing, local authorities are advertising property, 
diversifying their intake of tenants and relaxing all 
criteria of access. In areas of shortage and need, this $ 
is harder to do, and some overriding priority must be given 
to the honc1caa. Even act more open access, faster 
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re-letting of empty property on more relaxed criteria 
should reduce the-incidence of homelessness and broaden 
the social base of many estates. However, later 
chapters will show that only compensatory intensive 
management can make a residual unpopular estate attractive 
to residents and applicants. The'fact that its occupants 
are poor should not so completely determine the quality 
and therefore the popularity of estate life. 
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CHAPTER VI - THE THREADS OF DEPRIVATION IN THE COUNCIL 
. _s,... _ ...., SECTOR w ý... __. ... ý,., ý_........... _. _.,.,. , _,. _ ..,,.,. »...,..., ., ý .... ý ...., _.... ý,. _.. _.,.. _ .. ý....... _.....,.. .... .J 
"A clean person gets a clean house and a dirty 
person gets a dirty house. " 
E. Burney, "Housing on Trial" 
COUNCIL RENTING IS LESS POPULAR THAN OWNING 
It has become common currency that owner-occupation is 
financially and socially the most advantageous form of 
tenure, and that a council dwelling, while often providing 
a welcome way out of insecurity, overcrowding, lack of 
basic amenities, or even homelessness, is a poor second 
best. Just how serious the cleft is between ownership 
and council renting gives us a further and possibly 
decisive clue to the emergence of unpopular and 
difficult-to-manage estates. At a basic level, we know 
. 
that 93% of owner-occupied homes are houses and only 7% 
are purpose-built flats, compared with 66% houses and 314% 
flats and maisonettes among council dwellings. Density 
of occupation is lower and space standards are higher in 
owner-occupied dwellings than in council dwellings with 
66% of'dwellings having one or more bedrooms spare, 
compared with 47% in the council sector. The most 
important hallmark of a council-owned dwelling might be 
that people can almost invariably, except in renovated, 
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old inner city areas, recognise it as "publicly owned". 
What people aspire to and what they are forced to accept 
M1a6výr^W N ýu . I. nw a. r. yr . w. 
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home and their neighbours, and how they use it. 
In 19731 the Department of the Environment National 
Movers Survey showed that local authority tenants moving 
into a council home on the whole did not feel they were 
choosing what they wanted or liked. Only 13% said they 
were moving because they wanted to. Among people 
becoming owner-occupiers, 514% said they were buying 
because they wanted to. At that time, demolition and 
slum clearance were still a major element in pushing 
people into the council sector causing 34% of moves into 
council accommodation. We have already shown how much 
reluctance and compulsion accompanied that process. The 
need for a better home and personal reasons for moving, 
such as family break-up, were the other major causes 
(provoking a further 35% of moves). Therefore, at 
least 69% of council tenancies were created by push 
factors, whereas only 25% of new owner-occupiers felt 
pushed by poor conditions: a majority of owners were 
pulled by the attraction of becoming owners. 
In 1978 the General Household Survey2 asked people which 
form of tenure they preferred and 72% chose owner- 
occupation, while only 19% preferred local authority 
renting. At that stage nearly 30% of the population 
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occupied a council dwelling. Among council tenants 
themselves, almost half (149%) stated that they would 
rather be owner-occupiers. 
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In 1983 the Building Societies Association sponsored a 
survey to measure the aspiration to owner-occupy in 
greater detail. They found that younger age groups 
were extremely keen to buy a home, with 89% of 
25-34 year olds saying they preferred to own. Even 
among 35-54 year olds, '84% wanted to own, -and among 
55-64 year olds, 71% did. Among adults under 35,93% 
expected to become owners within 10 years. 
Council tenants were also asked whether they wanted to 
buy their existing home. The responses were broken down 
according to ages. Only 30% of 25-34 year olds were 
very interested, 28% of 35-54 year olds, 114% of 55-64 
year olds and 5% of retired council tenants. The 
enthusiasm for buying their existing council home 
declined sharply with age but even in the youngest age 
group, less than a third wanted to. The vast majority 
of council tenants would not want to buy their own home 
in spite of the very substantial cash incentives to do 
so and the strong desire to become an owner-occupier. 
In a rough fashion, this response confirms an overall 
sense that a majority of people prefer to own rather 
than rent; but that many council tenants are not where 
they want to be; and that a majority of those wanting 
to buy would not want to become owners of their existing 
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council home. 
People's choice of tenure between renting from the 
-council-'and -, buy ing~ `their-own""home'-has-di'Verged more " 
starkly with the passing of time. The following table, 
puts together the findings of various surveys over the 
last 17 years and illustrates the growing divergence 
clearly: 
Trend in attitudes to renting and owner-occupying, shown 
through four opinion surveys 
Prefer Prefer 
owner- local 
occupation authority 
renting 
1967 Opinion Research Survey 66 23 
1975 Building Societies Association 69 21 
1978 General Household Survey 72 19 
1983 Building Societies Association 77 16 
There are several threads to this tenure preference and 
to the general disinterest in buying one's existing council 
dwelling. Firstly, as we have outlined in Chapter I, the 
design and scale of council housing makes much of it very 
unpopular and undesirable for home-ownership or for 
renting.. Secondly, the allocation of council housing has 
led to large concentrations of disadvantaged households' 
within the council sector and in exaggerated form within 
certain estates. This gives people a strong incentive 
to leave those areas rather than regard them as a permanent 
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home. Thirdly, local authorities have run their housing 
stock on the whole in a singularly careless fashion, 
without the intensive, small-scale, personal effort that 
--ý-°' -might-have-compensated for-the°-problems-""of*-"design; µ scale'""" """"ýj 
and social need. 
There is underlying these grave deterrents to council 
renting an inherent desire for each household to exercise 
the control over the home that only ownership can bring. 
It is clear that for most social groups, owning a house 
will be more attractive than renting. It was partly with 
this in mind that the Tories introduced the right to buy 
for all council tenants. However, as we have seen, 
council dwellings are often not the occupants' idea of a "home", 
the place where you choose to stay, to invest your care, 
money and pride. On the more unpopular flatted estates, 
the case is more extreme. Even supposing a tenant was 
keen to buy, the problems of repair would be considerable, 
communal areas would be beyond his control and individual 
ownership hard to envisage. Tenants have been reluctant 
to take on the risks and responsibilities of ownership 
where the council retains control of so many elements in 
the home environment. 
Therefore, 'while sales might help change the pattern of 
council tenure at the better end of the stock with the 
better-off tenants, -"its impact at the les's' desirable, 
poorer'end is insignificant. 
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POLITICAL SWINGS 
There has been a longstanding divergence between the two 
politica-l--parties over-the role of - council housing ` ""ý "' 
and the question of owner-occupation. The Labour Party 
has traditionally pursued the viewpoint that council 
housing should be for all and should not be segregated on 
a class basis, while also encouraging owner-occupation. 
It was responsible for a number of attempts to build 
mixed communities of owner-occupiers and tenants under 
the public housing umbrella. 
3 
Conservative policy has consistently advanced and favoured --= 
owner-occupation more wholeheartedly than Labour, and 
regarded the council sector as a necessary second-best 
for those unable to buy. 
4 
One would have expected these 
somewhat diverse policies to result in some kind of contrast 
in results between the actions of Labour and Conservative 
Governments since the war. 
/I 
In practice, however, Labour Governments, traditionally on 
the side of the underdog, have encouraged rehousing 
according to need, concentrating on the "housing poor", 
and have dragged their feet on the sale of council housing, 
feeling that it would intensify segregation between 
home-owners as "haves" and tenants as "have-nots" by 
" enabling better-off council tenants to büy their council 
homes. As a result-,. many would-be owners were driven 
permanently out of the council sector, and the council 
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sector, particularly in the largely Labour-controlled 
cities, became progressively more and more oriented 
towards the most needy and those least able to buy. 
Points'systems"for"`rehousing-, have increasingly focussed 
on allocation according to need, and Labour Councils 
have prided themselves on rehousing large numbers of the 
"housing poor", who inevitably suffered disproportionately 
from multiple disadvantages. The result has been an 
inevitable bias towards social polarisation, with the 
most socially egalitarian of purposes - that is, to lift 
the "housing poor" out of private slums into "decent" 
council-provided homes. Labour's opposition to or 
ambiguity about the Conservative Right-to-Buy legislation 
that gave all council tenants the right to buy the council 
dwelling they occupied, at a significant discount, has 
intensified still further social polarisation their 
policies towards the needy have helped to create. It 
has certainly intensified the problems of dense, inner 
city, flatted estates where often the sense of being left 
behind has become overwhelming. 
The Tories, on the other hand, have encouraged sales and 
have experimented in alternative initiatives for unpopular 
blocks, such as sales to developers. These initiatives 
have been singularly successful in rescuing such blocks 
from demolition but have invariably brought in a much more 
`--ecönömicälly secure and ambitious range-"of-households. . The 
very poor , zat*e.,. ýnvariäb1Y been displaced into other council 
estates. The hope of the Conservatives was to break up 
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the monolithic class nature of much council housing. 
In this they have failed. 
THE DESIRE TO OWN AND THE RIGHT TO BUY 
It is worth examining the Right-to-Buy provisions of 
the 1980 Housing Act and their impact on tenure in a little 
more detail since they are a milestone in housing policy 
and enshrine the Conservative philosophy of "a property- 
owning democracy", while casting serious doubt on the 
ability of the Labour Party to respond with anything 
more than churlish confusion to this popular housing 
bonanza. 
Under the Right-to-Buy, tenants could buy their home with 
discounts of 30-60% depending on how long they had lived 
there. They also acquired a legal right to a mortgage 
so long as they could meet repayments. Because of the 
social composition of council housing residents, many 
/- 
groups in council housing were excluded from the right 
to buy by economic circumstance. According to the 
Institute of Cost and Management Accountants, less than 
half of existing council tenants would qualify for 
mortgages and discounts under the right to buy. In 
spite of the popularity of this measure and tenants' 
declared-ambit-ions-to become-' owner-occupiers-, - by- 1983 
only 9% of council tenants had applied to buy their own 
home,. and the number of new applicants had begun to decline. 
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According to Ray Forrest and A. Murie in their study of 
the application of the Right to Buy, 
5 the poorer social 
groups already concentrated in public sector housing 
.Yr,.. -would--be... largely. excluded : ---- -.. -. _ ... v ... .f 
They produced evidence of the concentration of sales in 
houses rather than flats, and in lower-density, more 
attractive areas. For example, Bristol had sold 2,000 
dwellings by 1982. But while one third of its stock 
comprises flats, only 1.5% of sales were of flats. In 
London, 16 houses have been sold for every flat, thereby 
skewing even further the balance of the stock towards 
unpopular, flatted estates. They found the typical 
dwelling sold to be a 3-bedroomed, semi-detached house, 
and sales to be most popular in the New Forest. In 
Greater London, with the lowest rate of sales in the 
country, only . 7% of the stock-had been sold. Murie and 
Forrest linked low sales not only with poverty, but with 
dissatisfaction with existing dwellings. Although this 
inevitably links far more strongly with flats than 
houses, it would apply to the poorer cottage estates6. 
The most important defect in the flight-to-Buy legislation 
was that two major costs had to be added to the mortgage 
if the buyer lived in a flat in an inner area. Rates 
are often-as high or'even higher for a"purpose-built flat'and 
in inner London are often now £10 a week or more. In 
addition, councils spend approximately £107 a week on 
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management and maintenance of a dwelling on a flatted 
estate (the G. L. C. currently spends £208). Councils 
argue that many of these expenses apply to Right-to-Buy 
-- -° . -flats .- In addition, . owner-occupiers .. on,. 
f. latted, 
_estates,,,.,, .....,. , .. 
demand the full level of services, thereby forcing up 
council costs. 
9 As a result, service charges on flatted 
estates are often very high as well, in the region of 
£10 per week. 
/- 
Because of high costs, coupled with an often poor 
environment and social and management problems, even 
those normally eligible to buy are far less likely to 
want to on a flatted estate, and in fact may not be able 
to afford a discounted flat with a very low market value, 
but high rates and service charges. 
The foregoing evidence bears out the fears of many 
housing experts that the right to buy, while offering a 
unique advantage to many previously excluded households, 
does nothing to eliminate the problems of poverty and 
cumulative disadvantage in the remaining council sector. 
Opposition to the Right-to-Buy in itself offers no way 
out of the inherent problems, while frustrating an 
obvious desire to own among many tenants. 
Therefore, in the-long run, 'both approaches to public 
housing policy - privatisation under various guises, and 
a commitment to help the needy - are intensifying the 
238 
process, already far advanced, of leaving the poorest, 
least skilled, most economically dependent, in the council 
rented sector, while the more ambitious, more skilled and ''ý 
utaý+r 
`' "" ' "' märe""süeces`sfül ý""möve' oütThr 'buy''up the "möre 'desi'rable-'" t 
council homes. The large, impoverished cottage or 
flatted estates have become steadily more decayed, 
virtually untouched by the right to buy or by socialist 
dreams of a classless society. 
The result of spreading owner-occupation has been an 
increasing concentration on council estates of those who 
had least choice and who for economic or social reasons, could 
not buy their own home. This trend is overlaid on the 
very substantial bias of council housing since 1930 to 
give priority to those in housing need and to those without 
other choice. Therefore the present quite extreme social 
polarisation between council renting and owner-occupation 
is an extension and intensification of a longstanding 
bias in the council sector towards the needy and the 
"housing poor". We now examine in more detail the extent 
of that poverty. 
POVERTY 
Peter Townsend, in his mammoth study of povertyl0 based on 
ä survey conducted-in 1969, found that in spite of 
substantial subsidies in the council sector and relatively 
low rents at the time of his study, the richest 10% of the 
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"I population spent only 7% of their income on housing 
whereas the poorest 31% spent 25%. The decline in 
private renting and the expansion of owner-occupation 
among-the better-off means. that a -ma jor. ity... of the,,.,,.. 
poorest now live in council housing. Peter Townsend's il' 
finding 15 years ago might, if anything, be less extreme 
than current realities because sharp rises in council 
rents and fuel costs have possibly increased the 
proportion of income that the poorest now spend on 
housing. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES 
The Housing Policy Green Paper of 1977 examined the 
socio-economic make-up of households in different 
tenures. According to the 1971 Census, nearly half of 
owner-occupiers (46%) but 80% of local authority tenants 
were manual workers. By contrast, over a quarter of 
owner-occupiers were in the top professional and 
managerial social grouping compared with only 1 in 20 
of council tenants. By 1975, only one fifth of 
unskilled, manual workers were owners, while nearly 
I- 
two-thirds were council tenants. 
Roof11"analysed the 1981 Census figures and produced 
the following diagram to show the tendency for lower 
socio-economic groups to be increasingly concentrated in 
local authority housing. The overall proportions of 
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both owners and council tenants in the total population 
is rising in the face of a steep decline in private 
renting. 
The owner-occupier 
proportions at the 
The council tenant 
with much bigger j 
proportions of the 
unemployed. 
29. 
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diagram shows the very opposite, but 
umps over the last 20 years in the 
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Source: Roof, July/August 1983, article by 
Chris Hamnett, "Split City". 
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INCOME GAP 
ri 
d 
i 
ý, 
I 
ýý 
Average earnings in the two sectors were compared in 
1975.12 At the time, national average earnings were- 
£3,000 a year. 
30. INCOME GAP BETWEEN COUNCIL TENANTS AND OWNER-OCCUPIERS 
% in each group 
TENURE Income under 91,500 tlncome over £4,500 
Economically Economically Active Inactive 
Active Inactive. 
Owner-occupiers 8% 1 80% 19 14 1 . 4% 1 
Local authority 
tenants 16% 1 96% 1 S4% 1 4% 
Source 
. FoLmily 
EXFe. ndifiure Su'vey 1 Iq'75, HM SO. 
The figures show a clear division in average levels of 
income between owner-occupiers and council tenants. 
More up-to-date figures in the 1982 Family Expenditure 
Survey13 show that normal weekly disposable income per 
household was £102.13 among local authority tenants and 
£176.90 among owner-occupiers. Among households in the 
process of purchase, it was £201.62. 
Nearly half of local authority tenants in jobs earn less 
than the national average whereas only a quarter of 
working owner-occupiers earn less than average. 
14 
The General Household Survey of 1981 illustrates further 
the income differences between owner-occupiers and council 
tenants. The following graph shows clearly the 
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preponderance of lower incomes among tenants, and higher 
incomes among owners, though a large num'- of retired 
owner-occupiers are on relatively low incomes. 
31 . 
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Generdt Household Survey I Ail 1 
The General. Household Survey showed that in 1982, the 
income of' all owner-occupiers was £171 per week, and 
of council tenants was £94 per week. 
WELFARE RECIPIENTS 
The number of households who received supplementary 
benefit, probably the most absolute measure of poverty, 
15 
has been found to be much greater in the council sector 
than among-owner-occupiers. The proportion is increasing, 
especially among women with dependent children and among 
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the unemployed. While local authority tenants comprised 
roughly one third of all households in 1982, the"council 
sector housed nearly two-thirds of all Supplementary 
.. ý,.. ýý-.... ý -Benefit-recipients-..;,..,. ý.. ry . ", ý,. ý,. ý .,.... ý. K...,... " , .,. ý-,. __w_uý ýý.. _ ýý,. ý., ý ý. ý 
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NUMBERS OF PEOPLE 
% OF 
RECEIVING SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT AND AS 
ALL PEOPLE IN THAT TENURE" 
O wner-occupiers Private tenants 
Local Authority 
Tenants 
196716 362,000 41o 81'4,000 25% 978,000 20% 
197516 391,000 14% 573,000 20% 1,297,000* 25% 
19821 623,000 6% 591,000 
.. 
25% 1,980,000 140% 
Bearing in mind that owner-occupiers form the majority of 
the population, the figures below show how dramatically 
the numbers of council tenants receiving Supplementary 
Benefit have shot up in the last 15 years. The large 
increase in dependent council tenants is explained almost 
entirely by the very steep rise in unemployment, although 
the ageing population also has some impact. They also 
show that numerically the private sector houses less 
dependent households now than it did 15 years ago. " There 
are over three times more council tenants than there are 
owner-occupiers who are supplementary benefit recipients. 
Among women living alone with dependent children, two- 
thirds of those on supplementary benefit were council 
tenants in 1975. There were seven women with dependent- 
children receiving supplementary benefit in council housing 
for every one in the owner-occupied sector. There were 
three and a half times the number of unemployed among 
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council tenants as among owners. It is obviously 
virtually impossible to become an owner when once a person 
is unemployed or on supplementary benefit. If owner- 
. -". >, ý. " -occupation ... continues to- expand, . then- the-drift . 
into-counc. il_.., -. 
housing of the poorest households will inevitably continue. 
FAMILY BREAKDOWN 
The contrast in family structure between owner-occupiers 
and council tenants bears out the evidence that family 
break-up places a disproportionate burden on council 
housing. In 1971,37% of widowed, divorced or separated 
household heads owned their home, while 40% rented from a 
local authority. Conversely, 55% of married household 
heads owned their home while only 26% rented from a local 
authority. 
18 The 1977 Housing 
that there was a steady drift, 
in family break-up and divorce, 
council housing, with the often 
other social implications. It 
we have seen, where there is an 
household. 
Policy Green Paper deduced 
with the general increase 
of separated families into 
accompanying poverty and 
is particularly true, as 
unemployed woman head of 
The General Household Survey of 1981 showed that nearly 
two-thirds of one-parent families had become local 
authority tenants, while only one-third of other families 
rented-from a local authority. There are other indicators 
of the housing disadvantages of one-parent families, such 
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as the fact that while 90% of other families lived in a 
house as opposed to a flat, only 73% of one-parent 
families did. And while just over half of one-parent 
.--- --- -. -families -had -central heating, over two-thirds of other . _-. 
families did. These qualitative aspects of housing 
overlap with the issue of owner-occupation, as well as 
diverse conditions within the council sector. 
EDUCATIONAL GAP 
Another major measure of economic and social opportunities 
_ 
highlighted in the 1982 General Household Survey was 
educational attainment. Here the contrast was very stark 
between the two tenures. Over a quarter of owner-occupiers 
had passed G. C. E. Advanced level or higher exams, while 
only 5% of local authority tenants had. Conversely while 
38% of owner-occupiers had no qualification, 74% of council 
tenants had none. Lack of qualifications overlaps with 
unskilled work,: which in turn links strongly with 
unemployment. Unskilled workers are very heavily 
concentrated in council accommodation (over 61% of them 
live there). Economically inactive adults are also over- 
represented (k4%)19 both in the council sector and among 
households with poor educational attainment. 
RACIAL DISADVANTAGE 
Racial' disadvantage also has some impact on council housing. 
246 
For a long time it was the case that racial minorities 
were more likely to be owner-occupiers than the native 
population. This in turn led to many furnished 
tenancies being created in owner-occupied houses. In part 
aiM iY v -v. ýwTý^Y ""µ 
'' it'was"a--ghetto"re"spörise tö^'pröb1em's of *äccess to council 
housing and other parts of the rented housing market2° 
As access opened up to minorities in the late sixties 
and as the shift to renovation through Housing Action 
areas forced landlords to improve their properties or sell 
to the council, an increasing number of furnished tenants 
became homeless and gained access to council accommodation. 
A very disproportionate number of these were from racial 
minorities. 
21 By 1981,146% of households of Caribbean 
origin-lived in council accommodation. The proportion 
among white households was 32%. 
22 Families of Asian 
origin were still very under-represented (only 140/0,23 
partly because of their more recent arrival, partly 
because they tended to live in wider areas of the 
country where terraced private housing was still very 
cheap and plentiful, but where demolition and council 
rehabilitation programmes have slowed down dramatically. 
Nonetheless there is evidence that Asians are gaining 
increasing access, most commonly to the least popular 
estates. 
COUNCIL HOUSING, THE CITIES AND FLATS 
Council dwellings house disproportionately disadvantaged 
groups, while council housing is itself concentrated` 
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in city areas where the greatest deprivation occurs. 
Nationally, the local authority stock has grown by 46% in 
the last 20 years, but by 75% in the inner areas of cities. 
24 
"~ Y'ý50°Jö° öf`the°totäl" i's in metropolitan areas"; -, including 
London. The proportion of inner'London's population 
living in council accommodation has risen-from 31% in 
1971 to 43% in 1981. This is against a backcloth of 
substantial population loss throughout inner London. 
The concentration of flats in metropolitan-and city areas 
is even more intense than the concentration of council 
dwellings as a whole. This, of course, is closely related 
to land shortages and-high density building already 
illustrated in the history of council house building. 
Since the war about 11 million council flats have been 
built, mainly in city areas. About 75% of all dwellings 
built by the Greater London Council are flats; in 
Islington, 69% of the council stock is in flats and 
maisonettes; 62% of all council dwellings in Greater 
London are in flats. 3i4% of council dwellings in 
metropolitan areas are in flats and 25% in non- 
metropolitan areas. The heavy bias towards flat-building 
in the council sector is heavily concentrated in the major 
urban areas where most of the poorest households live. 
Because flats have long been considered inferior to houses 
as family dwellings, households with less choice, greater 
need, lower priority and less skill in handling the system 
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have ended up disproportionately concentrated in flats. 
The G. L. C. lettings survey25 found that all disadvantaged 
groups (homeless, unemployed, unskilled, one-parent, 
coloured)--were-"two---to«-three--times- as-lik-ely-Mto end up on 
older flatted estates. For example, 45% of non-white 
applicants, compared with only 15% of white applicants, 
were rehoused in older, unpopular flats. 
In Europe, flats have not suffered the same 
Britain, partly because a house is not a r"e< 
in many European cities, and partly because 
cleaning and guarding of communal entrances 
have helped maintain a lev. el of supervision 
that has made them acceptable. 
FLATS AND CRIME AND VANDALISM 
stigma as in 
il alternative 
caretaking, 
and courtyards 
and control 
Without a doubt, flats have proved harder to manage than 
houses. Oscar Newman, 26i in his celebrated examination of 
crime in New York public housing blocks, demonstrated a 
clear and strong correlation between increases in crime 
and the reduced opportunity for the exercise of social 
control through the design and layout of buildings. 
Street properties were the least crime-prone. High-rise 
enclosed flats in large blocks with internal corridor 
access and unguarded, unobserved entrances were the worst 
because social controls were weakest. Anti-social 
behaviour often went unchecked on a communal estate. 
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Alice Coleman applied Newman's concept of defensible space 
to council blocks in London. 
27 She found that anti-social 
behaviour was magnified on flatted estates where minimal 
social controls operated because of the large number of 
communal spaces and other "design disadvantages" such as 
long corridors or interlinking blocks. The impact of anti- 
social behaviour is minimised in street properties. Anti- 
social families can most readily be absorbed in individual 
houses, preferably on noisy, busy roads with lots of 
opportunities for surveillance, or on cut-off back streets where 
the impact on others is reduced. 
The Home Office-sponsored Community Development Project28 
maintained that a majority of unpopular council estates, by 
virtue of their often highly public and communal layout, so 
accentuated and made public the annoying behaviour of 
neighbours that social problems, barely noticed in the old 
back-street slums, were accentuated and exacerbated. This 
very fact has weakened the normal social controls, which were 
in any case hard to exercise in a new environment with an 
uprooted community. All these problems are incomparably 
greater on large flatted estates. 
'. ' The concentration of undesirable flats in big cities 
encourages many more economically viable households to drift 
away. 
"-.. --.. :,...., CITY_. fPPRIVATION 
On a combination of measures of deprivation, the 1981 Census 
revealed London, Manchester and Merseyside as the most deprived 
areas, with 28 metropolitan authorities having serious problems 
of deprivation, 29 
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The incidence of homelessness was heavily concentrated in the 
biggest cities with the highest incidence of deprivation. 
The 23 authorities having more than 1,000 households claiming 
homelessness in a year comprised 13 in London and 10 
tl_ 
metropolitan authorities. 
30 Again London's problems were more 
intense than anywhere else in the country. 
33. 
The density at which people live in large cities is another 
factor in social stress, pressure on services and a general 
sense of environmental strain. There are very large 
variations within different city areas, with London suffering 
far greater pressure than anywhere else in the country. The 
following selection shows the wide variation even between 
different major cities. Stark contrasts between city areas 
and the countryside on housing densities are obvious. 
DENSITY31 
Urban Area Nos. of people per hectare 
Islington, Inner London 108 
Liverpool 45 
Manchester 39 
Sheffield 15 
Doncaster 5 
National - England & Wales 3.3 
CONCLUSION 
It is hard to. imagine the cumulative impact on the most 
unpopular council estates of such diverse elements as location 
in dense inner city neighbourhoods or on the edge of industrial 
belts, poverty and other disadvantages of race, family make-up 
Jib 
,, ä 
and education; the size of the estate, often a thousand or 
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more dwellings, and the size of the landlord, often 
controlling tens of thousands of homes; the design of the 
estate, at best communal and public, at worst dangerous, 
dirty and unguarded. 
32 
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The council sector itself is shrinking in absolute numbers 
but is expected to remain at over 4 million homes for a 
33 
of the stock, long way into the future and comprises 25% 
a very sizeable chunk of the housing market. Therefore its 
increasing undesirability and poverty pose bigger problems 
than ever before, coupled as they are with the demoralisation 
that these trends are causing both among occupants and 
housing staff within local authorities. 
There is no way of knowing whether council policies have 
directly created the social stigma that accompanies the least 
popular estates, housing the most vulnerable and disadvantaged 
people, or whether the fact that some estates have proved 
intrinsically unpopular has led to policies which accommodate 
the social reality of a hierarchy of applicants. We do know 
that some otherwise attractive and well-situated estates have 
been stigmatised exclusively by their occupants, and that 
adjacent and similar estates or blocks sometimes differ 
t 
Va 
'iy$J1ýli 
, 
ýýi 
'ý 4ý 
; ý. 
dramatically from each other in standards and general popularity; 
seemingly because of their social make-up. 
There is no overriding determinism,. and so . many -elements come- . 
'- -- 
into play that we will never be able fully to answer why or how 
the present situation emerged. However, the estate; which were 
conceived of as the solution to established slums, have too 
often themselves inherited the same title. 
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CHAPTER VII - ANALYSING DIFFICULT-TO-LET ESTATES 
- THE GOVERNMENT'S FIGURES 
In the first six chapters we have looked in some detail at 
how, from the late nineteenth century, the building of the 
council stock, both in scale and style, generated problems 
that led to the growing unpopularity of many council 
" estates. 
We have also examined how council dwellings were allocated 
over the years and showed the development of systems of 
both allocation and transfer which were destined to cause 
serious concentrations-of poor and socially disadvantaged 
households in the least popular estates. 
We have described the management and maintenance systems 
within local authorities which have had a particularly 
harsh effect on the poorest, high-density estates of 
unsympathetic physical design, where only a very intensive 
and integrated form of local management could be expected 
ýý to work. 
Finally, 'we saw that the growing division between owner- 
` "' : occupation and council tenure-In terms of economic-and- 
social disadvantage enhanced the trend towards the 
development of unpopular council estates, particularly in 
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the large city authorities with multiple social and 
economic problems. 
w"' The problemsof design, scale, discriminatory allocations 
and transfers, inefficient and insensitive management, 
combined with the overall heavy concentration of the less 
skilled and less economically self-sufficient within the 
council sector, have led to the emergence of difficult-to- 
let council estates at the least attractive end of the 
council stock. 
Newspapers, both local and national, frequently report the 
horrors of living on particularly infamous estates, helping 
to extend the blight and stigma, deterring would-be 
residents and generating fear among existing residents. 
However, accurate information on the actual estates on a 
national basis, their number and their condition, is almost 
non-existent. Only the Department of the Environment's 
Investigation of Difficult-to-let Housing, published in 
1979,1 and the reports of the Priority Estates Projectin 
1981,19822, and 19843, have produced published accounts 
which attempt to analyse the situation of difficult-to-let 
council housing in any detail. However, there are two 
valuable sources of information gleaned from every housing 
department in the country that trace the broad outlines of 
the problem. of difficult-to-let estates for the first time. 
In 1974, the Department of the Environment conducted a 
postal survey of all local authorities in the country, asking 
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for information on up to three post-war estates that were 
considered unpopular and difficult to let. This 
information is analysed in detail here for the first time, 
although the 1974 survey led directly to the 1976 
investigation of difficult-to-let estates whose findings 
were published in 1981. Secondly, since 1978, the 
Department of the Environment has asked all local 
authorities in their annual Housing Investment Programme 
submissions to state the number of their difficult-to-let 
properties. This information does not give any indication 
of size of estate, type of dwelling or building style, date 
of construction, or any other details. However, despite 
being based on officers' judgements not uninfluenced by 
political considerations, it is the clearest indication 
that exists of the concentration and extent of the problem 
in particular local authorities. The information has not 
previously been examined. 
The Government's investigation of difficult-to-let estates 
conducted in 1976, but only published in 19819 is "_~4. '~4ý. 
-; 
ý{" u 
-brief ly,. 4i, "älaari`sed.. since it is much more selective and 
focusses heavily on 30 estates and their detailed problems. 
This chapter examines the evidence from the 1974 postal sürvey5 
and the Housing Investment Programme submissions from all 
local authorities for 1978,1981 and 1983. 
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THE FIRST NATIONAL SURVEY OF DIFFICULT-TO-LET ESTATES 
The recognition that there were difficult-to-let council 
dwellings emerged in the early 1970's after reports that. 
councils were having to advertise tower blocks in local 
newspapers in order to find willing takers. This state 
of affairs was partly caused by the Ronan Point disaster, 
where part of a tower block in East London collapsed 
following a gas explosion. The collapse highlighted a 
growing consciousness that many of the new council estates 
were felt to be an eye-sore and difficult to let, and in 
some cases were actually unacceptable to live in at all. 
The fact that council dwellings had to be advertised was 
such a shock to officials, who for decades had advocated 
large-scale building to cope with the seemingly insatiable 
demand for council housing, that the Department of the 
Environment decided in 1974 to conduct a national postal 
survey to establish the scale of the problem. 
The definition of a difficult-to-let estate used in the 
survey was as follows: 
"Not only those schemes with a high vacancy, but 
also those which, while fully occupied, had other 
indications of unpopularity, such as a high rate 
of requests to transfer out of the property or a 
concentration of problem families. "b 
All local authorities in England and Wales were asked to 
name up to three difficult-to-let post-war estates within 
their area. The restriction to three estates per authority 
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was to limit the "amount of work"7 in processing the survey, 
in order to produce an initial over-view only. This biased 
the results of the survey substantially away from the 
authorities with major problems. In that sense the survey 
is extremely limited. Nonetheless, it gave clues that 
were to be borne out by later evidence. 
87% of local authorities replied, but only 79% of 
metropolitan authorities, compared with 89% of non- 
metropolitan authorities. Therefore, the results even 
further under-represented the problem in cities where the 
larger proportion of difficult-to-let dwellings were expected 
to be found. 
Altogether the nearly 62,000 difficult-to-let properties, 
described in the survey returns, comprised 307 estates or 
groups of similarly designed dwellings. The large number 
of estates represented makes the 1974 survey by far the most 
comprehensive picture of the problem to date, although many 
questions were not asked and the scale of the problem could 
not yet be gauged with complete accuracy because of the 
serious undercounting. * 
'It is somewhat puzzling that the average number of 
dwellings per estate was only 201 in the examples reported 
in the survey, much smaller than in the estates in the 
later difficult-to-let investigation or in the Priority 
Estates Project reports. The survey broke up estates into 
smaller examples where groups of dwellings had been built 
to a different design or at a different period. This to 
some extent accounts for the size being smaller than 
expected. Another possible explanation is that local 
authorities only reported on particular problem blocks or 
areas within bigger estates. It is quite common to have 
intense concentrations of problems in the least favoured or 
most communal or dense part of the estate, often the middle 
area, or the part of the estate that was occupied last (see 
later report on Ashfield Valley, and previous chapter). 
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UNDERCOUNT 
The results were assumed by the Department of the 
Environment to underestimate the problem because of the 
restriction to three estates and exclusively to post-war 
dwellings, and because of the lack of information on one 
fifth of the big city authorities who did not reply to the 
survey. 
One of the most serious limitations on the information 
collected in the postal survey was that at the time of the 
survey report - 
"No reliable overall picture exists[ed] of the 
form in which the post-war housing stock has 
been built. "8 
Therefore comparisons between the difficult-to-let stock 
and the total stock were often impossible. Even now we still 
do not know the average size of estates, one of the key 
factors in unpopularity. Nor do we know the full extent 
of industrially-built units. Nor do we know the precise 
division between flats, maisonettes and houses, nor their 
exact geographical spread. However, through the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accounting (C. I. P.. F. A. ) and 
H. I. P. returns, we do now have a general picture of some 
aspects of the stock, and we do know the total size of the 
stock. 
At the time of the 1974 survey, it was not known how many 
properties some 40% of local authorities actually owned. 
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It is ironical but hardly surprising that, at the time 
when the Government finally became alarmed at some of the 
housing problems it was itself generating by building 
council housing "half blind", it also discovered that the 
overall size and nature of the public stock was not even 
known. With such a large and unexpected gap in 
information, it was impossible to estimate the proportion 
of the stock of houses, flats or maisonettes that were 
unpopular in 140% of local authorities. Nonetheless, the 
information available on the difficult-to-let dwellings 
themselves, their location, design and age, was very 
revealing. The survey gave much new information on 
difficult-to-let dwellings (although the survey provided 
no way of relating problem dwellings to the council stock 
in general). 
DIFFICULT-TO-LET ESTATES CONCENTRATED IN CITIES 
The difficult-to-let estates were found in the survey to be 
heavily concentrated in the metropolitan authorities and 
the true concentration was likely to be even more intense. 
Of the local authorities that replied, 38% had at least 
one unpopular estate and 12% had at least three. Over 
half the total of 62,000 properties were in metropolitan 
areas, even though metropolitan areas had only 
approximately 25% of the total stock. Based on the survey 
returns, 140% of the metropolitan districts for which there 
was information had at least three difficult-to-let estates, 
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and 32% claimed to have one. It was considered likely 
that a large number of the metropolitan authorities 
returning the maximum of three examples had other 
difficult-to-let estates. 
The regions of the country with the highest proportion of 
difficult-to-let estates were London and the North-West 
(the lowest was the South-West). This finding could have 
been predicted because the North-West had experienced 
serious population loss, a high rate of slum clearance, a 
high rate of council building and a high concentration of 
flats (see below). It is also the area of the country 
where a crude housing surplus is most in evidence. The 
inner London area has had by far the highest-density 
developments and the largest proportion of flats in the 
country. It has also suffered serious population decline 
and has much the highest concentration of council-owned 
property in England and Wales. 
THE MOST RECENT ESTATES WERE MOST UNPOPULAR 
Possibly the most significant and unexpected finding of 
the 1974 postal survey was that 58% of the difficult-to-let 
stock was built in the most recent decade immediately 
preceding the survey, 1965-1974. This contrasted sharply 
with the fact that only 36% of post-war construction took 
place in that decade-9 Obviously the most recent dwellings 
were posing the most serious problems. 
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In the two earlier post-war decades of 1945-64,64% of 
construction took place, but only 142% of difficult-to-let 
dwellings dated from that period. The finding is puzzling 
on the face of it because the post-war shortage of building 
materials often led to lower standards such as metal frame 
windows, lack of lifts and so on in the earlier building 
period. Space standards were also reduced under the 
Conservatives during the 1950's and early 1960's, and high 
densities were encouraged because of the overall shortage 
of housing. In spite of these factors and-the greater age 
and therefore dilapidation of the stock, it apparently 
posed fewer problems than the newer estates. There were 
several possible explanations for the more recent and more 
severe problems: one was the increase in the proportion of 
flats being built and the other was the spread of 
industrialised building methods, 
10 both of which, as we 
shall see'from the later Difficult-to-Let Investigation, 
11 
enhanced the unpopularity of many new estates. It was also 
found that modern (pöst-19614), industrially-built, flatted 
estates were on the whole larger and therefore more 
difficult to let and manage. In the postal survey, the most 
modern blocks of flats and maisonettes were two and a half 
times bigger than the earlier walk-up blocks. Later 
studies have borne out this early association between size 
and unpopularity. The sheer size of many developments in 
the more recent period often led to a sudden rush of lettings, 
often 1,000 or more, over a very short period. This 
inevitably taxed the highly centralised and rigidly 
administered lettings systems and took a great and sudden 
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bite into the often outdated queues of applicants. As soon 
as flats began to stand empty because of these difficulties, 
other problems began to emerge - vandalism, a "bad name", 
"low grade" lettings and so on. 
An added reason for the greater problems of the more recent 
estates was the decline in demand for council housing 
dating from the mid-sixties due to the reduction in slum 
clearance, just at a time when supply was reaching its peak. 
In addition, lettings systems, rigidly geared almost entirely 
to slum clearance rehousing, failed to adapt quickly either to 
the changing demand or to the need for a more flexible 
approach posed by the large new estates. 
Each successive decade since the war produced greater numbers 
of difficult-to-let dwellings and smaller, overall numbers of 
homes. It is possible to deduce that the increased size, 
predominance of flats and industrialised building style and 
decline in housing demand all made the more recent estates 
the most unpopular. 
On the question of the age of the difficult-to-let property, 
there is a difference between the metropolitan and non- 
metropolitan districts. The non-metropolitan districts 
found that almost two-thirds of their difficult-to-let 
property had been built in the previous decade, while in the 
metropolitan authorities there was a lower proportion, just 
over 50%. In other words, the disproportionate 
concentration of more recent estates was greater for the less 
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urban areas. The latter finding was possibly explained 
by the scale of slum clearance in the urban areas in the 
fifties which produced many dense, flatted estates by the 
early sixties. Non-metropolitan districts were less 
involved in slum clearance, but were urged by the 
enthusiastic Labour Governments of the sixties to build 
new-style prestigious council housing. Councils were 
often reluctant to do this because of uncertain demand. 
Therefore it is possible that the non-metropolitan districts 
ended up with difficult-to-let estates in the late sixties 
and early seventies through Government determination to 
persuade them to build, while metropolitan districts 
created difficult-to-let estates out of seeming necessity. 
The Penrhys estate in the Rhondda Valley and the 
Killingworth Towers estate in North Tyneside are two 
examples of industrially-built estates with large numbers 
of flats constructed since 1964 in non-metropolitan districts 
with low housing demand, on a scale and in a design that was 
guaranteed to make them unpopular. In the rapidly 
depopulating Rhondda, direct Government intervention was 
the reason for the 1,000-dwelling, "no fines", concrete 
estate being built. Overall the bulk of difficult-to-let 
dwellings belong'os to the most recent decade. 
34. DATE OF CONSTRUCTION OF DIFFICULT-TO-LET DWELLINGS 
IN ENGLAND AND WALES IN 1974* 
Date of construction No. of dwellings 
1945-1954 9,600 
1955-1964 16,500 
1965-1974 35,500 
Total 61,600 
*197k Department of the Environment Survey 
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UNPOPULAR STYLES 
In the survey local authorities specified whether the 
unpopular estate comprised houses, walk-up flats and 
maisonettes or lift-access flats and maisonettes. On the 
question of unpopular design, in the whole of England and 
Wales the houses posed the smallest numerical problem, 
closely followed by lift-access blocks and then walk-up 
flats. Again we have no accurate way of testing to what 
extent this was a reflection of their proportion in the 
total stock, due to the incomplete overall information. 
Houses were in any case under-represented since we know 
that they comprised about two-thirds of the total public 
stock, but only about one fifth of unpopular dwellings. * 
The most interesting fact about the non-metropolitan 
authorities was that houses formed the single largest 
category of difficult-to-let dwellings in non-metropolitan 
*There were strong regional variations between the numbers 
of difficult-to-let dwellings in the three main categories 
of styles: houses, walk-up blocks and lift-access blocks. 
In the North-West and London metropolitan districts, lift- 
access blocks were at least twice as often cited as 
problems compared with walk-up flats; in Yorkshire it was 
evenly balanced; and in the North and Midlands and South- 
East, the numbers were reversed, with walk-up blocks 
occurring twice as frequently as lift-access flats. In 
all the non-metropolitan districts, the walk-up blocks 
were a bigger problem than the lift-access blocks. These 
regional differences could most likely be explained by the 
overall numbers of that type of dwelling. in that particular 
region. ' But because of the 40% gap in the available 
information on the housing stock, the attempts to identify 
the reasons for the regional variations in the unpopularity 
of different styles are somewhat meaningless. 
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districts. This not only reflected the predominance of 
houses over flats in these districts, but also revealed 
that industrialised building methods, unpopular 
architectural styles and large-scale developments of 
houses proved as unacceptable in areas where houses were 
the norm as industrially-built, weirdly-designed, large- 
scale, flatted estates in the cities. 
NO. OF DIFFICULT-TO-LET DWELLINGS IN METROPOLITAN AND 
NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS BY BUILDING TYPE (NEW TOWNS, 
WERE EXCLUDED FROM THIS TABLE) 
Metropolitan 
Authorities 
Non-Metropolitan 
Authorities 
Total 
Walk-up 13,689 9,132 22,821 
Lift-access 15,226 3,1415- 18,671 
Houses 3,788 9,697 13,485 
Other 102 3,316 3,418 
TOTAL 32,805 25,590 58,395 
The different types of difficult-to-let dwellings tended 
to belong to distinct building periods. 79% of walk-up 
flats belonged to the pre-1964 period, and almost all 
(89ý lift-access blocks to the post-1964 period. Houses 
were more likely to belong to the fifties in the 
metropolitan areas (62%), but in non-metropolitan areas 
even very modern houses (1970-74) were proving unpopular 
in thousands. These tended to be industrially built, 
poorly insulated, expensively heated houses, often designed 
against traditional commonsense without eaves or window- 
sills, and with flat roofs, mono-pitch roofs or other 
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variations that lost their tiles, leaked or had faultily 
constructed rainwater gulleys. St. Helen's, Merseyside, 
boasts one estate of houses built in the last decade with 
almost all those characteristics and with most houses 
unable to keep out the rain. 
It is possible to show from the information collected by 
the Department of the Environment in 1974 that as each new- 
building style peaked in fashion and was encouraged by 
subsidies and government circulars, so too-did they peak 
in unpopularity. As each new architectural and design 
idea was tried in the public sector, so it moved into 
disrepute as it posed difficulties in letting, management 
and maintenance. 
The most unpopular period of all was 1965 to 1969, which 
was the peak period for tower block construction, 
industrialised building and flat-building. As a result. 
of the prevailing stress on industrialised building, the 
largest number of difficult-to-let houses were also built 
in this period, using concrete, non-traditional and system 
building methods. 
TOWER BLOCKS 
Unexpectedly, tower blocks as such were relatively 
insignificant among the unpopular styles. Only 4,170 out 
of a total of nearly 62,000 dwellings were in tower blocks, 
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only one in 12 of the unpopular. dwellings in metropolitan 
districts, and only one in 23 of the dwellings in 
non-metropolitan districts. Tower blocks have generally 
performed above expectation, in spite of their highly 
stigmatised image. 
12 Part of the reason might be that 
their poor reputation and massive media coverage has led 
to more drastic remedial measures being more thoroughly 
applied, such as-special lettings policies, entry phones, 
resident caretakers, and door porters. The other reason 
might be that tower blocks have little internal communal 
space apart from lifts and are therefore easier to manage 
than balcony or deck blocks. 
The predominance of smaller dwellings in high-rise blocks 
was another dominant. reason why tower blocks nationally 
were easier to let and manage in spite of their greater 
apparent unpopularity. There was high demand for the size 
of unit they commonly provided and, more importantly, they 
housed relatively fewer children because of their bedroom 
size. A high child density was a major cause of 
unpopularity, according to the difficult-to-let investigation, 
and it has also been closely linked with high levels of 
vandalism. 
13 Tower blocks with fewer bedrooms and 
ý' therefore a lower ratio of children suffered less vandalism. 
Wherever tower blocks did house large numbers of children, 
however, the results were disastrous. 
Although in numerical terms tower blocks formed only a small 
proportion of all council dwellings built (about L1%) and 
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about 114% of dwellings considered unpopular, nonetheless 
they were the symbols of a whole new departure in style 
and scale that took domestic building into realms of 
fantasy that the general public (and the Royal Family) 
have baulked against to this day. 
36. TABLE SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFICULT-TO-LET DWELLINGS BY DATE 
OF CONSTRUCTION AND STYLE OF CONSTRUCTION 
1945-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 Key 
Walk-up 1,891 3,949 2,001 1,245 1,452 1,049 
Maisonette - 184 2,104 3,820 '2,323 2,259 ----- 
Tower - - 128 391 2,995 656 
Deck 387 411 637 874+ 5,217 7,181 
Houses 1,604 874 4,068 1,013 5,413 3,014 
Total 3,882 5, 
_418 
8,938 7t343 } 17,1400 14,159 
Source: Department of the Environment Survey 1974. 
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It can be seen from the diagram that houses peaked twice in 
unpopularity. All other building styles except houses 
peaked once before being shown to fail. Houses were in 
continuing demand and generally popular but were foisted 
with new-fangled designs or materials in the '50's and 
'60's. The non-metropolitan authorities were the main 
house-builders, but started late and ended late with the 
new styles and building methods. 
DENSITY 
- 
The postal survey collected information on the density of 
difficult-to-let estates and predictably the largest number 
of problem dwellings was found at the highest density. 
However, the number of unpopular dwellings at high, medium 
and low density, was more evenly distributed than would 
have been expected. One possible explanation of the 
spread of dwellings across the range of densities could be 
that many of the flatted estates that appear to have a high 
density have very large areas of communal open space around 
the blocks. In fact, a latter-day justification for 
building flats rather than houses was that for a comparable 
density you could produce much more communal green space. 
Le Corbusier himself used this argument. 
1 We do know 
however, that compared with the ideal densities proposed by 
Ebenezer Howard and the Garden City movement at the turn of 
the century in response to inner city pressures, the 
density of nearly half of . 
the difficult-to-let estates was 
too high. 
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37. TOTAL OF DIFFICULT-TO-LET DWELLINGS AT DIFFERENT DENSITIES 
Low Medium High 
1-59 bed 60-119 bed 120+ bed 
spaces per acre spaces per acre spaces per acre 
Nos. of 
difficult-to-let 14,206 16,333 17,355 
For a large number, nearly 14,000, the density was not known, 
which typifies the ignorance about council house-building in 
general. 
3-BEDROOMS MOST DIFFICULT TO LET 
Another interesting question in the survey was the number of 
bedrooms. The most problematic size numerically was a 
3-bedroom dwelling, yet since the turn of the century this 
was considered the standard family requirement. 
15 In the 
private sector, three bedrooms are still the norm, although 
smaller dwellings are becoming more common. The only 
possible explanation for the concentration of 3-bedroom 
dwellings in the difficult-to-let category is the allocation 
procedures followed so rigidly 10 years ago when the survey 
was conducted. A family with two children was normally only 
allowed a 3-bedroom dwelling if the children were of the 
opposite sex and aged over 10.. Otherwise they were only 
eligible for a 2-bedroom dwelling. "Preventive" allocations 
to bigger units were very rare because of the still 
prevailing view that vast queues of eager and needy 
applicants existed for all council dwellings. Underletting 
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was frowned on as a waste of valuable housing space. Yet 
those with experience of allocations know how much easier 
it was throughout the '70's to achieve rehousing for a 
household eligible for a 3-bedroom category than for a 
2-bedroom category. Need operated as the determinant for 
rehousing but only within each bedroom category. The 
situation became so absurd in Islington that in 1975 you 
needed double the points to get a two-bedroom house than a 
three-bedroom. Of course, demand for smaller units had 
escalated dramatically, partly through the larger proportion 
of elderly, the increase in newly-formed families seeking 
first homes, and partly as young, single people left home 
prior to getting married. Cullingworth showed in 196916 
that over half the applicants for council housing wanted 
one-bedroom units, while the supply was something like 57% 
of all dwellings had 3+ bedrooms and only 12% had one- 
bedroom. In unpopular, high-rise blocks in the survey, 
only 400 units had three bedrooms and 3,600 had one or two 
bedrooms, underlining a major reason why they had let more 
easily. The largest number of unpopular 3-bedroom units was 
in houses. 
Allocation restrictions were a major cause of the problem in 
letting unpopular 3-bedroom units. It has been found in' 
several places that 3-bedroom houses that were hard to let 
were easy to sell on the open market, indicating that where 
no bedroom restrictions existed, there was take-up for the 
3-bedroom houses. Sales of 3-bedroom council houses were 
successful in Skelmersdale, Knowsley and Newcastle. The 
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vast majority of houses on any estate would have been built 
with three bedrooms since this has been the recommended 
norm for a house since before the First World War. 
17 
Therefore an estate of unpopular houses would almost certainly 
have mainly 3-bedroom dwellings. The impact of low income 
on allocation procedures is nowhere more visible than in the 
problem of letting 3-bedroom houses. Better-off, smaller 
households are often willing to buy a 3-bedroom house. 
But low-income tenants, who need a 2-bedroom dwelling, are 
often reluctant to accept three bedrooms because of the 
extra cost of heating or furnishing. Even where councils 
have tried to liberalise their lettings procedures and 
"underlet", they have had difficulty in persuading tenants 
to under-occupy. It is ironical that many old terraced 
properties were demolished because they were too small to 
convert to "decent-sized" modern units. Flats were often 
justified because they afforded more bedrooms on the same 
land. Yet now, with shrinking household size and growing 
concentrations of poverty in council housing, the extra 
space is often a liability. 
In spite of unexpectedly serious problems with 3-bedroom 
houses, flats overall were still the dominant problem, 
comprising nearly three-quarters of all unpopular dwellings, 
k 
Ä 
t 
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and a majority of those (nearly two-thirds) had only one or 
two bedrooms. 
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DIFFICULT-TO-LET DWELLINGS BY BUILDING TYPES AND BEDROOM SIZE 
1- and 2-bedroom 3-bedroom Total 
Tower 3,727 443 4,170 
Lift/deck 9,623 5,074 14,697 
Walk-up 14,012 9,487 23,499 
Houses 3,743 12,243 15,986 
Other - - 3,418 
TOTAL 61,770 
CAUSES OF UNPOPULARITY 
The postal survey asked local authorities to list the 
reasons which their housing managers considered "very 
important" in causing the unpopularity of estates. 
Unfortunately, the replies to this vital part of the survey 
were not broken down between metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
districts, but only by region. Nonetheless the reasons 
given were very revealing. The most frequently cited 
reason nationally for unpopularity was design, followed 
closely by vandalism with which it was associated. The 
third major cause was social stigma. Social stigma was 
often generated by the operation of the lettings system, 
which in turn was often connected with design, vandalism and 
wider social problems. Design, vandalism and social 
stigma were so far ahead of all other reasons as to be 
considered the major causes of unpopularity. In fact many 
of the subsidiary reasons, such as external appearance and 
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unsuitable environment, the next most common causes, were 
strongly linked to the three central reasons. 
The reason given least frequently for unpopularity was the 
internal appearance of the dwelling. This would be partly 
because so many of the dwellings were fairly modern. with 
good amenities. It would also bear out the general 
impression that applicants and residents care more about 
the overall "feel" of an estate and its social and physical 
aspect than the particular amenities of a home. It 
certainly proves that a "modern and satisfactory" home does 
not necessarily satisfy the needs of the occupier, and is 
in line with Octavia Hill's view that amenities matter less 
than good management and maintenance and a cared-for 
environment. High-rise blocks as a major factor in 
unpopularity ranked fairly low. So did the inconvenience 
or general lack of facilities of an estate, although there 
were estates where this was considered the overriding problem. 
39. REASONS HELD BY HOUSING MANAGERS TO 
BE VERY IMPORTANT IN UNPOPULARITY 
Reasons No. of times cited 
Design of. dwellings 109 
Vandalism 104 
Social stigma attaching to estate 94 
External appearance 68 
Unsuitable environment 66 
High-rise dwellings* 49 
Lack of local facilities 35 
Too far from the main centre 32 
Inadequacy of public transport 26 
Internal appearance 21 
The definition of high-rise, according to CIPFA, is 5 storeys 
or more. 
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When the reasons for unpopularity are scrutinised according 
to period of construction, then previous trends are 
confirmed. The period 1965-1969, when the greatest number 
of unpopular dwellings were constructed, is also the period 
most strongly connected with the three dominant reasons for 
unpopularity - design, vandalism and stigma. The period 
with the next greatest number of problems was from 1970 
onwards, again confirming the pattern of more recent estates 
posing most problems. The immediate post-war decade had 
fewer problems. 
"TABLE SHOWING THE BREAKDOWN BY PERIOD FOR REASONS FOR UNPOPULARITY 
1945-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 
Total no. of times 
all reasons for 78 48 89 84 192 113 unpopularity were 
cited by period 
41 TABLE SHOWING MAIN REASONS FOR AN ESTATE'S UNPOPULARITY BY PERIO 
OF CONSTRUCTION 
I- 
3 MAIN REASONS DATE OF CONSTRUCTION 
FOR UNPOPULARITY 
1945-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 
Design 14 7 14 16 36 22 
Vandalism 12 5 20 15 34 18 
Stigma attached 12 7 17 14 27 1.7 to property 
TOTAL 38 19 51 45 97 57 
The main reasons for unpopularity were clustered in the 
construction period of 1965 to 1974 rather than in the 
previous' decades. 
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One noticeable omission from the 'list of reasons for'unpopulari 
was any reference by housing managers to housing management and 
maintenance as such. In the later investigation, poor housing 
management was recognised as a major cause of unpopularity. 
But in 1974, neither the Department of the Environment, nor the 
local authorities that replied, so much as hinted at it. 
Housing management had not yet been recognised as the vital 
ingredient in the landlord function, without which any estate 
would be difficult to run. 
THE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION OF DIFFICULT TO LET HOUSING 
The Government was sufficiently concerned by the findings of 
the 1974 postal survey to undertake a more detailed 
investigation, conducted in 1976 in 30 local authorities 
claiming to have difficult-to-let estates. 
18 In the estates 
examined, the problems often seemed overwhelming and in every 
case the level of distress was a shock to the investigators. 
Several of the estates have since been demolished or sold. 
According to the Government investigators, the most significant 
problems causing the decline of the 30 estates in the eyes of 
the local authority employees and residents were in order of 
times mentioned: 
- Social factors, including concentrations of families with 
problems, high child density and divided community or lack 
of community spirit. 
- Management and maintenance problems, including vandalism, 
insufficient management, repairs or caretaking, and physical 
neglect due to insufficient maintenance funds. 
- Estate surroundings, including lack of play facilities, 
impersonal public spaces, and lack of community facilities. 
- Dwellings shortcomings, primarily condensation or water 
penetration, and outdated fittings. 
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- The final point was the vast size; physical 
separateness; and labelling of the estates. 
The Difficult-to-Let Investigation concluded that to cope with 
the major repairs problems of the estates, 
"Maintenance should be a personal and responsive service. " 
Housing management was recognised as the missing link: 
"The frequent failure to recognise the full extent of 
the role [of housing management] has probably played 
a large part in precipitating or accelerating the 
downward spiral in status and acceptability of many estates. " 
A direct result of the combination of communal design and 
inadequate management was the decayed and dirty environment of 
most survey estates - 
"At first glance what most of the case study estates 
needed was a thorough clean-up, not as a once and for 
all exercise, but as a prelude to continuous care and 
attention. " 
It is hard to imagine an official investigation of any other 
public service that would be forced either to specify "dirt" as 
a key finding, or to recommend continuous cleaning as a critical 
solution. Florence Nightingale's criticism of conditions in 
the Crimean hospitals was possibly the last comparable 
indictment of a Government-sponsored and funded service. 
Design was a primary issue - 
I- 
"[The] preoccupation with slum clearance and fast 
production of alternative housing led to unsuitable 
designs for families and well-publieisQd defects of 
some industrialised building systems. ° 
Sixteen of the original 23 post-war estates in the survey were 
industrially built with - 
"massive concrete facades of overwhelming severity. " 
All the estates bar three were dense blocks of flats. The 
intense communality - 
iyý. 
ýý, ý 
It 
"made heavy demands on-people's ability to live 
amicably at close quarters with neighbours. " 
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The Investigation found that many estates suffered from damp anc 
water penetration, lift failure, and defective heating systems. 
It was finally admitted by the Government in the face of 
overwhelming problems on the worst estates, that the 
administration, political structure and policies governing local 
authority housing caused general problems in the public stock 
that backed up into the worst estates, where the system finally 
failed altogether to hold things together within the bounds of 
the law. 
The report concluded that demolition, perhaps-the most obvious 
solution to the most undesirable dwellings, should not be 
considered before other options had been tried, although the 
investigators were so'depressed by some of the more modernistic 
estates as to consider that they had only a limited life - 
"The long-term future..... seems bleak. " 
19 
The Difficult-to-Let Investigation was the first published report 
by the Government concerning the specific problem of socially 
and physically undesirable estates. Its evidence was damning, 
cautiously worded as it was, and it highlighted beyond doubt 
both the magnitude of the design failure of modern estates and 
the total inadequacy of housing management and maintenance 
organisations. Most importantly, it stressed the social disarray 
and ghetto-like communities that were generated through a lettings 
system that pushed the most desperate households to the worst 
estates, arid it exposed officially for the first time a crude 
over-supply of council dwellings in some areas of the country. 
The Difficult-to-Let Investigation forged a partnership between 
a worried central Government and desperate local authority 
housing departments that led directly to the birth of the 
Priority Estates Project and the advent of local management on 
many unpopular council estates. 
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THE HOUSING INVESTMENT PROGRAMME SUBMISSIONS ON DIFFICULT- 
TO-LET ESTATES 
Chapter VI outlined how the council sector as a whole had 
increasingly housed poorer and more needy households, leading 
to heavy concentrations of deprivation on the least popular estates. 
The original Government survey and the Difficult To Let 
Investigation were very early feelers into the problem of 
difficult-to-let estates. We now have much more detailed 
information on the scale and concentration of the problem, based 
on the Housing Investment Programme Submissions for 1978,1981 
and 1983, 
* 
the most up-to-date evidence there is on the extent 
of difficult-to-let estates. 
At the time of the original Difficult-to-Let Survey in 1974, 
there had been no attempt to formulate an overall picture of the 
housing stock and its problems. But since 1978 the Government 
has asked local authorities in their annual Housing Investment 
Programme submissions to the Department of the Environment to 
specify how many difficult-to-let dwellings they have, as well 
as their total stock, the number of empty dwellings, and the 
condition of the stock. 
The major qualification to the present figures is the looseness 
of the official definition of difficult-to-let dwellings and the 
ý- lack of a detailed breakdown of the age, style and size of the 
estates. Difficult-to-let dwellings are defined as - 
"Those properties which are frequently rejected or are 
accepted very reluctantly even by applicants in urgent 
housing need. " 
Some authorities used their own definition of difficult-to-let 
dwellings, varying widely from the Government's. A few examples 
used in 1978 will illustrate the range. Hackney included all 
"unimproved pre-war estates and, generally, high-rise dwellings 
All figures except where otherwise stated are for 1983. 
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above the 10th floor". Southwark used the G. L. C. definition 
to include all inter-war unmodernised flats and all dwellings 
above the fifth floor. Lewisham defined as difficult to let 
all estates offered to people who had been on the waiting list 
, 
for_. 
-_ 
less than three months. -.... 
Wigan had, by far the broadest -' 
definition. It included - 
"pre-war unimproved council dwellings; maisonettes 
and flats above the first floor; 3-bedroom houses 
where there were too many such houses and a trend 
fnwarre ama1 1 Pr fami li ac _ ýý 
[Author's underlining] 
Wigan obviously had a severe problem of demand. Lewisham, in 
pinpointing the issue of unpopularity, was probably the most 
accurate. 
In all cases, the local authorities concerned were attempting to 
spell out objective criteria for designating a dwelling difficult 
to let. The use of "high-rise" and. "pre-war", commonly adopted' 
by the local authorities as their criteria for defining the 
problems, were far from being necessarily the clearest indicators. 
The Government and local authorities had already found that the 
later post-war blocks, more often low-rise, were the most 
unpopular. 
The problem of definition and counting was accentuated by the 
difficulty some local authorities had in deciding what was actually 
difficult to let and what was the result of inefficient, inflexible 
lettings systems. Hence the G. L. C., the largest landlord in the 
country, in. 1977 recorded 148,900 difficult-to-let dwellings, but 
by 1978 had reduced the figure drastically to 29,432. This was 
probably because of the radical change in lettings policy at 
County Hall, leading to widespread advertising and queuing on a 
first-come, first-served basis for flats that had remained 
vacant for more than a limited period or had been turned 
III 
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down by more than a certain number of applicants. The 
result was that many previously unlettable flats became 
occupied. However, the basic characteristics of a 
difficult-to-let estate remained unchanged, a high=-turnover 
of tenants, and general unpopularity with tenants who could 
afford to pick and choose, plus a high demand for transfers. 
In fact, ready-access lettings in some cases increased the 
transience of an estate. because of the mobility of young, 
single people. Although advertising generated demand and 
reduced the number of empty dwellings, it was not usually 
enough to restore a difficult-to-let estate to popularity. 
Therefore the larger G. L. C. estimate may have been more 
accurate. The G. L. C. and many London boroughs preferred 
the term "hard to manage" because they maintained that with 
high housing demand in London, virtually nothing was hard to 
let if a landlord would take all-comers, but most of the 
estates that became easy to let under the new, relaxed 
free-for-all were still very hard to manage and required a 
continual intensive input. 
The latest Department of the Environment figures for 1983 
revealed a heavy concentration of difficult-to-let dwellings 
within the metropolitan areas and particularly London, as 
already indicated in the incomplete 1974 survey. The 
authorities with the largest difficult-to-let stock tended to 
be the big landlords with very big stocks of publicly-owned. 
dwellings, and the local authorities experiencing severe 
social deprivation. The difficult-to-let dwellings in the 
HIP submissions were not described in any way, so there was 
! il 
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a 
no indication of the type and age of dwelling, or size of 
estate. Nor were the figures necessarily accurate, given 
the very loose definition used by the Department and the 
wide--väriätöri`S-iri 10-cal ---d-ef'ini`tions .- However, they did 
give a notion of the scale and concentration of the 
problem. 
42, 
In 1983 6.6% of council dwellings in England were classed 
as difficult to let. They were unevenly distributed, as 
the table below shows, with the largest concentrations in 
Greater London, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, the West 
Midlands and Birmingham. 
DIFFICULT-TO-LET DWELLINGS IN ENGLAND 
Figures from H. I. P. submissions for 1978,1981 and 1983 
1983 Number of 
Difficult- local 
Local Difficult, to-let as Increase authorities REGION authority to-let % of total decrease with over 
stock '78 1983 stock in 1978-83 5% of stock 
region difficult- 
to-let 
Greater London 632,000 108,672 13°% +J43% 21 
North-West 663,000 69,239 10% +19% 19 
West Midlands 579,000 48,352 9% +130% 6 
Yorkshire/ 
Humberside 578,000 27,478 5% +62% 4 
Northern 453,000 19,502 5% -18% 8 
East Midlands 395,000 14,983 14% +67% 3 
South-East 487,000 6,811 1.5% -24% 8 
Eastern 485,000 6,754 1.5%' -29% 6 
South-West 348,000 2,747 0.8% -8% 3 
LENGLAND 4,620,000, 304,538 6.6% +33% 78 
I 
Source: Department of the Environment, 1978,1981,1983. 
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The proportion of difficult-to-let dwellings in each area of 
the country parallels almost exactly the size of the local 
authority total stock. The bigger the number of council- 
- -""- - -owned -dwellings, "the, -greater --the -proportion- of --unpopular-- 
dwellings. This does tie the scale of unpopular council 
housing to the size of landlord and indicates a management 
cause of the problem. 20 
By comparing the figures for 1978 with 1981 and 1983, it is 
possible to see a steady progression in most regions. In 
the industrial areas, with the notable exception of Tyneside 
(Northern Region), the numbers of difficult-to-let dwellings 
increased. In the less urban regions the numbers tended to 
decline. This was partly because the slow-down in new 
building tended to reduce the surplus stock in the country 
as a whole. But the continued severe population loss from 
the big cities and the long-term unpopularity of a very 
large segment of the metropolitan council stock, coupled 
... R ...,. -a Nll 
with severe restraint on public spending on improvements, led 
to intensified problems in the cities. It is hard not to 
conclude that local authorities saw it in their interest to 
increase the number of difficult-to-let dwellings reported 
to the Government as justifying additional help,. although in 
fact the argument cut both ways since central government 
took the difficult-to-let pheonomenon in part as a proof of 
a surplus of housing in the public sector and in part as an 
indicator of inefficient management. There appeared to be 
only one logical explanation for the decline in difficult-to- 
let dwellings in the North: the development of a number of 
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intensive management initiatives on large, unpopular estates 
in Newcastle, Gateshead and South Shields. These 
authorities were among the first to move on the management 
-°°-° ° front and made a substantial- impact by 1982 
21 on at least'' 
4,000 difficult-to-let properties (see later chapter for 
more detailed examination of initiatives. 
The table below shows the trends by region: 
43. TABLE SHOWING CHANGES IN THE PROPORTION OF DIFFICULT-TO-LET 
DWELLINGS BY REGION BETWEEN 1978 AND 1983 
REGION 
Actual nos. 
of difficult- 
to-let stock 
in 1978 
1978 - 
base 100 1981 1983 
Greater London 76,000 100 121 143 
North-West 58,000 100 117 119 
West Midlands 21,000 100 223 230 
Yorkshire/Humberside 17,000 100 158 162 
Northern 27,000 100 83 72 
East Midlands 9,000 100 138 165 
South-East 9,000 100 78 76 
Eastern 9,500 100 78 71 
South-West 3,000 100 117 92 
ENGLAND 229,000 100 125 133 
ý- Note: The figure for the West Midlands rose dramatically 
between 1978 and 1982. Originally Midlands cities 
claimed to have very few difficult-to-let dwellings in 
the strict sense of the word. As oil prices and other 
troubles hit the car industry and the general recession 
hit engineering firms, the Midlands developed the fastest 
growing rate of unemployment in the country, causing ä 
rapid decline in general prosperity and possibly 
affecting crude demand for housing in the region. The 
cities of Birmingham, Coventry and Wolverhampton were 
also slower than others in recognising the problems of 
difficult-to-let estates. The West Midlands is now 
the region with the third highest proportion of 
difficult-to-let dwellings. 
Most other increases were numerically small. 42 local 
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authorities stated that. their number of difficult- 
to-let dwellings had increased between 1981 and 1982. 
Of these 5 were in London, 11 in metropolitan 
authorities and 26 in non-metropolitan areas. The 
overall percentage rose nationally in the five years 
of record-keeping from 5% to 6.6%. 
Inner London had by far the biggest concentration of 
problem estates. It had 11% of the national council stock 
but 28% of the national stock of difficult-to-let dwellings. 
Nearly one in five inner London council dwellings was 
considered difficult to let - over three times the national 
average. The total figure for inner London came to 86,000 
but the hand-over of the G. L. C. estates to the boroughs will 
have led to a substantial increase in that figure in 1984, 
because of the major problems the G. L. C. estates have posed 
for the already overstretched inner London boroughs. The 
inner London difficult-to-let stock was, as far as is known, 
exclusively in the form of high-density flats. It was 
therefore the most problematic, the hardest to manage, and 
the most costly to put right. 
The metropolitan districts contained just over a quarter of 
the national council stock but nearly half the difficult-to- 
let housing. Only three in every hundred council dwellings 
in non-metropolitan districts were hard to let. It is easy 
to see from the diagram below the disproportionate 
concentrations of unpopular estates in the city areas, 
especially-inner London. 
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The vast majority of difficult-to-let estates were in the 
cities, with 247,000, out of the total of over 305,000, in 
London and the metrocolitan authorities. It follows that 
all the other disadvantages of inner cities that we have 
already, examined must impinge directly on the condition of 
these estates. 
Inner London and Liverpool are the only major cities with 
more than half their stock in the form of flats. In inner 
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London, about 72% of the council stock consists of flats 
and maisonettes, and in Liverpool, 51%. We have already 
seen that one in five dwellings in London is hard to let; 
in, Liverpool, "the, ""proportion - rises to one'' in four. 
proportion in Liverpool is even higher than in London 
because of massive over-building, very poor management and 
serious depopulation. London and Liverpool together have 
about one tenth of the national council stock but one third 
of the unpopular estates. 
In other parts of the country, the overall proportion of 
flats may have less influence than the size and style of 
particular flatted estates which may compare unfavourably 
with the more typical houses and gardens. 
The size of the local authority landlord was a major factor 
in the scale of difficult-to-let problems. 35 local 
authorities in England owned over 30,000 dwellings each. 
33 of the 35 large landlords were in London or metropolitan 
districts. Only two were in non-metropolitan districts. 
The large landlords contained less than one third of all 
local authority housing, but over two-thirds of difficult- 
to-let housing. Over half the large council landlords had 
double the national average of difficult-to-let dwellings. 
They also tended to have the highest proportion of flats. 
The table below shows how concentrated and interlocked the 
key elements have become and how disproportionately London 
and the North-West suffer from a cross-fertilisation of 
problems, more than other areas of the country. All of the 
r1. 'I 
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cities listed have over 40% of the housing stock publicly 
owned, over 140% of council dwellings in flats, and a 
disproportionate concentration of unpopular dwellings. On 
average, one in five local authority dwellings in these 
cities was difficult to let. 
TABLE SHOWING THE % OF COUNCIL-OWNED PROPERTY, OF FLATS AND 
MAISONETTES AND OF DIFFICULT-TO-LET, IN THE CITIES WITH THE 
HIGHEST' CONCENTRATIONS OF ALL THREE'(OVER 140% OF STOCK 
COUNCIL-OWNED; OVER 140%° IN FLATS; ; OVER 6.6% DIFFICULT-TO- 
LET) 
Local Authority 
No. of 
council 
°° of total 
housing stock % flats 
dwellings owned by the difficult- 
council to-let 
Hackney* 45,000 57% 83% 20% 
Islington* 41,000 57% 69% 18°% 
Lambeth* 47 , 000 113° 70°4 33°° 
Lewisham 44,000 44% 75% 14% 
Greenwich 37,000 47% 60°4 20% 
Southwark 62,000 65% 76% 22% 
Manchester* 100,000 4+7°, b 39% 7°%** 
Liverpool* 69,000 40% 51% 26% 
Salford 113,000 47% 45% 16% 
Newcastle 47,000 46% 35%° 7% 
Birmingham 124,000 35% 39% 18% 
Source: 1983 H. I. P. Submissions 
*Hackney, Islington, Lambeth, Manchester were among the 12 
most deprived areas in the country. Liverpool was in the top 18. See below for definition of deprived area. 
**This figure is almost certainly a serious undercount. 
There is now clear evidence that the most deprived areas 
also have the most difficult-to-let dwellings. The Inner 
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Cities Directorate at the Department of the Environment 
studied the 1981 Census in great detail in an attempt to 
draw up a list of the main characteristics of a deprived 
area. They were: numbers of ethnic minority households; 
population loss; numbers of one-parent families; 
-homes 
lacking basic amenities. London had-much the highest levels 
of deprivation, except for unemployment. Unemployment was. 
heavily concentrated in-the north with the exception of-Corby. 
There were 2j times more difficult-to-let dwellings in the 
18 most deprived boroughs than the average. 
When we look at the five most deprived local authorities 
. 46. 
that were the biggest landlords, had the highest-proportion 
of flats, and rehoused large numbers of homeless families 
each year, we find that they had nearly four times the 
national average of difficult-to-let dwellings. 
22 
TABLE SHOWING THE 5 LOCAL AUTHORITIES OWNING OVER 30,000 COUNCI 
DWELLINGS, HAVING OVER 50% OF THEIR STOCK IN FLATS AND 
MAISONETTES, FEATURING AMONG THE MOST DEPRIVED 18 LOCA L 
AUTHORITIES AND'REHOUSING OVE R 1,000 HOMELESS FAMILIES A YEAR 
' 
Size of % 0A of 
Among 18 
most +ing Lboal 
. Authority 
local 
authority difficul 
flats and t- 
maison- 
deprived 1000 homeless 
stock to -let ettes 
local 
p. a. authorities 
Camden 35,000 15% N/A but V  
over 50% 
Hackney 45,000 20% 83% f 
Islington 41,000 18°% 69%  
Lambeth 47,000 33% 70% q 
Liverpool 69,000 26% 51% V J 
On average over half the housing stock in London is publicly 
owned, over 70% is in the form of flats, over 20% of council 
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dwellings are difficult to let, and London has much the highest 
incidence of, homelessness. Six of the 12 Inner London boroughs 
appear three or more times in the various categories of the 10 
most deprived boroughs in the country. 
These findings bear out the evidence of the previous chapters 
that council housing has built up severe problems over a long 
period. - 
The 1974 survey showed that three-quarters of the difficult-to- 
let dwellings were flats and maisonettes. The walk-up, balcony 
block style of estate was the. most common_unpopular type, with 
modern, concrete, deck-access and tower block estates a close 
second. Well over half the difficult-to-let estates were less 
than 10 years old (built since 1965) and a quarter were less 
than five years old. Difficult-to-let estates were also more 
likely to be built at high density and within a metropolitan 
area. The main causes of unpopularity were design, vandalism 
and social stigma. Some of the more surprising findings were 
that tower blocks formed only a small part of the problem, and 
very modern houses in non-metropolitan areas were quite heavily 
represented. 
The difficult-to-let returns now show layer upon layer of 
overlap between the fairly consistent numbers we have annually 
recorded of difficult-to-let dwellings and the other problems 
associated with them - location in cities, size of the council 
landlord, predominance of large, -high-density, flatted estates, 
and incidence of poverty. 
EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Councils themselves have been collecting and examining detailed 
Ii 
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ývidence about their unpopular estates. Their. findings are 
only mentioned here briefly to illustrate the extent and depth 
of their crisis. 
Islington housing department officials, early in 1982,23 
categorised. every estate of more than 50 dwellings in the 
borough as either easy to manage or hard to manage. Because. 
of great housing need and the consequent demand for almost any 
council accommodation in_Islington, it seemed more realistic to 
look at problem estates from the point of view of management. 
It covered about 31,550 dwellings out of a total stock of almost 
41,000 dwellings in January 1982, and it did not include 6,500 
units in pre-1911 street properties. It covered almost the 
whole purpose-built council stock, including ex-G. L. C. estates 
which had only recently been transferred to the Borough. 
Islington's evidence confirmed the findings of the original 
1974 Department of the Environment survey. The largest volume 
of unpopular council dwellings was built in the seventies; the 
size of individual estates tended to get larger as the decades 
passed; the number of unpopular dwellings increased; and they 
were heavily concentrated on the larger estates. In. Islington 
they were exclusively flats or maisonettes. 200 dwellings 
seemed to be the size above which flatted estates became hard to 
manage. The Islington evidence would suggest, therefore, that 
design and size were the two dominant determinants of unpopularity 
and that management problems were intensified under the impact 
of both. 
Lambeth housing department analysed the 1981 Census information 
in great detail, based on enumeration districts 24and was able to 
draw up a profile of the housing conditions and socio-economic 
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make-up of the households on`all Lambeth estates of more than 
200 dwellings. This'covered more than 75% of all Lambeth's 
council tenants living on estates of 25 dwellings or more and 
included virtually all of their unpopular estates. The 53 
estates, containing 28,000 dwellings, had an average of 528 
dwellings each. The vast majority of council dwellings were 
part of overwhelmingly large estates. Based on the Islington 
evidepce,, purely by virtue, of their size, the 53 estates would 
be hard to run and difficult to live on. 
The main purpose of the Census analysis was to establish whether 
there was a disproportionate concentration of social stress on 
some estates and whether a process of polarisation was at work 
because of the unpopularity of certain estates. There was a 
sharp contrast in the proportions of the following groups 
between estates: heads of household born in the New Ccmmcnwealth; 
one-parent families; unemployed; children under 16; large 
households; households owning a 
, 
car (see table 147). 
0 
The findings of the "Lambeth Estate Profiles", presented for 
Housing Management attention in 1984, provided a unique insight 
into the concentration of disadvantage and the cul-de-sac that 
inner city housing departments often find themselves in. 
The Cleveland County Research and Intelligence Uniý5did an 
exhaustive survey in 1980 of the social conditions in Stockton 
and Cleveland, compared with the Ragworth estate, a highly 
stigmatised and run-down cottage estate of 393 dwellings in 
Stockton. The findings were startling, especially since the 
estate and the houses were potentially very attractive. The 
main findings of the survey are summarised in the following table: 
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CONTRASTING LEVELS OF DEPRIVATION AND DISSATISFACTION IN 
CLEVELAND COUNTY AND IN THE RAGWORTH ESTATE 
RAGWORTH STOCKTON 
One-parent families 1 in 5 1 in 30 
Unemployment-- -- 33% 
(Teesside) 
No. of children under 16 45% . 
28% 
Manual workers _ 
88% 67°% 
Dissatisfied with the houses and. 300 oß facilities 
Dissatisfied with the level of 82% N/A 
vandalism* _ 
Dissatisfied with the appearance 720A 120A 
of the estate 
Dissatisfied. with _noise_ . 
52% 18% 
Dissatisfied with the level of 
privacy 28% 10°% 
Far from. relatives "and -friends 70, /0 400A (few or none near) 
6ý 
*37% of households had had windows of their home broken by others. 
The basic socio-economic findings were alarmingly predictable 
except that the number of children under 16 is higher than any 
other estate so far examined. The gap between the Pagworth 
estate and the wider community was more striking than anywhere 
we've examined. 
The Tyneside Partnershipas similarly documented the stark 
contrast between general conditions in Newcastle and Gateshead, 
inner city conditions, and social and economic problems on the 
five estates chosen for intensive management assistance. 
27 
A follow-up study was also done by the Building Research 
Establishment to show the contrast between the estates included 
in the Difficult to Let Investigation' and the rest of the council 
stock in those areas. The pattern of sharp deterioration from 
the average to the worst estates was replicated with alarming 
consisteney. 28 
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rThere is strikingly uniform evidence from the-five surveys 
of extreme-social deprivation on unpopular estates compared 
with other-parts of the community 'illustrating forcibly-the 
Gdvernment's-growing evidence about the emergence of difficult 
to let estates. --I- 
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CHAPTER VIII THE WORST ESTATES 
"Suitable, hygienic dwellings for the 
poorer classes at a substantially lower rent 
than that charged for accommodation of-the 
normal type" 
- from "Tenement Town" by L. White 
BACKGROUND TO THE SURVEY 
In 1979, in reaction to the Department of the Environment 
Difficult-to-Let Investigation of 1976, the Government 
decided to establish the Priority. Estates Project in an 
attempt to demonstrate and record possible remedies for 
unpopular estates in association with willing local 
authorities. 
Because of the pre-eminence of poor management and 
maintenance, it was decided from the outset-that a radical - 
change of direction in the management and maintenance of 
problem estates was called for. The full-time estate office tire, 
and the involvement of residents in their own destiny had 
become accepted within the Department of the Environment as 
the base-line for making any serious inroads into the 
problem of difficult-to-let estates. The local office was 
also the only avenue of direct contact with tenants on 
management issues and the only way of organising an effective 
day-to-day landlord service within local authorities with a 
large stock of council dwellings. Most other attempted 
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solutions, including re-design, major improvements and 
social and community initiatives, had failed to reverse 
the fortunes of. badly_stigmati. sed estates with the 
existing community. Attempts at management reorganisation, 
whether streamlining a centrally based, comprehensive 
housing service, or_attempting to provide :a coherent 
local 
service to cover a number of. estates in a limited area-or 
district, had also proved inadequate in the face. of. the 
severe decline of the worst estates. 
Over a period of five years the Priority Estates. Projeet,, 
sponsored by the Department of the Environment, visited 
about 100 local authorities in England and Wales, which 
had sought advice on problem estates or were taking the 
initiative in doing something about them. _ 
It ran three 
pilot projects in Hackney, Bolton and Lambeth. As a- 
result, the Project came into contact with every local 
authority in the country that it could uncover concerned 
about its unpopular housing. The writer was responsible 
for visiting most of the local authorities and"for helping, 
local authorities to organise local management offices on 
priority estates in several parts of the country. 
SURVEY METHOD 
In, 1982 the Priority Estates Project conducted a national 
survey of all local authorities that had established a 
full-time estate management office on a stigmatised estate. 
The aim of the survey was to find out how many local offices 
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. were organised and what, if any, success they were having. 
When the survey was initiated, it was not known that the 
-entire 
first crop of-estate offices in the country. would 
, be located-exclusively on difficult-to-let estates. 
'his. turned 
. out_ -to _be 
the. case. Later, the more ambitious 
local authorities; which had.. already marked up some 
success with a local office on their worst estates, became 
keen to decentralise their housing management further and 
set up offices on a wider scale to serve many or all of 
-their estates, -including more popular areas. - 
Walsall, 
Lambeth, Islington and--Newcastle were at the forefront of 
this effort to spread local management beyond-problem. 
estates. 
For the purposes of the survey, we restricted our enquiry 
where possible tothe first local office opened by each 
local authority. In every case, this was on one of their 
worst estates. There were 19 local authorities** that 
Lewisham Borough Council had two estate-based projects on 
run-down estates and decided to set up a third on a 
pleasant new estate as a preventative measure. 
** 
The G. L. C. was included because it was involved in 
estate-based projects in two boroughs, Lambeth and 
Lewisham, although it has now transferred the ownership 
of all its stock, with the exception of Tower Hamlets, to 
the boroughs in which they are located. Although we 
selected only one estate in each local authority, Lambeth 
and Lewisham had two projects or estate-based offices, 
one on an ex-G. L. C. estate and one on a b'broügh estate. 
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had set up 45 full-time* local management offices, stiffed 
with full-time workers, on unpopular estates and opened by 
: January. 1982, -the-cut-off date for inclusion in'the survey. 
: Only _one office 
"was selected from each local authoriity, 
: with the: exception of the-G. L. C. We included-two of'-- 
-their local initiatives because-they were . based-In different 
: boroughs. and . used -very different approaches as a -result. 
The total number of. estates- included -in the =survey was- = 
therefore 20. 
The following three chapters are a detailed examination of 
the problems leading to the local initiative. The main 
sources of information were the council reports that formed 
the basis of the political decision to make such a major 
departure from previous housing management practice and the 
staff who initiated the projects. 
The findings of the 1982 survey** provide the most detailed 
examination to date of the decline of a representative 
cross-section of the most problematic council housing. Here 
we present an overview of the problems, covering the four key 
areas so far discussed in this book: design, lettings, 
social deprivation and management. The account that follows 
Three offices only operated three days a week but were 
included because they provided an estate-based housing 
management entity. For a full examination of the method 
of selection and collection of data, see A. Power, "Local 
Housing Management: A Priority Estates Project Survey", 
Department of the Environment, February 1984. 
The survey was written up in brief and simplified form by 
the Priority Estates Project in order to convince 
councillors, housing department staf' and estate workers 
that local management was effective. 
Based on findings presented in Chapters VII and VIII, the 
estates included in the 1982 local management survey 
appeared to be broadly representative of the range of 
problems. 
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is based largely on the survey for which the writer was 
responsible, but it also draws heavily on her personal 
experience in visiting all the local authorities involved, 
and in working directly with staff and residents in 
approximately 30 local authorities in England, Scotland and. 
Wales. That experience coloured the commentary which is 
here recorded for the first time. 
THE TWENTY ESTATES 
The often shameful conditions described in the following 
pages prevailed before the projects began, and bear no 
relation to current conditions in the local authorities 
concerned or on the project estates. 
According to the 1983 difficult-to-let returns to the' 
Department of the Environment, the 19 local authorities 
included in the survey of 20 estates contained 13% of all 
English council housing, but 37% of all difficult-to-let 
dwellings. This meant that on the whole, special projects 
were set up in areas where the problem of unpopular estates 
existed on a large scale and not just on the particular 
estates in the survey. One in six dwellings in these local 
authorities was difficult to let, compared with the national 
average of one in twenty. 
Two-thirds of the estates comprised flats and the remainder 
were pre-war, unmodernised cottage estates on the edge of 
urban areas. The average size of estate was over 1,000 
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dwellings. The estates were spread across the country in 
Greater London, the Midlands, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, 
Tyneside, and the North-East. Of the 19 local authorities 
in the survey, 11 were in Greater London and seven in 
metropolitan areas. The survey covered the major areas of 
the country with concentrations of difficult-to-let estates; 
it---focussed predominantly- but not exclusively on flats; 
and it found that almost all the estates were very large. 
The actual problems faced by all the estate communities were 
oppressively varied and all-encompassing. The following 
diagram summarises the nature and extent of the main problems. 
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SNAPSHOTS OF ESTATES IN THE SURVEY 
-Snapshot 
descriptions of a cross-section of the estates 
in the survey will give some idea of the range and extent 
of the problems, and the causes of residents' despair. 
The Cowgate-estate*, Newcastle, was built on the edge of 
the city before the war. The estate is isolated, with 
poor shopping facilities. The 900 dwellings are terraced 
cottages, with 110 flats added since the war. At the 
time of the survey, the male unemployment rate was 60%. 
Decline accelerated from 1974, when transfers were made 
easier, because of the large supply of newer dwellings 
elsewhere. As the number of empty dwellings rose, so 
did vandalism. By 1978, there were about 100 vandalised 
empty homes, one in nine dwellings. Many gardens had 
been abandoned as fencing had decayed or "disappeared". 
The backlog of repairs awaiting action ran into thousands. 
Ashfield Valley in Rochdale was built outside the city, 
next to the abandoned Manchester Ship Canal. The 26 slab 
blocks, comprising 1,014 units, named from A to Z, 
Appleby to Zennor, are linked with open decks and bridges. 
The early blocks at the top of the alphabet let fairly 
easily. But by the time the housing department reached 
Zennor at the tail of the alphabet, willing applicants 
had dried up. Half of the offers were turned down. It 
is held that single male migrants from Donegal docked in 
Liverpool and headed straight for the Valley, having heard 
about the empty new flats. 
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The estate has unlettable one-bedroom flats on 
staircase landingsof every block. These have now all 
been bricked in. The Council has spent £4 million 
repairing the exposed_and. leaking decks, but the water 
is still coming in in places. There have been constant 
lift breakdowns and the entry phones that were later 
installed in the least popular blocks to try and curb 
-crime and fear of crime have not worked from the outset 
because'they were wrongly wired. There were in 1982 
270 empty dwellings on the Valley, and the council-was 
reluctantly considering selling it. Many people argued, 
_ 
that it should be demolished. 
The Stockwell Park estate in Lambeth, comprising 1,000 
dwellings, was one of the early low-rise, high-density 
estates, a hoped-for answer to the "tower-block blues" 
and to the desire of inner city dwellers to stay put. 
Practically the entire ground area is a vast cavernous, 
unused car park, and the estate is on stilts above. The 
overground walkways link all'dwellings, providing several 
miles of bleak, concrete corridors. Mugging and break-ins 
were very common in 1982 when the survey was carried out. 
The level of squatting, following on the large number of 
empty dwellings (63 in 1979) caused such social disarray 
that the tenants' association began to let flats direct, 
by-passing completely the council housing department. 
During the Brixton riots in 198t, the estate became a no-go 
area as youths used the underground garages and walkways 
as "safe" areas and police were temporarily stopped from 
coming onto the estate. The estate was used as the 
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location for the film "Black Joy", a mixed celebration 
of reggae, crime, dope and urban rebellion. When the- 
Brixton police set up a special beat-policing experiment 
there, reported crime went up by 185%. 
Lewisham's Honor Oak estate was built by the L. C. C. on 
spare railway. and allotment land in the early 193018 to 
rehouse dockland families from slum clearance areas-. 
Because it was designated to help the most needy, the new 
population was selected on the basis of poverty, illness 
and handicap from the existing slums. The flats, 1,100 
of them in 27 barrack-like blocks, were built to. a minimal 
standard, so that rents would be low enough for the poor 
families they were being built for. The result was an 
ill-suited location, high density, a total lack of communal 
facilities, strife-prone communal bathrooms, tiny bedrooms 
and so on. The other result was an almost uniformly 
impoverished population, which was to be the despair of 
estate officers, social workers, community*workers'and 
teachers. There wasn't even a Church. From the very 
outset people had an overriding desire to leave'the estate. 
Before the Second World War, a pacifist support unit set up 
a special project to try and help the new and unsettled 
community. 2 The task was constantly undermined by the 
people's hatred of the estate - 
"Because life in Tenement Town is so unsatisfactory, 
the families with higher standards of living 
instead of playing their part in raising the general 
level, only lived for the-day whSn they could escape 
to more congenial surroundings. " 
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As early as 1937, about one third of-the tenants left 
each year. 
Over the years many attempts were made to upgrade Honor 
Oak, -some with, some without the tenants. - in 1976, 
: when the Difficult-tö-Let survey was conducted-, the G. L. C. 
. was undertaking An 
i11-thought-out, -piece-meal improvement 
programme with some b19_cks- -being- -emptied- of-tenants 
to 
the envy of remaining residents, while other blocks 
-received a limited set of improvements with the residents 
remaining in occupation, and yet others were left for later 
programmes. Eight years later, some courtyards had been 
improved but others were as barren and bleak as ever. 
In 1981, a survey of three blocks revealed that nearly 
half the households there had children under the age of 16; 
142% belonged to ethnic minorities; a quarter had only one 
parent; 70% were in rent arrears. 
The estate, without local management or repairs, without 
major reinvestment, security, resident caretaking and a 
general leavening of the demoralised community, could not 
rise above its original designation - "a slum rehousing 
estate", carrying all the scornful and pitying type-casting 
that went with a somewhat meanly executed good intention. 
The environmental works have softened the contours of the 
estate somewhat, but the long bleak blocks still lbök more 
like a prison than home. 
The estates in the survey were all difficult places to run 
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and on the whole unpleasant places to live-in. - Many of 
the awful results of management incompetence and social 
decline were undreamt of. 
The- local authorities, towards-the end of, the seventies, 
-finally accepted that-the wrong system of management 
was 
being applied. - We-will now examine how they saw their 
problems, how they set up alternative structures and the 
results. 
THE BASIC PROBLEM - DESIGN 
First we will consider the physical aspects of the 20 
estates, the way they were built and the extent to which 
their physical. design contributed to their unpopularity. 
It is hard to separate out physical from social and 
organisational factors, since each element interlocks with 
the other. However, in order to trace some kind of 
evolution in the decline of the 20 estates, we examine what 
was put in place as people's homes to start with. - 
ENVIRONMENT 
The design problems of the 20 estates could be summarised 
under several items. The size and scale of most of the 
estates, the isolation from the surrounding community, the 
omnipresent communal areas, the abandoned, unguarded territory 
such as allotments, gardens and garages, made the estates 
look and feel neglected, decayed and poor. On the 13 flatted 
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estates, oppressive, ugly blocks and communal internal areas 
created a sense of anonymity and fear that depressed and 
repelled residents. In the case of the modern estates 
especially, which shared all the disadvantages of older 
flatted estates, problems were compounded by industrial 
design of gigantesque. proportions. The diagram that 
follows shows the severity of design problems, particularly 
on flatted estates, and more especially on modern ones. 
50. TABLE SHOWING DESIGN PROBLEMS ON: 20 ESTATES, LEADING TO THEIR 
UNPOPULARITY AND DECLINE 
Problem 
Over 200 dwellings 
Abandoned land 
Unmaintained, communal areas 
Dark, un-overlooked areas 
Damaged'; communal entrances 
Open balconies and decks 
Unprotected stairwells and' 
entrances 
Unpopular location 
Noise problems caused or 
enhanced by design 
Unused garages 
Vulnerable lifts 
Industrial Building methods 
Few or no community facilitie 
Damp and condensation 
Poorly guarded or abused 
community facilities. 
Failed improvements: 
- entry phones 
- house modernisation 
- environmental improvements 
TOTAL DESIGN PROBLEMS 
7 Cottage 6 Balcony 7 Modern Tota 
7 6 7 20 
7 6 7 20 
7' 6 7 20 
2 6 7 15 
0 6 7 13 
0 6 7 13 
0 6 7, 13 
7 2 4 13 
2 4 4 10 
0 3 6 9 
0 3 6 9 
1 1 6 8 
4 2 1 7 
1 1 4 6 
3 2 1 6 
0 1 4 5 
1 2 0 3 
1 1 1 3 
43 64 86 193 
Source: Background information from Department of the 
Survey of Local Management Offices. 
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It can be seen from the table that the modern flatted 
estates suffered from twice as many design problems as- 
cottage estates. _ 
Many design problems on flatted estates were quite' _- 
intractable, capable of some modification only if backed by 
intensive management. - 
On cottage estates-, size, communality and neglect took 
their toil too, _but it was much easier to see how these 
problems could be rectified through well-organised. 
management, sensitive modernisation and proper supervision 
of all communal areas. - 
SIZE OF ESTATES - 
Scale has already been discussed in some detail concerning 
problem estates in general and we have shown that when-once 
an estate has more than 200 dwellings, * it requires local 
management, particularly in the case of flats. The estates 
in the survey averaged 1,000-dwellings, which is way above 
the size with which a majority of people can readily identify 
as a community. 
Below is a diagram showing the size of the estates in the 
survey. The smallest estate had 272 dwellings, the 
largest 1,898. 
For the sake of simplicity, based on the Islington survey 
discussed in the previous chapter, we will assume from here 
on that 200 dwellings is the cut-off point for a manageable 
estate without special input. 
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51. . Number of Projects on Different-sized Estates 
ýý 
`ý.. 
w I: 
® Cottage 
® 
Walkap 
® 
Modem 
Under 400 homes 401-800 homes 801-1,200 homes 1,201 Homes or more 
Size of estates 
The problems created on. the survey estates by virtue of 
their size seemed to be: anonymity; a lack of identification 
of tenants with their estate; a sense of isolation; loss 
'of social controls; increased vandalism and crime through 
difficulties of detection; loss of management control; a 
desire to leave; a general dislike of the scale of the 
environment. It was hard for workers or residents to 
articulate the reasons for size creating such a sense of 
dismay. However, it was such a constantly recurring theme, 
echoing many other 
very apparent how i 
dissatisfaction. 
survey lent weight 
of an estate has a 
writings4 on the 
nuch it dominated 
The average size 
to our initial a 
direct impact on 
subject, that it became 
people's sense of 
of the estates in the 
ssumption that the scale 
its problems. 
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We concluded that size was one of the major causes of. 
i 
social and management decline on unpopular estate; based 
on the overwhelming'size of the estates in this survey-and the 
strong sense among residents and. workers that the large 
scale of the estates. greatly enhanced their unpopularity. 
Although we know that the large estates posed management 
difficulties and tended to be unpopular with. tenants, we- 
do not know how. big problem estates are on the whole. The. 
estates in the Difficult-to-Let Investigation averaged over 
600 dwellings. The fact that the average for this survey 
was 1,000 dwellings might illustrate, not the typical size 
of problem estates, but the extreme end of the problem, 
which councils had a strong incentive to tackle. Also 
large estates tended to provide a greater incentive to 
opening a local management office because they were a 
convenient size patch for'a"team'- unlike smaller problem 
estates. There are, however, many unpopular estates 
substantially bigger than-1,000, including three in this 
survey of over 1,800. 
Until clearer evidence is collected of the size of problem 
estates, it seems fair to assume that they rarely number 
less than 200 dwellings and more usually, have over 500. 
THE ESTATE CONCEPT 
On the survey estates it was very difficult for residents 
to identify with their community. It was also difficult 
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for council staff to identify with the estate because of 
the sense of uniformity, anonymity and alienation that 
the number of dwellings and occupants bred. The visual 
character of the estates was-such that they were separate " 
from-the surrounding- area and identifiable as aseparate 
unit or a community. - An unnatural boundary, separating" 
off the estates from the rest of the area, -was-created, both 
by the estates' physical definition, by their size and by 
the stigma attached to them: The larger the estate, the 
more stark this definition was likely to be. Not only 
was the estate physically-separate and identifiable, there 
was also an unusually strong community of interest within 
each estate, above all because of the common landlord. 
Everyone had in common the. fact that they were tenants on 
an estate, at the bottom of the housing hierarchy. There 
was also often an apparent-general economic and social 
homogeneity among residents (though this was far from always 
being the case). 
5 
It might well be, however, that the poorer a community and 
the märe . disadvantaged, the less' homogeneous it felt to 
those who lived there in that a majority of the people ended 
up there after falling through the net of slightly more 
viable communities above them in the social and economic 
strata. So poor estates often seemed to residents more 
like a collection of failures from somewhere else than a 
community of interest. Their size and separation helped 
set in train a circular decline, as their unpopularity 
invited low-income residents who disliked the estate for 
these very reasons and. who found it hard to identify with 
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their neighbours because of the overpowering-anonymity. 
Their failure to identify with their community in turn 
enhanced the estate's problems. - People with intense 
social and economic problems often simply do not want to 
identify with others-in the same uncomfortable boat. * 
The estates therefore' housed an increasingly reluctant 
population, -who often-did not identify with their surroundings 
or like their estate. ýSo-there was a double pröblem'of 
separateness and inner discord. For this reason unpopular 
estates have often been likened to prisons or ghettos. 
6 
DESIGN TYPES 
The 20 estates in our survey represented an almost exact 
spread between the main three design types of council estate, 
with seven cottage estates, six balcony-block, walk-up 
estates, and seven modern concrete complex estates. 
"52. AVERAGE TYPE AND SIZE OF ESTATES IN STUDY 
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COTTAGE ESTATES 
It was surprising to find that one-third of the estates 
comprised houses and gardens. For Londoners and residents 
of flats, this seems. unthinkäble. However, 'the cottage 
estates'were located exclusively outside the major cities 
of London, --Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool, -in areas 
where flatted estates äre: much-rarer and the cöttage style 
predominates. In fact, the "cottage" stock was seriously 
_y 
under-represented among the problem estates since over 
two-thirds of the national-stock has been built-as houses - 
and gardens, and the proportion outside London, Birmingham, 
Manchester and Liverpool would be over 75%. 
* This bears 
out the overall impression that flats are overwhelmingly 
more unpopular than houses. Nonetheless, age, size, and' 
social stigmatisation resulting mainly=through lettings 
policies and poor management, caused some cottage estates 
to be unpopular, and set in train the familiar cycle of 
decay, neglect and finally abandonment of dwellings and 
facilities that would signal the social extremes to which 
poor cottage estates could sink. Low general demand in 
many areas of the country and antiquated amenities in 
kitchens, bathrooms and heating appliances, would also have 
an impact on the lettability of a cottage estate, as would 
location and the original image of the estate. 
Cottage estates were unpopular, not just because they were 
old and unmodernised, but because they were built with a 
Only in London would it be unheard of that a cottage estate should be unpopular. All the other cities have poor, 
run-down cottage estates, but these do usually pose less 
severe management problems than their flatted estates. 
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communal uniformity, a mean stamp on them, an "estate 
atmosphere" that residents rejected. 
All the cottage estates in the survey were built away from 
the town centres, and. residents disliked feeling cut off 
from relatives, friends and services. Life seemed to be 
happening somewhere else. Three of the cottage estates 
in the survey had always been stigmatised because they 
rehoused en bloc residents of a notorious pre-war slum 
clearance area. Six of the seven cottage estates were 
completely unmodernised at the outset of the local 
management initiative, yet all were at least 40 years old 
and in serious need of, 'najor renovation. This fact 
dominated tenants' dissatisfaction and the difficulties in 
letting empty dwellings, which in turn led to rehousing of 
last recourse or "dumping". The subsequent stigma gathered 
its own momentum and unless radical management and community 
initiatives were undertaken, modernisation of itself could 
fail to reverse the declining fortunes of these estates. 
This happened on one of the seven, the Goscote estate in 
Walsall, where earlier improvements were simply stripped 
out by thieves making an illegal living from selling council 
central heating systems on the black market.? Other 
cottage estates not in the survey, such as Abbeyhills, 
Oldham, and Cloverhall, Rochdale, had experienced the 
failure of modernisation in the mid-seventies through lack 
of management back-up and inability to move a family in 
faster-than the vanddls could get to. it. Therefore 
modernisation, while a prerequisite for restoring run-down 
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property to lettability, was not of itself the-answer to 
an estate's problems. 
The interior design of the houses on cottage estates was 
often problematic, especially because of very small 
kitchens., However, as"basic: dwellings, they offered a 
workable-and generally_acceptable, if cramped,. home that 
inmost cases simplyneeded_repair and updating. 
The other design problem of cottage estates was-that: on' 
the one hand they were built in the pre-war period.. when there 
was little acknowledgement of the need for community 
facilities, -such as a community hail, a children's playground 
or a football pitch; on the other hand, they were built 
with verges and stretches of grass which required constant 
maintenance and litter-picking, back alleys (or runnels) that 
were badly lit and unkempt; and odd corners of land that 
had simply not been built on. No-one any . 
longer knew why 
these abandoned areas had been left there. Often they 
were simply at the end of a row of houses, not big enough 
to build on, but too big for someone's garden.. - 
On one 
estate, they were owned by another landlord and-had not been 
acquired with the rest of the site. On another, a workshop 
had been demolished and nothing put in its place; on another, 
the housing money had run out and building had been 
peremptorily stopped. 
Estate roads, by contrast, were usually narrow, designed for 
an era when no ordinary people owned cars. Grass verges on 
all the estates were used for car-parking since the roads 
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were too narrow, either by residents who wanted their car 
within sight of their windows but had no garage, or by 
outsiders, such as lorry and van drivers, looking for 
somewhere to park. The result in winter was deeply 
rutted, muddy verges that the council pointed to as proof 
that they could do little to improve the estates in the 
face of such irresponsible tenants' action. On at least 
one estate, residents had knocked down their front walls 
in order to park their cars outside their living rooms. 
Fear of theft was a real element in this. 
In no case had the construction of an estate office or a 
repairs base taken place while the estate was being built 
or in the 40 years that had since-elapsed. On one of the 
estates, shops were built, but because they were purpose- 
built with relatively pristine conditions, rents and rates 
were high and shops had difficulty getting established. 
Because shopkeepers were on the whole not willing-to live 
as tenants on the premises on a poor estate, shops were 
often unguarded and frequently broken into and heavily 
vandalised. Many shops were boarded up or abandoned. 
On no cottage estate had a community centre been built 
with the estate, though community facilities were added in 
later years. These were often inadequate, such as a wooden 
hut for a community centre in Leicester. Belatedly, 
playgrounds of sorts had been added in several cases. 
Overall, on the cottage estates, the public landlord was 
over-generous, if not positively casual, in the use of the 
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land, while-giving very little coherent thought either to" 
its future use or maintenance, or looking at all carefully 
at the social needs-of the upr-noted slum-dwellers it was 
-to rehouse en masse on the brand- new site. - --- 
It must be said that many of the cottage estates were not 
architect-designed=, and very little planning skill was -- 
-brought to-bear either. '-7'- M6st local authorities did not 
employ architects at-the time when these estates-were 
bui-lt. 
$ It was considered-sufficient to put up rows of 
adequate houses of standard design and leave spaces between,. 
-very much-as the nineteenth century industrialists had built 
the inner city terraces, -only with more generous space. 
The cottage estates, with their houses and gardens, were 
far more enclosed-and controlled than the flatted estates. 
But on the seven cottage estates in our survey, many front 
, gardens 
had become abandoned rubbish heaps. In fact on two 
-estates, the council had communalised front gardens, turning. 
them into open-plan grass verges because private gardens 
were such an eyesore. Needless to say, - communalised front, 
gardens were not properly maintained. However, -the-fact 
must be faced that "defensible space" does not automatically 
operate in a very poor, demoralised community, residents 
can simply give up all'attempts at guarding or caring for 
their own property. 
Back gardens were an even bigger problem and on most estates, 
over the 40 years of the estates' life, fences simply 
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disappeared and many back gardens became communal tips 
and shortcuts. 
The c'.. rall effect on a cottage estate of the widespread 
abandonment, neglect, and rubbish dumping on public open 
space and in private gardens, was to generate an 
atmosphere of depression and abandon that deterred self- 
respecting people from considering moving there and forced 
more ambitious tenants to leave. They simply couldn't 
accept the low standing of such a neglected estate. 
In-spite of this, many gardens were enclosed and well cared 
for, alibeit often with ad hoe home-made fencing, and many 
tenants made endless use of the areas attached to their 
houses, whether or not the fencing was still standing. 
Flat dwellers did not have outdoor space to make use of, 
only space that was abused. 
Intrinsically, all the cottage estates in the survey were 
adequately if unimaginatively built and laid out and it was 
relatively easy to conceive of making them perfectly 
acceptable. The same could not be said of the 13 flatted 
estates. Unsightly and wasteful as the derelict areas were 
on the cottage estates, they could not be compared with the 
ubiquitous squalor of almost very square foot of territory on 
the flatted estates. 
THE FLATTED ESTATES 
While building de. qian ni; Uo 
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for problems, as. the cottage estates showed, it was easier 
to see why the flatted estates in the other two categories 
of-balcony or'modern style were unpopular compared with the 
seven cottage estates. The 13 flatted estates were all 
oppressively built at high density, with a mean- finish. 
The flatted estates were larger on the whole than the cottage 
est-ates and this increased--the dense atmosphere. Ten of 
the 13 had more than 800 dwellings and the modern estates 
were largest-of all, with an-average of well over 1,000 
dwellings. The greatest'impact was created by the denseness 
of the blocks. * Many of the flatted estates were built at 
over 200 bed-spaces to the care. All the survey estates 
were in this sense extremely oppressive, whereas the cottage 
estates with about 60 bed-spaces to the gare seemed open and 
airy by comparison. 
COMMUNAL SPACE, DOGS AND CHILDREN 
It was the intense communality--of the-flatted-estates, ---where 
your children, your dog, your rubbish and your milk were 
shared because you couldn't keep them to yourselves, that 
people seemed to hate most of all. 
Dogs illustrated the problem well. They were a menace on 
all the estates and were somehow associated with communal 
space. Many people with dogs tended to treat the open areas 
Alice Coleman argues that density is not a factor in problem 
estates, citing the much greater density of old city streets 
as evidence. However, density of design, coupled with size 
of blocks and scale of estates, seemed to have a serious 9 impact on the environment of the flatted estates we visited. 
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as a private house resident treats his garden. They would 
1 open the door and simply put the dog out. It is hard to 
appreciate how great a loss of control the dog problem 
represented on the estates we visited. The one feature 
that seemed to explain it, other than a cussed fecklessness 
among dog-owning residents, was the lack of private space 
and the extensive communal areas. However, it was also a 
function of weak, negligent management and illustrated the 
need to enforce communal rules rigidly. Dogs had been 
explicitly forbidden in most tenancy agreements but the rule 
was simply ignored. Dogs were ubiquitous. On one tower 
block in Liverpool, that was one third empty, stray dogs lived 
inside the building and wandered in and out of the lifts with 
the legal occupants, moving between floors and waiting for 
lifts just as the two-legged occupants did. 
It is not possible to link dogs directly with design, but 
they did somehow epitomise the problem. Dogs were acquired 
primarily for security and companionship, as a result of the 
fears generated by flat-living; but secondarily, as a 
compensation for cramped estate-living where a dog 
represented freedom and outdoor space. Unfortunately, only 
brutally rigid management enforcement could contain the dog ' 
problem and this was missing from all of the survey estates. 
Many children became equally communal, put outside the front 
doors to play. Again, this often appeared to be simple 
fecklessness on the part of tenants, but it was more an 
acknowledgement of the fact that children through the ages 
have spent most of their time out of doors, when not in 
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school or eating or at work. In a minimally designed 
flat, the imperative to escape to the outdoors is 
stronger than ever, and can only_be repressed at serious 
cost to the children's development and the mother's 
nerves. But the communal design of flatted estates 
militated. against the-kind of play that was compatible 
_ with adult needs, 
the safety of the children and the 
survival. of: communal facilities. 
Children and dogs, -therefore, came to be viewed-as 
uncontrollable threats, proof of the slum. character of the 
estates, and also a source of much direct damage. Our 
impression was-that this resulted more from the design of 
the estates and the living patterns. they generated than 
from the nature of the people, although as always the one 
fed the other. Both problems seemed substantially more 
severe. on the flatted estates than on the cottage estates, - 
though it is almost impossible to quantify. 
r 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COMMUNAL AREAS OF FLATTED ESTATES 
All three types of estate had large areas of rarely cleaned 
communal space with no-one effectively in charge of them, 
but the problem was more especially difficult and prevalent 
with the flats. 
The major distinguishing feature of. the flatted estates, 
Alice Coleman has spent three years quantifying among other things excreta (human and dog) on flatted estates compared 
with terraced streets and has shown that thb former are 
significantly more abused than the latter. 
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apart from the block structure and their height, was the 
ubiquitous no-man's land of common parts. A house is 
private; even if rented and owned by an absentee landlord. 
The street onto which a house abuts is public, and-in that- 
-sense is-seen to belong to the community. Houses and 
streets on council estates share the public/private 
definitions. A '-flat opens out onto a string of common 
-areas that are neither clearly-public, nor clearly private>>- 
4 
and therefore belong neither to an individual tenant nor to 
the community of tenants as-a body. They actually belong 
to the landlord, 'and therefore must be cared for by the 
landlord, as the philanthropic trusts have accepted over the 
last century or so. Local authorities have not taken this 
'blanket responsibility seriously and in almost every case 
have assumed that at least some of the responsibility belongs 
to tenants as individuals or as some kind of undefined 
collective body. 12 This has not happened. Tenants' collective 
responsibility for common areas that they do not own, but 
that are part of their estate, has not been defined in law 
and could not-be--enforced if it was, unless tenants 
collectively became the legal landlord, as happens in the 
rare cases where they form a co-operative. In all other 
cases, the landlord is entirely, solely and exclusively 
responsible for communal areas, a responsibility that was 
not executed with any diligence on the 20 estates. 
On the flatted estates in the survey, the problem was inherent 
and therefore much more intractable. Firstly, there were 
more communal areas than were easily manageable. Planners, 
with some kind of conscience for the living style foisted 
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on low-income families- by 'virtue of the block concept, 
ensured on the whole maximum space around the blocks to 
compensate for the enclosed flat-living, especially on 
the modern 'estates, where planning ideals were at their 
zenith. The result was absurdly high densities within 
-blocks and too much unused-or abused open space. Secondly, 
the design of flats dictated communal entrances, stairwells, 
rubbish collection areas and so on within each block. 
-Thirdly, design fantasies created frightening dark-areas. 
-The general lack of security and the major problems--of- 
policing caused by such design features as underground car 
parks, multi-storey car parks remote from dwellings, 
overhead pedestrian walkways, linking bridges, long open 
decks and enclosed corridors, under-used, sometimes abandoned 
shopping precincts, unguarded communal drying rooms and 
rubbish stores within blocks, all helped generate crime and 
fear of crime and invited noise and vandalism and graffiti that 
often turned a communalistic design fantasy into an ugly and 
abused eyesore. 
COMMUNAL PARTS OF BLOCKS 
The basic communal parts to the actual buildings posed the 
most difficult problem - the doors and entrances, stairwells, 
balconies, decks, rubbish collection points and garages. 
These areas were constantly damaged, dirty, or simply badly 
designed and unable to stand up to the wear and tear or so 
many users. They required constant maintenance and 
supervision, not just because of greater use and abuse, but 
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because they relied more on vulnerable externals such'as- 
I 
lighting and working doors, without which they became 
dangerous and even unusable. For example, on Tulse Hill 
rubbish stores and collecting points became unusable because 
doors were broken off and not replaced. As a result, the 
rubbish store would-be- severely abused and men-would refuse 
to collect from it. -Drying rooms, garages and-store- 
sheds, were widely abandoned-because doors fiere=ripped off and 
not replaced. Balconies and. stairwells were sometimes-*-unlit 
for weeks because-light-"fittings were broken-and bulbs, 
constantly stolen. - 
In many local authorities we visited, attempts at keeping 
doors on their hinges and lights working had quite simply 
been abandoned. On several estates no stairwell window had 
glass in it and no door, either to rubbish areas or to 
entrances, was in working order. 
UNGUARDED LIFTS AND COMMUNAL ENTRANCES 
There were lifts on at least some blocks of all the more 
modern flatted estates. Lifts were a constant attraction 
to abuse, provided a challenge to ingenuity and daring. 
Boys would ride on the roofs of lifts, try to open doors 
between floors and even try to trap unsuspecting people in 
them. Lifts would often be vandalised and in tower blocks 
on at least three of the project estates in the survey, 
Alice Coleman's research shows that the more dwellings share 
a communal entrance, stairs, corridors, the greater the level 
of dirt, vandalism and other abuse. 13 
. 326 
broke down continually. On two of the estates, in tower 
blocks over 15 storeys high, lifts were sometimes out of 
commission more often than-they were working. In one case, 
new lifts had to be installed. On both estates, elderly 
people and very young children lived in the tower blocks and 
were dependent on lifts-to reach the ground. The blocks 
were 17 storeys and 23 storeys-high. 
Lift breakdown was associated with cheap installation,. 
ineffective maintenance and the lack of door controls or 
resident porter/caretakers; but it was also a function of 
the numbers of children using and abusing them and the 
challenge they-represented to youth as a communal collecting 
point and a technological adventure. - Because of their 
anonymous, unguarded nature, lifts never represented among 
the young a vital service they needed to protect,. rather a 
source of fun or an object of their scorn - a-way of getting 
even with an environment with which they did not identify. 
Lifts themselves were a frequent source of fear; people 
were afraid to travel alone in lifts for fear of attack; 
and even more commonly, people were ashamed of their visitors 
using the lifts because of the smell from people using them 
as a lavatory. It is unclear whether lifts were abused in 
this way through the need for a toilet, or as a symbol of 
the total lack of esteem in which the community, the estate, 
and especially its common parts were held. People do not 
deface what they respect as belonging to others or what. 
they know is guarded or overlooked. An unguarded lift, 
because it is enclosed, partly private and partly public, 
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1" 
a source of fear and a symbol of precarious dependence on 
others, appeared to bring out the very worst of the 
aggressive desire to abuse. It was extremely rare to_. 
enter a clean-smelling lift. 
It was obvious that all lift entrances required guarding, 
both in terms of. cost of installation and maintenance, cost 
of vandal damage, and-of the. large number of people using 
each lift, quite apart from. the need to keep them clean . 
and. 
working for the-sake of all residents. Yet nolocal.. _ 
authority we visited guarded lifts from when they were first 
installed. On six of the 13 estates, attempts were made, 
after initial damage, at installing entry phones in lift 
access blocks. But without local management, all these 
attempts failed and became themselves the targets of even 
greater vandalism. 
In fact, entry phones in lift access blocks were the only 
changes to communal areas attempted prior to local 
management, apart from one cottage estate in the north, 
where environmental improvements costing £4 million were 
carried out without any local management or tenant 
involvement and were destroyed completely over the following 
two years. Few as the attempts were, it is interesting that 
they all failed through lack of tenant consultation and 
management back-up. Many other estates not in the survey 
made similar attempts either at environmental improvements, 
communalising abandoned private gardens, reinstating 
tumbledown garden fences, planting out courtyards, enclosing 
entrances, providing garages, removing drying areas. They 
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all failed where they wer& not coupled with tenant 
involvement and intensive management, unless the existing 
population was moved out and 
effectively rebuilt. 
the estate or block 
Communal entrances and lifts were probably more menacing 
than the other areas because they were the residents' only 
means of access to their home or from their home to the 
outside world. The ease with which they could be damaged 
made residents feel vulnerable and therefore incited bully- 
style behaviour from tough youths, muggers and vandals, 
because the weak spots always do. For this reason, without 
very tight control, the failure to improve security to 
entrances-was to, be expeätbdL. 
DECKS AND BRIDGES 
The other communal areas that were integral to the blocks, 
and therefore provided a direct link to people's homes, 
were the decks and bridges. Decks and bridges were a 
special feature of the modern estates, along with the 
underground or freestanding, multi-storey car parks. All 
but one of the modern concrete complex estates in the 
survey had linking bridges between already large blocks. 
The idea, as we know, was to provide "streets in the air". 
In fact, their effect was to break down even further any 
sense of neighbourliness or identity. within a block, each 
of which could contain over a hundred dwellings. In purely 
This has been done on several Islington estates. 
i 
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physical terms they were extremely ugly, combining the 
worst features of main-road subways and overhead bridges. 
Instead of providing an arterial link within acommunity, 
they seemed to providea strangulating line of-access and 
escape for strangers. The police argued forcibly 
that 
they created a muggers'-paradise, giving constant cover- 
and escape routes. One estate was described by*the- 
housing manager as ä-"giant climbing frame"., Crime was 
alleged to be a bigger problem on these estates than anywhere 
else, although the-lack 'of äccurate figures made it hard to 
establish the. exact truth of this claim. The police in any 
event found them the hardest to police; caretakers the 
hardest to maintain; and residents, the most frightening. 
By the very anonymity and inter-connectedness that they 
created between 3,000 or more residents, no stranger could 
be challenged, no outsider detected. Everywhere was made 
to belong to everyone. 'And yet unlike streets, ' they were 
not public and therefore guarded by everyone's eyes. - They 
were often partially hidden and infrequently used. There 
was therefore a total ' contradiction between their exposed 
and public character and their unnerving atmosphere of 
abandon and secrecy. 
The open decks along the blocks in front of people's flat 
entrances created another major problem, with the noise 
they generated. They were almost always directly above 
someone else's bedroom. There was the noise of constant 
coming and going; but much more importantly they were 
ideal for skateboarding, roller-skating and even cycling. 
They were the first play area beyond the front door and 
, 
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they were fun because they were long and flat and were 
linked to the next deck and the next. There was no easy 
way that a tenant on the second floor could detect the 
children on the third deck making a noise. There was no 
social connection between one deck and the next, even 
though they, were all linked. 
Decks were in many-cases A 
-wind 
trap, with driving rain in 
bad weather causing surface puddling. Decks were not 
originally built as roofs or as roads, and yet they needed 
to function as both. 
_In_practice 
they neither kept out 
the weather_in many cases, nor bore the continual traffic 
successfully. ' Some decks were so exposed to the weather 
as to provide a major deterrent to prospective tenants and 
a constant deterrent to ordinary human intercourse. 
GARAGES 
There has been a disastrous multiplication of free-standing 
rows of unguarded garages, with demand for very few of them 
because of their vulnerability, providing ready rubbish 
dumps, refuges for tramps and other social outcasts, cover 
for glue-sniffing, drug abuse, and more innocent teenage 
pranks. 14 On older estates in-the survey, abandoned garages 
have been demolished by the council, having been half 
destroyed by vandals, even though there was some demand for 
them, simply because they could not be protected. Even 
worse were the communal underground garages that formed 
dungeon-like cellars under vast blocks on four estates in 
1 
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the survey. At Stockwell Park there were about 1,000 
virtually unused, dark underground garages. Oi. one estate, 
because of bitter experience elsewhere, the underground 
garages were blocked up and made unusable before the estate 
was ever let. Multi-storey car parks, separate from the 
blocks, were actually scheduled for demolition in one case. 
The question of unusable garages exposes the planning madness 
that dictated expensive and useless provision of garages 
without ever considering how they would be guarded or how their 
proper use could be ensured. 
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 
Seven of the 13 flatted estates and part of one cottage 
estate were industrially built with concrete slabs. All 
of the modern estates and all the tower blocks were 
industrially built. As a design method, it was not only 
ugly and unpopular with residents; it carried with it the 
liability of size, since it was not worth using the machinery 
and the large-scale building operation involved unless it 
came in a big contract. But its main drawback turned out 
to be - its failure to weatherproof, the most basic requirement 
of a dwelling. In some cases, flat roofs, external rooms 
and exposed decks actually leaked, flooding rainwater into 
dwellings. More commonly, the concrete slab components of 
the blocks and houses formed cold bridges into the dwellings 
causing intense damp, condensation and mould formation. 
This was common to all the industrially-built estates. The 
irony was that the condensation was blamed on the tenants' 
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lifestyle. Tenants were told that cooking, washing, 
running hot baths, drying clothes, in their homes were 
the cause of damp problems. Of course, domestic 
activities generated moisture but they were not the cause 
of - damp problems-. - -The building failure was not faced up 
161 _except_- in the{ most extreme cases. 
'The-problems of-cold bridges were intensified on several of the 
estates-by-projecting, overhanging bedrooms, sometimes 
exposed to the wind and weather on five out of six sides of 
the room. Only architectural folly and massive'spare cash 
could-have. induced local authorities and construction firms 
to hang a bedroom out of the building it was supposed to be 
part of. On one estate, the problem of cold and damp due 
to outhanging bedrooms was so severe that the projecting 
bedrooms were simply bricked up. It was becoming common to 
instal ventilators along the top and sides of new windows 
in an attempt to prevent condensation. So sealed windows to 
keep out draughts were ventilated through draught-creators 
to combat damp. 
The lack of insulation was made worse on all the modern 
estates by the exposed nature of all the sites and by the 
creation of wind tunnels and the even greater cooling effect 
that resulted. It is not by chance that the estates were 
located on exposed sites. Their scale and their late 
arrival on the housing scene determined that on the whole 
only the most unfavoured sites were. still available. 
Several estates, including two in Sheffield and one in the 
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! Rhondda, not in the survey, were so exposed and windy. -that 
elderly people found-3, t hard to walk upright through the 
estate in bad weather. The design of the estates actually. 
enhanced the . 
force and the : impact of the wind, -. particularly_ 
on the deck access. estates in Sheffield where able-bodied 
adults sometimes. had -difficulty 
-rounding , 
corners -on : the : 
exposed decks. 
Various attempts had been made at rectifying the design 
disaster of cold_and-_damp and exposure, __from sticking.: 
polystyrene tiles on. -inside-walls, _to 
re-lining -, decks. and 
in one case,,. glassing: in: parts-of the overhead walkways. _ 
The solutions were almost as costly and as risky as the 
_ 
original industrial-. building system. The only real. -_ 
solution to have emerged' appeared to be to build a "skin" 
round the dwelling to provide. normal protection-from the 
elements., On. the concrete comple. x_estates, enclosing all- 
exposed decks with glass and brick appeared to be. the: best 
hope, along with_internal, insulation. With industrially- 
built houses, -it seemed the ultimate irony to propose. 
building a completely new outer skin to an uninsulated, 
damp, cold, "modern" house. It was being seriously . 
considered on one estate not in the survey. 
TOWER BLOCKS 
Five of the industrially built estates included some tower 
blocks, two on walk-up estates and three-on modern estates. 
All the tower blocks were industrially built. However, 
they were on the whole less problematic than the lower blocks 
. 
334 
with balconies, corridors and decks. An enclosed building 
with only one or two entrances and generally only four 
flats accessible on each floor posed fewer problems than 
the open - bälcony-style -6r the interlinking, . open. walkway 
and corridor-style -b-locks. , -The tower blocks- rarely had -- 
flats with- more- than trio- bedrooms, whereas -th-e vast. majority 
of other-council dwellings- comprised family accommodation. 
with three bedrooms- or more. As a result, -child densities 
irr tower blocks were usually lower than other-parts-of the 
estates, - although-three London authorities'-with tsevere - -- 
lettings difficulties had rehoused many homeless, one-parent 
fsmilies in -tower blocks in the survey estates and had = 
severe problems as a consequence. Tower blocks were far 
from problem-free but they posed less of a threat than their 
reputation would have suggested. 
ABANDONED; --UNUSED-AREAS == -'= - 
There were areas on the flatted estates that were dark and 
unfrequented, such as the huge underground garage areas, 
communal rubbish rooms, multi-storey car parks, abandoned 
shop-premises. Bulky rubbish. -that would not 
fit in normal 
containers or chutes provided, often including old fridges, 
abandoned beds and settees and burnt-out vehicles, as well as 
illegally parked vehicles, would all be deposited on open 
spaces. 
All these half-hidden, unguarded and often totally unseen 
areas invited theft, dismantling and rebuilding of cars, 
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recycling of-council, heating radiators, light fittings, 
and more random scrap. More menacingly, they also 
sometimes harboured drug-abuse-and glue-sniffing. A_large 
deck access-estate_in Greater-Manchester was the-, subject=of 
a recent- T. V. documentary about- heroin: addiction= {July.... 
a98 ),. Filming=took-placesecretly from a flat-. rented 
from_. the-councilby.. the: police, and drug-trafficking and 
youth drug abuse were recorded on camera. 
Sometimes-the derelict areas were totally deserted: and - 
invited nothing-other-than the-fear that abandoned, dark 
and unclaimed-territory-Gan inspire. But the occasional 
violent crime or mysterious disaster generated a general 
sense-of-horror towards the abandoned areas. On Tulse - 
Hill, a large area of abandoned allotments along the edge 
of the estate-was. widely: hated and feared by residents. and 
staff_because -a ; deaf baby, had been found hidden. in the. 
undergrowth 
_in _the - 
late seventies. The identity-of-the 
baby_was never discovered.,. 
-. 
The-very desolation and lack 
of-users, 
-legal or 
illegal, put. a jinx on these areas: 
DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT-BACK-UP 
The design of flatted estates actually required a resident 
caretaker/porter/janitor/concierge. Many communally built 
estates of houses and gardens required an estate warden or 
caretaker too. Without a resident caretaker, it was 
impossible to maintain in functioning order such areas. 
In some of the local authorities where the projects were 
*Ashfield Valley, Rochdale 
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located, resident caretakers were no'longer employed 
prior to the local management initiative, and in some 
they never had been. On some estates resident caretakers 
had been withdrawn after vicious attacks on them 
personally or vandal damage to their flats and attacks on 
15 their families. Isolated incidents, which changes in 
working practices could maybe have overcome, were allowed 
to generate a level of fear among staff that caused the 
collapse of a vital ingredient in the management of 
communal blocks of flats. On some estates like Tulse Hill 
in Brixton, only the most defeated of caretakers would agree 
to stay. Even then they would only work in pairs, and only 
three of the eight posts were filled. 
It is important to grasp the intrinsic connection between 
the communal areas of blocks of flats and the requirement 
that they be serviced daily by an employee of the landlord. 
It is as intrinsic a connection in the functioning of a 
flatted estate as the link between a bus and its driver if 
the bus is to move. 
COMMUNITY FACILITIES ON ESTATES 
Prior to a full-time management office, community facilities, 
wherever they existed, tended to be beset with major 
difficulties, and yet it has been a criticism of estate 
design, that in so many cases, large communities were 
rehoused into dwellings without the proper provision of 
community facilities. On the Honor Oak estate in Lewisham, 
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the lack of community halls or play areas in the dense 
blocks was blamed for the failure of the community. 
16 
On Tulse Hill, the opposite was true, with a number of 
community facilities being built in an attempt to restore* 
the estate, some of which generated intense and continuing 
problems, and none of which of themselves restored the 
popularity of the estate. 
Laundry facilities and drying rooms epitomised the 
contradiction between needed communal provision and communal 
abuse. Their provision was considered a must for many 
years on flatted estates. On the most modern estates, this 
practice had become uncommon because of abuse, bu. t on the 
pre-war estates and estates built up to the sixties, it was 
a standard practice, recommended by government reports. 
17 
Most laundries and drying rooms had been closed because of 
vandalism, theft and tenants' protests. On every balcony 
on Tulse Hill in 1979, there was an abandoned, smashed, 
glass-strewn, windowless, doorless drying room. In Merthyr, 
the council agreed to brick up drying areas at the end of 
corridors as a concession to tenants' desires to-improve 
their cramped but appallingly misused environment. Yet on 
modern estates without laundries such as Ashfield Valley, it 
was a major plank of tenant protest that there were no 
communal drying facilities. There simply was not room in 
the small flats. 
The result was quite typical of communal provision. If it 
was not there, it was often considered a major cause of 
estate problems. If it was there, it became a major focus 
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of estate destruction. 
It may be asked why large estates should not work like a 
-village, separated. as they are, and-large enough to 
. support, their own facilities in most cases., -, 
Indeed many, 
a modern planner conceived of estates in exactly that 
light, encompassing schools, launderettes and hairdressers, 
. shops, community centre and even a pub and a church. 
Of 
course, many estates had none of these things and that was 
a major source of complaint, making it very difficult for 
tenants to get together. Fourteen of the survey estates 
had few facilities; a few had some facilities that worked 
reasonably. However, it was common on the problem estates 
in the survey with reasonable facilities to find the shops 
boarded up and the community centre or play areas a source 
of friction and factionalism, if not violence; and most 
facilities were expensive, dirty and vulnerable to 
break-ins. 
Both shops and community centres often resembled fortresses. 
Desperately needed play areas were often ransacked and 
abandoned. Where well used, they were often too near 
dwellings for comfort and a constant source of nuisance 
" between youngsters and elderly people with a need for quiet. 
On one estate, there was 
the edge of dense, ugly, 
authority could not rest 
because of the volume of 
residents. But neither 
remove it because of the 
a totally derelict play area on 
deck-access blocks. The local 
)re"it, badly needed as it was, 
complaints it had generated from 
could it summon the courage to 
rampant youthful vandalism that it 
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believed would be grossly exacerbated by such an act. 
The one obvious point was that communal facilities and 
communal areas did not-run themselves. Unfortunately,. 
because of the design of estates, and the social alienation, 
they needed . 
to be run and guarded by the landlord .r by the 
community association acting on the landlord! s. behalf. 
This happened. -on only--one of the estates in the survey--- 
prior to local management. 
MISUSE OF ESTATES BY YOUTH CONGREGATION 
Communal facilities and communal areas posed special 
problems in relation to youth. It was maybe logical to 
provide public space that-households were deprived of within 
their own domain. However, in practice these areas 
attracted vandal damage and youthful congregation. Youth 
always found out the unguarded corner to hang around.. A 
bench, a lamp-post, a fire-gate or an entrance way, a bridge 
or-a shop-front, -all-on different estates, provided a 
physical focus for the social instincts of youth. It was 
t 
then only amatter of time before the bench was dismantled, 
the gate off its hinge, the entrance chipped with gang names 
or sprayed with verbal abuse, or the light fitting torn out. 
The energy of youth attacked the unguarded areas with 
surprising venom. In winter, on modern estates with 
communal heating systems, boys would collect around the 
heating vents from the main boiler because of the heat they 
provided. These youthful collecting points not only 
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generated physical damage to the particular area of 
congregation. They also generated genuine-fear among 
smaller children and older people. The fear was born 
of isolated incidents of unusual horror, which somehow 
spread a threatening. reputation to any so-called gang of 
young people, who in most cases caused little damage, but 
simply identified themselves through their numbers and 
noise and physical dominance as a target of fear. 
The most horrifying example of-youthful abuseýof unguarded 
communal facilities was on-a large, old balcony estate in 
central London. There a group of about 10 youths hid 
themselves in the toilets of the community centre till the 
30 or so old-age-pensioners of the estate had come in for 
their lunch club. They then locked the exit doors, 
guarded them, and held all the old people up with knives. 
while two of the youth took all their purses. The youth 
escaped with their paltry haul, leaving a terrorised group 
of elderly residents, a defeated staff, and a paralysed 
community centre. A more trivial and more common example 
was on a northern estate where benches, newly installed on 
the steep hills to help elderly residents on their way home 
from shopping, were used nightly by gangs of youths as a 
collecting point. Older residents, after several hysterical 
meetings, got the new benches removed. In fact on, many 
estates, benches were removed as part of tenant-led 
"improvements", to prevent youth from congregating, and it 
was the strangest proof of an estate's disintegration that 
social facilities needed by everyone had to be withdrawn to 
pacify irate tenants and contain the explosive energy of 
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youth. 
It is the style of the first violent incident, coupled with-: 
the universality of the second, added to the landlord's 
unwillingness or inability either to guard or re-define 
common areas, that has led to the shrill polarisation 
between the "uncontrollable" youth on the. one hand, -and the 
angry, alienated adult residents on the other. The design 
-of the estates merely provided many vulnerable targets for 
the youth gangs that have always existed in poor areas. '' 
The remote council- landlord highlighted the general inability 
to hold behaviour within bounds. 
One of the noticeable areas of failure on the survey estates 
was the lack of more imaginative provision for youth. 
Local schools were often opened as youth centres in the 
evenings. Club halls were also often made over to estate 
youth clubs. Adventure playgrounds existed on several 
estates, though only one was well-run with leaders who 
could control the older youth. The leaders were residents 
and recently "ex-youth" themselves. 
Yet on every estate threatening gangs appeared and 
reappeared. They were often much tamer than their 
appearance or reputation. But in a crowd they were 
certainly capable of menacing, if not actually harming 
others. It was rare to hear of attempts to reach these 
gangs, and police were frequently called in by residents to 
disperse them. Confrontation always seemed part of the 
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sport, but an estate could rarely take the strain. 
Unemployment was inevitably exacerbating the youth problem. 
There literally was no outlet for the most energetic and 
creative spate of life. 
CONCLUSION 
The design of the 20 estates in every case posed problems of 
communal maintenance and social control. The 13 flatted 
estates had many additional features that invited abuse and 
fear. 
The problems of youthful congregation and vandalism 
highlighted the vulnerability of estate infrastructure and 
the lack of supervision at any level. 
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CHAPTER IX - THE MANAGEMENT-OF PROBLEM ESTATES. -EMPTY PROPERTY 
AND LETTINGS PROBLEMS 
THE PROBLEM SEEPS INTO THE COMMUNITY - 
There are a number of important management issues that 
follow on from the design of the estates, their inherent 
unpopularity and seeming unmanageability. Lettings 
problems and empty dwellings were the most basic indicator 
of unpopularity. The maintenance of communal areas was 
another. The support for and survival of communal 
facilities was another. The levell.: of neglect, damage and 
even total destruction to these areas spoke volumes about 
the scale of the management tasks of the public landlord. 
All the examples in this chapter are drawn from the 20 estates 
in the P. E. P. survey, 
3 
LETTINGS CONTROL 
.a Although'lettings are one of the key elements in housing 
management, the allocation of council housing has always 
been such a politically sensitive activity that extremely 
tight control of it has been retained at the centre. In 
fact, in many, local authorities, elected members still 
intervene personally in-favour of individual constituents 
and also create a great deal of pressure against such 
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changes as relaxing the residence requirements for access 
to council housing or a wider range of offers to homeless 
families, or monitoring lettings to racial minorities in 
an attempt'to identify discrimination. 
In several-local authorities in-'the survey, only one 
housing officer or one tightly organised and secretive 
section of the housing department, actually called a 
Y'lettings cell"-in-one-local authority, knew the-workings 
of the whole lettings system, in order to "ensure fairness" 
and to prevent housing managers, supposedly vulnerable to 
pushy tenants or hard-luck stories, from being able to 
influence decisions. 
This close and centralised approach to lettings created 
enormous delays in the system. On every estate in the 
survey it was difficult to get a dwelling signed up'--with a 
given tenant, even if it had been empty for some time. On 
no estate before local management was there a swift, 
locally-run re-let system, the only known approach that 
would keep empty property down and curb vandalism. Even 
the G. L. C's so-called "instant lettings" took up--to-three - -- 
months to clear the queue of applicants each time it formed 
in response to advertisements. 
Thus, for primarily political reasons, one of the key 
ingredients of day-to-day housing management had been kept 
out of the hands of local housing managers. Before estate- 
based offices opened, none of the estate officers in our 
20 estates did more than handle some of the mechanics of the 
lettings procedure, such as showing applicants a property or 
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signing them up as tenants after an offer had been 
' accepted. In no case, before local management offices 
were established, did they have any responsibility for 
finding suitable and willing. tenants, ensuring that. th. ere 
was a waiting list to fill any-dwelling the moment it came 
empty, or controlling-transfers. This separation-of-the 
lettings function from the rest of housing management made 
housing management itself a "toothless animal". _ 
It made estate managers feel that they were not in control 
of the property they were supposed to manage and took away 
their sense of responsibility for how the property was 
governed. ' Because they had no say in lettings, "it became 
much easier for housing officers to blame the tenants for 
the estate not working well, especially in the case of 
social problems. Government of the estate was clearly 
and firmly out of their hands and in the hands of the 
central bureaucracy and political machine, often anxious 
to be fair but unable to deliver. 
LETTINGS PROBLEMS AND EMPTY PROPERTY 
t 
It is hard to establish to what extent the 20 estates became 
hard to-let through the way they were designed and run, and 
to what extent it was the result of lettings policies as 
such. Very few local authorities were prepared to admit 
that they had a "dumping" policy. But in practice, they 
all used their problem estates to rehouse the most 
economically and socially vulnerable households. 
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We did not get exact figures for all the 20 estates and we 
relied heavily on the evidence of council staff for our 
overall conclusions, but it was clear that 15 of the 20 
were hard to let within the normal council allocations 
system. ' As a-direct-result, these estates-housed -- 
disproportionate numbers of one-parent and homeless families, 
unemployed people, households headed by a member of an 
ethnic minority, and disproportionate numbers of children. 
Further evidence of lettings problems and unpopularity lay 
in the high turnover of tenants on the estates and the high 
incidence of rent arrears (see below). 
The following table shows the incidence of lettings problems 
on the 20 estates. 
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LETTINGS'PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ESTATE-BASED 
MANAGEMENT 
Number of estates out of 20 
Higher than local authority 
average of one-parent families xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 16 
Higher than local authority 
average tenancy turnover XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 16 
Higher than local authority 
average of unemployed and XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 16 
tenants on welfare benefits 
Higher than local' authority 
average child density XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 15 
Hard to let XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 15 
Higher than local authority 
average of lettings to homeless XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 14 
Ethnic minorities 
disproportionately allocated to XXXXXXXXX 9 
unpopular estates 
Continuing stigma of first 
allocations from slum clearance XXXXX 5 
area 
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ONE-PARENT FAMILIES 
The numbers of one-parent families were known for 11 of 
the 20 estates. On average, 17% of households were 
one-parent families, compared with 1% nationally. On some 
estates, one half-of all-the families with children had 
only one parent. Residents themselves were=conscious of 
the social stress. this_caused, often mentioning the numbers 
of one-parent-families as-proof'of how unstable the =- 
community was and how much of a dumping ground for social 
problems it had become. 
They were less likely to have economic choice, and were more 
prone to allied problems such as homelessness. They were 
also-more vulnerable to sickness and family crisis. One- 
parent families were far more likely to be in financial 
difficulties, especially over rent payments, than 2-parent 
households. Therefore, the tenants' common diagnosis of 
their community as a "dump" and "full of riff-raff" had its 
own crude grounding in reality. 
The disproportionate numbers of one-parent families on 
estates where people on the whole did not want to live, was 
as much a reflection of their own housing need and lack of 
choice, as the relative ease with which the council could 
fit them into estates with a high turnover. It could be 
argued that existing tenants pressing for transfers off the 
unpopular estates should not be given that right, thereby 
ensuring a supply of empty dwellings for more desperate 
households on the better estates. In many ways this would 
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make sense as it would bottle up the more ambitious 
tenants on the estates that needed drastic improvements 
and a lot of drive to bring them about; it would help prevent 
ghettoisation and it would ensure a better chance for' 
poorer-households. In practice, however, though all-the 
local authorities we visited-paid lip service to-helping 
the needy and opposed grading of tenants and "dumping", 
they took the line of-least resistance, adopted progressive 
transfer policies for "good'-! 'tenants, i. e. tenants-with no 
arrears and tenants whose house was in a good state of 
redecoration for re-letting, and let the vacated dwellings 
on the 20 survey estates to the most vulnerable families, 
who had very little resilience or choice. The Cowgate 
estate, Newcastle, which was in the survey, traced its 
latest decline to the period in the mid-seventies when' 
transfers became much easier and many of the established 
tenants left for a "better" area, while the vacated 
unmodernised dwellings could not attract more ambitious 
and choosy. tenants. 
One indicator of the extent of upwardly mobile transfers 
was that the turnover of tenants on 16 of the 20 estates 
was higher than the local authority average. It would not 
have been possible in almost all cases to transfer to a 
worse estate within the local authority since these were 
the very bottom of the pile. Therefore it must be assumed 
that the vast majority of transfers were to better 
estates. 
CHILD DENSITY 
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Fifteen of the estates had higher than the local authority 
average of child densities. The major cause of this was 
the predominance of 3-bedroom dwellings on most estates. 
** 
Although exact figures were only available for nine estates, 
on these 33% of the population was found to be under 16. 
This was 50% higher than the national average. Large 
families have often been concentrated on the poorer estates. 
Therefore the high child densities were to be expected. 
But not all moves off estates were transfers - 
e. g. Tulse Hill: March 1980 - February 1981 
Tenants leaving estate 
Transfers off estate 41 (41%) 
No forwarding address 36 (36%)*** 
Deaths 10 (10%) 
Evicted 9 (9%) 
Flats abandoned 3 (3%) 
Other 2 (2%) 
101 
e. g. Wenlock Barn: Voids May 1984 
Reasons for void 
Transfers 25 (76%) 
Deaths 6 (18%) 
Abandoned 2 (6%) 
Found own accommodation 1 (3°%) 
37 
** Under 16's 
Springwell 
Braunstone N. 
Cowgate 
Ragwater 
Chalkhill 
Broadwater Farm 
Stockwell Park 
Tulse Hill 
Edward Wood 
Average 
Mainly 1981 Census 
31% 
38% 
31 °4 
45°k 
27% 
34% 
23% 
30°% 
3 3% 
***Many of these were likely to be transfers. 
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Although it_has. been. demonstrated that a high density of 
children causes problems such as noise and vandalism, this 
should not of itself cause an estate's unpopularity since 
many suburban owner-occupied estates--must have: similar. - 
child ratios. -It-is a function of the lack-of-social 
controls and the large-amounts of unfilled time through 
truancy and unemployment among-youth, coupled with 
unsuitable--design, high-density building and. the_intense . 
communality -but -poor , community spirit of. most estates .: 
_ 
that children cause so much trouble. 2 - 
Children inevitably created noise, instinctively congregated 
in groups and had an irrepressible exuberance that displayed 
itself in daring and damage, depending on how much they 
could get away with. The behaviour of children was not 
only determined in large measure by what adults allowed them 
to do. It was also very much a function of estate living 
as such, for both adults and children. The estate, as a 
separated but unintegrated community, as a vast uncontrolled 
but boring no-man's-land, the-estate as an environment 
hostile to family living and to children's love of the. outdoors 
and thirst for adventure, caused the loss of confidence by 
adults in their own community of children. Children became 
both the cause and the victims. Nothing could represent 
more vividly the failure of public housing than the 
overwhelming verdict by housing officers and government 
experts3 that children are an actual measure in themselves 
of unpopularity. One wonders whether it isn't also a 
symptom of our ageing society, the foundering nature of our 
economy and the loss of a sense of the future that makes us 
J1 
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connect children so glibly to a more general social malaise, 
and blame them directly for problems on unpopular estates. 
4 
Ironically, on the . most. unpopular estates-in areas of-very 
low demand, such as Merseyside and Greater. Manchester, very 
few families were moving. onto the problem estates in the 
survey, and existing families were as far as possible being 
moved off the flatted estates in these areas. They were 
. largely replaced-by young single people and the absence of 
family life was felt to generate even more instability and 
transience. This would indicate that the root problem was 
not the children of the young, single people but the overall 
management structure, which was totally' inadequate to cope 
with the problems of running a large, poorly designed estate. 
HOMELESSNESS 
Fourteen of the estates-housed disproportionate numbers of 
homeless families. On several estates, especially in 
London, the bulk of all lettings, up to 90% in one case, 
were to previously homeless families. Homeless families 
were not only disproportionately made up of one-parent 
families. They were very often black. In the cases of 
Lambeth, Haringey, Brent and Wandsworth, the majority of 
homeless families rehoused on the estates in the survey 
were black. There is substantial evidence that this was 
because of racial discrimination rather than because of 
homelessness, and has actually been demonstrated for some of 
the estates in our survey by Lambeth, Islington and Greater 
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London Councils. Almost' certainly, it would also be. true 
of Brent and Haringey. 
4 
The exact overlap between race, 
homelessness, and lone parenthood was not known for the 
survey estates but there was a funnel effect as the three 
categories of housing. disadvantage overlapped and were. 
sifted, to the bottom of the lettings pile. 
The poorest estates, such as we visited, became a lettings 
net to catch-those rejected by-the system for better offers. 
Various attempts were made in authorities as-far apart as 
Gateshead, Rochdale and London, to reduce lettings to 
homeless families on the estates in the survey. The effect 
of these efforts is examined in the next chapter. But the 
point of critical importance is that the homelessness funnel 
could be stopped or at least modified because it was partly 
a product of the filter system of lettings operations. - 
By. establishing strict criteria of need, of which 
homelessness is the most acute and the most irrefutable, and 
by running a dual system where good estates are for-those in 
less acute need who can wait., or those who "deserve"-better 
as-a result of their tenancy record, and where bad estates 
are difficult to let and can therefore be used readily for 
those whose need forces them to accept whatever's offered, 
certain estates become earmarked as suitable for the poor 
and the homeless. As a result, families who are desperate 
and can find no other way into the council market, inevitably 
uncover ways of becoming homeless, now the only sure avenue 
to rehousing. This does not mean that homeless families 
are liars and frauds, as is sometimmes suggested. It 
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means that they are prepared to go through the fight and 
pain and stigma of homelessness because they cannot hold 
their family home together without abdicating self- .. 
reliance and declaring themselves homeless. They cannot 
find their own home through normal channels and are forced 
into declared homelessness. by severely restrictive 
allocation policies. 
Homelessness on the -priority estates was a 
kind of slavery, 
a way of breaking a family's will to independence. _ 
One of 
the major effects was a kind of truculent resentment of the 
local authority, "the master", and angry resignation to the 
stigma and the dependence that went with it. It*was quite 
impossible to detect in many of the supposedly desperate 
homeless families being rehoused by the G. L. C. on their 
worst estates any sense of-gratitude or relief. In fact, 
this was one of the biggest factors in demoralising and 
even angering estate staff. Not only did homeless families 
resent their landlord, but in almost every case, the 
landlord's representatives on the ground, the estate officers 
or housing managers, often resented homeless families for- 
either grudgingly accepting or refusing offers on their 
estate. Newly recruited local management staff were more 
likely to accept a family '. s right to pick and choose. But 
certainly in London, where homelessness was a dominant avenue 
for lettings, it was considered the main problem and was 
constantly thrown up by housing officials and local politicians 
as a major reason for the failure to keep up standards of 
management on problematic estates. As an explanation it was 
patently absurd. Ironically, the stigma that was attached 
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to homelessness was the. very reason that councils at various 
times were unable to treat homeless applicants like any - 
others, but restricted offers to them either specifically to 
unpopular estates or-to "one offer only" or both. 
Councillors-and . housing officers alike were reluctant 
to 
tar all their estates. with the brush of homelessness: - The 
excuse was. that only-the unpopular estates had-vacancies. 
In. Lambeth,. -certain. -estates, such as 
the two-in our survey, 
were designated hard. to let and were reserved-at certain 
crisis periods for the homeless families on the grounds that 
their needs were so great that they must be given priority 
over all other lettings. At various times they were allowed 
one offer only. In other words, lettings policies ensured 
that homelessness became the hallmark of problem estates. 
Dumping was barely disguised. 
The fact that homeless families were often relegated to the 
worst council properties created the impression that 
homelessness in itself was some kind of social offence. 
Such a suggestion would be nonsensical. It was simply a 
rationing system to force the poor and the vulnerable into 
the dwellings no one else would *choose to live in. -The 
large estates were built with a dream of mass housing but 
they became minority housing. They would work for the rich 
but they rehoused almost exclusively the poor. They were 
meant to end slums, but they became in less than a generation 
tighter and more closed social ghettos than ever the 
back-to-backs were. 
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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
Ghetto is a dangerously loaded word. None of the estates 
in the survey were total ghettos, though most of them" - 
housed almost- entirely'households from the lowest-income 
backgrounds ör increasingly unsupported, dependent 
households. This was much more true out of London than in 
London however. Racially'none of the estates were true 
ghettos such as exist"in'the"United States Public Housing 
projects. 
5, However-, in the nine estates of the survey 
located in areas with a high concentration of ethnic 
minorities, the estates housed even more disproportionate 
numbers of minority households. On the seven estates for 
which there were specific figures, the average number of 
households headed by a member of an ethnic minority was over. 
10°x. Yet the average for surrounding areas was 27%. 
Therefore the gap between a representative concentration and' 
the actual proportions was considerable. On some estates 
4 
half or more of the population belonged to racial minorities. 
It was never the case that an estate was popular among 
non-white tenants while being unpopular with white tenants. 
Therefore this rehousing bias did not represent the housing 
choice of ethnic minorities, but a further mark of its 
unpopularity and decline. ' In fact, very often minority 
households exercised no housing choice at all since they were 
coming across the rehousing system for the first time, were 
often in very great need and more vulnerable outsiders to the 
council housing market. 
This may no longer be truexf the Asian-dominated estates of Spitalfields. 
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The incidence of homelessness and single parenthood was 
higher among non-white families seeking access to council 
accommodation than among white families, 
6 
and access to 
the least popular estates was most often linked with these 
factors. For example, on the Henry Prince Estate in 
Wandsworth, before 1982, about 90% of lettings were to 
homeless families, of whom 60% were black. However, the 
relationship between homelessness and race did not account 
for all of the concentration of ethnic minorities on 
unpopular estates that occurs.? What seemed to happen was 
that through homelessness, non-white families'would get the 
most disfavoured and restricted offers. Within that 
narrow range, they would be concentrated on the very worst 
estates or the estates where there were already many 
non-white families. 
The concentration of minority households was often taken as 
a further proof of stigma, referred to frequently by estate 
staff as both a cause and a clear sign of the estate's 
decline. However, it must be said that among residents, 
racial issues were rarely raised as evidence of decline. 
It is therefore possible that housing staff were more 
prejudiced than residents. Given the ambitions of housing 
staff to work on better estates and often to graduate away 
from estate-level work altogether, this would be quite 
plausible. 
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UNEMPLOYMENT 
Specific unemployment rates were known for 10 of the 20 
estates. - The average number of males over _16; o, f. working 
age seeking employment but unemployed on these estates 
was 57%. Estates in Merseyside, Greater Manchester, and 
Tyneside were found where over 70% of households had no 
breadwinner. Even on the- London estates, where-rates-, were 
much 
- 
lower, 
. unemployment was- a. rapidly growing problem, 
especially among the - young-, -_ and was more than. double the 
national - s. __.. _ý-" _, ý _ -ý",, fý ":: 
r"-,: 
average. 
-For,, te;; ample, ' on Tulse Hill, Brixton, it was 140% of all 
working adults. 
These unemployment, figures showed a most serious trend. 
It is hard to define exactly at what point, a community 
becomes economically and socially unviable. But our 
impression was that if more than half the population was 
not economically self-supporting, the consequent poverty 
and. marginality of that community made it unviable. The 
consequences of that state of affairs have been experienced 
in the United States in communal violence, rioting and 
looting, a pale shadow of which was seen in this country 
in 1981. Many of the riots in the United States began in 
public housing estate ghettos. 
8 The youth problems which 
were commonplace on estates, coupled with the unemployment 
levels here described, made a Molotov cocktail which local 
authorities were seriously alarmed by. 
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Lettings policies at the centre, as exercised in relation t'o"--" 
the 20 estates we examined, produced socially isolated 
communities at the bottom of-the public housing ladder. 
It would probably be more accurate to suggest that the 
social disadvantage of the worst estates were a result of 
lettings policies towards more popular estates where a 
system of queuing and-selection worked to the advantage. of 
better-off tenants. The complete lack of lettings 
policies other than "dumping" on the least favoured estates 
was primarily the result of selecting on merit for the more 
favoured estates. 
EMPTY PROPERTY 
The corollary of lettings problems was empty property. 
The number of empty properties on the estates was the 
clearest and crudest indicator both of the unpopularity of 
the estates and the cumbersome lettings policies. Only 
three of the 20 estates had a comparable tenancy turnover 
and number of empty dwellings with the rest of the local 
authority stock. But even these three estates had 
lettings problems in that they were unpopular with higher 
priority applicants and were difficult to let except to 
the most desperate households. A high turnover of tenants 
was common to 17 of the estates and not only undermined the 
social fabric; it also left behind the larger, poorer 
families, since they were the ones most likely to fall into 
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arrears, 
9 
a direct barrier to eligibility for transfers in 
most cases. 
1° On the majority of priority estates, the 
high tenancy turnover and high arrears went hand in glove 
by virtue of the lettings and transfer policies favouring. 
the better estates and the better-off tenants. 
We knew the number of empty dwellings at the outset of the-- 
special projects_on 18 of the 20 estates. There was a 
total of over 900 empty dwellings (5°% of total) with an 
average of 50 on each estate. However, there were wide 
fluctuations between estates that seemed as much a 
reflection of lettings incompetence or management diligence 
as housing demand. Thus several London estates in-areas of 
serious homelessness had more than 100 empty dwellings. 
Conversely, several northern estates in areas of very low 
demand had relatively few empty dwellings. According to 
the 1981 Census, the voids level in inner London was double 
the rate for outer London or for England as a whole. Voids 
on the survey estates in London ranged from less than 1% to 
lu/o" 
The-following diagram shows the number of empty properties 
on the 20 estates before a local management office was 
established. 
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51.. VOID PROPERTIES ON 20 ESTATES = 
VOIDS - excluding voids in capital programmes 
Type of estate 
== = 
Project 
starting 
date 
Number of 
voids at 
start of 
project 
-Voids as % of total 
dwellings 
on estate 
Cottage - N. W. England 1979 7 1.5% 
Cottage - North of England Feb. 80 19 1.9% 
Cottage - Midlands Feb. 79 50 2.5°% 
Cottage - North of England 1979 41 4"1°ß 
Cottage - North of England July 81 21 5.3% 
Cottage - Midlands Jan. 82 100. 35.01A 
Cottage - N. W. England Jan. 81 9 2.9% 
Balcony - London Apr. -80 15 2.2°% 
Balcony - London 1978 c. 100 18.0% 
Balcony - London V Mar. 
80 68 7.7°% 
Balcony - London Unknown 
Mainly balcony - N. West Feb. 80 79 4.1% 
Balcony - London July 81 43 16.0% 
Modern - London 8 0.5% 
Modern - London Unknown 
Modern - London 1980 
Ave10ge 1.2% 
Modern - London Aug. 81 34, 3.2% 
Modern - London Aug. 79 62 6.2% 
Modern - London July 78 123 11.0° 
Modern - N. W. England Feb. 81 1140 13.81k 
Cottage 
Balcony 
Modern 
Average -- 
Average - 
Average - 
34 
61 
61 
Lettings sections were run quite separately from other parts 
of the housing service, such as repair and control of empty 
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property or rent collection, all of which were integrally 
connected with the function of lettings. Therefore 
lettings departments took responsibility only for selecting 
tenants. They did not take responsibility for any of its 
consequences. 
Empty dwellings spän a whole chain of problems that-fed into 
the main arteries-of estate life. 
LOSS OF RENT 
The first result was the direct loss of rent and rates 
income to the council. This was barely mentioned by the 19 
local authorities and was certainly not considered a major 
reason for setting up local management. The remote 
management structures and the global accounting systems put 
little stress on maximising income as a way of paying for 
management-and maintenance, on the strength of which dwellings 
would be kept occupied as a very high priority. 
It-took a long time for the link to be made between rent 
income and management and maintenance costs and the virtue 
of keeping dwellings let. - A strong incentive now lies in 
the substantial rent and rates income each occupied dwelling 
generates since the big rent rises of the last five years. 
We calculated that 10 occupied dwellings paid for the salary 
of one estate worker. 11 On that basis, on average each of 
the 20 estates could in theory have had five additional estate 
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workers if they were fully, occupied. Several. of the local 
authorities we visited, which had not established local 
management, claimed that they had no way of paying for 
local management and maintenance'. Income from. rent and 
rates was-often earmarked to repay debt charges and to 
provide general council services, such as housing advice, 
homelessness admissions, members' inquiries and complaints. 
The idea had ' not_ taken , 
root.. that 
. management - and 
-maintenance 
were directly linked-to: rent. incomes, albeit such a. high 
proportion of-rent. income now comes from housing benefit. 
Therefore the loss of income from empty properties took a 
long time to percolate the-local authority consciousness. 
Even then it was more-the vandalism they invited and the 
cost of continually re-repairing damaged empty property 
than loss of rent that forced remedial action upon the'local 
authorities. Tenants by contrast were often very upset by 
the obvious waste from empty property and would frequently 
say - 
"If they kept all our flats occupied, maybe they 
wouldn't put our rents up so high. " 
EMPTY DWELLINGS BREED MORE EMPTIES 
The second direct effect of empty properties was the poor 
advertisement it made for the estate. The very fact that 
there were problems keeping it fully let advertised those 
very problems to existing residents,, applicants and council 
workers, especially caretakers and estate officers. It 
became hard to recruit caretakers to the estates with empty 
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dwellings and applicants would be more likely to refuse an- 
offer on a balcony or street with several other boarded-up 
properties. 
On the Tulse Hill estate in Brixton, the estate-officers . and 
caretakers were beaten to despair by 19 out of 20 
applicants refusing to take up offers. Some of these were - 
referred as homeless families but such was the physical aspect 
of--the-estate, with rows of boarded-up windows and-glassless 
stairwells, that even desperate households could not bear to 
move in. On some estates the local authority had all but 
abandoned attempts at letting property. In Liverpool, there 
were a number of flats on estates that were simply not 
offered by lettings staff to applicants. -On the Goscote 
estate in Walsall, after modernisation in the seventies, 
nearly half the dwellings were still empty and such was the 
notoriety of the remaining community and the bleakness of 
the ransacked, abandoned dwellings that it was still 
unlettable when the special project began. 
12 
VANDALISM 
Private property is normally guarded. Not so public 
housing, on the strength of which the impression was widely 
created on the run-down estates that empty property was not 
wanted any more. Empty, unguarded property appeared to 
belong to no one. 
Closely linked to the fact that empty property was unguarded 
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and that there was a lot of it, was the extensive 
vandalism. Empty dwellings on-all but one of the estates 
in the survey were invariably heavily vandalised, usually 
within a few days of them becoming empty. Where the 
dwelling was modernised or was being modernised, everything 
of value would be stripped out. Most local authorities- 
were convinced that it was the work of experienced-thieves, 
although it was still commonly classed as vandalism.... In 
one case, it was suggested-that the building -contractor. 
actually being paid to. do-the repair work was also 
responsible for stealing the heating systems and other 
fittings. On only one estate was any kind of effective 
guarding instituted, and it was an ongoing battle on all 
the others to outwit the vandals. On one estate, 
impregnable steel shuttering at the windows inspired 
vandalising youth to climb on the roof, take the tiles off 
and force a way in. Only a human guard proved really. 
effective and in 18 out of 20 this was not contemplated 
because of the cost. Yet each vandalised property cost 
anything between £500 and £8,000 to restore. The cost of 
a full-time night-guard plus relief would be in the region 
of £12,000 a year, so any estate with about 20 empty 
dwellings a year would have spent less on a guard than on 
repair to vandal-damage. The estates in the survey with 
an average of 50 empty properties each, could have paid for 
approximately two property guards each. 
On the 20 estates, neighbours did not see fit to guard the 
empty property next door, in spite of their direct interest 
in seeing it occupied rather than destroyed. There were a 
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number of reasons for this. If the police were called, it 
was claimed they often took two hours to come. In some 
cases, it was held they never came. There was a genuine 
fear almost everywhere of reprisals, so a resident was"- -ý 
reluctant to stick his neck out over something-that wasn't 
his own, whether it was against thieves or youthful vandals. 
The process of alienation had bitten so deep that people often 
felt there was nothing-to be gained by trying anyway. It 
was a lost cause. - This-latter view was based -on long 
experience of nothing-working, and no familiarity with the 
landlord's presence or, commitment to his property. There 
was no sense of ownership or control on the part of landlord 
or tenant. 
The landlord in turn genuinely did not believe it was his 
responsibility to-guard his own property. '. Councils in 
every case blamed residents for failing to stop vandalism to' 
empty property that did not even belong to them. Councils, 
by some strange misinterpretation of the meaning of being a 
socially responsible landlord, assumed that the estate as a 
collective entity belonged to the collective residents who 
happened to live there, rather than to the council. Councils 
on the whole did not in this sense take seriously the 
ownership of property. 
The logic, induced by the anonymous and seemingly negligent 
council landlord, that - 
What's no one's and no one can see is mine" 
produced the thief who stripped out the dwelling. It then 
"366 
became anyone's illegal business to recycle whatever 
could be"stolen. On the Tulse Hill estate, G. L. C. 
officers-claimed that one empty flat had had a central 
heating system installed eight times over in an attempt 
to get it-occupied. . 'But each 
time the vandals/thieves 
got there first. On the Cowgate estate in Newcastle, it 
became cheaper to strip-out-all the fittings, - including 
the central heating system, when a "house became empty and 
reinstate -them -later when an occupant was ready to move 
in, because otherwise-about £2,000 was lost each time a 
house became vacant through'theft and vandalism. Similar 
experiences could be cited for most of the 20 estates. 
AIMLESS VANDALISM 
So much for the theft-oriented or purposeful vandalism. 
The aimless vandalism was different. Breaking things has 
always-given a curious satisfaction, like crunching a 
Coca-Cola can underfoot. And if someone tries to stop you, 
it becomes a challenge and an adventure. Either way, the 
target of vandalism is there for the taking because it 
doesn't belong to anyone directly and is not being used or 
protected by anyone. The council is not a body almost 
anyone, except the elected politicians themselves, identified 
with very closely. So vandalism on the whole is either 
purposeful and profitable, or it is purposeless and unstopped. 
A notion of its main cause is indicated by the fact that 
occupied property was very rarely vandalised on any of the 
estates. In fact, it was almost unheard of except for 
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broken windows. Even vandalism to occupied garages was' 
much less common than to unoccupied garages. Most of 
the vandalism to empty properties on the poor estates 
should therefore have been stoppable, if the above analysis 
is correct, by simply occupying or guarding all property, 
in whatever way necessary. The same logic should apply 
to open spaces and, all other communal or unoccupied areas, 
as well as to dwellings. Guarding is part of the process 
of ownership. Occupation and use have proved the most 
vandal-proof preventives. 
SQUATTING 
Squatting is the. fourth consequence of empty property. It 
has one element in common with vandalism - it is a cause and 
effect of lawlessness on the poorer estates. There is an 
almost irrefutable logic to the argument that needy people 
have a right to occupy empty property, that would otherwise 
be vandalised. Squatting took place at some point on 10 of 
the 20 estates, but only five estates, all in London, 
housed squatters on any scale. The fact that the problem 
was concentrated in London was mainly a result of the loss 
of private-rented accommodation and the demolition of most 
old, decayed areas where people on the edge of the law and 
the economy previously tucked themselves away. There was 
real housing need among some squatting groups, and this was 
cheek by jowl with empty council property, on a very large 
scale in some boroughs. The empty property represented 
lack of management rather than lack of need. The boroughs 
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that were tough with squatters tended, to keep their 
property occupied and avoid the problem. The "progressive" 
boroughs, like Lambeth, Camden and Islington, with serious 
management problems, tended to attract squatters into their 
many. empty council dwellings. Ironically these were often 
areas of great social need and a high incidence of 
homelessness. The inefficient lettings system with large 
numbers of'empty dwellings seemed to be coupled with. - 
widespread homelessness and. squatting. It was tempting to 
conclude that the archaic lettings system to some extent 
generated both. 
It was the experience of the Priority Estates Project and of 
residents and housing managers up and down the country that 
squatting often brought with it many forms of social abuse 
including drugs, noise, all-night parties, large numbers of 
extra occupants, disregard of neighbourhood conventions and 
so on. Conflict with bona fide tenants has been common in 
squatting groups in the inner London boroughs, and the 
complete lack of sympathy meted out to squatters by estate 
residents was not necessarily, as is often suggested by 
liberal outside observers, a. sign. of bigotry and intolerance 
on the part of more traditional residents. Rather it was a 
function of the extreme difficulties of estate-living, where 
one group, whose members were in any case prepared to run 
the gauntlet of the law and were not afraid of the police or 
the courts, did not accept that noise and other anti-social 
behaviour was the business of those directly affected by it. 
Associated as squatting has often become with an anarchistic 
and individualistic view of society, it is obvious, leaving 
369 
aside the more extreme forms of social abuse, that squatters 
will not accommodate easily to a densely built-up and often 
dissatisfied community where individual behaviour is. 
magnified and impact on others maximised. - -- -- 
TRANSIENT OCCUPIERS - 
It is also true that on some estates unused buildings 
encouraged unsettled, transient occupiers, the fall-outs 
from society's safety net. It seems fair that they should 
fit in where they could and it is perhaps inevitable that 
they would find a niche in the least desirable estates. 
. 
However, their presence threatened even further the many 
tentative balances within the community, particularly where 
the indigent passers-through were the young unemployed. 
Increasingly, travelling gypsies were moving in and out of 
the worst peripheral estates as camp sites were drying up 
around the Northern parts of the country and even, in one 
case, in inner London and. another in central Birmingham. 
Illegal gypsy occupants caused a staggering amount of grief 
and dismay on three estates we visited, partly because of 
the noise of numerous dogs and children, but mainly because 
of their trade in refuse, their lorries and caravans and 
their asphalting equipment (now part of many travellers' 
trade), parked on the open areas of the estate. At Tulse 
Hill a large group of gypsies squatted in a block for about 
four months and caused serious disruption during their stay 
r 
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on all the above grounds. 
Squatting seemed inevitable where empty property on a wide 
scale existed alongside housing need. It also appeared to 
be coupled with failure to generate or back up strong social 
controls aimed at harnessing behaviour to acceptable levels 
of noise and nuisance. Squatting was not the only source 
of social abuse, but it was on several estates a major 
element in a general environment of disarray. 
Empty property, therefore, led to loss of rent, vandalism, 
enhanced lettings problems and squatting. 
CONCLUSION 
The combined impact of centralised, segregating letting 
policies and large numbers of empty and vandalised dwellings 
was so depressing to residents and estate workers that it 
generated its own momentum and in some cases seemed 
irreversible. Before going on to examine successes, we 
will look at other areas of management and social failure. 
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CHAPTER X- REPAIRS, RENTS; CLEANSING AND CARETAKING 
REPAIRS CONTROL : 
Lettings officers were-hand-picked and trained to have as 
little sense of identity with individual-applicants as -: 
possible in order to detach them from the highly pressured 
and stressful situations of both the customers for council 
housing and the receiving communities. Estate workers 
therefore exercised very little control or influence over 
lettings. 
Repairs were more central to the estate officers' direct 
relations with tenants, but almost always even further 
removed from his influence or jurisdiction. ' 
The feeling of helplessness, generated in the first 
instance by lack of any control over or say in lettings, 
was enhanced by the lack of any responsibility for'or 
control over repairs. In all cases bar one in the survey, 
repairs were handled by a separate department. Therefore 
even the chief housing officer was unable to exact the 
necessary repairs service since its delivery was not under 
his control. In recent times, some directors of housing 
have been placed theoretically in charge of the director of 
technical services, while both departments retained their 
,k 
ti 
Ik 
separate identity. 
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Without direct control over or responsibility for day-to-day 
repairs, an estate manager cannot satisfy tenants' needs, 
1 
since at least 60% of tenants' requests relate to repairs, 
and the proportion 'is usually higher-. 
2 The more remote 
and inefficient the repair's service, the higher that 
proportion is^likely to be. In'addition, the basic fabric 
of a house must be kept in good working order if it is not 
to become a slum. "" Yet the repairs departments'are not- 
directly responsible in most local authorities for keeping 
houses in good order. ' The housing department is normally 
the landlord department, responsible for actually maintaining 
a good standard of 'repair to the housing stock. The repairs 
departments are expected to respond as best they can to 
housing officers' requests for work. The endless inter-departmental 
squabbles that arise from that relationship, 
the so-called "client role" - lost job tickets, incorrectly 
ordered. jobs, access problems, incomplete work, 'trade 
demarcations and other bureaucratic confusions - serve only 
to eat up resources and alienate tenants. In the end 
neither department carried the can for the repairs. 'In the 
local authorities we visited, complaints from senior officers 
in the repairs departments about the incompetence and 
inefficiency of housing management and the irresponsibility 
and destructiveness of tenants were endless. Similarly, 
housing officers' tales of badly done work, long delays, and 
lost job tickets were almost continuous. Estate officers 
barely figured in this charade - "Sorry, I can't help with 
repairs" or "I can only tell them for you" or "It's not my 
fault" or "There's nothing I can do" were the standard 
management responses to the most frequent tenants' complaints. 
A 
v 
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On all the estates in. the survey bar. one, prior to local 
management, the repairs service was inefficient, and in 
some cases, delinquent, with patently dishonest practices 
at work. Three of the-local authorities in the survey, 
during the life of the Priority Estates Project, have had 
senior officers in-the direct'. labour organisation 
-investigated by the C. I. D. or by the Chief Executive. In 
one case they were all arrested, and the entire repairs 
department was-without-senior management while new chief 
officers were recruited 
In Hackney,. the, manual unions calculated that only 33°4 of their 
time was spent on actual repairs; 
3 the rest went on travel, 
paper work, waiting for materials and so on. 
Men were often tied to*bonus systems that allowed almost no 
flexibility. In one direct labour organisation, job times 
were calculated down to tenths of a second. In most local 
authorities, job times, on which bonuses were based, encouraged 
shoddy work, made some jobs much more desirable than others. 
Maximum bonus for the week could sometimes be earned by 
Tuesday. In one case the*men earned a better bonus if 
they sat doing nothing than if they worked. In the latter 
case, they simply ensured that jobs were left undone through 
"no access". In another local authority where there were 
bonus penalties for no access, the records for genuine 
abortive job calls through no access were simply destroyed. 
All record of the job ever having been reported was thereby 
lost. 
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Trade demarcations also attempted to lay down to the last 
nail and splinter of wood, whose job was what, so a carpenter 
or plumber, if both were needed for a job, could both get 
their bonuses. 'Often one tradesman would finish his part - 
of the job and collect his bonus, but the rest of the job 
would be left undone, either because the - complicated-systems' 
of a job-being-complete for one trade but requiring- 
re-ordering for another broke down, or because the bonus 
for finishing off a job might not be good enough. The 
division of labour and economies of scale appeared totally- 
nonsensical under all the repairs systems we came across 
in the 20 projects. 
On flatted estates, men would fight over who got ground 
floor jobs; materials would be hurled over balconies 
instead of the more laborious method of carrying them down 
stairs. Where glass panes were being replaced, it was 
normal practice to hammer out the glass and leave'it lying 
on the tarmac or grass below. Many a grass-cutting machine 
was'damaged this way. Spare materials were left lying 
around, as this was easier than carrying them back to the 
van or the depot. When once materials had been issued, 
there was often no check on what was left over. When a 
tenant on a G. L. C. estate complained about a cast-iron 
drainpipe that had been left outside her door by the 
repairsmen for weeks, the foreman said - 
"That's very odd, it should have been pinched by 
now. We never take left-overs away. " 
Tenants' views of this type of service ranged'from scorn to 
, 
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anger. Estate officers, -unaware that it should be a 
normal part of their job to run a repairs service, simply 
accepted with cynicism or despair the hopelessness of 
trying to get things done better. 
In our survey, no repairs service worked to the satisfaction 
of housing managers prior to local management. 
We have in-the course of our work come across three housing 
departments that received an efficient repairs service. 
Only one of these was in the survey, however, ' possibly 
because carefully repaired estates had not reached the 
point of decline that was common to the 20 examples we 
visited. The poor repairs service was one of three 
dominant complaints from tenants we consulted on priority 
estates. It was the major cause of the physical decline 
of property, the ultimate test of a slum. 
What we had no way of judging was whether the repairs service, 
to better estates was better, but it is very probable"that 
this would be the case. There would be more political 
impetus, more pressure from the community, and a better 
housing stock to work with. Repairsmen also preferred to 
work on better estates, like everyone else. The 'only 
mmeasured indicator that we found came from Rochdale where 
one of the more recent priority estates, Back o' the Moss 
(not in the original survey), was shown to receive a much 
worse service than the rest of the estates in the area, -as 
the following diagram shows. 
55. 
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DIAGRAM SHOWING BACKLOG OF REPAIRS ON PEEL LANE (BACK O'"- 
THE MOSS) COMPARED WITH THE REST OF THE HEYWOOD AREA4 
% of-day-to-day repairs orders- 
still outstanding after 10 weeks 
Peel Lane Estate 480/, Xzj 
Rest of Heywood 26ý 
u 70 Source = Rockkode FýoL&' Dýýo, ýfýºen+-tý"70 
100% 
Because there was no'commitment within the local authorities 
either to base repairs locally or to integrate them. firmly 
with estate management, the estates in the survey ranged 
from dilapidated and decayed to positively dangerous. The 
long-term prognosis for many of the estates was as a 
consequence fatal, 'and in many people's minds, poor council 
housing was like poor quality furniture. It wore out 
quickly, wasn't worth repairing and should be junked rather 
than restored. In the case of modern post-war estates, it 
sometimes wasn't built to last more than two generations 
anyway and its time was already up. 
RENTS, ARREARS AND LEGAL SANCTIONS 
With little or no say in lettings and little or no control 
over repairs, local estate officers often seemed like the 
emperor with no clothes, parading authority but commanding 
very little. The one-area they were invariably held 
responsible for was rent collection and arrears which took 
R 9 
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up a major chunk of a housing officer's time, 5 although 
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there were numerous other partial tasks that accrued to 
the local housing officer, from checking empty property, 
to inspecting the dwelling of a tenant wanting a transfer. 
However, on most estates, the estate officer's control 
over actual rent collection was minimal since office, giro 
or bank collection had become the norm. Only three of 
. the local authorities in our survey still used 
door-to-door 
collection. All three projects were on cottage estates 
outside or on the edge of the big cities, and in two of the 
three, door-to-door collection was only carried out on the 
better and "safer" parts of the estate. These collections 
provided an umbilical link between the households and the 
landlord and served to pick up repairs orders and complaints, 
las well as endless other queries and problems. Arrears 
were lower on the three estates, but were still much higher 
than for the rest of the local authority stock-on two of 
the three estates. Only where door-to-door collection 
applied to all tenants did*it really work since bad payers. 
often opted out of the door-to-door system in favour of 
other methods,. given the choice. 
On the remaining 17 estates, tenants either paid at a rent 
office, a rent van or the district office, or they paid by 
giro. Giro is supposed to be the most arrears-prone 
system. 
City University counted up over 30 designated jobs for 
housing managers in one of the survey authorities. 6 
In Keith Kirby and Sue Duncan's comprehensive analysis of 
arrears patterns, they show that arrears are much higher 
among tenants who opt out of door-to-door collection than tenants who opt to go on paying that way. Some local 
authorities operating door-to-door collections give tenants 
that choice. 
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'56 METHODS OF RENT PAYMENT 
(Some estates had more than one method of 
rent payment, therefore total exceeds 20) 
Number of estates 
Rent collected door to door 3 
At estate office 
6 
Fortnightly rent van 1 
At district office or area rent office 12 
Giro 9 
In fact, arrears were approximately the same for giro-as 
for office collection in our survey, arrears being extremely 
high on all the estates. 
RENTS, ARREARS AND LEGAL SANCTIONS 
Rent arrears on the 20 problem estates were held to be much 
higher than the rest of the local authority with only one 
exception. On'13'of the 14 estates where arrears 
information was complete, the unpopular project estates 
had on average double the arrears of their local authority 
as a whole.? But arrears were escalating rapidly across 
the board, and. iný'total -the difference was one of degree. 
Arrears in the survey were heavily concentrated in London or 
Liverpool. There seemed to be a direct relationship 
between difficult-to-let estates and rent arrears. The 
focus of arrears problems in London and Liverpool coincided 
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with the earlier findings of the difficult-to-let 
statistics (Chapters 7 and 8) and almost certainly related 
directly to the nature of the stock, the proportion of 
flats, the social deprivation, the size of landlord, and the 
housing management structures. 
In addition to the greatly increased arrears that appeared 
to result from mechanised, centralised or less personal 
rent collection, the actual cost of operating the rent 
accounts under the mechanical system was high and, under 
the giro system, usually higher than the labour-intensive 
door-to-door system. 
8 Of course, added to the actual cost 
was the cost in greatly increased arrears. Staff jobs 
had been cut on the ground, but banking services, giro 
charges, computer systems within the local authority and 
the multiplication of paper procedures that went with. 'the 
increasing remoteness, had all added to costs while reducing 
efficiency. Directors wrung their hands at the faulty 
computer print-outs, or alternatively, the accurate print- 
outs showing accelerating arrears. Their'mechanical "brain" 
did not do the job for them. 
Our impressions of arrears procedures prior to the 
establishment of a local office tallied with the City 
University research9 showing that even after the abolition 
of door-to-door rent collection and the computerisation of 
rent accounting, over 50% of housing managers' and estate 
officers' time was spent on checking and chasing arrears 
(mainly checking). Because of the dramatic increases in 
arrears, inevitably this has been an expanding and 
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increasingly burdensome part of the estate officer's 
role. 
TABLE SHOWING RENT COLLECTION METHOD AND ARREARS 
Estate 
_ 
Method of rent collection 
Average 
gross- 
rent 
1982/83 
-- 
Average 
debt per 
household 
fdr all 
house- 
holds 
Cottage - N. W. door to door + rent office £14-50 
£14-49 
Cottage - North -. V giro £19 £63 
Cottage - Midland estate office+district Office 922 
E95 
Cottage - North rent office £22 £160 
Cottage - North . estate office + door to 
door £19 £76 
Cottage - N. W. district office £20 £81 
Cottage - Midland estate office + door to doo r £22 £170 
Walk-up - London giro + rent office £25 £98 
Walk-up - London 
fortnightly rent van 
+ district office 
£25 £54 
Walk-up - London giro £25 £186 
Walk-up - London estate office . £25 
£218 
Walk-up - N. W. giro + district office £30a £230 
Walk-up - London giro + district rent offices £21 NA 
Modern - London estate office+district offic £39a £50 
Modern - London giro £30 £128 
Modern - London giro £33a £18.8 
Modern - London giro + district rent office £39a £253 
Modern - London district office £26 £235 
Modern - N. W. estate office+district office £22 £114 
Modern - London district office + giro £4Oa 
I_£368 
aincludes district heating charge 
There was a very wide range in levels of arrears between the 
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highest and lowest local authorities. 
The next diagram shows the number of weeks in arrears owed :; ý 
on average: by each household according to different types 
and location of estates in the survey. Weeks in arrears 
ae the clearest measure because it takes account of 
differences in rent levels in different boroughs.. And 
. while averaging 
the total debt across the total number 
of households concealed the real levels of individual 
debts, ' and the numbers of households free-of debts, it 
seemed to give the clearest indication of the problem and 
the variations on an estate by estate basis. 
58. TABLE SHOWING PATTERN OF ARREARS 
Average arrears 
in weeks 
LOCATION 
Out of London 5 
ý. -- 
In i: London 7 
TYPE OF ESTATE 
Cottage . 
Flatted 6 
Door-to-door 4 
COLLECTION METHOD Office 6 
Giro 6 
Flatted estates, location in London, and impersonal rent 
collection were shown to be related to higher arrears than 
cottage estates outside London with door-to-door 
collection. 
About five times more tenants on an unpopular estate than 
on an average estate might be in serious arrears. For 
Rif; 
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example, on one of the survey estates throughout 1983, 
between 44% and 58% of all tenants owed over £90 each. 
The exhaustive Department of the Environment rent arrears 
survey10 found that management., as well as social factors, 
were closely related to arrears. - (See following diagram). 
59. THE PATTERN OF VERY HIGH ARREARS 
RECOVERY ACTIONS 
LATE AND INEFFECTIVE 
OTHER AGENCIES 
UNHELPFUL -- 
/ High arrears as'ý 
a percentage of 
rent collectable and 
many tenants in 
serious arrears 
HIGH LEVELS OF 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
DEPRIVATION 
IMPERSONAL RENT 
COLLECTION 
CONFLICTING `-ý RECORDS LATE 
MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES AND UNHELPFUL 
60. THE PATTERN OF LOW ARREARS 
LOW LEVELS OF 
RECOVERY ACTIONS 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE 
 DEPRIVATION 
OTHER AGENCIES 
HELPFUL 
/ Low arrears \ 
as a percentage 
of rent collectable 
and few tenants in 
kserious arrears A 
FEW OTHER 
MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS 
PERSONAL RENT 
COLLECTION 
RECORDS PROMPT 
AND HELPFUL 
The Department of the Environment Arrears Survey found that 
door-to-door collection overcame most of the hurdles to rent 
payment, including in many cases, poverty. This was partly 
because of the personal contact and the pressure and sense 
of responsibility it created. It was primarily because it 
gave shape and identity to the landlord and it placed the 
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initiative for achieving the goal of , rent payment 
firmly 
in the hands of the local officer. 
The following diagram11 illustrates clearly the 
relationship between. method of collection and serious 
arrears. Only 6% of serious arrears cases were part of 
the door-to-door system, while 42% of all tenants paid 
their rent that way. -- 
61. USUAL RENT PAYMENT METHOD 
1% 
1% 
11% 
2% 
2% 
Random sample of all tenants Tenants in serious arrears 
Method 
By Post Office Giro Rent paid direct. by DHSS 
By bankers order "'""" ', öý Other methods o oe - 
By cheque through the To a rent collector 
post 
By deduction from wages At a council office 
Over 80°% of tenants with door-to-door collection had no 
arrears at all, compared with just over 60% under the giro 
system: 
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62, PERCENTAGE OF TENANTS IN ARREARS FOR EACH MAJOR PAYMENT 
METHOD 
100 
e0 
60 
40 
20 
0 
D oor to d oor Onhce Post ottrce 
co llection collectio n Giro 
Tenants in high arrears 1(50+) 
Tenants in low arrears rup to 0501 
Tenants with no arrears 
By contrast 914% of tenants with serious arrears paid either 
at an office or through some purely impersonal method. 
The Audit Commission report on local authorities' rent 
arrears in 1984 drew similar conclusions from its very 
close look at the London Boroughs. While it found that 
poverty, poor quality estates and big rent increases within 
large local authorities were major factors, the management 
structure and rent collection systems had a significant 
effect on the level of arrears in similar authorities. 
Impersonal rent collection, central systems, poor management 
control and overall management performance were key elements 
in making arrears up to 50% higher in poorly managed areas 
with similar social and economic problems. Rent arrears 
were a symptom of poverty and family stress. But more 
significantly they were often a symptom of an unworkable 
management system. 
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In general, arrears were found to relate to all forms of 
poverty and deprivation except old age. The numbers of 
elderly tenants in-arrears were extremely small everywhere. 
12 
It was felt that elderly people had reached a settled point 
in their life and had'become, with hard experience, better 
managers. It is, however, also possible that older people 
were more "grateful" to the landlord and had better rent- 
paying habits, born in the years of chronic shortage and 
more ruthless evictions: 
According to the Department of the Environment study, the 
most significant group of households in serious arrears was 
one-parent families, fully one quarter of whom were seriously 
behind with their rent (over £50). On the estates in the 
survey, and on problem estates in general, the proportion of 
one-parent families was extremely high. This would help 
account for very high arrears in the survey estates. 
However, 'taking average figures, the levels of arrears 
fluctuated more widely between authorities and regions than 
did th'e levels of poverty and deprivation. Five of the 
London estates had arrears that averaged more than £200 
owing per household,. whereas eight estates (seven of which 
were outside London) carried an average debt per household 
of less than £100. The range from £14 average debt on the 
lowest estate to £368 on the highest clearly related to 
management methods as well as family circumstances, given 
the overall poverty of the estates and the much lower 
unemployment rates on the London estates than in the North. 
ii 
This bears out the finding of the Department of the 
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Environment survey13 that arrears varied between 
authorities by a factor of 100, even when social and 
environmental conditions were comparable. -The variable 
factor was the style-of the local authority landlord. The 
following- diagram from the Department of the Environment 
study illustrates the-range of interlocking problems in 
arrears levels-, coinciding almost exactly with our own 
findings in earlier- chapters 'ln relation to more general 
problems on-difficult-to-let estates and on the estates in 
the survey. 
._ -63. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH AND LOW ARREARS AUTHORITIES 
High Low 'High Low 
Administrative type W of difficult to let 
Metropolitan 
districts/ Above average London Boroughs 
Non-metropolitan 
Below average districts 
Demographic type Rent collection 
Inner urban and 
Mersey/Tyne Other 
types 
Other types 
Door to door 
Dwellings 
20.000 or more 
Under 20,000 
% of flats 
40% or more 
Under 40% 
Arrears recoveryRent 
collectors 
etc. 
Housing assistants 
etc. 
Use of legal sanctions 
High 
low 
,I .i 
ý' 
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For the estate officer, as with virtually all other aspects 
of his job, rents had become a thankless, remote, seemingly 
endless task of harassment and paper chasing. He no 
longer actually did the job himself in most cases but had: 
to try to make the Post Office-or the computer do it 
properly-for him. He had lost all sense of control or 
purpose in the frustration of operating a complex, 
cumbersome and unworkable rent system. In one of the local 
}Iý 
1 
i 
authorities -in the-'survey-, . we counted 43 possible stages in-*. - 
the-rent arrears procedure, 
14 
only a handful of which would 
be personally performed by the estate officer. 
It was ironic that local authorities with high arrears more 
frequently resorted to legal sanctions, primarily eviction. 
In many cases, this was ineffective in recovering arrears 
because the-process was slow, it was rarely backed up with 
personal contact, and the action was often initiated after 
the-rent debt had already reached a very high, almost 
irretrievable level. 
LEGAL SANCTIONS 
The central problem with the removal of door-to-door 
collection was that the threat of eviction became the only 
real sanction. Previously, personal contact exercised a 
strong pull on the tenant, avoiding a direct threat. 
Because eviction is a complex legal procedure, long drawn- 
out steps must be taken. Because tenants on the whole are 
aware of the length of the process, many preliminary, 
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time-consuming steps are ignored or ineffectual. 
Therefore an elaborate game is set in train whereby 
effectively, estate officers waste much of their time and 
tenants build up arrears while the legal process of 
attrition grinds through its-143 stages. 
Under the office and giro. collection systems, the only 
successful method of reducing arrears was frequent visiting 
as soon as a family came into arrears. With high rent 
levels, visits would be necessary within a maximum-of two 
weeks in arrears in order to be effective. Otherwise the 
debt was beyond the powers of the family to clear and a 
pile-up of arrears was begun which led inevitably to the 
commencement of court proceedings. Court proceedings were 
not only extremely costly and time-consuming (no local 
authority had actually worked out the costs as far as we 
know, or took account of them); they were intensely 
alienating to the tenant and in many cases were simply 
ignored. In Lambeth, only a minority of tenants even 
showed up in court for the final eviction proceeding : -. ' 
Knowing that they were living on the council's very worst 
estates, they were often not alarmed at the prospect of 
being evicted by the council and taken in again as homeless. 
From the point of view of the estate officer, the initiation 
of court proceedings was purely a mechanical operation. 
Senior officers rather than estate officers actually went 
to court and in most cases, an actual eviction had to be 
authorised by the housing committee itself. Therefore the 
estate officer had very little involvement in the'harsh 
dý 
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court proceedings or any sense of the ultimate consequences 
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for the family. As in all such procedures, failure'to 
f carry responsibility for what you're doing or to carry 
through the task to the end, undermined any sense of % 
purpose or responsibility. Another problem was frequent 
conflict between politicians and managers over the use of 
eviction as a central tool of rent collection. 
Eviction, as an integral part of rent collection, was 
generating a growing pool of. disaffected, indebted households 
who-were almost past-being afraid of it. 
Most directors of. housing we spoke to cited the difficulty 
in obtaining an eviction, and the statutory obligation to 
rehouse homeless families after they had been evicted, as 
major causes of arrears. They felt they had no sanctions 
that worked. 
It is true that being forced to move because of arrears and 
court action was not such a terrible threat though in most 
cases, it did bring about some payments. One of the 
characteristics of very poor households that pre-dates the 
Industrial Revolution, with temporary squatting on the edge 
of common land, is the ease with which they move from 
shelter to shelter. It was a major finding of the Royal 
Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes and has 
carried right over into the worst estates today. 
Homelessness, while carrying a stigma in the society at 
large, is no longer such a threat to families who hate their 
current living conditions and who are very poor, and who are 
ýý 
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used to living on the fringe of society. There are enough 
"391 
empty council properties for them to feel. they will end 
up somewhere. 
In our view, the fact that eviction and rehousing after 
eviction removed the harshest edge from the sanctions 
against arrears, was not a cause of arrears. Rather the. 
constant. resort to ineffectual legal sanctions was a result 
of ineffectual rent retrieval methods. _ 
The remote 
collection method and the bureaucratic, de-personalised 
follow-up,, including the threat of eviction, - were the 
causes.. The problems-of eviction and homelessness, with 
the disaffection and, transience they bred, simply 
highlighted the need for a very different approach - with. 
speedy, personal follow-up in order to arrest the spawning 
of transient, brutalised. households who could no-longer 
feel responsble for their debts because the system was. 
beyond their ken. 
The examination of arrears showed two things. People's 
alienation from their surroundings, and their awareness 
that they were receiving a bad service, made them much less 
willing to pay their rent. It was one of the few weapons 
tenants felt they had. On the dense, flatted estates, with 
more acute dissatisfaction, arrears tended to be higher than 
on the cottage estates. 
15 
We have mentioned the social and management reasons for 
arrears being higher on problem estates. The important 
link is the chain-effect between housing a poor population, 
with many one-parent families, adopting arrears-prone 
.; ý, a ý: 
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methods of collection and debt recovery, preventing 
transfers of arrears cases but facilitating transfers'of 
other households, enhancing thereby the incidence of 
disadvantaged households, frequently one-parent families, 
and arrears cases. -The impact on the rest of the 
population and on estate staff was both to accelerate flight 
and encourage greater-delinquency among those remaining. 
It was alarmingly common to be told by tenants "They don't 
pay their-rent, so-why shou ld. -I? " The fact-that-arrears 
in the end made the link back to homelessness, even poorer= 
(if possible) rehousing-offers-and subsequent' 
reduced motivation to pay rent, completed the cycle that 
led directly to sink estates. 
tenants" be. evicted to? 
For where else could "bad 
It can be seen from the foregoing analysis that the trends 
in rent systems were exacerbating other problems and were 
being superimposed on an ineffective and poorly structured 
housing system that simply could not cope. 
CLEANSING AND CARETAKING 
PARKS DEPARTMENTS AND CARE OF OPEN SPACES 
The repairs department was not the only separate department 
responsible for part of the housing service. 
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On a majority of estates in the survey, the parks' 
. 
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department, quite separately from housing, repairs and 
maintenance, or cleansing, was responsible for maintaining 
communal gardens, grass verges, lawns and flower beds. 
Most estates had open planted areas. An absurd situation 
commonly arose whereby the parks department was not 
responsible for removing litter from grass and flower beds 
though it was responsible for cutting, hoeing and. weeding. 
Lawn mowers commonly shredded litter while they cut the 
grass. And decorative shrubberies and rose-beds, _where 
they survived, were often packed with litter between the 
bushes. Only on the-Victorian housing trust estates, 
among all those we visited, was this problem resolved by 
uniting within one job, 'under the estate manager, the 
warden/cleaner/porter who was also responsible for any 
planted areas. 
It was an administrative nonsense that housing departments 
were actually paying out from their meagre management 
budgets substantial amounts to parks departments for an 
unskilled job that could more easily be done by resident 
staff within the housing department. It was also ironical 
that the generous planning of open space to provide often 
large green areas on some of the most depressing and deprived 
estates should be so poorly maintained. Parks departments 
were prepared*to mow up the litter along with the grass 
because they were working on housing territory and not a 
park or a "public" grass verge; therefore they did not 
feel responsible for the quality of job they did. For the 
fact is that most parks departments do an excellent job 
1ýi ii 
,. 
'. 1 
,ý 
1 
j a 
except on estates; it is extremely rare even in the most 
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depressed cities to see a dirty, unkempt park. But 
parks and recreation departments inmost cases failed to 
do their job properly for the housing department on the 
survey estates. - 
REFUSE AND CLEANSING SERVICE 
On all estates, street cleaning and refuse disposal-were 
dealt with by other departments. It would have been quite 
possible to deduce on some estates that no rates were being 
paid and residents were not-entitled to a refuse service. 
On one estate, where there were large numbers of-families 
with over three children, the very large families were 
entitled to a second dustbin. The dustmen simply threw 
the additional bins into the automated dustcarts after they 
were issued to the families and the housing department felt 
powerless to do anything. They said that if they took any 
action, all the men would be out on strike and there would 
be no refuse service at all. It turned out on investigation 
that no one had discussed with the men the extra dustbin 
emptying involved. Industrial relations within the local 
authority were notoriously bad. On another estate, owners" 
of a row of shops that backed onto a very large estate 
simply put out and piled up their refuse all week at the 
back of the shops, on the tarmac courtyard of the estate, 
onto which the front doors of the blocks of flats opened. 
The Chinese Take-away put out piles of chewed spar, einib$ 
From there it was spread by dogs around the flats. The 
rates and valuers' department was in charge of shop rentals; 
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the housing department seemed powerless. It took 18 
months for the three departments, housing, rates and 
cleansing, to agree on, the siting and structure of ä refuse 
store for. the shops. There had never been one before. 
On-another-estate the-paladins were too small to take all 
the refuse-from the chutes. Previous daily collections 
were reduced to twice-weekly. The dustmen were paid a 
spillage bonus because of the overflow of rubbish, on 
which basis -caretakers "would not sweep up '*on -refuse days. 
The dustmen meanwhile did not clear up either, since no one 
checked on them. - In addition they refused to empty 
overfull paladins because it was extremely difficult and 
dirty work to pull them out of the normally blocked 
rubbish chutes. So for the following week, tenants had 
to put rubbish in plastic bags outside the overflowing 
refuse area. Dogs tore open the bags and scattered the 
rubbish. The men the following week had even stronger 
grounds for refusing to remove the rubbish or empty the 
bins since the whole area around the chute was blocked. 
The ensuring tussle cost. 'the local authority additional 
payments, industrial action and disputes with caretakers. 
Meanwhile tenants in small, crowded flats with no open 
fires, and usually no transport, had no alternative but to 
get rid of their rubbish at the mouth or the base of the 
chutes. It sometimes went over the balcony as a gesture 
of defiant alienation and aggression. 
A farcical refuse problem arose on an estate where no ' 
dustbins were provided and where there were large concrete 
of 
litter bins dotted around the estate. Tenants put their 
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black plastic rubbish bags in these bins in an attempt to 
dispose of refuse, so the bins were constantly overflowing. 
The response of the. cleansing department was to remove the 
litter bins altogether. They pointed to the resulting 
filth on the estate as proof that tenants were the cause of 
the problem. 
In a certain sense, of course, tenants were the cause of the 
problem since the litter. originated with them. But on 
large, dense and communal estates, without domestic 
fireplaces, littering was inevitable if there was not an 
adequate refuse service. Ironically, blocking up coal 
fireplaces in the course of modernisation has been the 
direct cause of greatly increased litter, as well as causing 
condensation and greatly increased fuel bills which many 
tenants had difficulty in paying. 
I The kind of extreme cowboy refuse service described here 
was prevalent in various fragments on 14 of the estates in 
the survey and all 20 estates were dirty, although the 
cleansing department was not responsible for keeping estate 
areas clean, only for organised refuse collection and some 
of the estate roads. We found only one housing department 
in the country (not among-the 19 local authorities in the 
survey) where an adequate cleansing service operated on 
large, poor estates. Only where there was strong housing 
management and a well organised manual caretaking service 
to supplement refuse collection did the refuse system work at 
all adequately. It was useless to leave the whole 
1ý! 1' 
,ý 
ýr ý 
i 
.. ,ý 
i4 
responsibility to a separate department. 
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The way the estates were built greatly enhanced the refuse 
problems. House by house, in streets, it has been possible 
to expand refuse capacity. But in blocks of flats, refuse 
storage areas and rubbish chutes, if they were big enough 
30-50 years ago, often no longer are. It is costly-and 
difficult to expand them and their inherent-problems remain - 
easy to block with bulky rubbish, accessible to dogs if 
protective doors are not maintained, subject to fires and 
other vandalism because they are unguarded targets. 
Refuse stores in basements of blocks were equally 
disastrous. Bags would burst as refuse men tried to clear 
them. They would then refuse to move the spilt rubbish and 
the area would degenerate. Dogs would get in, communal 
keys would get lost, doors would finally get broken. 
Caretakers would give Up on a losing battle to keep them 
clean. 
Unused garages were often converted into surplus rubbish 
stores to await removal. But that was a contradiction in 
terms. There was a continuous flow of surplus rubbish on 
all the estates, but especially on the dense, flatted 
estates and no effective system for staying ahead of it. 
Without more capacity than volume of rubbish, the estates 
could not be kept clean, and they were not. 
CARETAKING 
It was overridingly important to have resident caretaking 
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in the management of flatted estates. Cleaning of communal 
areas, maintenance of balcony and staircase lighting, 
emergencies in lifts, a contact point for calls to the 
police, evening patrols, are all vital roles for a resident 
caretaker. Without. a resident caretaker, it becomes 
extremely difficult to deal with emergencies such as 
flooding, which can affect flats several doors below. 
There were 13 flatted estates in our survey. Eleven of 
these had resident caretakers prior to local management, 
but on several there were only resident caretakers in the 
tower blocks, and on two less than half the designated 
caretaking posts were filled. 
4 
It was stated by the housing 
directors that it was no longer" possible to recruit resident 
caretakers to such estates, in spite of offering rent-free 
accommodation and 'secure long-term employment. 
Parts of most estates comprising maisonettes and flats in 
large blocks from four to eight storeys were without resident 
caretakers. One estate had the unpopular mobile caretaking 
service where gangs of men would move in and out of large 
numbers of estates, somewhat similar to Panda-car policing. 
No one knew who they were, when they were to come, or how 
long they might stay. Caretakers' unions sometimes pressed 
hard for a conversion to the mobile system as a way out of 
the growing unpopularity of the resident posts and the fear 
of attack. 
* Union leaders argued fiercely that with proper 
organisation it would work as well as, or even better than the 
There were several estates where caretakers had been 
violently attacked and on Tulse Hill, caretakers were only 
prepared to work in pairs after nasty incidents. 
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resident system. But tenants felt that it threw the baby 
out with the bathwater, making the caretaking role unpopular 
and ineffectual. 
That in fact is exactly what happened on one estate in the 
survey, where resident jobs were converted to mobile jobs 
and were finally withdrawn altogether. 
On no estate were caretakers answerable to estate-officers, 
or even integrated with them in a team approach to the 
estate as the only other estate-based housing employees. 
On two of the estates, dedicated caretakers were holding 
together the basic housing management against almost 
impossible odds. On the rest, caretakers felt unsupported 
and unsupervised, vulnerable to physical abuse and attack, 
unappreciated by tenants, and carrying out hopeless and 
undignified tasks that-were no sooner done than they would 
be undone. - The trend was definitely away from caretaking 
as a resident, manual-job. And yet without it,, it was 
impossible to see how the flatted estates could be managed 
at all. There were so many points of possible breakdown 
and such a dire need for vigilance and oversight. A most 
essential job had been undervalued. Resident caretaking 
was the last line to the landlord and it had almost seized 
up. 
SOCIAL SERVICES RESPONSIBILITY 
One major department that should have been closely involved 
ý; ýý 
ýý i 
a 
3 
ýý iý 
on the 20 estates was the social services department. In 
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practice, however, although many or the majority of social 
work clients live on council estates, it was rare to 
encounter a social worker in the course of housing 
management. 
-work. 
There. is a historic adversary 
relationship between housing workers and social workers. - 
This is because housing workers have to try and keep the 
lid on social problems and so-called "problem" families for 
the sake of good management and the majority population of 
an estate. 
_ 
They_are frequently forced to argue either 
for the removal'of a household causing nuisance on an 
estate or for the transfer of a "good" tenant away from a 
bad one. They are also expected to take proceedings 
against tenants for rent arrears and eventually go to 
court "against" the family for possession of their home. 
Social workers on the other hand, have a duty to support 
the families causing housing problems and also to argue 
for the housing rights of the most needy families. An 
ex-social services director, who became housing director 
in a Greater Manchester authority, summed up the conflict 
of roles by saying -" 
"Why should I worry about rent arrears? It's 
more important for the kids to have shoes for 
school. " 
He resigned as housing director three years later. A 
good housing officer is supposed to run a tight ship in 
tune with the vast majority of respectable, rent-paying, 
quiet, clean and orderly households. 16 A good social 
worker is supposed to 'understand the multiple problems of 
people who cannot cope and to help them without judging 
or pressuring them. Therefore the housing officer is 
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bound to see the social worker as soft, starry-eyed and 
even a do-gooder, while the social worker will often see 
the housing officer as hard-bitten, judgmental, bigoted, 
unjust and superior, or simply tough. 
In practice on the 20 estates, prior to local management 
offices being opened, the paths of housing officers and 
social workers rarely crossed except in the adversary 
roles outlined above. Yet the social needs of. the 
estates in question were almost endless and social services 
departments were often pouring in disproportionate 
resources to an unco-ordinated and seemingly fruitless 
effort. As an illustration, on the Oldham estate of 
Abbey Hills that we discussed in Chapter VIII,. at one 
time there were eight social workers and community workers 
and not a single full-time housing worker. The social 
problem of that-estate continued to mount out of all 
proportion to its size or physical characteristics, and 
the-very enlightened and constructive social services 
department appeared powerless to change it. This estate 
was. not included in our survey because there was still no 
local housing management and it was still in a relentless 
state of decline. 
Given the incidence of homelessness, single-parenthood, 
unemployment and the lack of skilled wage-earners, it was 
not surprising that unpopular estates had disproportionate 
recourse to the social services. The number of social 
services referrals on Broadwater Farm, Haringey, were six 
times higher than for the surrounding areas. Alice 
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Coleman, in her exhaustive study of flatted estates in - 
Tower Hamlets and Southwark, has shown that the numbers 
of children taken into care is much higher in large, dense 
flatted estates than in*the surrounding streets. The 
17 
social needs of unpopular estates-were out of all proportion 
to the size of the population they housed. 
The alarming finding of the Priority Estates Project 
survey was that in no case had there been any formal 
liaison between housing. and the social services departments 
in operation, prior to local housing management and very 
little after its establishment, except in three local 
authorities, in spite of general recognition of the 
overriding dominance of social problems. This does not 
mean that in most cases, relations were bad. This was the 
exception. 
, 
But generally, as with cleansing, repairs and 
parks, each department held the other responsible for the 
shortcomings of divided responsibility. In the case of 
social services, it was hard to see a way of combining the 
best interests of both departments within the present 
framework, and the best hope lay in the housing department 
adopting a far more welfare-oriented stance and social 
workers becoming integrated into the housing team. 
SOCIALLY DISTURBED HOUSEHOLDS 
What has not been commonly recognised either by housing or 
social services departments is. that anti-social, unneighbourly 
households cannot be adequately rehoused on large, unpopular 
i 
1 
"403 
estates, particularly of flats. These households are in 
a tiny minority 
18*and 
while their access to council housing 
is important, special-social and housing provision must be 
made to support and constrain them. Otherwise, there is 
no community within-which such households can be contained 
and various institutions, prisons, ' children's homes, ýmental 
hospitals, take over. - Sadly, on many poor estates, both 
housing management-and social services-support-are so weak 
that such families may drive out more normal, coping 
families and end up in a ransacked, crazed slum, - which 
tenants can only think-of demolishing as the way out. 
Blocks in Salford, Islington and Liverpool reached this 
pass. None of these communities survived. * This could 
happen on a much bigger scale unless the resources of 
social services departments are somehow brought to bear on 
local housing management. 
"HOUSING WELFARE" 
Social problems were generally left to social workers. 
Only on two estates were there housing welfare workers, 
whose job it was to help sort out social problems that 
related directly to housing issues, such as transfers, 
arrears, fuel disconnections, emergency furniture 
provision and so on. In practice, these workers were 
primarily responsible for helping with immediate issues 
rather than long-term social work support. Yet the need 
**Estimated numbers: less than a fraction of 1°%. 
Ordsall Flats, Salford; Myrtle Gardens, Liverpool; Blythe Mansions, Islington; none of which were in our 
survey because no attempt was made to tackle the problem through housing management. Ordsall Flats and Myrtle 
Gardens were emptied of tenants and sold to private 
. developers. Blythe-Man ions was_demolished__ 'z_ 
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for housing officers and caretakers to respond to social 
needs was becoming constantly more pressing. Elderly.. 
people and small children were particularly vulnerable 
=-= and easy to keep an eye on, yet this was rarely done. 
One London-housing-4i-rector put, it thus - 
"We're here to run estates, not look after 
people. " 
. -. _ENFORCEMENT OF TENANCY CONDITIONS 
Each tenant makes a legally binding agreement with the 
landlord, giving him the right to enjoy the peace and 
security of his home, and the duty to help his neighbours 
enjoy the same, as well as to protect the landlord's 
property and use it only as a home. - 
Estate officers and caretakers universally felt that-they 
had lost their previous authority and status, and that it 
was pointless even attempting to enforce rules to control 
noise, dog abuse, rubbish nuisance, disputes, or even, on 
some estates, illegal occupancy. These abuses disrupted 
the lives of many or most residents to varying degrees on 
all the estates. 
The only management tools invoked were transfers away from 
the problem for the discontented tenant who appeared to be 
the injured party, commonly known as a "management transfer", 
or eviction for those in arrears. Eviction was almost 
never used on other management grounds although some legal 
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measure was necessary in curbing social excesses. 
The result was virtual anarchy on some estates and very 
little respect for tenancy conditions among some tenants 
on all the estates.. Council employees often despised and 
disregarded the communities they were employed to serve on 
the strength of the social disarray that resulted. The 
'communities themselves were quite unable to enforce 
standards of behaviour on their neighbours. There was 
fear of-victimisation, a feeling that you should mind your 
own business and a sense of not belonging. It was hard 
to collaborate with neighbours who were often seen as part 
of the problem. Prior to opening the estate office on 
Tulse Hill in 1980, the commonest complaint was the abuse 
of neighbours. With careful investigation and questioning, 
the extreme transgressors were narrowed down to eight 
households on an estate of over 900 flats. Yet mayhem 
appeared to prevail and many tenants lived in fear of 
burglary, mugging, squatting, dogs and drugs. There had 
indeed been several violent and vicious attacks. 
Under the existing remote management, enforcement of 
tenancy conditions seemed laughable. 
CONCLUSION 
With repairs, cleansing, open space maintenance and social 
service support removed from the jurisdiction of the housing 
department; with housing departments running lettings 
Summary of findings from tenant consultation, Tulse Hill, June-September 1980 - Anne Power, Priority Estates Project, 1980. 
406 
almost exclusively from,; the town hall; and with estate officers 
increasingly losing control over any part of the housing manage- 
ment job, including rent colelction, it is not surprising that 
staff were extremely demoralised and almost universally ineffective. 
Tenants on the whole had given-up-all hope of a decent service. 
In the words of the district manager for Tulse Hill, the single. 
biggest problem on the estates was - 
"the total apathy of the tenants, their 
inability to conceive of anything better". 
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CHAPTER XI '- LOCAL OFFICES ON UNPOPULAR ESTATES 
"Genius is one per cent inspiration and 
ninety-nine per cent perspiration. " 
- Thomas A. Edison 1896. 
INTRODUCTION 
a 
From the. earliest days of the Priority Estates Project, 
it was clear that a full-time local housing office was 
a prerequisite for running a large and orten neglected 
estate properly. Our survey or 20 projects produced 
powerful evidence that this approach worked. 
Other attempts had been made on many of the eatatea, 
primarily costly physical improvementa or adaptations, 
but al3o aometimea initiatives involving aoaial acrvioea, 
community provision and ohangea in lettings policies. 
The tortunea of problem eatatea were not to be reversed by 
those piecemeal attacks on a multi-aided problem that 
constantly reappeared in a now ahapo. 
A few authoritioa had operated part-time aurgorioa without 
allocating full-time starr with roaponaibility for day-to- 
day management to the estate. Those provided some k&nd 
or link but did not change the central management structure 
or tackle the problems whore they arose. They were moot 
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often. a simple reporting service. They too failed to 
reverse the overall conditions of run-down estates. 
We were convinced by every visit we made that only a 
meticulous, detailed, day-by-day approach to all aspects 
of running an estate - rents, repairs, lettings, caretaking 
and. cleaning, welfare and communal law enforcement - would 
win back the confidence and self-respect of the residents, 
thereby providing. a basis for rebuilding a sound housing 
investment and a workable housing community. 
Having analysed in detail the poor services and major 
physical and social handicaps of these communities in the 
last three chapters, we now analyse the more intimate 
management approach developed by the. 20 projects and its 
impact on the problem. 
A CHANGE OF DIRECTION - GOING LOCAL 
When the Priority Estates Project began in March 1979, 
only three councils throughout the whole of England had 
full-time, estate-based management offices. 
1 In the 
following three years, the idea gained ground and by 
January 1982,19 councils operated 45 projects. We 
included 20 projects in the survey, selected from the 19 
local authorities. 
4 
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644. NUMBER OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OPERATING 
ESTATE-BASED MANAGEMENT OFFICES FROM-19782 
STARTING DATES OF ESTATE OFFICES 
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Before 1978 
The 19 local authorities represented only a tiny minority 
of the 403 local authorities in England and Wales. By 
June 1984, the number actually running full-time estate 
offices had risen to nearer'30 local authorities,. but it 
was still a trifling effort compared with the scale of the 
problem, although the 30 local authorities involved 
covered more than a dozen critical London authorities and 
several other major cities. 
- .. 
t" 4' .... 
1978* 1979 1980 1981 
Date of starting 
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LOCAL OFFICES 
/ 
Because of the urgency of the situation on many estates, it 
was important to establish how effective local management 
was. We first examined the direct impact of local offices. 
The effect of-a1T-the-16cal offices on the life of the 
estates in the survey was immediate and extensive. Once 
tenancy records were moved from the town hall or district 
to the local office, al] contact between the landlord and 
tenant was filtered through the local office. This did 
away-with the dual system, based on tenants having to go 
to a district or central office for what they wanted and 
separately, an estate officer having to visit tenants for 
what the landlord wanted, both sides frequently bypassing 
the other, and the information and action being constantly 
disjointed. The "by-pass" system resulted in neither side 
pursuing all the matters that required action. 
3 Many 
things had been left unreported or unattended by virtue of 
previous experience of fruitless journeys and abortive 
efforts. 
The most immediate impact of the local office was to open 
the floodgates to tenants' requests and complaints. All 
full-time offices reported extensive and continuous use. 
4 
Some did not record carefully how many users came to the 
office. However, we estimated that one fifth of residents 
called at a local office each week. * On Tulse Hill, 
about 200 callers a week was the sustained rate over five 
years, in spite of the office being open only two hours a 
day. In the Rhondda (not in the survey), about 70 callers 
a day was the average on an estate of 1,000 dwellings. 
Over a three-week period, most of the households on an estate 
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were expected to have contact with the office for one 
reason or another, although there were obviously'many 
uneven patterns to the use of local offices. It still 
did not compare with old-fashioned,. door-to. -door weekly 
contact-but it ' was -a -great opening up. To the estate 
officers- it. was like an unstoppable floodga. te. 
" There . were wide . fluctuations in the number of callers., 
-depending. on -three factors-: - hours of opening-; - . 
amount of 
-local responsibility;. - willingness to give advice and 
support on welfare. and financial matters as well as on 
housing. The most used office was in Walsall, with-360 
callers a week, where all functions were devolved to the 
neighbourhood management office, and where the office was 
open all day. But all offices were reported to be in 
continuous demand throughout their opening hours. We 
never went to an estate office open to tenants where there 
was no tenant in the office over some matter. In only 
one office did we encounter the strained, beleaguered 
attitude to tenants. so common in. centralised housing 
departments. This was typically the office with the least 
local power. -The-other 19 offices seemed business-like, 
friendly and purposeful. 
Half the offices were open all day every day and these were 
the offices that did best in controlling empty dwellings. 
As a result, vandalism was reduced and the general 
management of the estate was raised more quickly. Only 
one project was opened less than four days a week and we 
concluded that three days opening was the minimum for the 
e 
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project to work. 
65. OPENING HOURS OF ESTATE OFFICE 
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The longer opening hours were usually coupled with a greater 
degree of local responsibility and a greater degree of 
contact between tenants and staff. This in turn generated 
confidence, kept information up-to-date, helped speedy 
re-letting, helped prevent damage to empty property, 
encouraged people to stay-on the estate and to bring others 
to live there. Many local authorities and estate teams 
argued against opening all day every day on the grounds that 
it did not allow enough time for "the work to be done". 
However, as long as problems could be dealt with locally as 
they arose, the constant contact with tenants over all 
management problems actually ensured that the work was done. 
ii ý+ 
413 
Most of it could be done on the spot while the tenant 
waited. 
The purpose of a local. office in the eyes of most local 
authorities was to provide a point of contact for tenants. 
This in. itself was the most useful function. On the one 
hand, it gave tenants immediate access to the landlord, 
even if they couldn't get immediate satisfaction. On the 
other hand, it gave workers a direct incentive to build up 
a--good relationship with tenants and win their confidence 
by getting an answer to real problems. _ 
The local projects were widely regarded as exceptions to 
the rule, able to cut through red tape and get things done. 
Devolution of responsibility to the local offices was far 
from automatic and in fact apart from chasing rent arrears, 
ordering repairs, and tenants' advice and liaison, there 
was no area of management responsibility that was totally 
passed down 'to the local office. This was wasteful of 
time and effort, frustrating to tenants and staff, and 
illogical in organisational terms. It did not, however, 
do away with the value of direct contact through the local 
office This was wasteful of time and effort, frustrating 
to tenants and staff, and illogical in organisational terms. 
It did not, however, do away with the value of direct contact 
through the local office, and it did encourage better 
performance on almost all fronts. This was achieved by 
endless chasing and pressure. Much of the effort would 
have become unnecessary with a fully autonomous local 
organisation. Nonetheless the office provided effective 
it ý; 
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pressure on the system. 
LOCAL MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY --= 
There were nine vital areas of day-to-day. management that 
needed to be covered on any estate: 
Responsibility for letting empty flats, 
. 
organising 
transfers within the estate and controlling empty 
----- property; 
- Responsibility for arrears prevention and recovery, and 
rent collection where feasible, with rent information 
being provided weekly to enable immediate action. 
-A locally-based repairs team to cover small-scale, 
day-to-day repairs. 
- Local supervision of all estate workers including 
caretakers, cleaners and gardeners. 
-A co-ordinated local team approach to include all 
employees, manual and office-based. 
- Local input from staff and residents into any 
physical improvements, major repairs, etc. 
- Regular monitoring of performance in management and 
maintenance. 
- Close liaison with residents on all issues affecting 
the running of the estate. 
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"- Local responsibility for a day-to-day budget. 
In addition, local input into major repairs, improvements, 
environmental-works-änd modernisation was essential. 
The following diagram shows the number of projects-'- 
exercising local control over each of the nine key- 
" management- area's. 
66. 
r AREAS OF MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE. -CONTROL 'OF THE PROJECTS 
Responsibility for: Out of 20 projects 
Reasonably adequate. project control of 
rent arrears recovery 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 16 
Formal liaison with residents on issues 
affecting the running of the estate 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 15 
Input by management staff into 
improvement programme/s xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
13 
Local lettings XXXXXXXXX 9 
Estate-based repairs XXXXXXXX 8 
Co-ordinated team approach XXXXXXX 7 
Regular monitoring XXXXXXX 7 
Local supervision of caretakers XXX 3 
Local responsibility for a day-to-day 
budget 0 
No projects covered more than six of the nine areas of 
responsibility. Most in fact had responsibility for fewer 
than half the vital elements. No local authority at the 
time of our survey had established a management and 
maintenance budget for an estate or an area. The projects 
¶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on cottage estates had control over more functions and had 
on-the whole been more successful in improving conditions. 
It iszof course an easier task than on an estate with dense 
" blocks of flats. - Modern concrete complex estates had the 
67. 
fewest locally-based responsibilities and correspondingly 
the least. success in ", improving conditions. 
LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR EIGHT MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
Number of functions Number of projects Type of project controlled locally 
7-to 8 0 
4 cottage 
4 to 6 0 9 4 walk-up blocks 
1 modern complex 
3 cottage 
1 to 3 11 3 walk-up blocks 
5 modern complex 
LOCALL''BASE 
," CENTRAL SYSTEMS 
s 
.: 
In spite of 'lack of control over some functions, the project 
estates were improving management by dint of endless pressure 
from the estate through the office and back to the town hall, 
often reaching up to the chief housing officer, chief 
executive or senior politicians. Because they did not have 
direct control in many cases, project staff spent large 
amounts of time chasing, manipulating and even defying the 
-, system in order to make things work. This. approach might 
not be so successful on a broader front. It would be 
essential to establish very clear decentralisation of 
management functions if a local authority wanted to develop 
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estate-based offices on a wider scale. Otherwise a. 
number of-decentralised offices could create tremendous 
confusion through constantly having to refer back to the 
--centre and-chase basic-services. - ;. - 
The obvious way forward seemed to be the voguish borough- 
wide decentralisation of services. Yet many authorities 
felt they did not have sufficiently trained and motivated 
staff to implement intensive management across the board 
with local responsibility for all key management areas. 
- Many certainly did not have a system that readily lent 
itself to local autonomy. And the complexities of 
extricating services, staff and budgets from functional 
entities at the centre were often overwhelming. 
Most of the local authorities were concerned about the 
confusion between local project systems and the centre, 
but were unable to unscramble the layered, amorphous 
organisation for one-off projects. To base the estate 
managers in a local office was the first easy step that 
all had taken. To break up all aspects of estate 
management into locally-run, multi-skill units was much 
more difficult. Apart from Walsall, no local authority 
had attempted such an idea across the board, and Walsall 
did not include estate-based repairs teams. Hackney, 
Islington and Lambeth Councils were in the process of 
establishing local management offices across the board, 
but it was unclear whether any of these would relinquish 
central control over key areas, such as budgeting, staff 
performance and so on. In Walsall, Lambeth and Hackney, 
It 
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neighbourhood offices were planned to cover about 1,500- 
2,500 homes. The units often fitted awkwardly with 
estate boundaries and were too large if they were 
geographically spread or covered several large estates. 
--The problems of decentralisation for all these authorities 
were immense. 
No authority-the Priority Estates Project was in touch with, 
_apart 
from Stockton-on-Tees, was contemplating across-the- 
board, estate-level management although Rochdale said it 
intended to introduce comprehensive estate-level budgeting 
in due course. 
Only tenant management co-operatives had succeeded in 
extricating from the town hall system a management entity 
with its own staff, funds and'organisation, and with local 
'tenants. ' control. 5 But most tenants were reluctant to 
assume such wide responsibility, especially on estates with 
multiple problems as in the Priority Estates Project survey. 
On none of the 20 estates had tenants established a 
management organisation under their own control. Most 
estate offices were set up with unclear boundaries and a 
lack 'of designated authority. Nonetheless, their local 
presence and the fact that central services were usually 
bogged down in their own complexities, meant that they had 
a relatively free hand whenever they could get hold of the 
right bit of the system. 
The limited local management responsibility meant that in 
-, ý 
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a number of key areas there were still major problems and 
threats to the longer term viability of local management. 
Success was limited, but*the survey showed substantial 
gains in standards of-estate management and in tenant and 
worker satisfaction. -- 
GAINS ON THE ESTATES 
Because of the'direct contact-between estate staff and' 
tenants and the impetus this gave to improving the operation 
of the existing system, all'projects were having some impact 
on the estate conditions. 
The project staff were the main source of information on 
" the extent to which projects were bring about improvements, 
though we checked what they said against our own impressions 
and against housing department information. 
The improvements that seemed most important were: 
- Better general environment, usually remarkably cleaner. 
- Improved repairs service. 
- Greater security and less vandalism. 
- Rent arrears reducing or rising more slowly than local 
authority average. 
- No longer hard to let. 
- Fewer empty dwellings. 
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- Increased tenant involvement. 
- Successful physical improvements. 
- Co-operative local efforts in management and maintenace. 
-- Improved-caretaking. 
No project was improving in all areas but all were improving 
in some. 
The-following diagram lists. the principal improvements brought 
about in the 20 projects in order of spread of success. 
68. 
IMPROVEMENTS IN-THE PROJECTS LEADING TO 
ESTATES 
INCREASED POPULARITY OF 
Number of estates out 
20 bringing about 
improvement 
of 
Environment improving XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 19 
Increased tenant involvement XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 18 
Major repairs/environmental improvements XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 18 
Improved repairs service XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 15 
Less vandalism and insecurity XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 15 
Co-ordinated approach XXXXXXXXXXXXXX- 14 
Fewer empty dwellings XXXXXXXXXXXXX - 13 
Improved caretaking XXXXXXXXXXXX 12 
No longer hard to let XXXXXXXXXXX 11 
Lower tenancy turnover XXXXXXXXXX 10 
Lower child densities xxxxxxxxxx 10 
Fewer one-parent family allocations XXXXXXXXX 9 
Fewer homeless allocations xxxxxxxxx 9 
Improvements to homes xxxxxxxxx 9 
Rent arrears reducing, or rising more 
slowly than local authority average 
XXXXXXXX 8 
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Almost all projects had a better repairs service, a better 
environment, greater security, more involvement with 
residents and successful physical improvements, although 
it must be remembered that to improve on the previous 
situation was actually quite easy, once a local team was 
given the go-ahead, since we were starting from a very low 
base. The difficulty was in making improvements stick 
and integrating the various parts of the operation at the- 
local end so that a viable local management-unit could become 
accepted as part of the local authority structure. This has 
only happened in the half-dozen. authorities that we have 
extended local management beyond the initial experiment. 
i 
The two most difficult areas to reverse were rent arrears 
and social deprivation among incoming tenants. Without 
generating the full rent income, long-term management and 
maintenance could not be funded. Without reversing the 
intense social deprivation, too many of the better-off 
tenants would go on wanting to leave. Some way-of making 
a more mixed, economically and socially viable community 
still had to be found. Improvements were real, but not 
sufficient to secure the future of the worst estates. In 
addition, all projects were still so dependent-on the central 
system working in their favour and so circumscribed in their 
local powers, that it was often difficult to make the next 
major leap from the initial improvements to sound, long-term 
management. 
We had found a range of 18 dominant problems-in the projects; 
the cottage estates average 13, the walk-up blocks 12, and 
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the modern concrete estates 11. The projects on cottage 
r 
and walk-up block estates were more successful than modern 
concrete complex estates in bringing about improvements, 
in spite of the fact that cottage and walk-up projects began 
with a broader spread of problems than modern concrete 
complex estates.. 
We found 15 main improvements under way in the projects. 
The cottage and walk-up block estates were improving on 
average in nine of the 15 areas. The modern concrete 
complex estates were improving in only six. 
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The more serious difficulties of the projects on modern 
concrete complex estates in bringing about improvement 
were quite predictable. ; The physical and security 
problems of large, interlocking communal blocks were 
immense. The very large scale of rehousing, often over 
a short time-span, -bringing in a new and unsettled 
community of several thousand people, was a factor which 
could not quickly be resolved. The smaller-scale, more 
old-fashioned estates were often more run-down but 
easier to improve. 
CONCLUSION 
All estates were improving significantly on a number of 
counts, but the job was far from complete. The following 
chapters describe the most important of these 
improvements and some of the outstanding difficulties. 
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CHAPTER XI 
.I- 
IMPROVEMENTS TO'THE ESTATE AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 
WITH THE HELP OF RESIDENTS 
IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT 
The most popular, and one of the most successful, area of 
attack in the 20 projects was the general environment of 
the project estates. The built environment, described in 
detail in Chapter'X, was, on the 13 flatted estates at least, 
rather horrifying with its dark, high walls, its denseness, 
its great, smoke-streaked, grimy contours, its over- 
provision of tarmac, garages and sheds. On the cottage 
estates, it was oppressively uniform and drab. 
Everywhere it was dirty. Rubbish chutes on balconies 
usually showed signs of fire, as did refuse stores. Tarmac 
was. often pot-holed, clothes-drying lines abandoned, and on 
most estates there was the omnipresent boarding on 
unoccupied dwellings - sometimes torn off or sprayed over - 
always ugly and abandoned-looking. 
Fencing was broken down; graffiti abused all-comers; 
windows were out in most entrances. 
Lots of. windows had half-drawn or closed curtains. Poverty 
was often plain to see. The most depressing sight of all 
was the barred and shuttered shops, dark because the 
shopkeepers felt safer with the boarding left up. 
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The place looked a mess and this mattered as much, or more, 
to residents as the dwellings. 
All the survey estates shared these problems to a greater 
or lesser extent at the outset of the projects. Büt, in 
between the mess, there would always be attempts at-caring, 
a "Georgian" front door, a hanging basket with flowers, a 
"tenant's effort at enclosing and making private a-no-man's 
land, roses, -sunflowers, and the occasional vegetable patch. 
These things seemed buried because of the ubiquitous debris. 
But a closer look gave the lie - over half the residents on- 
any estate we visited showed an amazing willingness to go on 
trying. The new estate office was almost like Pandora's 
box in uncovering the latent ambitions of people everywhere 
to make their environment habitable. 
The opening of local offices and the involvement of-tenants 
had an electric effect on environmental problems. The 
attack was many-sided and-each estate had its own ideas. 
Skips were commonly used and so successful in attracting 
rubbish that they were sometimes abandoned again because the 
council couldn't cope with the volume. The estates were 
literally an alternative dump. Hundreds of tons of every 
kind of refuse had-accumulated over years and on most 
estates no end was in sight. It was a continual and 
seemingly endless task. Hundreds of tons of refuse were 
removed from some estates. 
Goscote, Springwell, Northwood (not in survey) 
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Litter-picking and grass-cutting were attacked with 
frustrated zeal via alien departments such as parks and 
cleansing, which usually responded to unheard-of pressure 6 
from areas where. previously nothing had been expected. 
The previous lack of standards was no longer acceptable. 
Miraculous graffiti removal and anti-graffiti paint were 
creeping in to-coincide with the advent of local _ 
enthusiasm. Children and local artists-undertook murals 
with little encouragement. 
Many different planting schemes were initiated - wild 
flower patches, nature gardens, balcony box competitions, 
allotments, shrub cover, creeper-planting up bare walls, 
seedlings in estate offices, daffodils and snowdrops on 
open ground, a tree nursery. These worked to the extent 
that children were involved, but always required a community 
leader of some kind. Over decades the trees will have 
their impact. 
Children were often enlisted to clear abandoned gardens, 
to paint murals, to plant shrubs and trees. In these 
ways, they were involved against vandalism, littering and 
abuse. Adult residents often did not like getting involved 
visibly, but would normally help the children's or 
teenagers' efforts and were generous in their praise of 
caretakers and community workers when things went well. 
They readily supplied tea to work parties and youth clean-up 
campaigns. 
. 
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Litter bins with-vandal-proof insides were coming into 
their own. Extra dustbins and bigger paladins were also 
"allowed" in the face of volumes of "overspill" rubbish. 
The key to it all . was_ 
the estate office and-the pride and 
prestige.. that went with cleaning up the. estate.. It "was 
definitely the easiest and most dramatic winner, -but 
" estates 
did revert.: to squalor. within a few days or. weeks if. 
effort. was.: withdraw. - :. _- 
=--- 
The role of caretakers and cleaners was absolutely critical. 
All else flowed-from the-elementary need to ensure 
cleanliness through a paid workforce. 
- The dustmen--were very important too. On most estates with 
" local offices-; relätions with these men and with their often 
critici-sed- ünionrepresentatives improved dramatically by 
virtue of'direet'cömmünication and a straight desire to be 
fair. Under central regimes, dialogue was difficult and 
everyone was-out-'-for their pound of flesh, because dialogue 
was hidebound by union protectionism, by political weakness 
and by management secretiveness and ineptitude. In the 
town hall, shared decision-making was almost unheard of 
below director's level. But with an estate office, it 
was possible to sort out sensible procedures and to win 
co-operation round the tea-kettle. 
Cleaners for communal staircases and landings were 
increasingly introduced in flatted project estates. It 
seemed impossible to leave any communal area to the goodwill 
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of the tenants as transgressors were hard to curb or.. to 
punish, and communal areas too numerous. The residents 
could not do it on their own, partly because of the size 0 
and complexity of. the task, "but principally 
because of 
its communal nature. 
For that reason above all else, the basic improvements to 
the environment hinged on the local office. - 
Nothing 
could be kept clean or cared for by remote control. 
There was always a dirty person to combat the clean one. 
Someone had to decide which way it would be, then enforce 
it, and then build up momentum for improvements behind 
enforcing it. The decision was always in favour of 
keeping the place clean. 
Cleaning up the estates was the most critical turnaround 
and it had succeeded on 19 of the 20 projects to a greater 
or lesser degree. 
The trouble with all the environmental efforts was that 
they needed constant checking, recognition and reprimand. 
Project staff were eager to get involved and did create a 
lot of positive pressure, as did leading residents. 
K 
. 
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RESIDENT CARETAKING 
All the flatted estates except one (12 projects) had 
resident caretakers. One estate had non-resident 
caretakers. We have already argued how vital the 
caretaker's role was on flatted estates, especially those 
which were large, dense, and run-down. No other part of 
. the. service was more critical or could have greater impact. 
Resident caretakers operated on a highly intensive and 
localised basis; this was the essential ingredient. As 
residents, they were extremely vulnerable to fellow-tenants' 
criticisms if their efforts were diluted. Caretakers 
were fairly thick on the ground in most projects. 
70, RATIO OF CARETAKERS TO PROPERTIES 
No. of Projects 
1 Caretaker for up to 150 properties 7 
1 Caretaker for 151-250 properties 3 
1'Caretaker for 350 properties 2 
Total 12 
Only three of the local management projects had direct 
control over the standard of caretaking, with caretakers 
fully absorbed into the local teams. Most caretakers 
were answerable to supervisors outside the project in the 
town hall. This often made for difficulties of 
co-ordination over jobs to be done, relations with tenants 
and team effort. In all projects, it would have made 
sense for caretakers to be an integral part of the local 
i 
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team under the local manager. However, most of the 12 
projects had good informal liaison with caretakers. 
-On eight estates, caretakers-patrolled the communal 
areas. This was an-essential part of keeping-a finger 
on the pulse. 'Patrolling was often misunderstöod'as 
endangering caretakers in case of trouble. However, 
caretakers who patrolled successfully did not intervene 
where they spotted trouble. They called for help. 
Their role was very much a deterrent and also*a 
reassurance to residents. When patrolling took place 
on Tulse Hill and Ragworth estates, it had an instant 
effect on vandalism, break-ins and the general sense of 
security. Where there was a serious threat of 
intimidation in large cities, caretakers patrolled in 
pairs. 
Caretaking standards had improved on all 12 project 
estates with a resident service. This was usually 
achieved with existing staff. The caretakers felt they 
were part of a team effort centred on the local office, 
and the better relations between tenants and council 
made the caretakers' job much more worthwhile. 
. 
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CARETAKING (based on 12 Projects) 
The caretaker's role was highly visible. Therefore, 
caretakers often enjoyed recognition and praise on project 
estates, especially for cleaning, an otherwise thankless 
task that was noticed by visitors and residents alike. On 
some -states'earetakers did minor repairs, helped in cases 
of flooding or other disasters, and also got involved in 
community activities. This broader and more flexible role 
very much enhanced their status. 
There were only two non-resident caretakers out of a total 
of 83 caretakers in the 12 projects. The consensus was that 
caretakers should be resident on the estate they'served. 
Otherwise, a vital link for emergencies was lost, and the 
standards patrolled answerable 
improved to project 
I 
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coherence of the management presence was jeopardised. 
Lift breakdown, communal light failure, blocked chutes, 
trouble with youth gangs, an accident to an elderly person, 
fire and flood, were all problems that could arise day"or 
night. The impact of an emergency on an-estate was far-. 
reaching-often tnvölving-a whole block-. ---Therefore --chaos 
and panic could spread if there was no clear point of 
contact. 
_Resident 
caretakers provided that vital link. 
The other critical element of resident caretaking was its 
manual character. Cleaning common areas, tackling emergency 
floods and light failure were three examples of the 
caretakers' manual role. Some authorities and-union 
representatives seemed to think manual work was Only good 
for someone else, and that caretakers would gain status by 
becoming office-based. This is patently 'absurd and undermines 
the value of the critical manual jobs on which our whole 
society depends. Caretakers without cleaning responsibility 
tended to lose their sense of direction and were no longer 
any use for -the constanemergencies of a large estate. 
Cleaning duties gave caretakers a constant daily routine 
that tenants recognised and that committed them to holding 
the line on all sorts of abuse. Caretaking is a complex ' 
job, based on a manual function with a major human component. 
In other words, it's one of the few truly traditional jobs 
to survive and be indispensable and irreplaceable. 
value was greatly enhanced on the project estates. 
Its 
Without 
caretakers, the flatted estates were not viable. 
f 
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FORMAL LIAISON WITH RESIDENTS 
We found in the Priority Estates Project and in the local 
management survey that without a clear sharing of 
responsibility between tenants and local authority, a 
local management office could not reverse the serious 
decline of an estate. It was a question of "the buildings 
and the people". 
ý There was a need for a straightforward 
trade-off between what the council would do as landlord 
and what the residents would protect and back in their own 
communal interest. 
The open door thät-operated on all 20 estates was not 
enough to ensure success-, "and most projects went much 
further, with close liaison between tenants and staff on 
many issues. 
In 16 of the 20 estate-based management projects, there 
were strong and active tenants' groups.. Fifteen of 
these 16 had the support of a paid community worker or 
organiser and had regular formal meetings with the council 
in order to discuss the running of the estate. Six had 
joint organisations between tenants' bodies and local 
staff. 
Of the four estates that had rather inactive tenants' 
groups or no tenants' groups, two had a community 
worker. 
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72. 
TENANT INVOLVEMENT 
of Number Number of projects 
_ projecs with regular 
Degree of tenant Number of with consultation and 
involvement -projects community liaison between 
work tenants and local 
support authority staff 
Strong, active' 1 16 15 15 
tenant group /s _ ." - 
Less active/no. - -- permanent tenant permanent 4 2 0 
group/s 
Total 20 17 - 15 
The involvement of tenants in management tasks was limited 
on most estates. On only four estates did residents have 
direct jurisdiction over any areas of management 
responsibility such as monitoring repairs, helping with 
lettings, selecting priorities for improvements. 
One of the residents' groups was aiming to form a tenant 
management co-operative but was foundering in its 
negotiations with the council. Four projects, 
* including 
the would-be co-operative, had elected bodies which were 
recognised by the council as having a formal say in the 
management of the estate. However, none of these 
organisations had yet taken on a permanent life of its own, 
and they depended very much on the goodwill of the council 
officers and the local leadership that emerged. 
Some estates had very varied communities and tenants' 
representation was not always straightforward. Several 
Brent Lambeth, Hackney and Bolton; the latter three 
were the three pilot Priority Estate Projects. Hackney 
and Bolton Tenant Boards both registered as Friendly 
Societies., 
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if the --estates__went__-to__gre. at_ lengths to ensure that 
representatives from minorities were directly involved in 
decision-making. _ --On -two'or three estates-, co-options 
'. from minority- organisätionsý to the- Neighbourhood- 
'Manageinent Cöinmittee -were= agreed- since the 'sizeable= 
ethnic- ini-nöriti'es= might- not be= elected ünder" a ina-jörity- 
ballot -system'.. Ensuring- -that- a- wide cross--sectiön- of" --- -' 
., 
the. community on- a= large= and1 diverse estate participated-' in 
decision-Making was= a---tigh-t.; röpe that= all-estate o-frf'icers 
Saalkerl : 
LIMITED ROLE FOR-TENANTS 
Tenants'-priorities_in- improvements were accepted in-. 
" principle-on most: estates through the established-liaison 
channels-. -. In practice, =constraints of finance, confusion- 
of-, respons. ib_üity.: between departments-and a7 dbsire- to- 
"treat everyone alike"- throughout'- the- council, led-, to"' = 
disappointment-and. bitterness when tenants': often-common=- 
sense opinions: were_overridden... -Ironically, this orten 
arose out. of.. over-ambitious spending plans-by councils= 
which distorted residents'-ehöices and generated 
consultation exercises that couldn't be followed through. 
Without a transfer of responsibility through a formally 
constituted management agreement between the council and 
the residents' organisation, it was difficult to overcome 
this problem. Only by registering as a Friendly Society 
could a residents' group consider taking such control. 
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Although registration does not of itself give control, it 
gives the tenants' group the legal status to negotiate a 
management agreement. Two projects' tenant groups had 
registered in this way. 
In practice, while a co-operative relationship between 
residents and local authorities was developed on most of 
the project estates, the role of residents was strictly 
limited, both by their own reluctance and the councils' 
nervousness. On only one estate in the country, 
Cloverhall, Rochdale (not in the survey), did the tenants 
take over full management and maintenance responsibility 
from the'council. This was a highly complex and drawn-out 
process, taking over three years to negotiate. 
It must be said that, while we talked to residents 
wherever we could, no systematic survey of residents' 
opinions was conducted on most of the estates, and it 
remains to be uncovered what a broad cross-section of 
tenants would say about local management. However, on 
two of the project estates, tenants were surveyed and their 
views were very positive. 
2 
Meanwhile, it is true to. say that the degree of local 
involvement and contact between staff and residents was 
much greater following the opening of local offices than 
on the average estate, and that, without exception, local 
staff were deeply committed to working with residents. 
4 
Local residents everywhere arglied for local offices. 
. 
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COMMUNITY WORKERS AND TENANTS 
It was surprising to find what an important role community 
workers played on unpopular estates. Within the local 
authorities, it was very common to hear officers and 
councillors belittle their role as "lefties", "do-gooders", 
or "agitators". Yet in practice, their desire to identify 
. with 
the needs of tenants and their ability to find their 
way through the town hall system meant that they often 
greatly enhanced the tenants'"chances of being heard. It 
was true in at least three cases that community workers 
played an adversary role in relation to the council which 
was inappropriate to the new management approach of a 
local office. It involved a confrontational style that 
militated against an open door to tenants' problems and a 
S. 
" co-operative relationship between locally-based council 
staff and tenants. On some estates, the hostile relations 
between tenants and staff took several years to overcome. 
This was particularly true where there was a well-organised, 
aggressively-led, but minority tenants' association backed 
by a politically-motivated community worker. * In that 
situation, the political rewards of efficient day-to-day 
management were not immediately apparent and therefore 
initially had no stronger appeal to politically-motivated 
community workers than they had to personally ambitious 
tenants' leaders or local and national politicians. This 
was changing in boroughs like Islington, Lambeth and 
Liverpool, as estate management was seen to''pay off" 
politically. In every case in the survey, common-sense 
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and good management eventually led to better relations 
with the council, with the community worker still backing 
the tenants, but in a collaborative rather than adversary 
role. 
As environmental issues have risen in people's 
consciousness and as money for instant physical solutions 
has disappeared, more and more councillors, community 
workers and residents have accepted the logic of local 
management and the importance of having a say in it. 
Therefore the "them" and "us" atmosphere of the classic 
public encounter between tenants and council has been 
supplanted . 
FUNDING FOR COMMUNITY WORK 
The community workers were funded in a variety of ways: 
ten were paid for directly by the local authority; four 
by Urban Aid or Inner City Partnership funds; three by 
voluntary organisations. Thirteen of the 17 community 
workers were on the local authority payroll. It was 
surprising to find local political commitment to this 
work, though it should be pointed out that community work 
jobs were constantly being reviewed and were very vulnerable 
to cuts in spending. 
TENANT TRAINING 
One of the innovations of the Priority Estates Project on 
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a number of the survey estates was tenant training in 
basic housing management issues. The first course was 
in January 1982 and organised at the behest of the 
Cloverhall Tenants' Association, Rochdale, where tenants 
wanted to take over from the council the management of 
their estate. Bolton, Hackney, Lambeth and Islington- 
tenants joined in. Training programmes have been 
organised around the key issues of rent income and' -. 
arrears; organising and allocating a local budget to pay 
for a local workforce;. allocating dwellings and choosing 
between conflicting needs of applicants; ordering and 
sorting out priorities for repairs; dealing with social 
problems; and running a democratic and efficient local 
body. 
The training sessions have been rich in inspiring local. 
leadership and in generating a sensible dialogue between 
the council and residents. The central ideas of local 
housing management have proved well within the grasp of 
the average layman and woman. The tenants who came 
forward from a run-down estate, with their disillusioning 
experiences of community breakdown and council ineptitude, 
usually warmed to the problems to hand because only 
exceptionally caring and committed residents were still 
willing to try after so much failure. The depth of their 
feeling for the problems always gave them a long start and 
the human content of the housing issues enabled them to 
seize on solutions very quickly. . Tenants received 
certificates at the end of each course to verify that they 
had completed the work. 
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The value of input into the training, -support and 
development of local residents' organisations tended to 
be questioned by councils, even though it was happening 
in most of the projects. The evidence from-the survey 
and from the training sessions suggested that it paid 
dividends. 
COMMUNITY FACILITIES 
It is perhaps surprising that fewer than half the projects 
were improving community facilities generally, given the 
level of social problems and of tenant involvement. 
However, on many run-down estates with a notorious local 
reputation, social services, health. and education services 
were already heavily involved, sometimes over many years. 
Nine project estates already had community provisions, 
such as a community centre, under-fives activities or 
adventure playground, before the projects were established. 
We found that the impact of these community provisions was 
largely dependent on an efficient housing management 
service, bringing some kind of coherence and order to the 
landlord services, requiring a local office to provide a 
focus for residents, management staff and other community 
services. Six local authorities we visited, that were 
not included in our study, had mounted estate-based, 
community projects with fairly elaborate provision of community 
facilities* but without involving directly the housing 
department. In no case had these community projects 
One estate had been provided with an under-fives playgroup, 
mothers' and babies' centre, youth club, community centre, 
and playground, as well as a full-time advice centre. 
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succeeded in reversing poor conditions. 
3 Housing 
management must be in the front line in order to tackle 
basic running problems, as'a prerequisite for wider 
community development. However, as the management 
projects became established, the demands for better 
community facilities grew. In most cases, these were 
popular and diverse. Football pitches, BMX tracks, play 
areas, quiet garden areas, workshops, mothers' clubs, 
church groups, 'Sunday schools, all sprang into existence 
and sought house-room. 
Community halls, while badly wanted on many of the 
estates, were extremely difficult to run and often hit 
financial difficulties, especially where there was a 
licensed bar. The scope for dishonesty in that case was 
endless and what was supposed to give the tenants' 
association financial independence became a"debt-spinner. 
On one estate, members running a community centre with .a 
licensed bar amassed debts totalling £9,000 owed to the 
breweries and resigned. As a result, the hall was closed 
for several months and the new tenants' association had to 
invest much of its energy in paying off debts. A second 
estate raised money to build a community centre, ran'it 
successfully for two years, then closed it down and boarded 
it up in the wake of factional strife only three years 
after it was first built. Tenants' organisations and 
community workers were often weak on the business side of 
community enterprises. 
Community facilities only worked in the end if they were 
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properly supervised, maintained and cleaned regularly, 
and organised in tandem with an efficient landlord 
service. On a majority of the project estates, this 
was gradually happening, though housing staff were often 
taking the initiative outside the immediate jurisdiction 
of their job and working closely with' particular groups 
of residents. 
I 
Many of the project estates were too large and too 
disparate for estate-wide community-run facilities to 
succeed. Small committed interest groups seemed to work 
better. For example, on the Broadwater Farm estate in 
Haringey, their Youth Association , representing primarily 
the interests of youth, a majority of whom were from racial 
minorities, worked tirelessly for their youth club, job 
creation, community facilities, and help with the elderly, 
most of whom were white. This organisation, based within 
one section of the community, managed to target itself on 
issues that would not only help the youth but the estate as 
a whole. On other estates, similar small interest groups 
formed and had an impact far beyond their immediate 
objectives. Under-fives activities, language groups for 
foreign women, training workshops, pensioners' lunch clubs, 
advice centres, are all examples that have sprung up. 
Organising around particular groups or goals can often 
generate local leaders and spread to much wider community 
benefits. 
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MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS 
Modernisation of outdated interiors to dwellings and 
environmental works to surroundings were going on on 18 
of the 20 estates. On 13 of the estates, local staff 
and residents had some influence over what happened. 
The following table shows a breakdown of areas of work 
and how the work was fundedl. 
73. 
CAPITAL'IMPROVEMENTS 
Type of improvement 
Number of 
estates 
. 
Source of funding 
(°A of total cost of work) 
Exterior of blocks and 67% HIP 
dwellings and work to 18 33% Urban Aid/Inner City 
the environment Partnership 
Inside homes 11 . 100% HIP 
Entry phones 9 100% HIP 
67%o HIP 
Community facilities 8 33°% Urban Aid/Inner City 
Partnership 
No improvements 2 
The most extensive improvement was to the estate 
environment. Almost all estates were being upgraded by 
landscaping, repainting, planting, and provision of 
playgrounds. 
Environmental improvements tended to work better than house 
modernisation because they caused less disruption. There 
was a growing tendency for tenants' priorities, such as 
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lighting and door security, to take precedence over 
architects' dreams for weeping willows and flowering 
cherries. This was not to say that tenants did not 
appreciate greenery. On, many estates they were actively 
involved in planting. But they set the highest premium 
on security and other basic items and wanted them first. 
Tenants at Tulse Hill and White City4 persuaded the G. L. C. 
to postpone landscaping in favour of improved lighting. 
Entry phones or secure doors were essential for communal 
blocks and were being installed on 10 of the 13 flatted 
estates, but were a dismal failure on half the estates,. 
even after the local office was involved. This was for a 
variety of reasons. Often they were installedprfor to 
resident consultation and in several cases prior to the- 
opening of a local office. In one ease, they were wrongly 
wired up and had never worked over. a 3-year period. In 
some cases, poor, vandal-prone doors and breakable glass 
were used*. And in some very disarrayed areas where social 
pressures were too severe, entry phones could only be made 
to work with full-time door-porters, acting as security 
guards. After numerous failures, this was tried 
successfully in Liverpool. Entry phones only worked where' 
other areas of management, particularly tenant involvement, 
lettings and maintenance, were operating properly. Long- 
term maintenance contracts were essential with specialist 
firms. 
The enclosure of public open space to provide private front 
In one case the glass was never put in. 
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and back gardens or patios, whether for flats or 
houses, 
was probably the easiest, most radical and most successful 
of the small-scale' environmental innovations, totally 
transforming the physical aspect and social dynamic of 
many blocks and more'than one cottage estate. 
Dwellings on five-oüt of the seven cottage estates and 
four walk-up estates were being modernised; - one cottage 
estate and one-walk-up estate had been modernised in-the 
1970's - 11 of the 13 estates that were 30 years old or 
more were thus being brought up to date. 
There were two innovative and exciting experiments in 
modernisation. One was the tenants'. grants scheme 
whereby tenants themselves became responsible for hiring 
a builder to'modernise their kitchen, bathroom-and-heating 
system, with professional advice from the council and a 
range of choices open to the tenant. The results were 
encouraging in saving money, accelerating the programme, 
involving the tenants directly and attaining a higher 
standard of workmanship, although this experiment had its 
special problems too. 
The other was the G. L. C's ambitious rolling programme of 
package conversions on its pre-war flatted estates, which 
included the two G. L. C. estates in our survey. The G. L. C. 
hired contractors to rip out and replace complete kitchens 
and bathrooms and instal full central heating over a five- 
day period. The work was carried out only if the tenant 
agreed. Special arrangements were made with neighbours' 
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for emergency water supply and cooking and no one was 
without services overnight. The modernisation, 'basic 
as it was, cost half to a third of the normal internal 
modernisations and caused minimal disruption. The G. L. C. 
package scheme was the only example we-found of a large- 
scale capital operation broken down so. effectively into 
each dwelling component that it was actually cheaper and 
faster and more efficient than any other modernisation 
scheme we encountered. 
Modernisation of homes was popular, even though the process 
caused quite incredible disruption to family life, often 
over months. Most councils were no longer rehousing 
families, but were carrying out modernisation around-the 
family or, at most, temporarily rehousing them for the 
worst few weeks. 
* The biggest frustrations were the 
unkept promises of council staff and the unrealistic 
timetables of builders. All capital improvement programmes, 
including modernisation, were decided at the centre and 
carried through by centrally-based staff. This often 
meant that valuable local expertise and on-the-ground 
supervision we. relost, even though there was some local 
input. In only five cases were project staff directly 
responsible for co-ordinating improvements on the ground, 
though not for taking key decisions. Even then, they 
were usually attempting to achieve a co-ardinated programme 
with the involvement of council architects, surveyors and 
Seven projects did conversions with tenants in situ. One 
rehoused tenants temporarily; three rehoused permanently. 
The in situ conversions were-very popular. 
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engineers, building contractors and sub-contractors 
(often several firms), private consultant architects, the 
tenants affected by the work, the central lettings 
department where rehousing was required, finance 
department for payment of contracts, legal department 
for checking contracts and pursuing any breaches, and 
sometimes the direct labour organisation for ongoing 
"repairs while the major works got under way. Up to 11 
separate organisations or departments, other than the local 
housing office, were therefore involved in one way or 
another. 
By no standards could such a structure be regarded as 
logical or workable and it is not surprising that, among 
tenants, 5 capital works earned more derision, if not anger, 
than any other aspect of estate management. It was not-. 
that tenants did not want improvements. They were crying 
out for them. But the nonsensical organisation and the 
waste grieved them in their need. 
The most radical major innovation was "lopping off" the 
top one or two storeys of LI- and 5-storey blocks of 
maisonettes and flats. While costing at least £8,000 per 
dwelling, it produced an attractive row of houses from an 
unlettable block of flats in areas where there was a crude 
housing surplus (such as Merseyside, Greater Manchester 
and Tyneside). It had the major advantage over demolition 
of asserting some value in the community and in council 
housing, but it was not a solution which enjoyed widespread 
application and was too radical for many local authorities 
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to contemplate. It was becoming too expensive for the 
Government to encourage. However, in the areas of surplus 
flats, it was a most enlightened and imaginative way 
forward. 
Often relatively minor improvements which were not very 
expensive made an important difference to the overall 
conditions. Cavity wall insulation on a cottage-estate 
(Leicester), gas fires in the living room that-also heated 
the water (Stockton), anti-graffiti paint in hallways and on 
staircases (Rochdale), laminated glass in windows in 
vulnerable public areas, and vandal-proof light covers on 
exposed balconies (G. L. C. ), strong, solid front doors on 
thief-prone balconies (Haringey and Brent) had'an 
immeasurable effect on the quality of life. Each 
improvement might cost £50 to £250 per dwelling, the type 
of investment that could be replicated many times over. 
The shopping list given here was a direct result of 
tenants' pleadings. Their needs and requirements were 
often- far more immediate and basic than the council would 
normally allow. The obsession with capital programmes and 
the involvement of architects, surveyors and building 
contractors at the wrong'level and on the wrong scale, had 
often distorted the progress of maintenance and continual 
renovation into a kind of new-build approach to old 
dwellings. The innovations in local management greatly 
enhanced the tenants' ability to ask for and oversee 
sensible and modest improvements, which were so much more 
likely to fulfil the object of-the exercise. The same could 
not always be said of more ambitious and less locally focussed 
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spending. 
All the estates in the survey needed substantial sums 
spent on them on an ongoing basis, either by virtue of 
their age or their-design or both. However, we concluded 
that large-scale building contracts on dense, fully-occupied 
estates were cumbersome, costly and wasteful. It seemed 
more logical to disaggregate the work needed, organise 
small-block or area-based contracts and generally do small 
sections of the work on an incremental basis. Then it 
became easier to pick up mistakes. The amounts of money, 
the penalties and the faulty plans became more manageable 
and rectifiable. This incremental approach, with resident 
involvement in decision-making, was increasingly being 
adopted as funds became more scarce and previous blunders 
more apparent. 
Improvements on Tulse Hill were radically modified in the 
light of tenants' preferences. Balcony lights were renewed 
instead of extensive landscaping, and improved rubbish 
chutes were given priority over better car parking. 
Sleeping policemen were introduced to stop speeding 
traffic instead of waiting for planning permission to 
close some roads and open others. The latter plan had 
bounced between departments for five years and would have 
cost £2 million - the 10 sleeping policemen cost £100 each 
and took six weeks to get agreed and put in place. 
A major problem in all the projects was the way capital 
budgets were drawn up. Capital spending was the puppet 
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of central and local government financial problems-and 
there was no ongoing commitment to planned maintenance, 
nor any regular, clear local budgets. 
The real need in the projects was for a competent 
repairs team able to take on bigger and more regular 
maintenance, such as roof overhaul, plumbing replacements, 
cyclical repainting and suchlike, thereby reducing the 
need for disruptive, unwieldy and often wasteful crash 
programmes when an estate had already reached a 
catastrophic point of decay. There was no reason why the 
maintenance programme should not include continual upgrading 
of the inside of dwellings and of communal areas. This 
approach was being tried on one estate. In the long run, 
the ongoing long-term maintenance approach would be 
cheaper and more intelligible to residents. 
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CHAPTER XIII - THE HARD CORE OF MANAGEMENT 
- REPAIRS_ 
- RENTS 
- LETTINGS 
LOCAL LETTINGS 
The letting of empty properties was the most. complex and 
sensitive issue. It was very difficult in the larger 
authorities and on-the less popular-estates to achieve 
quick and effective letting of empty property except on a 
decentralised basis. The lettings chain involving an 
offer being made, viewing arranged, possible refusal, -- 
new offer, caused a time lag that in turn invited vandalism. 
The alternative to this damaging cycle was letting to 
desperate households who were more likely to accept an 
unpopular offer quickly but who might compound their family 
problems and the unpopularity of an estate by accepting an 
unsuitable offer. This form of social "dumping" was the 
common practice on all the estates prior to local management. 
On 16 of the estates, there were changes in lettings policy 
in an attempt to reverse the decline. In one or two cases, 
homeless families were no longer offered that estate for a 
time; in others all applicants were carefully screened to 
prevent households with severe social problems ending up on 
the estate. On the flatted estates, there was an effort to 
reduce child densities, either by under-letting large 
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dwellings or by restricting access for families to lower 
floors. In all tower blocks there was a declared policy 
to move families out, though this was proving increasingly 
difficult to implement in-London because of the worsening 
housing situation. 
All restrictions on lettings policies carried their own 
liabilities. Under-letting larger dwellings to smaller 
families and-childless households, unless rents were 
reduced, imposed a-big rent and rates burden--on a low-income 
household. More importantly, 'heating and furnishing a 
dwelling that was larger than necessary was a serious 
problem. Under-letting in many areas was no longer 
considered a very sensible solution unless a tenant 
particularly wanted it and was able to cover the extra 
cost. Excluding families from tower blocks was very 
successful, both for the families who moved out and for 
childless households who moved in, but to extend that 
policy to upper floors of 4-storey flats or maisonettes, 
as has been done in Liverpool and Rochdale, so narrowed 
the demand from suitable applicants that there was a surplus 
in many areas of 3-bedroom upper floor dwellings for which 
the only demand was from single people. 
Most of the single applicants in places like Rochdale and 
Liverpool were unskilled, unemployed, transient youngsters 
who had just left home and who could not cope with 
furnishing a large flat, connecting gas and electricity 
and paying for rent and rates. - The turnover was very 
high under such lettings and moonlighting was common, 
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leaving hire purchase and fuel bills as well as rent 
arrears very often. The trail of debts enhanced the 
poor reputation of. an estate, leading to the common 
refusal of shops and delivery services to deal with bona 
fide tenants. Local authorities were reluctant to ask 
for deposits or guarantors, yet such precautions were the 
only ways of protecting the stock and the lives of other 
tenants, which were often made miserable. by freewheeling 
youngsters not yet used to the fragile independence they 
had found. The blocks and dwellings themselves were 
often totally unsuitable for young single people. 
Excluding the homeless and other low-income groups from 
the poor estates proved socially divisive and politically 
sensitive. It was hard to justify, given the existence 
of empty dwellings and-the patent housing need of some 
households. A policy that overtly limited the rehousing 
of homeless families on bad estates made the immediate 
connection between homelessness and unpopular estates, 
often seeming to blame homeless families for poor 
conditions. Making a wider range of offers to homeless. 
families in areas of high demand was the only alternative 
but was not a policy that was widely adopted. The only 
other solution was to open up demand through better 
management and local lettings. 
Eleven of the projects still had centrally run lettings 
systems but seven of these enjoyed special policies in an 
attempt to prevent social ghettos. In only four of the 
project estates was there no change in lettings policies 
and virtually no flexibility. There, the management staff 
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had a serious uphill battle to make anything work. 
Where there was some flexibility, local managers were 
able to intervene and affect lettings practices 
if not 
carry them out themselves. This greatly enhanced 
the 
sense of purpose and satisfaction of the local staff 
and often involved residents in lettings matters too. 
It 
also produced more applicants. 
On the 11_ estates without local lettings, the number of 
empty homes had increased fractionally from 496 at the 
outset, to 522 in 1982/83. On one highly unpopular 
modern concrete complex estate, empty flats increased by 
150 to 29°% of all dwellings. The increase happened in 
spite of special lettings policies and some flexibility, 
but no local waiting list or local lettings. By trying 
to reduce the number of lettings to families with children 
and to disadvantaged groups in an area of low housing 
demand, there were greater difficulties at the town hall in 
finding applicants at all. Even on the estates where the 
number of empty dwellings was falling, the reduction was 
much smaller and slower without local lettings, as these 
figures show. 
A LOCAL WAITING LIST 
The system that worked most successfully was where lettings 
were handled entirely by the local office. This happened 
on nine estates. All but one. of the nine were able to 
generate some local demand. Under local lettings, anyone 
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wanting a home could queue at the local office for any 
dwelling available. The overriding priority was to get 
the dwellings occupied. This random method of letting 
worked best in that it was fast, 
_it 
enhanced tenants' 
choice and commitment, and it was even-handed. No one 
sat in judgement over anyone else. 
Local lettings reduced the number of empty properties* in 
every case. The main advantages of the local list-were 
speed of letting, a guarantee that people who applied 
locally actually wanted to live there, and a chance to 
strengthen local ties. Relatives, friends and local 
people were often willing to move onto a local estate that 
was unpopular with outsiders, because of their roots in 
the neighbourhood. The local list included applicants 
referred from the town hall and people applying direct to 
the local office. Under local lettings in some authorities, 
only households registered on the central waiting list were 
eligible. Rehousing was in these cases according to the 
same priorities as the town hall with the same points 
system and with homeless families and other urgent cases 
taking automatic precedence. 
But in some areas, the&arth-of council applicants was such 
that lettings took place on a first-come, first-served 
basis at the local office. Dwellings were let literally 
over the counter. In general, the local waiting list 
V We eliminated from our estimates in all project areas. 
properties that were empty for major improvements, but 
included vandalised empty property that would otherwise have been fit for letting. On one estate, there had always been very few empty dwellings. 
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generated a steady stream of applicants if it was open to 
all-comers. 
A large pool of willing applicants was essential if local 
lettings were to work. Even in areas where through the 
central or district system, there appeared to be few 
applicants, such as Liverpool, Newcastle and Gateshead, a 
local office, letting empty dwellings direct, was likely 
to recruit in people who otherwise would not consider 
living on the worst estates. This change'of psychology 
was born partly of the impact of local management. More 
importantly, it overcame the absurd pecking order that 
commonly passed as tenants' choice whereby, through the 
central lettings system, applicants were asked to rank on 
paper their top choices of estates. On that basis, of 
course, applicants had never asked for the estates in our 
survey., 
'u LETTINGS 
Type of letting 
No. of Voids Voids Voids No information 
projects down same up 
Central 11 51 3 2, 
Lettings from 9 81 0 estate office 
IMPACT OF THE LOCAL OFFICE ON LETTINGS 
The number of empty homes in the nine projects with local 
lettings had dropped from a total of 435 at the outset of 
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the projects to 225 in 1'982/83 when we conducted oür 
survey. The following, table shows the changes that were 
brought about in the number of empty dwellings where the 
local offices handled lettings. 
75. CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF EMPTY PROPERTIES UNDER LOCAL AND 
CENTRAL LETTINGS IN ALL PROJECTS FROM THE OUTSET OF THE 
PROJECTS TO THE TIME OF THE SURVEY 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
Start of project 
Central lettings - 
empty homes go up 
Local lettings - 
empty homes go 
down 
Nov. 1982 
The following table shows that the number of empty 
dwellings rose on three estates, none of which had local 
lettings. Empty dwellings were reduced, often 
substantially, on the other 17 estates. 
The projects started at varying times. We used the- 
figures recorded for each project when it began; 
regardless of actual dates. 
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NUMBERS OF EMPTY PROPERTIES AND CHANGE IN THE RATE 
SINCE THE-LOCAL OFFICE OPENED 
OF VOIDS 
Type of estate 
Recent voids 
Date '11otal 
Empties 
as % of 
total 
°%'change 
from start 
of-project 
Cottage - N. W. England Nov. 
82 7 1.5% same* 
Cottage - North of England 1982 ' 15 
1.5°% -21%* 
Cottage - Midlands Sept. 
82 30 . 
1.5% -hI0%* 
Cottage - North of England 1982 10 1% -760A* 
Cottage - North of England June 82 23 
6% +10% 
Cottage - Midland Mar. 
83 44 15% -LL°%* 
Cottage - N. W. England Jan. 83 5 1.6% -44%* 
Balcony - London Dec. 82 22 3.2% +45% 
Balcony - London Nov. 82 26 
4.7°% -74% 
Balcony - London Nov. 82 43 4 . 9°% 
-36%ý 
Balcony - London Nov. 82 22 201/6 
NIA 
Mainly balcony - N. West Jan. 83 37 1.9% -53. %* 
Balcony - London Nov. 82 17 6.2% -60% 
Modern - London 0.5% some 
Modern - London 1982 av. 30 1.6% N/A 
Modern - London 1982 
Av6gage 0.8% -33% 
Modern - London June 82 27 2.5°% -21% 
Modern - London Oct. 82 34 3.14°% -45% 
Modern - London 1982 
Av5rage 4.9% -551/6 
Modern - N. W. England Jan. 83 293 29% +109° 
*Starred numbers represent estates with local lettings. 
Local lettings did not work in isolation from other 
management initiatives. They had to be coupled with a 
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local office, a general clean-up of the environment, 
swift repair of empty property, good security, employment 
of night guards, control of vandalism, and special 
recruitment drives for new residents, including-advertising 
in the paper. All these involved the close co-operation of 
residents who had to be persuaded that there was some point- 
in trying. 
Empty, 'boarded up homes were a visible announcement of 
trouble and told residents and outsiders that the dwelling 
on offer was basically unacceptable before the applicant 
even saw inside it. Extraordinary steps had to be taken 
at the outset of a local management project to reverse this 
situation. Conventional lettings did not prove sufficient. 
Conversely, a full estate, the direct and personal 
achievement of the local workers who were dealing with 
applicants, generated demand, built up a local queue and 
created an atmosphere where local workers were personally 
committed to getting homes occupied. They were "marketing" 
the homes in a positive way rather than just coping with. a 
hopeless cycle of offers, refusals, boarding up, more 
offers, vandal damage, further refusals, squatting. 
The problems and the solutions were shown to be closely 
interrelated and as many elements as possible had to be 
tackled together. Local lettings on their own did not 
fill the estate's empty properties. 
Local lettings in the eight projects saved the councils 
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thousands of pounds by bringing in extra rent and rates 
and by stopping vandal damage to now occupied property. 
In all, approximately £210,000* a year was being recouped 
through rent and rates from the previously unoccupied 
homes. Even allowing for very high arrears, a lot of 
cash was at stake: the equivalent of a salary for at 
least two workers in each of the eight projects. 
Additional savings on repairs to empty property and 
reduced vandal damage were between £500-£2,000 per 
property. Local control of lettings was an essential 
economy for hard-pressed local authorities with difficult- 
to-let estates. 
POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO LOCAL LETTINGS 
In spite of the obvious advantages of devolving lettings 
to the local offices, chief housing officers and senior 
politicians on the whole took unkindly to the idea. So 
ingrained was the notion that council housing was strictly 
rationed and that you had to queue for it, prove your 
overriding need for it, and fit the dwelling and estate you 
wanted according to council-determined criteria, that any 
freer, more localised and more autonomous lettings system 
seemed synonymous with "queue-jumping" and parochial 
bigotry. The genuine fears that local lettings might 
discriminate against minorities and might lead to unfair 
To arrive at this figure, we averaged rent and rates for 
2-bedroom properties in all the projects £20 per week), 
multiplied by 50 (rent-paying weeks) and by 210, the 
reduced number of empty properties. 
'461 ii 
lettings were bedded-deep within the. psyche of 
centralised administration. Local lettings were rarely 
initiated from the centre. Almost always they followed 
logically upon the local office struggling with the 
problem of failing to fill empty dwellings while the 
centre failed to supply sufficient willing applicants. 
Some local officers. took the initiative in going*to the 
centre, taking names. from the central waiting list and 
contacting applicants direct. In that way, de facto, 
local lettings developed. By the same token, when once 
the office was there on the estate, tenants would bring 
in sons and daughters, friends and relatives, needing a 
home of their own. 
informal initiatives. 
The idea proved itself through 
In the hard-pressed London boroughs, the constant pressure 
of homelessness caused central allocations departments to 
resist local lettings, often bitterly. They wanted (and 
needed) to commandeer all vacant dwellings for the endless 
demands of homelessness. However, many families opted to 
remain in "bed and breakfast" until a "good offer" came up*? - 
rather than be dumped on the worst estates through central 
lettings. This happened constantly at Tulse Hill and 
Stockwell Park in Lambeth where homeless families often 
failed to materialise at the local office when sent from 
the town hall. Through the local lettings scheme, however, 
tenants came and registered at the local office in large 
numbers. There were always willing takers and anyone who 
was homeless or under threat of homelessness took automatic 
priority. The council could refer any needy case and 
ýi N, 
, ýý'i 
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determine their priority. It then depended on the. 
family to show up. 
In that way, the local lettings worked for everyone. It 
only remained to monitor closely for any sign of. ' 
discrimination or unfairness. The estates concerned so 
overwhelmingly attracted and housed disadvantaged groups 
that this was very unlikely to be the case. There was 
no suggestion that the eight projects with local lettings 
discriminated in any way against vulnerable households. 
If anything, they helped the very poorest communities 
regain self-respect by enabling fast lettings and encouraging 
a full estate, the surest indicator of communal wellbeing. 
TRANSFERS 
Transfers continued to be facilitated as a way of overcoming 
tenant dissatisfaction and on all estates there were still 
substantial problems with the volume of re-lets, although 
this was declining as the estates improved. One of the 
most destructive and common types of transfers was a 
"management transfer" where a "good" tenant was moved off a 
"bad" estate because he was being harassed by a "bad" 
neighbour and had come to blows in some way. There were 
numerous cases of this happening for a range of reasons from 
attacks by dogs, to noise nuisance and racial abuse. 
Whatever the cause, it was the most damaging way out, 
breaking the resolve of those who remained, including staff, 
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to curb the nuisance. The main argument against the 
alternative approach of moving-the offending family was 
that they were bound to move to somewhere better since they 
were usually already on the council's worst estate. The 
whole notion of transfers as an avenue of escape had yet 
to be lost on most of the 20 estates. Jeremy Seabrook's 
snapshot notes about Walsall1 summed up the problem of 
management transfers: 
"It is the policy of the authority to move old 
people out if they are harassed by the young..... 
part of the nature of things that the young will 
so torment the old that they have to be moved. " 
Given slack housing demand in many areas, the turnover of 
tenants continued to be very high and it did not seem 
reasonable to deny people transfers. Yet only when 
vacancy and transfer rates began to fall did an estate 
community usually begin to galvanise. A lot of management 
effort was focussed on reducing the demand for transfers. 
INTERNAL', TRRNSEERS 
One way of satisfying changing housing needs, while 
retaining the community, was to organise internal transfers 
locally. Six of the projects without local lettings were 
allowed to give priority to internal transfers on the estate. 
Allowing tenants to transfer to another home within the 
estate through the estate office was a tremendous boost to the 
morale of tenants and workers and had the opposite effect 
of normal off-estate transfers. It helped prevent more 
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ambitious households from moving off to other estates 
altogether. Transfers were often needed because of 
changing family size and circumstances, because of major 
repairs and also because of neighbour problems. Ready 
internal transfers, as an alternative to transferring off 
the estate, helped to keep down the number of empty 
homes on the unpopular estates and held together the 
tenuous community links which were so vital for a healthy 
future. Tenants were often willing to stay on the estate 
if their other housing problems could be solved. 
2 
Local housing officers took many initiatives with internal 
estate-based "swops" and transfers, thereby pleasing 
otherwise frustrated transfer applicants. It also gave 
'a 
sense of control and responsibility to the local office which 
they were keen to exercise. It did mean that the "better" 
dwellings would be snapped up by existing residents if they 
came vacant, leaving the less popular dwellings for newcomers. 
But it was less destabilising than a complete exodus. 
LOCAL REPAIRS 
Repairs were the most difficult and costly problem to sort 
" out. Because they were not normally run by the housing 
department, they were rarely integrated into the local 
management structure. However, with one exception, all 
repairs ordering in the 20. projects was done through the 
estate office. This had the great advantage that tenants 
could at lebst pin down the person they had reported their 
repairs to, and estate officers could make instant 
reference to repairs records and could chase them by phone 
with the tenant in attendance. 
P, 1 vies P. r 
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In 15 of the 20 estates the repairs service was reported 
to be improving. Because proper monitoring of repairs 
was almost non-existent, it was extremely difficult to 
extract more than impressionistic information in most 
authorities, either. about the central repairs system or 
the impact of the local office. However, we managed to 
glean uniform evidence to show that only where there was 
'a local repairs team based on the estate, working in 
concert with the local office, were staff and residents 
satisfied with the service provided. 
There was a vast difference between the repairs service 
offered by an estate-based team on eight estates and that 
offered by a district or centrally-based system on the 
remaining 12. 
A majority of the district-based repairs services had 
improved somewhat in the project estates as a result of 
on-the-spot staff, quick reporting, better liaison with 
tenants through the estate office, better relations between 
local housing staff and repairs workers and fewer access 
problems. However, the district service was still 
cumbersome, inflexible, slow and difficult to control. 
No one was wholly satisfied with it and there were many 
complaints. 
The backlog of jobs, the'level of complaints, the problems 
of access to homes were higher in. district and central 
systems. Overheads took up more than half the repairs 
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budget and workers spent on average less than half 
their 
working hours actually doing the repair jobs required. 
Employees were as dissatisfied with this state of affairs 
as residents. 
3 
Most of the projects relied on the central organisation 
for work on heating or drains or other specialist 
services. This invariably posed major problems of 
delays, inefficiency, --crossed wires, wrong parts, lack of 
parts, etc. etc. But there was often no alternative-for 
highly specialised repairs, such as lift maintenance or 
central heating. 
PROBLEMS WITH DIRECT LABOUR ORGANISATIONS 
The direct labour organisations were geared to paper and 
mechanical operations that fitted badly with the 
sensitive and personal local approach that the run-down 
estates cried out for. 
In several of the project authorities without local teams, 
the unbending rigidity of the central direct labour 
organisation, the acrimonious industrial relations, the 
extreme defensiveness of the unions, and the emphasis of 
directors on computerised records, specialist teams, 
economies of scale, job control and systems analysis, 
prevented the reasoned consideration of local teams. The 
new legislation forcing direct. labour organisations to 
tender for most local authority repairs work added a 
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further layer of'confusion to an existing minefield. 
The result. was that repairs remained an expensive and 
unsatisfactory area on a majority of project estates 
and the failure to resolve it could lead to the 
demoralisation of project staff and the extended cynicism 
of tenants, as well as the continuing decay of the'stock. 
Only where the local project could bend and adapt the 
system on a local basis and integrate repairs into local 
management, did repairs give satisfaction. This'was 
happening on eight of the 20 estates. 
ESTATE-BASED REPAIRS TEAMS 
With repairs more than any other aspect of housing, the. 
scale and remoteness and specialisms of the local authority 
structure impeded progress. Yet it was easy to achieve 
almost overnight success with a local, well-supervised 
repairs team. 
The eight projects which had an estate-based repairs 
service had all brought about an improved * service. 
backlog of jobs had been cleared in four projects. 
v. 
The 
The 
number of jobs completed by each worker had increased 
significantly in four projects. 
4 Travelling time and 
paperwork had been reduced by virtue of on-the-spot 
liaison. 
"Improved" in the opinion of the staff and residents. 
Their general popularity was based on very close proximity 
to residents and local staff, which ensured constant feed- 
back on actual experience. Therefore we took satisfaction 
to be a valid measure of success. In four projects with 
accurate and accessible records, we checked the productivity 
of local teams. 
W 
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The local repairs teams employed approximately one worker 
for every 100 properties. Once the backlog of outstanding 
repairs had been cleared, each worker could normally 
handle about 150 properties, or do more preventive or 
planned maintenance work. On two projects the workforce 
was reduced as the backlog was cleared. 
One element that was clearly vital in a good repairs team 
was high-quality, -on-the-spot, full-time supervision and 
co-ordination. One local repairs team collapsed 
temporarily because of inadequate supervision, but all the 
other teams seemed to attract able and hardworking foremen 
or team-leaders. 
Tenants and estate staff were delighted with the results. 
Repairs workers were no longer the. scapegoats for everyone's 
frustrations. Liaison was usually'friendly, informal and. 
effective. Many unexpected benefits accrued. For 
example, on one estate where entry phones had been continually 
out of order, the local repairs team leader did a daily 
round with a screwdriver and oilcan, finding that he could 
keep them all functioning. It was not vandalism or 
electronic hitches, as previously suspected, but very 
minor yet important shif. ts and pressures in door frames, 
locks and hinges, that caused slight but critical blocks 
to the door-closers. 
The commitment of locally-based repairs workers to the 
estate was often a major element in their agreeing to work 
outside the tight, defensive and often absurd demarcations 
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that so beset the average council repairs system. Some 
jobs did not even get as far as a job ticket. Where a 
repairs worker fixed a tap or a lock while replacing a 
pane of glass, he was simply doing a favour. He did not 
earn-a bonus on the basis of which his wages were made up, 
but he did re-define his job. The-amen in the local 
teams were reported'to be unwilling to be moved back to a 
central system when once they'd experienced the 
satisfaction of'doing the job locally and flexibly. - The 
praise they received from residents was unstinting. It 
would have been hard to refute the eye-witness evidence of 
the people who experienced the system at first hand. 
77. IMPROVEMENTS IN REPAIRS 
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had information on the performance of the teams. . 
It was 
not possible to collect data on performances in other 
local authorities because of complex paper systems and 
wide variations in the way jobs were defined and 
information recorded. We give below a summary of our 
findings from examples in the survey. 
An analysis of repairs done by Newcastle's entire direct 
labour organisation in 1980/81 showed that the average 
ratio of repairs tradesmen to properties was 1 employee to 
58 properties. The average number of repairs completed 
each month in Newcastle was 4j jobs per worker per week. 
The local Cowgate repairs team, with the same ratio of 
staff to properties, completed on average 71 jobs per 
worker per week. Its productivity was 79°% higher than 
the rest of Newcastle. 
An estate-based repairs team of 6 tradesmen and 1 foreman 
was set up on the Tulse Hill estate in November 1982. It 
covered 882 Tulse Hill flats plus another 600 properties, 
1,500 in all, with one workman to 250 properties. Its 
performance was closely monitored by the Priority Estates 
Project. The team completed on average 10.4 jobs per 
worker per week. The estimated average for the borough 
was-6.2 jobs per worker. 
A local repairs team has been established on Ashfield 
Valley since it was built. It comprised 5 tradesmen, 
giving 1 worker-to 200 dwellings. A check on productivity 
revealed that the team averaged 30 jobs per worker per 
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week. The team was extremely well thought of. When 
1,000 tenants were canvassed across the whole estate for 
their complaints, only five people mentioned repairs, a 
most extraordinary come-back. 
In the Chatsworth Intensive Management Project, Liverpool, 
nearly 2,000 properties were serviced by the local repairs 
team of 20 operatives, including three foremen, one yardman 
and one wagon man, giving one employee to 100 properties. 
Its performance was closely monitored by the Intensive 
Management Project since it was set up in 1980. In the 
year 30/11/81 to 28/11/82, the team completed an average 
of 7.4 jobs per worker per week. It was estimated that 
productivity in the intensive management repairs team was 
57% higher than for the City of Liverpool as a whole. 
Islington started setting up local repairs teams borough-wide 
in July 1983. Within nine months, the first experimental 
teams had increased productivity and reduced the backlog 
from 7-11 weeks outstanding to 1-2 weeks. 
Although the number of jobs completed per worker per week 
is a somewhat crude measure (a particular estate might 
demand many small jobs that can be done in a short time, and 
there are many different definitions of a job), there was a 
broad consistency among the few comparisons that were 
\ 
Y 
f 
available. 
r? 
$: 
ýý 11 
472 
TABLE SHOWING PRODUCTIVITY OF LOCAL TEAM 
Name of estate Ratio of men to Job rate of Job rate of*, 
with local team property in team local team local authority 
71 jobs 41 jobs 
Cowgate 1: 50 a week a week 
101 jobs 6 jobs 
Tulse Hill 1: 200 a week a week 
Ashfield Valley 1: 200 
30 jobs 
a week 
- 
Local backlog 
Islington local '- 1 320 
7-12 jobs 1-2 weeks; 
repairs teak a week backlog borou 
weeks 
In spite of the success of local teams, no local repairs 
team was regarded as safe from the axe and several were under 
constant threat. Directors of Technical Services were 
almost unanimous in their resistance to local teams and 
their reluctance to set them up. * Sensing that direct 
labour organisations were in for an increasingly-thin time, 
they were jealous of what power they had and guarded-it 
zealously. They were also far more centralist in their 
organisational approach than most housing directors, 
believing firmly in economie. s of scale, investment in 
expensive hardware, large, centralised stores and so on. 
But the criticisms by tradesmen, councillors and tenants 
alike were overwhelming. Existing organisations were quite 
unsuited to the small-scale, labour-intensive, messy nature 
of most day-to-day repairs, yet the power and prestige of 
direct labour organisations were often closely tied to the 
BIG SYSTEM. Local repairs teams either were anathema to 
'r 
ýi 
ýq 
the majority of local authorities in the survey or had to 
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fight hard for survival in the eight-where they were 
established. Ironically, -the only hope of survival for 
most direct-labour organisations was the delivery of a 
sensitive and finely tuned intensive repairs service. I 
COST-EFFECTIVE REPAIRS 
All local authorities feared that local repairs teams were 
administratively too expensive to be replicated. We had 
direct cost calculations for only one of the local repairs 
teams. In Lambeth, the local team cost £159* per dwelling 
per year including all the repairs that could not be 
covered by the local team, such as central heating or 
roofing. The costs included labour, materials, office- 
based costs, and the direct labour organisation overheads 
of the Directorate. The average cost for Lambeth as a 
whole under the central system was 9330 
5 Productivity was 
68% higher locally than the borough average and 87% of all 
jobs were completed within seven days. There was virtually 
no outstanding backlog of jobs. This team was clearly cost 
effective, as well as cheaper than the more traditional 
system. 
The evidence from our survey and from the Priority Estates 
Projects showed that local teams were viable over fairly 
small areas for basic day-to-day jobs as long as specialist 
services were provided from the centre. Management 
co-operatives, which usually covered about 100-150 dwellings, 
Based on Lambeth direct labour organisation's own figures. 
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set great store by having their own repairs service, "often 
with an odd-job handyman, backed up by a local contractor. 
A small estate of 200 dwellings might employ a carpenter/ 
plasterer who could also glaze and do other small jobs. 
Other skills might have to be covered by paying the central 
repairs service out of a local budget or by contract with a 
local builder. In two estate projects, small building 
firms ran a highly effective local repairs service, both 
on estates of 200-400 dwellings. But most local authority 
direct labour organisations would not hear of such flexible 
local working arrangements. In many places a local team 
was unviable except over a large area because tradesmen 
would only agree to be supervised by a foreman from their 
own trade. This would have meant doubling the size of the 
team and was obviously unworkable on a smaller scale. In 
Liverpool, the local repairs team was large because of trade 
by trade supervision. 
Generally, it seems likely that with higher productivity, 
saving on travel and central administration, a reduction in 
paper operations, and a major-improvement in access to 
tenants, a high level of tenant satisfaction and a high 
standard of maintenance by virtue of eliminating the backlog 
of local repairs, local teams should be cost effective and 
possibly more economical than the centrally-run services. 
Many local authorities spent more than £200 a year for eachl 
property on repairs and maintenance. The average spending 
in the survey was £187. This would allow them to employ 
one worker per 150** properties including local supervisors, 
allocating approximately £100 per property per year for 
central costs and contract work. This would mean that in 
a totally decentralised system the repairs team would be 
financially viable within present average spending rates. 
An unusually frank Borough Treasurer asserted that it would 
be impossible. not to save on a local team, given the costs 
**and inefficiency of 
the centre. 
This ratio should be adequate on average. The estates we 
visited. -were in'much worse condition than the average. ___ 3° 
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RENT ARREARS 
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Arrears control was the area of management that was most 
frequently handled locally, although rents on 17 of the 
20 estates were no_longer collected door to door. In 
looking at the problems' that led to the establishment of 
the offices in the survey, we examined in some detail the 
method of rent-collection and the problem of arrears. 
Here we examine what-impact the local offices have had in 
reducing arrears. 
14 projects had no responsibility at all for rent 
collection and therefore had no personal involvement with 
the tenants' payment of rent. This was probably a 
critical weakness in the local management system. 
All the projects dealt with rent arrears but on four 
estates there was insufficient control over arrears 
procedures to allow the local management office to operate . 
efficiently. Arrears information in general was often 
incomplete, or slow in arriving at the local office. Six 
estates did not have proper information. 
When the projects began, 13 of the 14 estates for which we 
had exact information had on average double the level of 
arrears of the local authority as a whole. Therefore, it 
was not surprising that of all the responsibilities tackled 
locally, arrears was the most time-absorbing duty of estate 
officers, and it therefore madeevery sense to localise it. 
It was a source of great indignation both to the councils 
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r and to rent-paying tenants that so'many households "got 
away with" not paying. It was fairly clear, however, that 
the higher arrears related directly to the greater poverty, 
the poorer conditions and the generally lower expectations 
that prevailed on the worst estates, as well as the weaker 
management control. * Unfortunately, chasing arrears without 
a localised rent system was prone to mistakes and was 
difficult to sustain. 
The existence of the local office and local control did 
not radically alter the approach to arrears and it was a 
continuing major issue in most projects, although there was 
more emphasis on debt counselling and advice, and relative 
to the rest of the local authority, most of the project 
estates were holding their own or improving somewhat. 
The following table shows the high level of arrears owed on 
most of the project estates, particularly the flatted estates. 
As was found in the Department of the Environment rent arrears 
survey, tenants on the most modern estates were often the most 
dissatisfied, paid the highest rents, and had the highest arrears. 
` 79. AVERAGE RENT ARREARS - 1982 
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There was the additional problem that on five estates, 
-tenants were paying often uneconomic-heating charges, based 
on the sixties' fashion for district heating systems, which 
had looked like a good buy when they were part of a'msssive 
building contract but which proved very expensive to run in 
the-post-oil crisis. of the seventies and eighties. (They 
often also--broke down. ) This greatly increased the debt 
burden"on poor households that simply could not afford 
high weekly heating charges they could not control. This 
-tooy applied-most'-often to the modern estates. - 
Since the projects began, four projects had reduced their 
total arrears figure. This was very much the opposite of 
the national trend, 
6 
or the trend within the survey 
authorities. A further four had more slowly rising arrears 
than the rest of the local authority. That still left a 
majority of projects with double the average arrears. 
Nonetheless, only 'two were doing worse than the local 
authorities as a whole, in spite of the immense problems of 
poverty on all of the projects. V 
80 
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'3. IMPACT OF ESTATE-BASED MANAGEMENT ON ARREARS 
IMPACT OF ESTATE-BASED MANAGEMENT ON RENT ARREARS 
Arrears reducing 47 
Arrears increasing more slowly than local 
authority rate of increase 4 
Arrears increasing as much as local 
authority rate of increase 4 
Arrears increasing faster than local 
authority rate of increase 2 
Information not available 6 
ýýýý 
., 
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Detailed figures for nine local authorities and the'local 
projects within them, enabled us to make a clear comparison. 
* 
The following table details the percentage changes in arrears 
where they were known between one year and the next. 
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RENT ARREARS -UNDER LOCAL MANAGEMENT 
ESTATE 
CHANGE OF ARREARS AS 
% OF ANNUAL RENT ROLL 
OVER APPROX. ONE YEAR 
Project 
arrears 
Local authority 
arrears 
Cottage - N. W. - - 
Cottage - North +8% +39% 
Cottage - Midlands +18°A +32% 
Cottage - North -5% +13% 
Cottage - North -23% +9% 
Cottage - N. W. +8°A" +114% 
Cottage - Midlands - +66% 
Walk-up - London +18% +79% 
Walk-up - London - +34%. 
Walk-up - London - - 
Walk-up - London - +55% 
Walk-up - N. W. -15°% -17°% 
Walk-up - London +21% 
Modern - London - - 
Modern - London - +401° 
Modern - London +16°% +17% 
Modern - London - +2% 
Modern - London +142° - 
Modern - N. W. -7°% +55% 
Modern - London - +52°% 
1ý 
a, 
ii 
i 
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The incomplete arrears information was symptomatic of the 
current malfunctioning rent collection and accounting systems. 
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It can be seen clearly from this table that in the nine 
local authorities where proper information was available, 
all projects were doing better than the local authority. 
REDUCING ARREARS 
The projects had found that there was no effective method 
for preventing worsening arrears other than speedy. personal- 
intervention or, as a last resort, concerted legal action. 
The withdrawal of door-to-door collection meant that any 
approach to tenants over rents automatically implied 
arrears and debts. The projects, which worked so hard to 
establish goodwill with tenants, were extremely reluctant 
to pressurise people who were financially hard-pressed already. 
Estate staff backed off more often than they should. There 
was a lack of awareness on the part of often soft-hearted 
estate staff that debt could be a crushing burden on a poor 
household. This meant that arrears were sometimes pursued 
rather gingerly. 
No project had uncovered an innovative breakthrough in 
tackling high levels of arrears. But the projects which 
had reduced rent arrears had achieved this through swift 
personal visits after not more than two weeks of arrears. 
The overall ethos in those projects was that arrears were 
unacceptable and must be cleared at all cost. Residents 
accepted this ethos. Bad debts and threats of eviction 
were followed through with Court action; but with a good 
ý'ý 
personal system, this was almost never necessary. Tight 
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financial management was usually associated with. the 
efficient organisation of housing services in general. 
Ironically, it was the more "sloppy", less rigorous 
approach to arrears that in the end led to more legal 
action and more evictions. Notices seeking possession 
were issued to about 25% of all the tenants on one estate 
with exceptionally high arrears. They were as ineffectual 
as other measures in tackling the massive arrears problem. 
Housing Benefit caused considerable confusion and an even 
higher level of arrears in many of the authorities. In 
theory, Housing Benefit should make arrears a thing of the 
past and any form of rent collection largely irrelevant to 
poorer estates, where incomes are low and where a'majority 
depend on supplementary benefit, unemployment or sickness 
pay. However, most local authorities were neither ready 
for-its introduction nor seemed to have a good system for 
calculating a tenant's entitlement readily, nor changing 
its level with the constantly changing circumstances of 
individual families. One of the problems Housing Benefit 
was meant to'solve was the previous complications of so 
many different sources of financial support to low-income 
households. However, levels of Housing Benefit and rent 
owing were re-calculated with every change in family income. 
For families at the bottom of the housing market, often in 
short-term jobs, or with family members changing, Housing 
Benefit was often out of date. This made a mockery of the 
simplification it was supposed to introduce. It also 
meant that where arrears had been caused by mistakes. in the 
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system, it was very hard "ever to recover them or allay 
tenants' fears. 
For example, in Lambeth at the outset of Housing Benefit, 
the rents owed by about one third of the Tulse Hill 
tenants were wrongly calculated, showing many tenants 
wrongly in arrears. Many people stopped paying rent 
. altogether or paid less than they should only to discover 
later that they had been building up arrears. Because the 
debts were acrrued on the wrong calculation, the tenants 
fought hard not to repay them. This made arrears chasing from 
the estate office even more unpopular than it already was. 
Although many housing departments came to grips with 
Housing Benefit over a period of months, it introduced 
another element into the general morass of arrears in. - 
authorities that were not coping. It also made the rent 
control system more remote than ever. 
No local authority handled Housing Benefit at the local 
level, and it seemed very difficult to inject a sense of' 
personal involvement or responsibility either among staff 
or tenants on a poor estate, entirely organised and locked 
up as it was in main frame computers. 
The major advantage of Housing Benefit on all the estates 
was that "fully passported" tenants were freed almost totally 
from the arrears debt syndrome. This applied to well over 
S 
A 
half the tenants on most estates. 
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The experience of the local management projects in 
tackling rents and arrears was very close to the-national 
experience, showing that: 
- door-to-door collection was no longer the main form 
of rent payment in metropolitan and London boroughs, 
but authorities still using it had the lowest level 
of arrears; 
- big city authorities with serious. security problems 
in connection with rent collection were increasingly 
changing to*office, bank or giro systems. Arrears 
under remote systems were five times higher or more 
than with door-to-door collection; 
- visits and personal rent collection could still'be 
used for arrears cases and could contain the problem, 
even where the general method of collection was no 
longer door to door; 
- immediate personal and determined follow-up (within 
two weeks maximum) helped prevent large arrears 
developing in most cases. 
The relative, if limited success of the local management 
projects in reducing arrears was the result of on-the-spot 
pressure, personal contact and financial advice. Its 
limited efficacy, however, pointed to the problem being out 
of control in some areas and very serious in most areas. 
There was a need for a system of visiting to be reintroduced 
to replace the now largely defunct door-to-door collection 
483 
system, and to supplement and modify the cumbersome and 
often inaccurate computerised, centralised'and mechanical 
systems. 
CONCLUSION 
No project had an integrated local management service covering 
lettings, rents and repairs, the core areas of estate 
management. So much capital, prestige and job promotion was 
tied up with their organisation that local authorities found 
it impossible to disaggregate them completely. 
The local offices served as pressure, points and organisational 
bases. But the staff did not feel they had enough control. 
Their responsibilities to residents and for delivery of 
estate management services were sometimes in direct conflict 
with their responsibility to central directorates and 
political overlords. The desire to help needy people, 
whether already living on estates, or waiting to be housed, 
led to two divergent views of the best way forward - partial 
localisation with central control or total local autonomy. 
To date, estate-based management has been a partial division 
of responsibilities and functions between local and central 
organisation. The jockeying will probably continue well 
into the next decade and the landlord-tenant relationship, 
sitting so awkwardly in the late twentieth century, will 
continue to jostle against its inherent contradictions. 
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CHAPTER X. iV - THE LOCAL AUTHORITY INVESTMENT IN LOCAL 
MANAGEMENT 
STAFF ORGANISATION 
Having looked at the impact of the estate offices on the 
very worst conditions in public housing that we could 
find, we must consider the staff input, the cost, the way 
the projects were funded, the possible savings from 
management changes, and how local management could be paid 
for on a more permanent basis. 
Firstly, the staff input should be examined. 
STAFF RATIOS 
We checked the number of properties per estate officer 
borough-wide in comparison with the staff ratios in the 
local management projects. In only two local 
authorities did the staff ratio remain the same locally as 
under the central system. In all others, the number of 
management staff to properties increased with the local 
management office - in many cases substantially. The 
following table illustrates what happened on the ground. 
We knew the staff ratios in all the local offices, but failed to discover the central staff ratios in two of the local authorities. Therefore the averages were based on 
the 17 known local authorities. 
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'`ý' 82. STAFF INPUT INCREASES WITH LOCAL MANAGEMENT 
Estate managers to Estate managers to 
Estate properties across properties within 
local authority local office 
Cottage 1 manager per 
915 1 manager per 1454 
properties properties 
Walk-up 1 manager per 
855 1 manager per 586 
properties properties 
Deck/modern 1 manager per 646, 1 manageraper 
429 
properties properties 
In the cottage estate projects, the ratio of estate managers 
to properties was halved and the results on the whole were 
very positive. 
In the local authorities with modern, unpopular estates, 
staff ratios across the board were more favourable, and fewer 
extra staff were recruited for the special projects. - As 
we have seed the results were not so significant. 
The local authorities with walk-up estates had the lowest 
staff input. However, this was partly compensated by 
resident caretaking. 
Overall in 18 of the 20 projects, management input was more 
intensive than the local authority as a whole. This showed 
clearly inLthe, major improvements being brought about. 
However, only six local authority projects had one estate 
manager for 350 properties or less. The other property 
ratios varied from one manager for 375 dwellings to one to 
800. 
The management staff figures of course only applied to the 
486 
employees in the project, who were considered directly 
responsible for estate management -a whole battery of 
functions, and lots of partial duties. 
Many other workers formed part of the local teams. 
Clerical and administrative staff found in 10 projects, 
repairs workers, cleaners, caretakers and wardens, added 
up to a. sizeable workforce, usually about 20 to a thousand 
dwellings, or one employee to 50 dwellings. This was 
about the same ratio as housing associations and the 
Victorian trusts. employed and, on the whole, it was 
adequate. It was interesting that in the 19 local 
authorities, the average staffing levels across 'the 
borough were also one employee to every 50 dwellings, 
including maintenance and caretaking staff, the difference 
being that many jobs were based in the town hall or 
district office with layers of vertical supervision and 
paper-chasing operations. The ground-level staff was 
often minimal. Therefore although in the local 
management offices, usually one or two additional estate 
officers were recruited, the staff input within the local 
team had gone up significantly. The output changed 
noticeably too because jobs were closer to the ground 
where paper operations could be cut and where results were 
quick to show. 
The project local authorities, with the exception of 
Walsall, found it hard to grasp that they could re-deploy 
most staff to local teams and. reduce the central workload, 
without more than a relatively small expansion in overall 
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staff ratios and a lot of job re-definition. Estate 
management itself, as the history of. housing development 
revealed, was always a meagre department. 
TEAM LEADERS 
All the projects had leaders or co-ordinators or senior 
officers in charge. Twelve project leaders were on senior 
grades within the local authority structure and eight were 
on assistant grades. 
On cottage and walk-up block estates, the majority of the 
project team leaders were on a senior grade. On modern 
concrete complex estates, the majority were on lower grades. 
The lower average grading on modern concrete complex estates 
must partly be a result of the fact that in these projects 
there was less local responsibility for management,. e_. g. 
lettings. It must have also helped produce the result 
that the projects on modern concrete complex estates were 
less successful in improving conditions. 
" 
83. SENIORITY OF PROJFCT T. RAT)F. RS 
Grade No. of project 
leaders on grade i .. Typeý; of ,. estate 
1 walk-up block 
P01 2 ------------------------- 1 modern concrete complex 
4 cottage 
S01/2 10 
---------------------------- 14 walk-up block 
----------------------------- 2 modern concrete complex 
3 cottage 
API4 /5 8 ----------------------------- 1 walk-up block 
----------------------------- 
4 modern concrete complex 
l 
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Local management offered a very different career structure, 
whereby ambitious young employees or capable and 
experienced housing managers were choosing to leave the 
mainstream hierarchy of the housing department for a job 
with direct responsibility, some seniority and no buck- 
passing. 
THE COST OF LOCAL MANAGEMENT 
Thirteen projects were funded entirely from local authority 
Housing Revenue Accounts, the statutory local purse which 
all local authorities must set up to pay in rents and 
subsidies, and to pay out debt charges and management and 
maintenance costs. The remaining seven projects were 
funded by a combination of Government and local authority 
support. Three of the 20 projects in our survey were set 
up by the Priority Estates Project with some Government 
help. In every other case, the local authority had taken 
the initiative in organising estate-based management, 
although in the case of Liverpool, the three Intensive 
Management Projects were very much the product of the inner 
area studies sponsored by the Department of the Environment 
and were funded by inner area Partnership. The two 
Tyneside projects were also funded by Partnership, but were 
firmly rooted within the local authorities. Ragworth, 
Stockton-on-Tees, was Urban Aid-funded. 
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SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR LOCAL MANAGEMENT PROJECTS 
Source of Funds No. of Projects 
Local Authority Housing Revenue Account 13 
Inner City Partnership 3 
Priority Estates Project 3 
Urban Aid 1 
Local authorities had reached a critical point on some of 
their estates where only local management offered a 
reasonable hope of success. While most local authorities 
would argue that they simply could not afford local 
management, the authorities in the survey argued'that they 
could not afford not to have it. 
It is true that drastic Government cuts over the previous 
five years had seriously reduced the amount of money 
available for major improvements to estates and 
modernisation of older council property. Government 
support to local rate funds had also been out more and 
more. However, rent incomes rose steeply and most local 
authorities are now in a rent surplus for the first time 
in decades. That is, they collect more in rent than they 
-pay out in debt charges, management and maintenance. 
This unfortunately does not apply to most of the beleaguered 
inner London boroughs or most of the Metropolitan 
authorities, though even they are in a better position to 
pay for local management than they were before rent rises. 
Rate-capping could mean that in the high-spending city 
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authorities, management and maintenance must be paid for 
entirely out of rent income. The precedents for this 
are not good. Even Octavia Hill and the 5% philanthropists 
found it very hard to make business ends meet with low- 
income wage-earners in rented housing at the turn of the 
century. On the other hand, Housing Benefit has become 
a major rent subsidy and as rents have risen, so-more and 
more tenants have become eligible for it. It. should, if 
it continues, replace rate subsidies to the Housing Revenue 
Accounts as the main Government subsidy to management'and 
maintenance budgets. If Housing Benefit were out, then 
the financial artery to housing management would be severed. 
The actual cost of providing a local full-time office with 
permanent staff was much lower than most critics would 
suppose, lower in fact than the typical. management costs of 
the same local authorities under a central system. The 
average central management and maintenance costs for all 
19 local authorities were estimated as £7.38 per week per 
dwelling in 1983-84 throughout the stock, 
' 
with about £4.87 
on average being spent on repairs. This would leave £2.51 
per dwelling per week for management at all levels, but 
mainly central and district. The average local management 
cost for the 20 full-time estate offices, including 
caretakers and all local staff, was £1.41 per dwelling per 
week, substantially less than the average central management 
cost. The cost for the flatted estates, including 
caretaking, was £1.70, and for the. cottage estates £1.11. 
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TABLE SHOWING MANAGEMENT COSTS 
Average management and maintenance costs in £7.38 
19 local authorities 
Average expected spending on management in £2,51 
19 local authorities 
Average actual local management costs with £1.70** 
local office on 13 flatted estates 
Average actual local management costs with £1.11** 
local office on 7 cottage estates 
Of. course, some central costs would need to be added to this, 
but local offices, as has been shown, were capable of 
shouldering the main management functions more effectively 
than was common at the centre. Therefore there was no 
need to duplicate many central and local costs. Walsall 
had cut middle management ruthlessly in order to do this. 
But most local authorities duplicated roles and 
responsibilities, causing considerable confusion, increased 
costs and poorer delivery. 
Almost all local authorities argued that central services, 
such as housing advice and homelessness, services, and also 
for central overheads and charges to other departments such 
as legal, parks, etc., ate into the Housing Revenue Account, 
leaving too little for estate-based management across the 
board. However, many central costs should diminish as 
local offices take on genuine responsibility. In Walsall, 
both homelessness and housing advice, as well as all 
lettings. were handled at the local offices. In Walsall. 
**The national average 
for all local authorities was £5.54. 
These figures do not include ongoing district or central 
costs nor the cost of centralised rent or lettings systems, 
etc. I 
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the council showed off its totally empty, furniture-less 
town hall housing department after all staff bar the 
Director and three assistants had moved out to neighbourhood 
offices. 
2 
The main problem was a reluctance in most local 
authorities to give up central control, coupled with a 
desire to keep all the senior tiers of officers in jobs at 
the centre. - This would not be possible with full 
decentralisation to local estate-based management. It was 
vital that functions should not be duplicated at local, 
district and central levels as happened in high-spending 
boroughs, nor retained at the centre, as happened in highly 
centralised boroughs. Such double structures were not 
only very costly but also-rendered decentralisation inoperable. 
Local management could only work, in the long run, in the 
place of central management. 
Most of the local authorities in the survey had not 
accepted the logic of full local autonomy, even though they 
appreciated the gains made by the projects and their cost 
effectiveness. 
Most of the local authorities in the survey were spending 
above the national average on management and maintenance of 
their housing stock. The following table shows the wide 
variation in average overall spending, particularly between 
the London authorities and the Northern ones within our 
survey. Costs often reflected wider management problems 
rather than more intensive input at estate level. 
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TABLE SHOWING AVERAGE MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE COSTS IN 19 LOCAL , 
AUTHORITIES PER DWELLING PER WEEK AND LOCAL MANAGEMENT COSTS PER 
DWELLING PER WEEK (WHERE KNOWN) 
Management and Estimated local Estimated local 
maintenance costs authority costs management costs 
Local per dwelling per for management per 
dwelling per 
authority week - 
local only week for 12 local 
authority average housing projects 
Actuals 1982/83* 1982/83 1982/3 
Greenwich £7-99 £2-66 
Hackney N/A 
Hammersmith £11-89 £3-96 £1-80 
ý. - Pill }-ºnm _ 4a Mili LlW 
Islington 
Lambeth 
Lewisham 
Wandsworth 
Brent 
Haringey 
Bolton 
Rochdale 
Tameside 
iverpool 
ateshead 
ewcastle 
falsall 
)tockton- 
>n-Tees 
, eicester 
r. . C. 
ll local 
authorities 
N/A 
£9-39 
£6-51 
£9-42 
£8-96 
£8-56 
£3-95 
£5-87 
14-73 
£5-0k 
£5-16 
£5-62 
£6-09 
£3-13 
£2-17 
£3-14 
£2-99 
£2-85 
£1-32 
£1-96 
£1-58 
£1-68 
£1-72 
£1-87 
£2-03 
C4-47 
£6-06 
£12-31 
£5-77*** 
£1-49 
£2-02 
£4-10 
£1-92 
77p" 
£2-57 
£1-85 
£1-15 
£1-58 
62p 
£1-40 
£1-62* 
£1-46 
40p** 
£1-62 
£1-L1 
C. I. P. F. A. Housing Revenue Account Statistics. 
* Represents actual budgets. 
C. I. P. F. A. estimated average for 1983/8+. 
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Thirteen hard-pressed local authorities established local 
management offices without recourse to special funds, 
representations. to Government, or any special pleadings. 
They found it cheaper than had commonly been believed, 
although the now widespread and hard-hitting financial 
constraints on local authorities. might have a severely 
restraining influence'on innovative approaches to housing 
, 
management problems. Nonetheless, many of the more 
-committed 
local authorities are still extending neighbourhood 
management and local offices to other estates. 
SAVINGS 
It is important to give some idea of the possible cost 
benefits of local management. The number of empty dwellings 
at the outset of the projects was over 900. By 1982 this 
total had dropped by about 20%, making a total gain in rent 
and rates income of nearly quarter of a million pounds a 
year. The saving on vandal damage to these now occupied 
properties would have been a minimum of £90,000 and savings 
on boarding up and other security measures, in the region 
of £36,000. Reduced rent arrears had only brought savings 
in four projects. There the savings were in the region 
of £100,000. The scope for further savings on arrears was 
very great. The savings through local repairs can only be 
judged by Lambeth's experience, where the cost of a greatly 
improved service was half the previous cost, a saving-on 
one estate of about £150,000. Other savings included 
reduced vandalism to garages and lifts. In Liverpool, on 
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one estate in one tower block, the saving was 
£50,000 in 
the first year of employing door guards. The savings 
through the use of vandal-resistant light shades (to protect 
bulbs) on one estate was £14,400. These partial estimates 
made an average saving in each project of approximately 
£39,500, well above the salary costs of additional staff-. 
Assuming that improved performance in management and 
maintenance continued, the savings would also continue. 
Certainly the converse was true, that any relaxation in 
standards or input led to a swift decline in performance 
and reversal in conditions. This occurred temporarily on 
at least three estates. 
The list of possible and actual savings could be extended. 
But the main cost benefit on a majority of the estates 
resulted from the fact that a combination of social 
physical and management ills had caused these estates to 
consume large amounts of money, sometimes over many years, 
to very little effect. Under local management, they were 
costing somewhat less than expected, and the decline and 
damage was being arrested. The balance of judgement lay 
in the continuation of the projects. To our knowledge, 
all of the local offices have survived the severe cut-backs 
of the last few years. In 16 of the 19 authorities, 
further local offices have been opened, and paid for out of 
the Housing Revenue Account. The Audit Commission recently 
found that there were few savings to be made from economies 
of scale in estate management. Conversely, they found that 
the greater the number of dwellings per local authority, the 
higher the unit costs tended to be. Local management 
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appeared to be paying its way and at least in the worst 
estates actually saving money. 
A BUDGET 
No project in the survey had a working budget. Ta local 
authorities tried to establish costs for particular estates 
from their central accounts, but these generated mountainous 
computer print-outs and meaningless lists of figures attached 
to miniscule items. 
The Priority Estates Project has shown that a viable local 
budget can be calculated, based either on the average 
management and maintenance costs of that local authority or 
based on the Housing Association allowance, which is Government- 
determined and more generous than many local authorities. A 
figure of £8* per dwelling per week will provide any estate of 
200 dwellings or more with a full-time office and one employee 
. 
to 50 dwellings, with a local repairs service and a full 
complement of resident caretakers and cleaners. There will 
invariably be some money left over for locally determined 
improvements. The following outline budget gives some idea 
of how a local budget, tied to each estate, might work, based 
on experience in the Welsh Priority Estates Projects A 
simplified model estate budget is calculated by multiplying 
the local authority's average management and maintenance 
spending after debt charges have been deducted by the number 
of dwellings and 50 weeks for an annual budget. The current 
Housing Association allowance is almost £9 a week-3. This 
budget is based on the c, ouncil's average management and 
1984 figures, e. g. Cloverhall Estate, Rochdale, which has now been taken over by the Cloverhall Tenant Management Co-operative. 
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maintenance per dwelling of. £8.50. 
87. SIMPLIFIED MODEL ESTATE BUDGET 
INCOME: 
£8.50 x 1000 x 50 = 
9425,000 
EXPENSES: 
Estate office £12,000 
3 Estate officers £30,000 
1 Clerical worker £ 7,000 
8 Repairs workers £80,000 
Materials £50,000 
Specialist work £110,000 
10 Caretakers £70,000 
Employers' overheads (23% of 
£187,000) £143,010 
£1402,010 
ýi, 
ýý 
ýý 
a 
ý, il 
f 
Iý'. 
Here we have 22 employees to cover 1,, 000 dwellings. There 
is no allowance for central overheads in the budget. There 
is a strong argument that the central service costs should 
be met almost entirely from the rates. This would have the 
salutary effect of making local authorities more cost-conscious 
at the centre rather than always resorting to stringency at 
'the periphery where it hurts the public most, but senior 
officers least. 
A major problem with extending local housing management is 
that although local authorities have always put money into a 
Housing Revenue Account, they have never budgeted, as housing 
associations have, to provide the day-to-day services on the 
ground. Even'the newer Priority Estates Projects with clear 
. 
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and specifically allocated budgets are. under threat while 
finance departments manipulate the housing revenue accounts 
for their global budgetary purposes, and other departments, 
such as parks and direct labour organisations, can charge 
unrealistic prices for services they deliver - often to a 
very poor standard. We concluded that unless a local estate 
office became an autonomous management entity, with its own 
completely separate budget, deducted from rents collected 
and from housing benefit, local management was unlikely to 
work on a wider front, because it would always seem a luxury 
in periods of financial stringency or when other initiatives 
gained favour. An allowance per dwelling per year, comparable 
to housing associations and deducted from rents and housing 
benefit, seemed to make financial and organisational sense, 
t" 
', 
; 
I' 
ýýý i, 
and-to give some permanence to the local management organisations 
" that were emerging on the large unpopular estates. This 
simple and obvious idea would require a major reform of local 
and central Government finances. 
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CHAPTER XV - CHANGING THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS 
"Hawkers, traders and others are prohibited from 
calling, shouting or using ä bell around these 
premises. " 
- L. C. C. Mersey House 
The sign, still displayed today outside an old block of flats, 
suggesting that bell-ringing causes more nuisance than is 
acceptable and that salesmen bringing their wares round the 
blocks somehow lowers its level of control, gives some idea 
of how far council housing has travelled from its original 
status and concept. 
In the last few chapters we have shown the impact that local 
offices had on landlord-tenant relations, on environmental 
conditions on the estates, on staff morale and general 
management performance. 
The most significant and most difficult turning point on the 
estates was the restoration of confidence and the establishment 
of peaceful living conditions, so that fear no longer prevailed:. 
over confidence, and shame over pride. Having lost a sense 
of control or even purpose, social abuse was a most sensitive 
and explosive touchstone for the future of the estates. 
On estates where abuse had become rampant, only long-term 
patterns of control would re-establish more guarded behaviour. 
At the outset of all the Priority Estate Projects, we talked 
to tenants in small groups throughout the estates and recorded 
what they felt were the main problems of their community. 
All groups on all estates listed the same three-dominant issues, 
500 
albeit in different orders: poor repairs; rubbish and a 
neglected environment; and crime, vandalism, insecurity and 
social disarray. There were different words and nuances to 
each main theme, but the underlying feelings were the same. 
Better repairs and environmental upgrading fitted fairly easily 
with management procedures within the local offices. The 
' control of social abuse and the reversal of social disarray 
were much more daunting tasks. It was a daily struggle and 
only implacable determination brought an end to severe 
vandalism and loss of control. 
BEAT POLICING 
Crime and the prevention of crime were major preoccupations 
of the residents. All projects except one suffered previously 
from an atmosphere of tension and fear of crime. 
Beat policing played an integral role on 19 of the 20 project 
estates. Because good policing was impossible without 
community resolve and because tenants everywhere felt 
vulnerable and dependent on good policing, the success of beat 
policing was of paramount importance. The establishment of a 
local management office almost inevitably led to a change in 
policing from reactive response to a preventive beat approach 
to crime. 
Brixton police had said in 1979 that without a housing 
management office, policing a dense, flatted estate properly 
was impossible. At first this seemed like a lame excuse for 
police failure. But, on reflection and after tenant 
consultations, it became very. clear what the. police were 
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/driving at. 
1 Criminal activity, theft, vandalism and personal 
attacks were all flourishing under the cover of communal 
disarray. Because-there was no "handle on the community", 
there was no confidence between the police and the public or , 
E. 
between the police and the council. Therefore policing was 
going badly wrong and tenants appeared to be to blame. They 
were the criminals, so it seemed, or at least the cover for 
crime. When once the local office was open, and tenants 
became involved block by block in planning the future of their 
estate, it became possible for'the police to be brought in on 
a continual preventive basis. 
On 13 estates, beat policing had a major impact in improving 
police/community relations and was considered a success by 
residents and local staff on. all 13. All beat policemen 
called in regularly at the estate office and patrolled the 
estate on foot, but only five worked exclusively in the project 
area. The five locally-based police projects were undoubtedly 
the most successful. The policemen liaised very-closely with 
residents and project staff. They spent a lot of time with 
children and by virtue of their sociable personalities were 
able to do preventive work especially with the youth. Where 
the police covered a wider area than the estate, the results 
were on the whole less satisfactory because they were more diluted. 
The 13 projects reported that beat policing had helped inspire 
confidence and a sense of security in the community and had 
reassured workers and residents that complaints or ongoing 
problems over policing, *such as a slow response time or frequent 
changes of personnel. 
There was only one clear failure, based on the police's inability 
1-011 
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to provide low-key, friendly bobbies in such a hostile 
environment, and the total'rejection by the youth of the estate 
of the kind of heavy-handed "search and arrest" swoops that 
were the common response to repeated muggings. The estate 
was racially mixed and policing was strongly labelled as being 
anti-black. It took the black tenants themselves to sort out 
the policing problem and the police were the first to admit it. 
We discussed the tenants' dominant role in coming"to grips with 
crime, policing and social control later. 
Actual crime records were available only for two projects. 
Therefore the evidence of "success" in beat policing was based 
on project staff assessments and on feed-back to them from 
residents. It was also based on the police's own assessments 
of the value of beat policing. Residents and project staff 
universally argued in favour of local beat policing as opposed 
to more remote Panda car patrols and emergency responses. 
88. 
BEAT POLICING 
Beat covered 
project area only 
Very successful 32 
Satisfactory 10 13 
Unsatisfactory 50 
Failed 11 0 
Beat covered. 
wider area 
1 
7 
5 
1 
We felt that local opinion was a valid way to assess policing 
on an estate since the way people felt about security was a 
fairly clear measure of the actual impact of crime and vandalism 
and police activity. It was important that tenants felt safe 
The Springwell estate, Gateshead, showed a decrease in reported 
crime and vandal damage of 30% in the 12 months March 1981-19820 
Three beat policemen-were based full-time on the estate during 
that period. 
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in their homes, safe to walk around the estate, and confident 
, enough to challenge vandals and report criminal activities, 
as 
this in turn brought policing into a more preventive role with 
strong community backing. 
worked. 2 
At the end of the day only this 
I 
It is not quite clear what actually happened to bring-the 
project estates into some kind of social order from disorder. 
But a transition did take place. The reduction in crime and 
vandalism and the increased feeling of security among tenants 
reported on 15 of the estates often resulted from a combination 
of factors, of which beat policing may have been only one 
element. 
Many improvements in security related to the existence of the 
estate office, the introduction of door security, a reduction'in 
the number of empty dwellings, the role of resident caretakers 
in patrolling the estate grounds, the employment of. guards, 
wardens, door porters and so on, the closure of walkways, the 
demolition or securing of garages. The reduction in vandalism 
in 13 of the project areas was probably a result of several 
changes, including stronger doors, better lighting, break- 
resistant glass, evening patrols, door guards and more 
responsive policing. 
Tenants themselves had a vital part to play in increasing 
security. As estates improved and tenants' feelings about 
their surroundings became more positive, they were more likely 
to feel able to protect their homes and environment. Tenants 
felt able to challenge vandalism and report crime if there was 
sufficient back-up for intervention from the estate office and 
r 
the police, and if they felt'confident that neighbours would 
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support them in resisting reprisals and 
intimidation. The 
fact that tenants were calling on police and caretakers for 
help was a sure sign of a community upturn. The 
fact that 
beat policing and other security measures were sticking 
meant that some confidence was flowing back into the estate 
communities. 
DISTURBED RESIDENTS 
The families who were outside normal social controls, who 
simply could not be curbed, posed almost insuperable problems. 
Many people, residents, managers, councillors, said they were 
the real problem. 
The evidence we gathered would suggest that they formed a small 
minority, though their impact was often out of all proportion 
to their numbers. 3 Estate offices reported a maximum of 30 
disruptive households - roughly 3% of each estate. That of 
course is a much, much higher proportion than in the population 
at large, and shows the effect of "dumping" policies. 
However, if 97% of the population were determined, they could 
normally cope with 3% of households who broke accepted norms. 
One problem was that many other families were involved around 
the edges, whether out of fear of reprisals, childhood 
friendships, street. or balcony social patterns, or simply felt 
in the same boat but not quite to the same degree. After all, 
someone must go to the noisy all-night party besides the host! 
The main problem in curbing abuse'was that the vast majority of 
tenants who caused no nuisance and who simply wanted to live 
their own lives in peace, did not want to stay on the estate, 
did not like its environment, did not identify with their 
Cullingworth in 1969 suggested it was about 0 . 5% 
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neighbours and did not know how to curb the aggressive, 
anti-social behaviour meted out by the few. There had been 
a sense of total defeat in the social atmosphere of all 
the estates that was reflected in the tenants' own verdict 
that - 
"Neighbours were more to b19me than the council 
for the estate being bad. " 
Council officers and caretakers frequently echoed this 
view. 
It needed an outside catalyst, a new initiative, a 
determined stand by someone with authority and back-up to 
reverse this sense of social defeat. 
On Tulse Hill, through block by block meetings, we traced 
eight households out of a total of 900 responsible for 
generating a siege atmosphere and creating the impression 
in block after block that most residents were involved in 
the social abuses that were so bitterly complained about. 
In six of the eight cases we found that management pressure 
curtailed the main problems - dogs and noise. Two families, 
who should never have lived on a crowded communal balcony 
anyway, were moved off Tulse Hill. The estate subsided 
to relative normality in the course of three months, helped 
immeasurably by beat policing and by the local lettings that 
were introduced at the same time, resulting in the immediate 
occupation of about 70 empty flats through a local queue. 
The only condition for getting a flat was being accessible 
by telephone and being prepared to move in the day it was 
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offered. Squatting was thereby overcome, too, with all 
the sense of lawlessness and anarchy it brought with 
it 
in Brixton. 
After a series of noisy, overcrowded parties in West London, 
an injunction was secured to prevent. an all-night "rent party" 
on a-balcony flat. The action was successful and the abuse 
was curtailed. 
In Kirklees on their Priority Estate (not in the survey), 
housing officers were putting substantial pressure on tenants 
with noisy or uncontrolled dogs, with rubbish causing a 
health hazard, or where elderly or frail tenants were harassed 
or upset by neighbours. The Tenants' Association backed 
this strong stand with police protection and evidence in court 
if necessary. Kirklees was one of the few authorities that 
had taken action in court to make social pressure stick. 
In one case, a tenant was evicted on grounds of nuisance. 
In other cases, the nuisance stopped in advance of court action. 
It was not always so straightforward to curb disarray. On 
the Broadwater Farm estate, a remarkable tenant, mother of 
six, called Dolly Kiff in, took the bull by the horns, deciding 
that mugging was as bad for the youth who were associated with 
most of the crime as it was disastrous for the victims. She 
organised, with her own teenagers, the Broadwater Farm 
Youth Association, with the declared aim of winning over 
the youth of the estate to constructive activities and 
away from crime. She was as concerned for the elderly 
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white population as she was for the black youth and 
almost exploded when the council offered the police a 
base on the estate- before. the Youth -Association. 
On the strength of taking over the police base, her 
standing with the youth rose sky-high. They began to 
take a pride in leaving money and goods around in their 
club. It was a challenge to anyone to dare offend Dolly 
or the name of the Youth Association by "nicking". The 
Youth Association has organised a food shop, a nursery, 
a*lunch club and also runs meals on wheels for the estate. 
The Youth Association recently won two football matches 
against the police and the question remains whether the 
police will be skilled enough to build on the confidence 
of the racially-conscious, highly motivated and jealously 
communitarian tenants. 
Broadwater Farm was one of the few estates where almost 
everything was in train -a local repairs team, locally 
supervised resident caretaking and cleaning, tenants on 
the management panel, local recruiting for estate jobs, 
and a multi-racial local staff team, 50% of whom were 
residents on the estate. There the social disarray had 
provoked almost total despair, which in turn galvanised 
the tenants into their own remarkable turnaround. The 
council has been more than anxious to respond. 
Other estates were tackling social disarray, usually with 
strong backing from vociferous tenants and usually with 
some success. The estates where it was very difficult 
to make headway were those where the level of demand for 
k 
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council-rented accommodation was so low that dwellings 
could not be let except on a give-away basis: there, the 
social abuse and disarray were often most severe. Greater 
Manchester, Merseyside and Tyneside, all suffered from 
this overwhelming problem and the projects, to the extent 
that they were successful, were "poaching" tenants from 
other waiting lists. Neither was there any point, as 
happened in two northern deck-access style estates in the 
local office orchestrating the emptying of the estate. 
In both cases about a quarter of the dwellings were empty. 
In Killingworth the increase in empty dwellings related 
directly to the local project office's success in reducing 
arrears, thereby helping tenants to gain a transfer to 
better accommodation. Sales, "lopping off" upper'storeys 
to halve blocks of flats' into terraced houses, and 
furnished bed-sitter experiments had to be tried in these 
cases. 
It had to be recognised, and increasingly was in the 19 
local authorities, that "dumping" disproportionate numbers 
of socially disturbed households on already disarrayed 
estates simply multiplied the problems of the families 
concerned and accelerated the decline of the estates. 
The local offices were ensuring that this longstanding 
practice was no longer tenable. 
In addition, it was being recognised that disruptive, 
unresponsive, and unneighbourly behaviour could not be 
tolerated on dense communal estates. Where the gauntlet 
was thrown down and the household could not respond, there 
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was no alternative but to move that disruptive household. 
Only by a combination of tough-minded and consistent measures 
could the estate community be protected and survive. 
THE CHILDREN 
There were many children on most of the project estates and 
they were often blamed for the damage, crime and disruption 
that was so common. Some of the older children and 
teenagers were certainly capable of substantial damage and 
were hard to reach. This cycle had to be broken down. 
The children and young people were a key to protecting the 
environment and the general security of the estate. Their 
direct involvement often diverted their energies away from 
more destructive activities and made them want to protect 
improvements they had helped create. 
Children had to be seen as an asset to community life. 
Their joie-de-vivre, their ability to survive, their 
ingenious defiance of their too harsh childhood, made them 
the most special members of the community. No sentimental, 
soft-hearted, free-for-all playschemes had any long-term 
appeal to them. Competitive sport, heavy activity, material 
rewards (crisps, a coke, 'a free swim) and access to the 
outside world were the prizes they coveted and the things 
that won them over to helping. They never wanted to help 
for long but it helped them stop destroying. Like the 
children in "Lord of the Flies" and Graham Greene's 
"Destructors", they were often horrified at their bullying 
power and wanted to find-the limit. The feeling of-things 
giving way under their pressure made them feel deeply 
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disturbed and even more destructive. The closer the limit 
could be drawn with the toughest of the youngsters, the more 
likely the estate was to curb its social disarray. But it 
was not a discipline that could be imposed easily. Almost 
everyone wanted lines to be drawn and it was a matter of 
making the first move very carefully and then the second, 
with enough of the key actors helping both draw and hold the 
line. Adults were needed to back the involvement, the 
6 
restraint and the encouragement of youngsters. 
However, wanton destruction, curbed through the initial efforts, 
did not stay at bay for long and new gangs had a nasty habit 
of forming immediately in the wake of the reformed gang that 
had just converted to gardening. So like rubbish, vandalism 
was not something that was overcome once and for all. It 
had to be fought day in, day out. Some estates were more 
resilient than others. 
There was something about the environment of some estates that 
invited damage, no matter what was done, and only a much 
greater degree of social control and tighter guarding seemed 
likely to overcome it. In the end, only extremely tough- 
minded residents could do it. The projects were doing a 
holding operation with the help of the residents. 
Tenants, estate staff, caretakers, police, all needed to know 
that the other adult groups were prepared to set limits. 
They needed to advance in concert. Otherwise estate workers 
held on to outmoded views of tenants' lack of care-and 
destructiveness, while tenants continued to feel that the 
council was a useless landlord because it couldn't keep things 
in order. and stop the estate from being'"a bad place". 
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That was why in the end, tenant consultations and the local 
i 
workforce based in a local office were vital. Through that 
network of contact, the council landlord discovered, often 
with surprise, that the disarrayed community had a total % 
identity of interest with the housing authority - to make the 
estate liveable in and to pay its way for a decent service; 
to protect the capital and social investment; to enhance the 
chances of the next generation of "problem" children; to call 
the bluff of the bullies; and to call out the courage of the 
silent mainstream, the ordinary people who had never been asked 
before and who did not want to speak out of turn, but who in 
the end wanted to feel satisfied with their home, and exercise 
some control over it. A retired caretaker put it best - 
"I'm seventy this week, and in all my life so far no one's 
ever asked me for my thoughts about anything ..... I've 
often thought it might be a good idea if the GLC sent 
people round say once every year or so, asking people on 
the estate what their feelings were. But of course they 
never did, which is why it's such a sad place now. 
"..... When. they first built it twenty years ago or more it was going to be paradise, wasn't it?..... They'd all, been living in very bad conditions, in slums and places like that, and here was this marvellous modern new housing estate ..... in those early days there was a great-sense of community among the people who came to 
live on Providence. They all knew that they had all 
come here to have a new start in life. 
"..... it just strikes me as a funny thing that's all, 
that all the years I was working on the estate no one 
ever asked me my views about it. 
"Oh yes, it is a sad place now. "7 
3 
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CHAPTER XVI_ - CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD 
We-have described-the development of council housing 
from its inception to the present day with the aim of 
explaining the emergence of the most unpopular estates. 
As the history has unfolded, this perspective has 
inevitably led us to look at the poorest communities 
and try and identify the causes of social disarray and 
even communal breakdown. 
All is far from well with large numbers of council 
estates. But there is growing experience of attempts 
to rectify the most severe problems, adopting if only in 
part the tried and tested methods that set in train-the 
social housing revolution of late Victorian times. 
Octavia Hill had pioneered an intimate, custodial, and 
locally based housing management organisation that 
depended as much on the goodwill and support of the 
tenants as it did on the dedication and care of the 
landlord. It was this organisation that the new public 
landlords failed to reproduce as they steadily emerged to 
be the largest landlords in the country. 
VICTORIAN HOUSING TROUBLES AND REFORM 1862-1914 
The rapid development of towns and the spread of factory 
employment led to dense urban housing in back-to-back 
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terraces that quickly became slums under crowded and 
impoverished conditions. 
4 
Octavia Hill, inspired by the awful conditions in central 
London, persuaded rich benefactors to buy up slum houses, 
and hand them over to her. She developed a system of 
intensive management among the most destitute slum 
inhabitants that relied on constant personal contact, 
careful business management, essential but modest repairs 
and improvements, and retention of the existing community 
in existing but-improved dwellings. Octavia Hill 
trained many women in this new style of landlordism and 
inspired a powerful movement among leading philanthropists 
like Lord Shaftesbury. Oetavia Hill bitterly opposed the 
building of large blocks of flats. She argued that women 
were naturally better housing managers than men. She did 
not think elected councils should become direct landlords; 
and she pleaded for each family to have its own patch of 
outdoor space, no matter how small. 
The Victorian Housing Trusts began at about the same time 
as Octavia Hill, but developed a new style of model 
dwellings built in dense blocks of tenement flats, housing 
only the "poor of good 'chara'cter" and charging rents 
beyond the means of the most needy. However, the Trusts 
did establish intensive, local resident management based 
on close relations with the tenants. They have managed 
to run seemingly unpopular, densely-built blocks 
effectively to this day. 
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Local authorities began building model dwellings in the 
last 20 years of the 19th century, copying the new style 
of*flat-building of the Housing Trusts but incorporating 
very little of their management technique. The early 
council blocks in London were sometimes hard to let and 
were run' from the beginning from County Hall where 
housing functions were acquired by different departments. 
The landlord service was remote and fragmented from the 
outset. Rents generally were high; the most desperate 
families were pushed into a. diminishing supply of private 
accommodation. Early council housing was expensive and 
housed a privileged population of artisans and securely 
employed workers. By 1914, they and the Trusts together 
provided only a tiny fragment of housing; 90% of households 
still rented from private landlords in poor conditions. 
THE FIRST ATTEMPTS AT MASS SLUM CLEARANCE AND REHOUSING . 
1918-1939 
The acute housing shortage and accelerating decay, which 
were highlighted by the First World War, led to innovative 
general subsidies for new buildings. Councils produced 
many new high-quality estates on the edge of cities. But 
from 1930 onwards a radical shift took place. Subsidies 
became tied to slum clearance, and rehousing of slum 
dwellers and to relief of overcrowding. Higher subsidies 
were made available for flats on expensive city land, and 
the modern pattern of welfare housing in dense inner city 
flatted estates was established. The Governments of the 
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day were determined to tackle slums. Over a million 
council dwellings were built under these subsidies 
before World War II. 
Social problems quickly emerged and while the lady housing 
managers were increasingly influential on the welfare 
aspects of slum demolition and rehousing, they were 
ignored on matters of overall housing management by 
the rapidly expanding local authorities. 
The public landlords carried out their duties to tenants 
through assorted departments - Finance, Engineers, 
Surveyors, Sanitary Departments and Town Clerks. They 
threw up their own municipally-oriented housing body, 
founded in 1932 as the Institute of Housing, which openly 
opposed the integrated and localised emphasis of the 
rival, and better qualified, Society of Women Housing 
Managers, founded in 1916 to carry on Octavia Hill's 
tradition. 
A 
By 1939 there were over a million publicly owned dwellings. 
Many estates were difficult to run, and tarnished with the 
same reputation as the slums they were built to replace. 
A coherent housing management structure had not evolved 
within local authorities, though some attempts were made 
by a small minority of housing departments to graft a 
social and welfare role onto the more "professional" 
aspects of housing. 
The landlord service was delivered in a fragmented way, 
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attracting less attention and interest than building, 
and argued over in acrimonious and jealous terms by the 
various professional protagonists. The Government 
collected evidence of this great confusion for its 1939 
report, which admirably summed up the problem. but failed 
to give any sense of direction on the way forward for 
public landlords. Local authority housing departments, 
like the L. C. C., were complacent about this service, 
blaming failings on the minority of bad tenants who 
could not adapt to the better conditions now offered. 
THE POST-WAR HOUSING BOOM 1945 TO PRESENT DAY 
By the'end of the Second World War, with extensive 
bombing"of cities, further rent freezes and disinvestment 
in'old slum areas, the housing situation was chronic. 
For 25 years a massive public housing boom was generated 
by Labour and Conservative Governments, with generous ' 
subsidies for slum clearance, demolition and flat-building. 
The higher the block, the greater the proportion of 
subsidies. - Councils were the major providers throughout 
the period and flats became the dominant form of new 
construction. 
Because of the vastly ambitious scale of public building, 
four million council homes in 35 years, the desire to 
produce large, dense flatted estates in a monotonous, 
almost mindless style was unsurprising. Industrial 
i 
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building and high-rise seemed obvious answers to the 
numbers game. Massive clearance of seemingly obsolete 
houses, usually condemned for lack of amenity and 
overcrowding rather than structural flaws, was a glib 
response. 
But the cities emptied partly as a result of clearance, 
and new estates housed only a small proportion of existing 
residents. The exodus to suburban owner-occupation was 
fuelled by slum demolition and council building. Small 
job centres were. often demolished too. 
The result was a largely unpopular style and scale of new 
housing, reduced demand, and major problems of damp, 
structural defects and communal layout, that led to 
vandalism, fear of crime and increased difficulties in 
letting. By the time councils stopped building unpopular 
monoliths, much demand for public housing had effectively 
evaporated. The result was a decline for the largest and 
often most modern estates. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING MANAGEMENT WITHIN LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES, 1945 TO PRESENT 
The massive building boom of the post-war era, producing 
large, costly and difficult-to-run estates, generated an 
unprecedented scale of management problems. 
The typical housing department comprised a lettings and 
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welfare section, with repairs, rent, collection and 
building, dealt with by separate departments of the local 
authority. 
The recruitment of staff for the rapidly expanding 
housing departments proved difficult and standards were 
lowered drastically and training was minimal. 
" "Rationalisation and streamlining" were the order of the 
day, with severe cut-backs in the already poor estate- 
based services. 
At the same time, the bureaucratisation of procedures 
narrowed and tightened functions, limiting room for 
manoeuvre and enhancing the sectional division of 
responsibilities. Power was increasingly concentrated 
in fast expanding town halls and estate-based staff. 
became more and more divorced from decision-making and 
control, as well as increasingly ineffectual in relation 
to tenants. They were expected to cover more and more 
ground with less and less power to deliver. Contact 
was reduced to a bare minimum and often done away with 
altogether with the withdrawal of rent collection, the 
centralisation of repairs, and the reduction in cleaning 
and caretaking services. Staff ratios remained high, 
but were actually out at estate level in the period of 
rapid expansion from 1950-1975. 
Because slum clearance generated-such huge demand, and 
because the imperative to build large and high seemed so 
overriding, housing departments operated under a seige of 
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applications, waiting lists, "decanting" and demolition. 
Little or no thought or effort went into the long-term 
management implications. Even weighty Government reports 
on living in flats, rehousing disturbed families and 
organising a "comprehensive housing service" failed to 
address the fundamental issues of flat-building, localised 
services, dis-economies of scale, landlord-tenant 
relations, repairs as an integral part of management, and 
the more basic welfare. or service role of housing. 
Housing departments grew in importance and sophistication, 
but also in complexity and size. Rarely did they control 
all aspects of estate management and up to 12 entirely 
separate departments might be involved in any one estate. 
The housing department itself might comprise half a dozen 
separate hierarchies of functions. By the seventies, 
housing departments often employed hundreds of staff, 
controlling thousands of properties - 38,000 in the average 
metropolitan area - worth hundreds of millions of pounds. 
Yet by the time public housing started to fall seriously 
from favour in the mid-seventies, the public landlord 
had virtually lost control of estate management. Unpopular 
dwellings were coupled with a remote service that tenants 
could not identify with-or locate. Meanwhile, housing 
staff found it increasingly difficult to deliver on anything 
but the narrowest part of the total service. 
The attempt to organise a comprehensive housing service 
seemed to be shutting the door after the horse had bolted. 
N 
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ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING - NEED OR MERIT 
Throughout. the last 50 years, the allocation of council 
housing was the most strife-torn and confused area of 
housing management. Having started out with carefully 
selected, economically secure tenants, local authorities 
shifted in the thirties almost totally to poor, 
overcrowded slum dwellers, whose conditions were 
overwhelmingly bad. After the Second World War, public. 
housing was declared "for all", but the massive shortage 
made rehousing more like a mad scramble than a priority 
system. When slum clearance began again, rehousing 
from demolition areas took overriding precedence, but 
although access according to need was now widely accepted, 
the major issue of distributing an uneven stock between 
conflicting groups remained to be resolved. A system of 
points was developed, which included the grading of a 
family's standards, their merit based on behaviour and 
rent-paying records. This system required lettings 
officers to sit in judgement. over who "deserved" the most 
popular or least popular homes. A complicated "system" 
of matching quality of applicant with quality of rehousing 
was developed and applied in most local authorities. 
Vulnerable categories, such as the homeless, racial 
minorities, welfare recipients and unemployed, tended to 
receive the lowest grade offers and became disproportionately 
concentrated in the least popular estates. 
There was such a large area of discretion within a highly 
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complex and therefore largely invisible central lettings 
system that sifting inevitably took place. 
Large-scale transfers made matters worse by offering more 
ambitious and respectable existing tenants the chance to 
upgrade their housing. The instability and substantial 
vacancies created by transfers off the worst estates 
reinforced their unpopularity, resulting in widespread 
lettings on these estates to the most desperate households. 
Lettings therefore became the tool of segregation and 
discrimination in the public sector, resulting in a 
polarisation between good and bad estates, forcing 
residents of the bad estates to seek a constant way out, 
and trapping the "lowest category" applicants in the areas 
with the worst reputation. 
THE GAP BETWEEN COUNCIL HOUSING AND OWNER-OCCUPATION 
A wider process was at work simultaneously, creating a 
growing disparity between owner-occupiers and tenants. 
Most council tenants would prefer to be owner-occupiers, 
but less than a third would want to buy their existing 
council home. Most council tenants did not choose to be 
council tenants but felt pushed into it by bad housing 
conditions, demolition or lack of other alternatives. 
Not only does this sense of lack of choice determine the 
unpopularity of much council housing; it also disguises 
major differences in the economic and social wellbeing 
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of residents in the two sectors. Council tenants are 
substantially poorer on average, are more often 
unskilled, with poorer educational qualifications than 
owner-occupiers. A much higher proportion are 
claimants of supplementary benefit or unemployed. A 
high proportion of separated families dependent ön means- 
tested benefits are housed within the public sector. 
Racial minorities are also increasingly,, and in-, -tne": case 
of Caribbean minorities, disproportionately concentrated 
there. 
The council sector enjoys other significant disadvantages. 
It is disproportionately located in cities where 
deprivation is highest. It is built in unpopular forms 
with a high proportion of flats and large, anonymous 
estates. 
Its. design makes it harder to police or to supervise. 
Social stress and lettings policies determine that the 
poorest and most disadvantaged households are crowded 
onto the most undesirable estates at the bottom of an 
intense pecking order. 
The consequent disarray leads to some council housing 
being difficult to let to anyone at all. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S RECOGNITION OF DIFFICULT TO LET ESTATES - 
1974-1978 
For the first time, in 1974, the Government recognised the 
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problem of unpopular post-war council housing. In a 
1 survey of all local authorities, it established that 
over half of problem estates were in metropolitan areas; 
three-quarters were flats; and over half the difficult- 
to-let estates were less than 10 years Old. The main 
causes of unpopularity were given as design, vandalism 
and social stigma. ' Tower blocks comprised a small 
proportion of the problem. 
The. Government has since 1978 asked all local authorities 
to inform it annually of the number of dwellings that are 
difficult to let. The figures collected-bear out the 
earlier findings that difficult-to-let estates are 
overwhelmingly located in cities. The overlap with 
homelessness and poverty, the proportion of flats and the 
size of the local authority landlord have also been 
demonstrated through the national figures to be associated 
with lettings difficulties. 
Council housing has not overcome the problem of slums. 
The crude shortage has declined but "difficult-to-let 
estates" have emerged as a major housing disaster. 
, 
The Department of the Environment's Investigation of 30 
difficult-to-let estates provided the first published 
account of the problem. It spelt out the design failure 
of large modern estates and underlined the'need for 
compensatory management if flatted estates were to work. 
Coupled with design aberrations, the decline of localised 
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housing management and the concentration of desperate 
households within unpopular estates were both direct causes 
of disintegration. The case studies revealed an over- 
supply of council housing in-some areas. 
The report suggested that only by introducing a wide range 
of remedies, including more personal and sensitive management 
and maintenance, physical remedies and a reversal of the 
lettings spiral, could the problem be tackled. 
LOCAL MANAGEMENT SURVEY 
In response to the Difficult to Let Investigation and 
evidence from local authorities, the Department of the 
Environment launched the Priority Estates Project in 1979 to 
develop with local authorities experiments in reversing 
conditions on very unpopular estates through a local 
management office with the full involvement and backing of 
tenants. A survey was conducted in 1982 of 20 special 
housing projects on the most run-down estates in 19 local 
authorities, giving valuable details about the nature of the 
problems and possible ways of tackling them. 
The 20 estates were spread across the country and ranged from 
cottage-style, pre-war estates, through balcony-style flatted 
estates, to the modern concrete complex estates of the sixties 
onwards. The average size of the estates was 1,000 dwellings. 
The main design problems related to the communal nature of all 
the estates, the poorly maintained environment, and on the 
flatted estates, the oppressive, dense style and the constantly 
damaged and poorly protected lifts, stairs, rubbish chambers, 
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r garages, drying rooms and so on. 
Every communal part was abused. All the estates suffered 
from youthful vandalism. The modern concrete estates 
suffered from leaks, damp, condensation, and noise in more 
intense forms than the others. Cottage estates could be 
just as'decayed and unpopular as the flatted estates, but it 
was easier to see how they could be restored. The 13 
flatted estates in the survey were depressingly large, 
anonymous and even frightening. 
SOCIAL AND MANAGEMENT DECAY ON 20 ESTATES 
The design of the 20 estates led to major social and 
management problems. 'Allocation of housing was probably 
the single most dominant question and the survey showed that 
there were above average concentrations of many disadvantaged 
groups on the 20 estates. Thus, homeless families, one- 
parent families, numbers of children, racial minorities, 
unemployed adults, were all over-represented. 
At the same time, there was a higher rate of turnover of 
tenants, causing instability and unrest, with many tenants . 
aiming to upgrade their housing by leaving. A corollary of 
the lettings and turnover problems was a disproportionately 
high proportion of empty dwellings. This applied to almost 
all the estates too. Some estates had as many as a hundred 
empty dwellings and one. estate was almost a quarter empty. 
Empty dwellings created a chain reaction. More people refused 
to come and live there because of the atmosphere of dereliction. 
Squatters moved in. Vandalism and theft to empty property 
were commonplace. The cost of all this damage was substantial 
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and, coupled with the loss of rent income, generated serious 
concern. 
Communal facilities, where they existed, were often ill-used. 
Where they didn't exist, the estate seemed barren and 
spiritless. 
Rent 
. arrears were exceptionally high on almost all the estates, 
but there were enormous-variations and some management systems 
seemed unable to cope with them. The disappearance of door- 
to-door collection was a major setback. The alternative of 
legal sanctions was ineffective, costly and extremely 
damaging to landlord-tenant relations. 
Repairs presented serious problems and were invariably run 
independently of housing management under a remote system. 
Homes were generally poorly maintained. Cleansing, Parks 
and Social Services Departments, 'all ran their separate 
operations, unconnected with each other, or with the housing 
department. Generally, performance was poor and the estate 
received a service commensurate with its generally low 
reputation. No estate had a local management office prior 
to the projects, and no estate caretakers worked in a team 
with estate officers or repairsmen or social workers. 
Tenants were often isolated, frightened and desperate to 
escape. The council was often at its wits' end. 
LOCAL MANAGEMENT OFFERS HOPE OF SUCCESS 
We examined the local offices which were opened on the 20 
estates in an attempt to stem overwhelming decline. When 
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they were set up, their impact on the local community was 
immediate., opening up extensive and frequent contact between 
landlord and tenants and providing an-on-the-spot service, 
cutting through red tape and acting as a pressure point and 
arbiter with the council. 
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF 20 LOCAL MANAGEMENT 
PROJECTS 
The cumulative experience of the first 20 local management 
projects has been an invaluable source for many further 
initiatives. The most important lessons could be summarised 
as follows: 
- Local estate offices open all day to tenants, with full- 
time staff and all housing records brought about an 
impressive improvement in landlord-tenant relations. 
- Almost all estates were undergoing physical modernisation 
and adaptation, often incurring major expense. On the 
whole this reinvestment was successful in rebuilding the 
popularity of the estates, but it relied heavily on local 
management to ensure long-term maintenance. 
- Local management of repairs, rents and lettings was only 
partially delegated. Where local repairs teams were 
introduced they were highly popular, efficient and cost- 
effective. Local lettings brought about a significant 
reduction in the number of empty dwellings and also 
substantial savings in vandal damage and loss of rent 
income. However, local lettings and local repairs were 
introduced on only eight of the 20 estates. 
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Rent arrears were on the whole being contained but 
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were less expensive than is commonly imagined, were 
usually funded from the Housing-Revenue Account direct, 
and brought about substantial cash savings. No local 
authority questioned the value of the investment in 
local management. 
THE FUTURE 
There are many unanswered questions which impinge directly on 
unpopular estates and the future of housing management. If 
housing benefit is reduced for large numbers of low-income 
households, rent arrears will rise and income for management 
and maintenance will be reduced. 
If rate-capping is extended, the hardest-pressed authorities 
with the most formidable-problems will be obliged to reduce 
their rate subsidy for housing without being able to reduce 
their debt charges. Again spending on management and 
maintenance will suffer. 
If the right to buy continues to favour the better-off and the 
better property, the council sector will be increasingly 
polarised. 
There are other unresolved issues. The number of manual jobs 
in local authorities is decreasing and white-collar jobs 
increasing. The white-collar unions often exercise a 
stranglehold on essential services. The white-collar council- 
wide strike in the Rhondda Valley, 'causing massive refuse and 
flooding problems, and the children's home strike in Islington 
are two examples. 
ýý I 
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Official homelessness is on the increase, yet families are 
reported to refuse accommodation on the worst estates in 
many London authorities, and the number of families in 
temporary bed and breakfast accommodation is high, sometimes 
in the very boroughs with the most empty council dwellings. 
i 
The cost to councils per family is much higher than alternative 
solutions to the problem. 
Some housing departments are attempting to decentralise 
services, but finding it costly because they are not willing 
or able to accept a corresponding reduction in their central 
departments. The areas covered by decentralised "local" 
offices usually involve several estates which rarely have a 
common sense of identity. Thus they fail to resolve the core 
problems of the worst estates. 
Major economic and social issues also impinge heavily on 
council housing. Large areas of the country have. a crude lack 
of demand for conventional family council housing, of which 
there is an over-supply. Waiting lists are often overweighted 
with single teenagers wanting to leave home, hoping to get 
access to property that more highly pointed applicants. reject. 
Large institutions, mental hospitals, children's homes and 
hostels discharge vulnerable people "into the community". 
As there is a chronic shortage of supported, sheltered 
accommodation, such households often end up on the largest 
and most disarrayed estates. 
Poor estates contain a concentration of the unemployed and 
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with the rise in unemployment, this tendency has 
increased. - The poorest housing communities outside the 
south-east have generally more than 50% of the adult male 
population out of work. In the: north, as few as 10% may 
have jobs on the worst estates. 
The imponderables spell a bleak long-term future for 
"council landlords and tenants, "unless more creative use is 
found for the physical capital and human energy which has, 
in the past been so undervalued. 
HOUSING MANAGEMENT OF THE FUTURE 
The central problems of run-down council estates are 
endemic. A majority of the estates we studied are very 
large with over 500 dwellings. A majority are built in 
dense blocks of flats and all are built with many communal, 
unguarded and unusable areas. At least a third of problem. 
dwellings are built with industrialised and non-traditional 
designs and materials which are unpopular and often 
expensive to maintain. 
There is severe poverty and the estate communities are 
often isolated, uprooted and transient. Disturbed 
households are most frequently rehoused on the least popular 
communal estates where their problems and those of their 
neighbours are intensified. 
The loss of shops, social facilities and centres of 
employment through slum demolition has by no means been 
Iw 
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made good in the rebuilt estates and there is often a 
sense of desolate inactivity. 
'- Councils, especially city councils, are too big and too 
complex to co-ordinate or execute effectively the 
meticulous delivery of landlord responsibilities and 
thus suffer from distant and often acrimonious relations 
with tenants. 
Inadequate households are often blamed for the problems 
of'estate management, and physical reconstruction is the 
most commonly proposed solution. However, neither 
changing the population of council estates nor embarking 
on a major new demolition programme is a realistic or 
humane way forward in the immediate future. 
There are seven major changes in organisation which could 
make a significant difference to the. operation of housing 
services on the worst estates. 
The first is a new system of housing finance, allocating 
a management and maintenance allowance for all council 
dwellings, taking account of the type of dwelling 
(houses/flats), special maintenance needs (lifts/decks/ 
flat roofs), the-age of the property (renewal of services) 
and location (extra costs for London), with a different 
rate for metropolitan and-non-metropolitan authorities. 
A compulsory deduction from rent income, with adjustments 
in the wider subsidy, system for the varied financial 
obligations of different authorities, would provide such 
.N 
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an allowance. This would facilitate the provision of 
budgets for each estate and allow local management 
organisations to flourish. 
The second is to`reorganise the traditional council 
housing management hierarchy into locally-based entities 
along the lines of schools, hospitals, health centres, 
banks: and other services. All basic housing management, 
rents, repairs and lettings, would be part of the local 
organisation. As there is no known economy of scale, in 
housing services, -such a reorganisation, while reaching 
the customer more effectively, would not add significantly 
to costs. 
The third change would be to tailor capital investment and 
major repair, and improvement programmes to the. priorities 
of residents and to scale down all building contracts to 
locally manageable proportions., Work should be done 
incrementally and within, very strict financial limits to 
allow practical solutions. and intelligible plans to flourish. 
Waste, has created an immense well of bitterness on the worst 
estates. Careful reinvestment is urgently needed. 
The fourth development would be to enhance the formal role 
of residents in the running of their estates. Only where 
they are at the forefront of changes, do improvements seem 
to succeed in inspiring the support of the community. 
There are several formulas for the residents' role. A 
locally constituted management body, comprising elected 
11 
residents and council nominees, could preside over the 
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running of all day-to-day estate affairs, in conjunction 
with staff. - 
The fifth point is that manual jobs are-vital-to the 
healthy operation of landlord services. Caretaking, 
local repairs and cleaning make the critical difference 
between a habitable estate and a veritable. slum. These 
jobs can only be sacrificed at. the risk of hastening 
demolition-programmes already-under way in some councils, 
often for social and custodial rather-than structural 
reasons. As many-as possible of the jobs must go to-- 
residents and the actual number of locally-based jobs 
should increase. Other forms of economic activity can 
be stimulated by the generation of a local workforce. 
The sixth element would attack the size, scale and anomie 
of council housing in the least popular areas from as 
many angles as possible, by physically breaking it down 
into small, manageable units; by enclosing as much 
public space as possible and making it private;. by 
guarding all necessary communal services and access points; 
by personalising details such as colour schemes, door 
designs and gardens; by encouraging individual initiative, 
enterprise, and vitality, including diverse service 
provision through shops and so on; by enhancing the 
enforcement of basic social norms through the close 
working liaison between landlord and tenants. 
The last and most difficult change would be to broaden the 
socio-economic base of the most unpopular areas by 
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introducing a variety of tenures and by having a much 
I 
more open lettings system throughout the council sector, 
without residential qualifications, points assessment or 
grading for the mass of applicants, using the simple 
concept of queuing,. but with a fall-back priority system 
for households who cannot find their own way into the 
local housing market. By opening up areas of low demand 
to a more flexible, open-door buying, selling and lettings 
system, any latent housing demand will be uncovered and 
difficulties in letting decline. A new look should be 
taken at the need for furnished lettings too. At the same 
time in unpopular areas, the local waiting list should 
encourage people with ties in the area to apply, thereby 
strengthening the community. 
The right to buy and sales of unwanted blocks of . 
flats 
should be balanced by local authorities' ability to acquire 
street properties so that the disequilibrium between 
council flats and houses in inner areas can be gradually 
redressed. 
There are serious limitations to local authority landlords 
operating on such a vast and monolithic scale as they have 
in the last few decades., Leaving aside the politicaliy 
charged debate about public and private ownership, there 
are many arguments for scaling down and diversifying the 
social landlords within the publicly built housing market. 
Churches, social and community organisations, trade unions, 
businesses, social services, health authorities, as well as 
the large reserves of individual occupiers, have all at 
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different times shown an'interest in housing provision 
and organisation. There is scope for a variety of 
smaller trusts and associations, such as exist in 
-Scandinavia and Germany, to help manage publicly-built 
estates. 
Local management organisations, developed in many varied 
forms in all parts of the country on the very worst 
estates over the last six years, offer a way forward. 
Indeed, had local management been in-., peace -`flrom l: týhe ýtery 
beginning of council housing, the situation today might 
have been very different. Octavia Hill's intimate, 
businesslike and incremental system, designed over a 
century ago, but adapted to the requirements of a more 
democratic age, is still the only working solution to 
succeed in the poorest areas. Local management does 
not resolve the long-term dilemmas of public housing but 
it offers one remedy - so far the only proven remedy - to 
many of the problems of large estates. The future of 
one and a half million council dwellings. - of nearly five 
million people - is in jeopardy. 4 
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Abandoned back gardens were common on cottage estates 
where fencing had disappeared. 
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2. Where fencing was reinstated, pride was restored. 
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3. Derelict, empty houses had front walls removed and roofs 
in serious disrepair. Some houses had been restored 
for 
letting and ransacked more than once. 
/ 
4. Houses and front walls were restored and dwellings re-let 
after the opening of a full-time management office. 
5. A cottage estate in the north-west had poorly designed 
and unmaintained communal play areas that fell into 
decay within a few years of being built. There was no 
6. A near-empty block of pre-war tenement flats in Liverpool 
that the council planned to demolish until a builder 
bought them, renovated them and sold them to individual 
owner-occupiers. 
7. The Rhondda valleys have continuous terraced housing along the valley bottoms. 
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"Italianite" architecture offers mono-pitch roofs that 
occasionally lift off in high winds. There are over 400 areas of communal land wedged between tiny gardens 
on this estate. 
concrete estate was built in the late sixties on the 
ridge between two valleys. A reclaimed slag heap is 
in the distance. 
10. A large but decayed northern cottage estate suffers 
from wall-tie failure and is under threat of demolition. 
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11. The same city boasts the largest industrailly-built 
estate in Europe. Wind tunnels are so powerful that it 
is sometimes impossible to round the corners of upper 
floor decks. 
12. A thousand flats and maisonettes were built on stilts 
and linked above ground with decks and "podiums". 
13. These "gigantesque" tower blocks have dark internal 
corridors. Frequent lift failure in one of these blocks 
meant that old people were sometimes marooned. One old 
lady took two hours to reach the sixteenth floor on foot. 
Luckily the local estate officer carried her shopping. 
Fortunately this style of tower block was very uncommon. 
14. These blocks on a large estate with long decks and 
linking bridges were blighted, then emptied and 
demolished. 
15. An L. C. C. balcony block estate that was stigmatised by 
shared bathrooms and low rents. First World War 
stretchers were used to make the fencing. 
ib. This northern estate, straddling a dual carriageway, was 
never fully occupied. It is now managed through a local 
office. This estate has a high proportion of children 
because of its large dwellings. 
i 
i 
17. This estate is a quarter empty and has bricked-up, 
bed-sitter flats and protruding bedrooms. The 
entry phones were wrongly installed and have never 
worked. 
-A 
balcony block estate. 
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19. Windows were smashed to communal drying rooms on every floor of the same estate. 
18. Garages were abandoned and vandalised on an ex-G. L. C. 
20. A tenant exerts control over his balcony. 
i 
40 
21. Front entrances to a 1950's estate in Hackney. 
22. Private gardens in front of the blocks transform the 
communal areas. 
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23. An unwanted site scars the landscape after the 
demolition of surplus 4-storey maisonettes in 
Merseyside. 
24. A close-up of some surplus maisonettes. 
25. A number of councils are "lopping off" upper floors 
of blocks, and putting on pitched roofs, making the 
lower floors into attractive and popular houses. This expensive solution avoids some of the scars of 
total demolition and is cheaper than new terraced 
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26. These entrances to private dwellings are frightening 
on decks in Lambeth. 
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27. Cavernous underground garages are virtually unused on 
this estate in South London. It is proposed to fill 
the whole area in with concrete and landscape above. 
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28. All 50 communal entrances on this estate in South Wales 
have fallen into disrepair. Stray dogs compound the 
ubiquitous litter problems of unguarded communal areas. 
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29. A porter's lodge inside the entrance to a tower block, 
manned for 18 hours a day, has more than paid for itself 
by eliminating vandalism and bringing about full lettings. 
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30. Many blocks were joined by overhead bridges on this 
difficult-to-manage estate in Brent. 
31. Walkways were blocked off in an attempt to control 
crime. Walkway closure groups were organised among 
residents and enclosed groups of flats and corridors 
were upgraded. 
32. The contours of a 
softened by tree 
front gardens. 
and protected the 
large tower block estate were 
planting and providing individual 
Residents were directly involved 
trees. 
e 
33. The Broadwater Farm Neighbourhood Office with the 
resident superintendent of caretakers and one of 
the housing managers. A team of over 20 mans the 
1,000 flats and maisonettes. 
4 
34. Mrs. Dolly Kiffin, 
the Broadwater Farm 
in turning the tide 
in London. 
the tenants' leader 
Youth Association, 
on one of the most 
and founder of 
was instrumental 
difficult estates 
35. Tenants on a training visit to London learn about the 
Tenant Board on the Wenlock Barn Estate in Hackney. 
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36. Tenants work hard to learn the ropes of local estate 
management. 
37. Cloverhall Tenant Management Co-operative visits the 
HDlbrook Co-op, Islington, for a training session. 
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